CLANNISM AND ESCALATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS
IN SOMALIA

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Masters in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

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DECLARATION A

"This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented to any University or Institution of High Learning for a degree or any other Academic Award".

[Signature]

Name and Signature of candidate
DECLARATION B

"I conform that the work reported in this Thesis is carried out by the candidate under our supervision".

Name and Signature of Supervisor

06.07.2012

Date
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my beloved family and my dearest parents. The family put up with my stay away from home in order to pursue my degree. They dearly missed my presence. They have been the motivation for my hard work to ensure timely completion of this course. My dear parents provided me with the education foundation which I take pride in today. Thank you all.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

All praise is to Allah the Almighty. His Will is be and it is. This work is a complete illustration of his blessings to me.

I am sincerely indebted to my Supervisor Dr. Abuga Mokono Isaac, whose intellectual guidance led to the successful completion of this work. To my Lecturers, I walk away from this program with my head high; the knowledge imparted in me is going to change lives into a better world tomorrow.

My sincere gratitude to my parents, family and friends whose dedicated commitment to encouraging me to complete this report, can never be underestimated.

To my Research Assistants and Data Analyst, your sincerity and reliability can never be matched. Thank you.
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<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>SDM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TNG</td>
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ABSTRACT

This study sought to investigate the extent to which clannism has contributed the escalation of armed conflicts in Somalia. The focused on three specific objectives aiming at investigating the existence of clannism in Somalia, finding out the role of clan based rebellion against Barre's regime on escalating inter-clan and intra clan armed conflicts and examining the role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts. The study adopted a descriptive and it achieved a response rate of 78.9% of the targeted 133 respondents. Stratified random sampling and purposive sampling techniques were used in selection of the study sample. The data was processed and analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Scientists software version II. The findings reveal clannism is highly existent in Somalia and is an integral part of society. It was established that the clan system is not the basis for conflicts rather; their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions and conflicts. The study also established that Clan-based rebellion in Somalia fell apart after its success to overthrow the regime because of the clash of interests of the clans. However, the study refuted the assertion that the clan based rebellion involved defining the ruling clans in general terms as enemies to be defeated and cleansed since some clans preferred to affiliate with such ruling clans. The study concludes that the clan system is fully established in Somalia and without the manipulative tendencies of clan leaders with vested interests, the clan systems can deliver peaceful ending to armed conflict in Somalia and ensure reconciliation amongst the warring conflicting clans. This study recommends that is need to change the attitudes of the clan leaders that they should give peace a chance to prevail in Somalia. Besides, integration of peace and reconciliation tenets in the Somali education system would sow seeds of peaceful resolution of armed conflicts amongst the Somali clan systems. The study also recommends possible further studies to be undertaken in areas like; whether the plurality of clans in Somalia presents the country with development opportunities vis a vis the challenges posed by clannism; the role on international players in the escalation of armed conflict in Somalia among others.
CHAPTER ONE

PROBLEM AND ITS SCOPE

Introduction
This chapter specifically covers the background to the study, the purpose of the study, the objectives, research questions, the scope and significance of the study and indicated below:

Background of the Study
According to Huffman (2009), Identity plays a fundamental role in conflicts, as it is elemental to how individuals see and understand themselves in conflicts. Identities distinguish between who is “us” and who is “them,” mobilizing individuals and collectives, and providing legitimacy and justification for individual and group desires. Identities are themselves created and transformed in processes of social struggle. Understanding how identities impact conflict and conflict processes, and the ways they are constructed within conflicts, informs us about the emergence, escalation, and probable transformation of social conflicts (Huffman, 2009).

Taking into consideration the anatomy of the Somali conflict, many factors have played a part in Somalia’s fall into a long-lasting warfare and violence. According to Menkhaus & Ortmayer (2000), clannism is a fundamental ingredient in the Somali conflict as the clan identity constitutes one of the most resilient features of Somali society. The clan identity and family lineage serves as the basis for Somali personal identity (Mulligan, 2009). Like all ethnic identities, clan identity in Somalia can be mobilized or demobilized by enterprising political elites; it can be exceptionally divisive and destructive;
and it has the capacity to be highly flexible, fluid, and even inventive (Menkhaus, 2000).

As Mulligan (2009) argues, Somali clan system makes a “national” genealogy, which is an ethnic family tree divided through paternal descent (in the male line) with each clan named after the founding ancestors of the group. According to the World Bank (2005), in the peace processes (both in Art, Djibouti and Mbagathi, Kenya), four major clan families Darood, Hawiye, Digil-Mirifle, and Dir, along with minorities (Bantu, Barawans, and Bajuni), are considered to represent Somalia (WorldBank, 2005).

As a pastoral society, Somalis rely heavily upon the clan system in order to implement social order and conduct general governance. This reliance on clanship varies with the availability of alternative sources for such security, support, and identity. The growth and reliance upon clannism in Somalia since the beginning of the Somali civil war has been exponential as the clan frequently has served as sole source of security within the community (Mulligan, 2009).

According to Korostelina (2009), Social identities, such as (ethnic, national, religious, regional), have existed for centuries, yet have only from time to time resulted in conflict. The author argues that social identities themselves do not arise as a result of conflict between groups, but do have the potential to become more salient and mobilized. As a matter of fact, Social identities never cause or initiate conflict and should be understood neither as sources nor as consequences of conflict, but as a form of consciousness that entirely changes the dynamic and structure of conflict. Once social identity becomes involved in interest-based or instrumental conflict, it then changes the nature of political or economic conflict in particular ways, making conflict protracted and deep-rooted (Huffman, 2009).
In the context of Somalia where clan is a strong social identity, this does not imply that clans are naturally conflictual but to a certain extent, this identity can be manipulated with determination to acquire control over resources and power. Warlords and divisive leaders put emphasis on the differences among clans as a tool to mobilize clan members. In this way, clan and sub-clan differences turn into real identity differences which can be a force for division and fragmentation, particularly when manipulated for political purposes (World Bank, 2005).

While the conflict in Somalia cannot be reduced to a simple clan formula, other factors also helped shape and complicate the prototype of the conflict. However, clannism came to take on a dynamic role of its own independent as the political leaders were aspired to manipulate it for their own benefit. This dissertation which is under the topic of Clannism and Escalation of Armed Conflicts in Somalia will focus on three specific objectives aiming at investigating the existence of clannism in Somalia, finding out the role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts and examining the role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts.

**Problem Statement**
Since Somalis are split up into many clans and sub-clans, clan is the most important social identity in Somalia and, thus, clan membership continues to play an important part in Somali culture and politics. As a clan-based society, this does not necessarily mean that clans are essentially conflictual but that rather they can be manipulated purposefully to get hold of resources and power.
Numerous underlying factors have contributed to Somalia's protracted conflicts. The legacy of these factors continues to influence the current political and economic dynamics in the country. Somali intellectuals put the blame of the Somali conflict on clannism. But the debate is that Clannism as its strong contemporary manifestation in Somalia is poorly understood which leads some of the national and foreign observers to attribute all of Somalia's misery to clannism even though there are others factors denying its relevance.

In this sense, apart from clannism, there are other factors such as Poverty, Underdevelopment, Corruption, Repression of Barre's Regime and Cold War politics. These factors had never been put under critical debates as much as clannism was put. Consequently, out of many possible factors, clannism seems to be considered as the root cause of the conflict in Somalia to many Somali and non-Somali intellectuals. Therefore, the researcher anticipates that clannism as favouritism in political decision making and public resource distribution has a bearing on the escalation of armed conflicts in Somalia. It is therefore necessary to examine the clannism related factors that led the escalation of armed conflicts in Somalia.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent to which clan favouritism in political decision-making and public resource allocation have contributed the escalation of armed conflicts in Somalia.

Research Objectives
i. To investigate the existence of clannism in Somalia

ii. To find out the role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia

iii. To examine the role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts

Research Questions
i. Does clannism exist in Somalia at a level that can escalate armed conflicts?

ii. What role did clan-based rebellion or insurgency against Barre’s regime play on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia?

iii. What role does clan-based politics and power sharing play on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts?

Hypothesis
1. Clannism has no bearing on the escalation of armed conflict in Somalia.
Scope of the study

Geographically: the study was carried out in the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu whereby a large number of the south-central clans who witnessed the catastrophic conflicts are available, the North Western and North Eastern parts of the country namely Somaliland and Puntland respectively.

Content Scope: this study covered only issue related to clan favouritism in political decision-making and public resource allocation that contributed the escalation of armed conflicts in Somalia. The researcher also identified the impact of clan favouritism in such a way that it has contributed the escalation of armed conflicts which led the current inhumane conditions in Somalia.

Time Scope: The period which the study covered was from 1988 to 2005; this is because, the majority of the clan based conflicts occurred in that period. After 2005, the country went deep into ideology-based conflicts with strong foreign influences.

Significance of the Study

This study will be used by the government of Somalia in understanding the influence clans have on the day to day livelihood activities of an ordinary Somali national.

The government, the warlords and the international community interested in conflict resolution and restoration of peace in Somalia shall use this study to give them insights into the clannism factor in the social, political and economic conflicts which often escalate into armed conflict in Somalia.
The international community will appreciate the differences in the degree of importance attached to clans. In Somalia, a clan is not only a unit of identification but has much influence to even determine the political dispensation in a country as the case is in Somalia.
Operational Definitions of Key Terms

Clannism is defined in this study as clan-based favouritism in national political decision-making and public resource allocation.

Conflict Escalation
Conflict escalation is defined in this study as the flare-up or eruption of a destructive, confrontational and bloody conflict.

Armed Conflict
Primarily International humanitarian law distinguishes two types of armed conflicts, namely: International armed conflicts, opposing two or more States, and Non-international armed conflicts, between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups, or between such groups only. There is a third armed conflict recognized by international humanitarian law which is a new phenomenon known as 'an internationalized armed conflict'. It occurs between two different factions fighting internally but supported by two different states (Chelimo, 2011). However, in this study, armed conflict is defined as a war between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups such as rebels.
Conceptual Frame work

Independent Variables Extraneous Variables

Clannism
- Favoritism
- Nepotism
- Political
- Clientelism
- Patrimonialism

Dependent Variable
- Rise of insurgency
- Civil war
- Mass atrocity
- State collapse

Escalation of Armed Conflict
- Dictatorship
- Under-development
- Poverty
- Cold war
- Foreign

Figure 1: Source: Constructed By the Researcher

Figure 1 displays how the independent, dependent and intervening variables in the study are affecting one another. This conceptual framework tells us how these variables interrelate to each other and can be affected while the IV mostly talks about the major clannism-related factors that can escalate an armed conflict.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter covers the honoured efforts of scholars who extensively wrote about the issues of identity in relation to how it can escalate armed conflicts among the communities. The chapter deals with the analysis of the literature related to the study with the objective of bearing in mind the concepts, ideas and opinions of scholars. The review of literature will be guided by the objectives of the study stated in the first chapter.

Theoretical Perspectives

The choice to start an armed conflict is a complex one. Smith (2004) argues that developing theoretical explanations for the causes of armed conflict involves the analysis of multiple and interactive variables. He noted that most of researches conducted before 1990 were focusing on the causes of armed conflicts at international level. However, the relative importance of focusing on the causes of internal or civil conflicts has only been generally acknowledged since the end of the Cold War. The research on internal conflicts particularly focuses on ethnic, environmental, political and economic factors that escalate internal conflicts (Smith, 2004).

According to (Smith, 2004) relative deprivation theory presents a clarification based on the contrast between groups' expected and actual access to prosperity and power. This approach is closely related to group entitlement theory of Horowitz 1985, which places more explicit emphasis on ethnic factors which accompany the economic and political factors. On the other
hand, ethnic diversity does not necessarily leads or causes to a war. Otherwise, the majority of war-prone states would have been the most ethnically diverse states which is in fact not the case (Smith, 2004). In reality, Smith (2004), argues that ethnic and religious diversity may even reduce the risk of violent conflict as the divergent groups learn the skills of living together despite their intrinsic diversity. The tragedy of conflict will only arise when the learning process fails, therefore, ethnic diversity may turn out to aggravate conflicts as it offers a fertile material for political mobilisation (Smith, 2004).

Davenport, Armstrong II & Lichbach (2005) present three alternatives for the conflict escalation argument. The “inflammation” hypothesis (derived from the “Grievance” proposition), the “incapacity” hypothesis (derived from the “Greed” argument) and the “ineffectiveness” hypothesis (derived from the “Insurgency” argument):

The first one, the “inflammation” hypothesis proposes that a civil war emerges when state repression or subjugation prompts dissidents to increase their rebellious efforts. Here, prior repressive activity infuriates or enrages citizens who subsequently increase rebellious behavior to the level of civil war.

The second one, “incapacity” hypothesis proposes that a large-scale conflagration emerges when political authorities are unable to apply significant levels of state repression. In this case, repressive behavior of the political authority is initially low, challengers recognize a weakness in state coercive power and in this context, rebels increase their rebellious efforts to civil war.
The third one, the "ineffectiveness" hypothesis proposes that a large-scale conflagration emerges when governments apply coercion and dissidents simply outlast or outfight states. Here, repressive behavior is initially high, subsequent dissident activity is high, challengers perceive a weakness in state coercive power (despite sustaining costs), and in this context those in opposition to authority increase their rebellious efforts, resulting in civil war.

**Related Studies**

This portion discussed past empirical investigations similar to or related to the present study.

**Understanding the Concept of Clan**

According to Collins (2004), Clan is defined as "an informal organization which in general comprises a network of individuals related or linked by kin-based bonds. Affective ties of kinship are its essence, constituting the identity and bonds of its organization. These bonds are both vertical and horizontal, linking elites and non-elites, and they reflect both actual blood ties and fictive kinship" (Collins, , 2004).

According to Kreuzer (2005), clans are are basically social organisations which can be active in the political sphere in the interest of their members, led by leaders traditionally legitimised usually through age and genealogical status (Kreuzer, 2005). Furthermore, clans are organic, tightly knit kin-based organizations, which persisted from pre-modern times and pre-existed any given political regime due to their adaptivity and capacity to resist (Sokirianskaia, 2009).
Collins (2006), explains that “clan makes up the identity and social universe of its members” that it possess an inherent meaning, and legitimacy and cannot simply change its social constituency. Clan is a hierarchical structure, “any particular clan network includes both elites and non-elites or masses” (Sokirianskaia, 2009).

**Clan Versus Tribe**

A clan is a collection of people united by real or perceived kinship and ancestry. Clan members are organized around a founding ancestor. According to Sjoberg (2009), clan is a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds. The clan shares a "stipulated" common ancestor that is a symbol of the clan's unity (Wikipedia, 2011).

Clans can be described as tribes or sub-groups of tribes. The word clan is derived from 'clann' meaning 'family' in the Irish and Scottish Gaelic languages. The word was taken into English about 1425 as a label for the tribal nature of Irish and Scottish Gaelic society. In different cultures and situations, a clan may mean the same thing as other kin-based groups, such as tribes and bands. Often, the distinguishing factor is that a clan is a smaller part of a larger society such as a tribe, a chiefdom, or a state which exist as kin groups within their respective nations (Wikipedia, 2011). On the other hand, according to the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, the term tribe usually denotes a social group bound together by kin and duty and associated with a particular territory. Members of the tribe share the social cohesion associated with the family, together with the sense of political autonomy of a nation. In this sense, Sjoberg (2009), argues that the discourse on kinship, “tribes” and “clans” is a heavily contested one in the social sciences. On the other hand, anthropology has developed a critical
perspective on these same concepts in the later half of the 20th century (Sjoberg, 2009).

In this study the concept of “clan” is used instead of “tribe” for the reason that we are referring to the literature on “clan-based political conflict and civil wars in Somalia. Arguably the concept of “clan” is a loaded term in English and its Somali forms (Beel) and it is not the aim here to provide a thorough critique of the concept’s use in social science literature. Suffice to note that the term is widely used and by using it here is indicated the literature that we are directly engaged with (Ioan M. Lewis, Laitin, David D. & Samatar, Said S. & etc.).

Therefore, we define “clan” narrowly in order to avoid confusion with other informal phenomena like clientelism, regionalism or organized criminal organizations (mafias) as an informal organization comprising a group of individuals linked by kin-based bonds, either real or imagined (Sjoberg, 2009). Kreuzer (2005), emphasizes that clans and clan rule should not be associated together with clientelism, patronage, corruption, mafia structures or similar. These may find links in a polity characterised by clans, but they are not inevitably related to clan rule, nor are they not present in other political forms of order and rule.

**Clan Identity in Somalia**

Clan is an important social unit in which its membership plays a vital role in Somali culture and politics. The nature of somali clans are patrilineal and are often divided into sub-clans, at times with many sub-divisions (Wikipedia, 2011). Due to the division of the clan into a number of subclans and even the sub-subclans into sub-sub-subclans, Gettleman (2007), argues that the term clan is freely used for large family networks, like the Hawiye, and smaller ones, like the Ayr a sub-sub-clan of Hawiye.
Clans make the solid rock of Somali identity. A good example is what Gettleman (2007) saw in Mogadishu when Yusuf Mohammed Ali, a respected figure among the Suleiman clan said: "Out there, you needed to belong to someone". This statement is a good indication that clans provide identity, satisfy the need of belonging and acceptance as indicated in the Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Accordingly, they function as a safety net, a social network, a justice system and, most importantly, protection (Gettleman, 2007). Similarly, Moore (2007), presents a very relevant and clear-cut example that Muhammad Farah Aidid, a well known Somali politician writes: "the very fact that this social structure – clans- has been continuing for thousands of years without much change despite colonial rule and an oppressive military regime under Siad Barre shows its strength, utility, and capability to solve the various problems and exigencies of their difficult life" (Moore, 2007).

An inclusive chart of the Somali clans and sub-clans is difficult to find as the presentation of their structures varies and is often disputed. However, most of the literature written on this matter conclude that there are two major clan groups, Saab (Sab) and Samaal (Samale) whose descendants formed six clan families, namely the Darod, Dir, Isaq and Hawiye, Digil and Rahanwein (Rinehard, 2011). But in the peace processes both in Arta, Republic of Djibouti 2000 and Mbagathi, Republic of Kenya 2002-2004, however, the four major clan families were considered to represent Somalia Darood, Hawiye, Digil-Rahanweyn, and Dir (within which the Issa is included), along with minorities Bantu, Barawans, and Bajuni (WorldBank, 2005).
Nature of Clan Structure in Somalia

As previously discussed, the clan-system is the most important social factor among Somalis and in particular the nomadic-pastoralist Somalis. This lineage-based system can be distinguished into categories of clan-family, clan, sub-clan, primary lineage and mag-paying group as these divisions have a varying size (Gundel, 2009).

Gundel (2006), defines the clan-family as generally the upper limit of clanship. He argues that the genealogical length of a clan family is not fixed and can count up to 30 generations up to a common ancestor. Furthermore, Gundel (2006), presents that Somalis being comprising of nomadic-pastoralists and sedentary agro-pastoralist people, with minority groups of ethnic Bantu descent, as well as of Arabic descent, such as the Bajunis and Barawanis, the lineages of the pastoral Somalis are united by a common, mythological forefather called Samaal and the lineages of the sedentary agro-pastoral Somalis stem from the forefather Saab. Gundel (2006) presents that the sedentary agro-pastoral Somalis claim to be Somalis via mythical descent to the Qurayshi which is similar to the mythological perception of the nomadic pastoral Somalis who claim that they also descend from the household of the prophet Mohammed, notably the Qurayshi clan.

Within the Somali context, Gundel (2006), defines the Clan often to be 20 generations that can act as a corporate political unit, and do tend to have some territorial exclusiveness, following their regular seasonal movements for pasture and semi-permanent settlements. As mentioned above, clan-members derive their identity from the clan, and in addition, it is the upper limit of political action which happens to have territorial properties, and is often led by a clan-head, in a decentralized form of administration (Gundel, 2006). Gundel (2006) identifies the 'primary lineage' as the most distinct descent group within the clan which is defined as the lineage to which a
person describes himself as a member (most often between 6 and 10 generations).

Finally, Gundel (2006) presents a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the category of mag-paying or diya-paying group in which he specifies it as the most basic and functional lineage unit. An English translation of Diya is that it is an Arabic word literally meaning blood-compensation, while the word Mag is the Somali word meaning for blood-debts or blood-compensation. The Mag-paying group is the most important level of social organisation for each individual. Gundel (2006), defines it as a small corporate group of a few lineages who reckon descent to a common ancestor some 4 to 8 generations, and is sufficiently large in numbers (few hundred to a few thousand men) to be able to pay the Mag (Gundel, 2006).

![Clan Family Diagram](image)

Figure 2: Source: Gundel, "The predicament of the 'Oday'", 2006

Clan Identity and Conflict

Many scholars argue that political instability and power struggles in Somalia can be best explained as conflicts between different clans within Somali
society, struggling for the access to power and scarce resources. However, the argument on the subject of whether clan identity actually plays a significant role in political conflict still continues. But the fact is that Somali experience makes obvious that clan is a double-edged sword which can closely link Somalis and tears them apart (WorldBank, 2005). Almost all the armed conflicts that ravaged modern Somalia broke out along clan lines. However, this does not suggest that clans are naturally conflict based sort of identities but that rather clan identities can be manipulated decisively by divisive leaders in order to get control over resources and power. This notion is strongly associated with what the Instrumentalists argue that divisive leaders deliberately encourage groups to focus on the “us versus them” syndrome to stress distinctiveness of identity (with regards to a distinguishing feature), and create a strong sense of unity in a group vis-à-vis another (WorldBank, 2005).

According to the Instrumentalists argument, Somali Warlords are instrumental in invoking loyalty to raise or lower the level of identity from clan to sub clan and sub-sub clan and back again. Therefore, clan identities are used as a tool to mobilize clan members when in conflict, and cleavages are drawn upon to wage war. In this way, the World Bank Report (2005) demonstrates that clan and sub clan differences can be a force for division and fragmentation, particularly when manipulated for political purposes.

The essence of the discussion presented above is that clan-affiliations are strong within the Somali society. Wolters (2007) presents a relevant fact from Central Asia. He argues that being a member of a certain clan binds that person to special rules of reciprocity in the course of contact with other members of his/her kinship group. As a result, he presents that the players in political struggles prefer their kinsmen as allies, because such a preference is distinguished by lower transaction costs (and vice-versa: 18
refusal of this kind of preference can significantly increase the transaction costs of alternative exchange processes) (Wolters, 2007).

In the context of the Somali society, the World Bank' Report (2005), explains that members of the Somali clans or sub clans have the tendency of providing support to their leaders for the sake of the success of their clan or sub clan. In addition to that, strong clans and sub clans provide protection against external attacks and support themselves, compared to the weak clans and sub clans who cannot provide the same level of benefits to their members (World Bank, 2005).

Social Life and Clan Affiliation of the Somali Society
Clan system plays an important role in the social life of Somali nation. Clans provide protection and support during periods of crises. Clan leaders are a source of prevention and conflict management within the society. Indeed, clan system is a moderating force used to bring about peace, reconciliation and cooperation. There is a rich and deep relationship shared by the Somali clans. For example, Inter-clan marriages, cross-clan businesses, social interactions and religious congregations among clans are very strong and demonstrate a different scenario of the clans’ engagement in political life. Members from different clans work together in harmony to promote health, education, peace and human rights. In fact such interactions and partnerships are on the rise, and play an important role in increasing the potential for peace and weakening the destructive aspects of clans (World Bank, 2005).
Understanding the Nature of Clan Protection

Somali Clans provide protection for their members from any aggression from other clans. There is a Somali proverb which runs: Ama Buur Ahaw Ama Buur Ku Tirso ("Either be a mountain or attach yourself to one"), signifying that if you are not a big, strong clan, you attach yourself to a strong clan (Gundel, 2009). It is common in the Somali tradition that weak clans seek protection from the stronger clans by entering contract with them. Such agreements are known as Gaashaanbuur, meaning "pile of shields". There exist varying degrees of adoption and incorporation within stronger lineages. These range in degree of dependent status with associated inferiority from neighbour (deris), appendage (saar - parasitic creepers), followers (soor raac), to pretenders (Sheegad - those who claim to be what they are not.) In the case of sheegad, the weak group may assume the lineage affiliation of its protectors and may claim a common agnatic origin (Gundel, 2009). A good example of protection is the 'Mukulal Madow' (black cat) phenomenon of protection which means that they are no longer targeted with impunity as for instance the 'Jareer' groups still are. The 'Mukulal Madow' phenomenon refers to the cases where for instance 'Rer Hamar' households have established relations with strong 'noble' clans, especially Hawiye Abgal and Habr Gedir, through marriage. This means that Rer Hamar households whose daughter(s) are married to strong clans now enjoy a level of protection from these clans.

Clannism and Escalation of Armed Conflicts

The clan system of Somali society has both escalating and de-escalating forces of armed conflicts. We have mentioned that if the clan identity is manipulated for the purpose of getting access for power and resources, it will turn into a potential factor for destabilization and serves as a conflict
The civil war in Somalia developed gradually right from the inception of Somali state. The root causes can be a combination of several factors arising from local and international levels. Despite the fact that there was extreme frustration over basic human needs, there were also other factors such as dictatorship, ineffective economic policies, extreme poverty, loss of state authority; politicisation of the national army, and coups and counter coups d’état which finally led the escalation of the civil war. Consequently, the difficult living conditions that spread across the country became an incentive for so many Somali young men to join the rising rebellion against the government which eventually turned into the adoption of a culture of violence and crime as strategies for ensuring livelihood (Ssereko, 2003).

By definition we mean “Clannism” (or “clanism”) as it refers to favouritism in political decision-making and public resource allocation, in particular. The military regime under President Barre (1969-1991) was a military-based, one party Marxist-Leninist system marked by constant repression of opposition, clannism, corruption and economic mismanagement (Amnesty, 2005). According to Menkhaus (2003), the government of Siyad Barre (1969-1990) exploited clan identity in to divide-and-rule policy. The regime is widely blamed for the rise of the destructive clannism which has afflicted Somalia since 1990 and which has made reconciliation and cooperation much more difficult to achieve.

Moore (2007) argues that the regime of Siyad Barre can be divided into two phases. From 1969-1978, the regime endorsed Somali nationalism and was getting support from the Soviet Union in order to enhance the social, economic and military conditions of the country. In 1977, Somalia and Ethiopia fought over the Ogaden region in the eastern part of Ethiopia which created a lot of disputes between Somalis and their Eastern Bloc allies.
However, after the defeat of Somalis in that War, the regime entered into the second face and its policies from 1979-1991 changed substantially into that of an obsessed dictatorship.

In order to promote nationalism and people’s total allegiance to their Somali identity, the military regime began a campaign against tribalism called *Olool*. The campaign was a nationwide endeavour to battle corruption and revive Pan-Somalism and national unity. Although the attempts to strengthen Somali unity in their early stages were reasonable, many of the policies were oppressive to traditional clan system. According to Moore (2007), the regime’s policy towards ending tribalism were oppressive methods to bring about nationalism as they were suppressing many of the traditional clan activities. For instance, the traditional diya or blood compensation system that existed for centuries was forbidden and replaced by a new state controlled death penalty. The regime changed the traditional greeting of “*[ina aleeer]* meaning cousin in English and replaced by *[jaalle]* which means “friend” with the intention of minimizing the kinship connotations that these words give. Finally, civilian or military personnel took over leadership positions that clan leaders once held and *(Guddi)*-traditional council were ignored as decision making bodies. The penalties for violating these laws were brutal and severe ranging from fines, imprisonment, to death. This harsh penalties lead that many clan based activities were subdued in the 1970s (Moore, 2007).

Besides strengthening the cause of nationalism, the regime was also in pursuit of realizing the vision of *[Somaaliweyn]* which means Greater Somalia aiming at the unification of all Somali inhabited territories under Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. In fact the Somali national flag has a five pointed star on it clearly indicating that various places that Somalis live. Two points are for the British and Italian Somaliland who had now united as one
immediately after their got independence and the other three points represent Somali claims to Djibouti, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, and the northeast corner of Kenya (Moore, 2007).

Somalia under Barre’s regime paid every possible price to ensure that this dream would be achieved. The intense desire for creating Greater Somalia and Barre’s confidence in his army backed by the Soviet military assistance led him to support a rebel group called Western Somali Liberation Front WSLF with resources and, as the conflict progressed into 1978, eventually, the regime of Barre declared a total war on Ethiopia. The Soviet Union was supporting both countries Ethiopia and Somalia and refused to choose one side and started pressing the Somalis to withdraw its support of the WSLF (Moore, 2007). Even though the Barre’s regime tried to convince the Soviets to support him against the Ethiopians, however the Soviets did not need the Somalis and when they refused to live in peace with Ethiopia which was a communist country. Therefore the Soviets did not feel any pressure to stand beside Somalia. As a result, Somalia officially cut off its diplomatic relations with the Soviets alleging that they betrayed Somali state and violated the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the of July 1974. Somalia expelled Soviet personnel and immediately began to look for other alliances for economic assistance; however, it was unsuccessful as the United States did not have interest in supporting a country that had just invaded its immediate neighbor. Similarly African countries did not have interest in assisting Somalia and accused it of violating the Charter of the OAU. The Soviet Union switched from Somalia and extended a military aid to Ethiopia. The amount of aid granted to the Ethiopians was enough to enable them to defeat the Somali army and by March 1978 the Somali army was defeated and war was coming to an end in favor of the Ethiopians (Moore, 2007).
The defeat of Somali army in the Ogaden war marked the beginning of Somali state collapse due to the political and economic consequences of the war. The country fell into political and severe economic crisis. Moore (2007) says that Siyad Barre had successfully inspired enough nationalist enthusiasm to create “Greater Somalia;” however, the regime’s failure in that war moved away the regime’s vision for nationalism. Somali people became less and less fascinated by Barre’s nationalism and became to a greater extent very skeptical of the regime’s ability to remain in power. However, the military regime was aware of the fact that its policies were failing due to the growing opposition from the country. The regime resorted to maintain power by suppressing the oppositions.

With the death of the vision of Greater Somalia, the regime’s endeavor for nationalism also diminished. Due to the loss of the people’s support, the military regime entered the second phase of using oppression and clannism. The clannism that had been in the past a punishable crime, the regime now opted to use in order to control the people. As a result, the regime escalated inter-clan conflicts to keep the various clans distracted from the regime’s failed policies. Furthermore, the regime turned to oppress all clans that seemed to be opponents. The regime relied upon some of the Somali clans and handed in most of the key governmental positions to them to guarantee the regime’s power. Such reliance on certain clans and favouring them then others, triggered deep hostility that ignited the recreation of clan based political parties. Clans created armed opposition parties to defend themselves from the regime. The government became fighting bloody war against its own civilians. Clan-based opposition parties created bases throughout the country and begun to occupy various parts of Somalia (Moore, 2007).
The Rise of Clan Based Rebellion in Somalia

Reno (2002) argues that marginalization from power provide insurgents with justifications to develop coherent organizational and ideological challenges to the authorities. By definition, rebellion is a violent struggle that threatens to seize power through violence and fighting (Heleta, 2008). A rebellion can become a revolution if the rebels succeed in overthrowing the ruling regime and substantially changing the system (Heleta, 2008). According to Heleta (2008), rebels arise when a government fails to fulfill the essential requirements to its citizens, so that the doors are open for a mass upheaval and rebellion by the marginalized groups within the society. Heleta (2008) also notes that a widely shared sense of grievance among people is a necessary condition in a rebellion. He argues that four preconditions may lead to a mass unrest, rebellion, or revolution:

- A widespread sense of disappointment with the conditions of life (relative deprivation);
- Focusing the feelings of disappointment upon political institutions; vacillation, incompetence, and incoherence of political leadership through resistance to reform or through injudicious use of force;
- Combination of economic and political feelings of deprivation with the acceptance of
- A myth or ideology of change.

Therefore, Ogundiya (2010) notes that “a rebellion is construed as any armed violence conducted by the military, paramilitary and/or civilian population directed at an established state or authority, whether legitimate or illegitimate, in order to redress real and/or imagined injustices, pursue personal or group ambitions or in extreme cases designed to depose the
incumbent and establish a new government or state or both”. Rebellion and Insurgency are considered as a form of armed rebellion in this study. An insurgency can be defined as an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (Ogundiya, 2010).

Numbers of theoretical thinking have emerged. These include theories that focus on the political context in which rebellion arise were developed. For instance, the political opportunity theory assumes that grievances are inherent and that it is not variation in individuals’ actual position, or status, that influences their decision to engage in unconventional politics, but rather the availability to affect conventional means of participation. If effective conventional means of influencing the government are available, individuals will choose them over the higher risk, higher cost non-conventional methods of participation. Therefore, the theory suggests that the more democratic a country is, the less rebellion there will be. This means that rebellion is a high cost option in both highly repressive regimes, where its consequences are most severe and success least likely, and in the least repressive regimes, where alternative means of influencing the government make rebellion a less appealing option. (Morrison, 2003).

Another theory is theory of Relative deprivation which suggests that it is a group’s perception of discrepancy between its value expectations and its value capabilities.” Therefore, it is the difference between what a group believes it should receive and what it believes it will receive. The theory simply states that those who are the most deprived or frustrated, are the most likely to participate in political conflicts (Ogundiya, 2010).

According to Ogundiya (2010), there are seven broad typologies of for armed rebellion in Africa:

1. Ethnic competition for control of the state;
2. Regional or secessionist rebellions;

3. Continuation of liberation conflicts;

4. Fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority;

5. Warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse;

6. Border disputes; and

7. Protracted conflict within politicised militaries.

Referring these theories to the case of Somalia, in the 1980s, after years of rampant corruption and repression, Somalia fell down into political and socio-economic crisis. Well before the state collapse, the economy was weak and poor with malnutrition and starvation spreading all over the country. In the 1980s, the country had one of the lowest per capita caloric intakes in the world (Leeson, 2006). At the end of the decade the government spent less than one percent of GDP on economic and social services, while military and administration consumed 90 percent of the state’s total recurrent expenditures (Leeson, 2006). Worse than what we have mentioned, the regime was alternatively using state resources to give privileged clans at the expense of the disadvantaged clans. For instance, the regime awarded certain client groups preferential access to arable land and water. The regime’s “clan favoritism” created tension between Somali clans. In the late 1980s marginalized clans reacted armed groups on clan basis. For instance, the Somali Patriotic Movement SDM (comprised largely of Ogaden Clan), the Somali National Movement SNM (comprised largely of Isaaq Clan) and the United Somali Congress USC (comprised largely of Hawiye Clans). All these armed factions were united against Barre and wanted to oust him from the power (Leeson, 2006).
Apart from the grievance held by the deprived clans, the other reasons why so many clan-based armed groups were able to form and attempt to gain power was due to the mass amount small arms and light weapons that had been flowing into Somalia (Moore, 2007). The clan based rebellion stationed throughout the country and begun to control various regions in Somalia. However each clan was earnestly targetting Barre as a common threat without having a clear-cut plan to be implemented after the removal of Barre. Moreover, there was not plan of national reconciliation between the previously favoured clans and the clans that they were oppressed under Barre’s regime, who were into the the power (Moore, 2007).

With the fall of Barre’s regime in 1991, inter-clan conflicts did not immediately disappear. The seeds of clan based politics erupted into violence when Somali government crumbled (Leeson, 2006). Clan-based militias controlled different parts of the country. There were frequent warlord fights; killings of civilians; kidnapping for ransom; robbery and rape (Amnesty, 2005).

Rival factions emerged and started fighting in order to take control of country. For instance, the two well-known warlords General Mohamed Farah Aided and Ali Mahdi Mohamed were contesting for presidency of the entire Somali nation (Mohamed, 2009). Although the men collaborated to finish the Siyad Barre regime, they failed to compromise. The outcome of their conflict was a bloody war. Each of the two men settled to become a local political leader of his respective clan-family. Interestingly, the two “candidates” were members of the same Hawiye tribe of Mogadishu and central Somalia (Mohamed, 2009). Therefore the clan-based rebellion against Barre’s regime led both inter-clan and intra conflicts as each clan wanted to dominate others which finally ravaged the lives of millions of Somalis.
Clan Based Politics and the Failure of Reconciliation Efforts

The politicisation of the clan identity led struggle for control of the enormous political power and economic resources. Starting from the days of General Siyad Barre’s reign, clan divisions were manipulated as some clans dominated national politics and others were subjected to harsh treatments. This situation worsened after the defeat of the Somali armed forces by the Ethiopians who were backed by the communist world. Following that defeat, the regime lost the confidence of the people as they doubted its ability to lead the state. The defeated regime actively resorted to use clan-based politics to divide the Somali clans in order to buy time to remain in power. This clan politics affected the attitude of Somalis towards the central government and also the nature of inter-clan relations leading to a widespread distrust and deep inter-clan hostility which eventually ended up the rise of clan-based insurgencies (Dersso, 2009).

Following the collapse of the Military regime in 1991, reconciliation efforts were sponsored to resolve the bloody civil war. Dersso (2009) noted that the conflicting parties had both contradicting political ideologies and conflicting economic interests. The process in which most of the conferences adopted was to bring together the fighting warlords as representatives of their clans’ interests. In 2000 and 2004, the Arta and Embagti peace conferences held in Djibouti and Kenya respectively, adopted new approaches of making broader inclusion of the different actors of the civil society. The broad participation of these two conferences produced the Transitional National Government (TNG) 2000-2004 and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 2004-present.

The process that led to the creation of the Transitional Governments was based on clan system whereby each clan gets a portion of the government posts. The conferences adopted a new formula of 4.5 clan-quota system. The formula was first adopted during the establishment of Transitional
National Government in 2000. It allocates an equal number of seats in parliament to each of the four major clan-families – the Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and Digle-Mirifle – and half that number to remaining minority groups (ICJ, 2008).

The essence of the 4.5 formula is based on the principle that no major clan is essentially superior to any other, and that the decision-making power should be more evenly among clans. Even though this formula initially seemed to be a solution to facilitate the process of power sharing, it was inevitably clear that certain clans who failed to get posts felt marginalized and rejected it as non-functional and unfair (ICJ, 2008). The consequences of the clan based politics and power sharing system were the rise of infightings within the government reflecting complex inter-clan rivalry that caused the total failure of national reconciliation endeavour which was mandated for Transitional Institutions to achieve.

**Why clan based politics is bad?**

Kreuzer (2005) notes that political clans attempt to infiltrate the state institutions in order to convert them into followers of the clan. Therefore, in the political process, clans make clan rule a lasting political principle of order. Kreuzer (2005) argues that clan politics weakens the democratic rule due to the extensive control the clans have internally. Therefore, establishing democracy based on the will of the individuals is impossible, in view of the fact that the individuals acts as part of the clan and must adhere to whatever their clan see fitting to the interests of the clan without taking into consideration the interests of others.

Moreover, Kreuzer (2005) also notes that not only clan politics undermines democratic rule, but also the authoritarian rule. Clans can undermine authoritarian rule as they protect their networks against attempts of external
control. As a result, the autocratic rule loses its autonomous decision-making capability. This is because; if the autocratic rule tries to seize power of the state in a more extensive sense, the regime must overcome the basic structure of the clan system. In more specific terms, the autocratic regime must shut out the clans as political players that can influence its monopoly over decision making. Kreuzer (2005) concludes that clan politics undermines the ability of the state to reach the local and build a modern state bureaucracy.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Methodology encompasses the means, techniques and frames of reference
by which researchers employ to carry out an inquiry. This chapter focused
on how the study was undertaken. This includes the procedures and
justifications of the research design, the study population, sample size and
sampling procedures, the instruments were used for data collection and
analysis.

Research Design
This study used descriptive research design to investigate the extent to
which clan favouritism in political decision-making and public resource
allocation has contributed the escalation of armed conflicts in Somalia. The
study employed both qualitative and quantities methods in order to analyze
and find out on the story behind the escalation of armed conflicts in Somalia.

Research Population
This research was carried out in the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu
whereby a large number of the southern clans who witnessed the
catastrophic conflicts are available, the North Western and North Eastern
parts of the country namely Somaliland and Puntland respectively. This study
primarily focused on politicians and the educated people in the areas
mentioned above. Hence the target population of this study consisted of 200
participants selecting a sample size of 133 respondents for data collection.
Sample size
The sample size of this study was 133 respondents which were derived from 200 participants of the target population. Of the sampled 133 respondents, only 105 questionnaires passed the data cleaning exercise and therefore a response rate of 78.9% was realized.

Table 1: Selected Sample Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians = Siyaasiyilin</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education sector (lecturers, head teachers, masters students, senior teachers) = Aqoonyahano</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan elders = Oday Dhaqameedyo</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Sheiks = Wadaadada Diinta</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants = Ganacsatada</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Researcher

Sample Procedure
This study employed stratified random sampling method due to the nature of the respondents of the study. Stratified random sampling was employed because the different categories of the sample had to be selected to engage in the study with equal opportunities of participation.
**Research instruments**

The study used combination of primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through administering Questionnaires, and undertaking Interviews. Questionnaires were employed to the collection of data which the respondents were required to fill as they were enquired by the researcher. Questionnaires included both close ended questions and open ended questions that were intended to capture all necessary data from respondents (Amin, 2005). Interviews were referred to capture the ideas of representative of the respondents. The researcher used interviews to obtain those information that may not be easily obtainable though questionnaires.

**Validity and Reliability of the Research instrument**

Reliability is dependability or trustworthiness and in the context of a measuring instrument, it is the degree to which the instrument consistently measures whatever it is measuring (Amin, 2005). It refers to the ability of the instrument to produce consistent results. It is the degree to which measures are free from errors so that they give same results when repeat measurements are made under constant conditions. While the validity means the ability to produce findings that are in agreement with conceptual or theoretical values; in other words, to produce accurate results and to measure what is supposed to be measured (Amin, 2005).

To measure the Validity of the research instrument, the study used content validity index (CVI) approach. The researcher rotated the research to three judges to ensure that the items are valid and then inter-judge Coefficient of Validity was calculated as:

\[
\text{Inter judge coefficient} = \frac{\text{Number of judges declared item valid}}{\text{The total number of Items}}
\]

\[
34
\]
According to Amin (2005) for the instrument to be accepted as valid, the average index should be 0.7 or above. To ensure that data is reliable and valid, a standard test will be done. The reliability test involves a "test and retest" exercise. This means the instrument will be subjected to a representative sample.

**Data Gathering Procedures**

The researcher collected the data by using qualitative and quantitative methods from the sample size of 133 respondents, who were mostly representative from the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu whereby a large number of the southern clans who witnessed the catastrophic conflicts are available, and also respondents from the Somaliland and Puntland state of Somalia respectively through questionnaire and interviews.

**Data analysis**

The study used both qualitative and quantitative methods for the data analysis. As qualitative method the size of the findings was appropriate and easy for readers. So to achieve this objective, the respondents were given questionnaires that they were answering by filling them. Data was analyzed by using SPSS for every objective.

**Ethical Considerations**

The data that was collected from the respondents was classified and was only used for the purpose of the fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding. The respondents were fully informed the content of the research and its aims.
Moreover, there were also other key ethical issues that were given due attention in this study is the privacy of participants, voluntary nature of participation and the right to withdraw partially or completely from the process, consent and possible deception of participants, maintenance of the conditionality of data provided by individuals or identifiable participants and their anonymity.
CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Introduction
This chapter presents the findings and interpretation of the results of the study. Presented in line with objectives, this chapter contains; sample characteristics including gender, age and nature of business. The presentation is guided by the following research questions;

i. To investigate the existence of clannism in Somalia

ii. To find out the role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia

iii. To examine the role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts

Response rate

Table 2: Showing the response rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeted respondents</th>
<th>Actual respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of targeted respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary data.

Of the targeted 133 respondents, only 105 of the filled questionnaires were found fit to use in the study leading to a response rate of 78.9%. This study found 78.9% a sound percentage rate to rely upon in generating information for this report.
Sample characteristics

The study established the sex, age bracket, and nature of business as;

Sex of the respondents

Table 3: showing gender response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percentage%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Data

The gender distribution revealed that the 25.7% of the Respondents were females while 74.3% of the Respondents were males. This suggests that more males are engaged in clannism and armed conflict issues and were much more accessible to participate in the study than females. It also suggests that fewer females were knowledgeable and willing to engage in clannism and armed conflict discussions.
Age bracket of the respondents

Table 4: showing age brackets of the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29 yrs</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 yrs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 yrs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and above</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary data

The results indicated that majority of the respondents were 50 and above years of age (38.1%). This partially because majority of the people engaged in Somali political system are elderly. They were followed by those aged between 20 and 29 years of age (29.5%). This category was high because majority of the respondents who could read and interpret the English questionnaire were in that age bracket, this study also found a good number of these engaged in merchant trade. These were followed by respondents aged between 40 and 49 years (19%) and the least were those aged between 30 and 39 years of age (13.3%).
Marital status

Table 5: showing marital status of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widower</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary Data

From the table above, the results indicate that majority of the respondents were married at (36.2%), this can be justified by the finding that majority of our respondents were 50 and above years of age which is family bearing age. This was closely followed by the single age (24.8%) which corresponds with our earlier finding that next majority of the study's respondents were aged between 20 and 29 years of age. This age is not yet responsible enough to care for a family. This was followed by a considerably high percentage of widows (22.8%). This high percentage of widows is an effect of the protracted civil war in the country while the least were widowers at 16.2%.
Education background of the respondents

Table 6: showing the education status of the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s degree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary data

From the table 6 above, there was no PhD respondent engaged in the study. Only 3.6% of the respondents had masters degrees while the Bachelors were also 12.4%. These relatively lower percentages could be attributed to a destroyed education system especially in the regions most affected by the civil wars. Secondary and diploma holders were the biggest number of respondents at 40% and 21.9% respectively. Only 17.1% confessed to have finished primary education as the highest academic qualification attained.

Section 3

The results in the table below were generated from the questionnaire which required respondents to choose the most applicable alternatives ranging from 1 Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 Disagree (D), 3 Not Sure (NS), 4 Agree (A), and 5 Strongly Agree (SA).
Existence of Clannism in Somalia

The table below shows results for the respondents' perceptions about the existence of clannism in Somalia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existence of Clannism in Somalia</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan is integral in Somali society and influences all aspects of Somali life e.g. political, economic and social</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan system is not the basis for conflicts rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions and conflicts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain clans are more attractive and generous to live in their areas than other clans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When you think about how certain clans have treated other clans, you feel an overwhelming anger for the whole clan not the perpetrators.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan identity is superior to national identity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despising someone's cultural background or physical appearance can be a form of clannism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using derogatory terms for people of a certain clan background can be a form of clannism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not hiring, or not promoting, someone of a certain clan can be a form of clannism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewarding or punishing people differently based on their clan origin can be a form of clannism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It has to be blamed for certain clans for the escalation of the armed conflicts in the country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali society would be better off if it was based on the cultural values of your clan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of your clan origin, it gave you a lot of the strengths you have, e.g. political, economic, social and so on</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan is a very important and gives you protection of all kinds</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion of certain clans from the national politics escalated the conflict</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military regime practised clannism within the society</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain clans deserve to take political leadership in Somalia than other clans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is bad to forsake your clan even if they are doing something bad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge is a must at any cost for the victims of the clan members</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If national interests collide with the clan interests, one should side with his or her clan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each clan should put its interest first and other clans' interests second</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali state collapsed due to the existence of clannanism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali state collapsed due to bad political leadership and economic collapse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali state collapsed due to diplomatic mistakes, e.g. 1977 war, kicking out of Soviet Union, Execution of the 10 Sheiks...............</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If national resources or political positions are not enough, one is justified to give his or her fellow clan members because they need as others need you are in power for them first.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan system is what made Somalia a failed state</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a fellow from your clans comes into power, the livelihood of the your clan would improve anyhow</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary data
The results from table 7 above indicate that Clan is integral in Somali society and influences all aspects of Somali life e.g. political, economic and social (M=4.10), that Clan system is not the basis for conflicts rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions and conflicts (M=4.23), that Certain clans are more attractive and generous to be lived in their areas than other clans (M=3.99), and that When you think about how certain clans have treated other clans, you feel an overwhelming anger for the whole clan not the perpetrators (M=4.12). Neutrality was expressed regarding whether Clan identity is superior than national identity (M=3.56), it was expressed that despising someone's cultural background or physical appearance can be a form of clannism (M=4.08), that Using derogatory terms for people of a certain clan background can be a form of clannism (M=4.33), not hiring, or not promoting, someone of a certain clan can be a form of clannism. (M=4.12), that rewarding or punishing people differently based on their clan origin can be a form of clannism (M=4.03), that it has to be blamed for certain clans for the escalation of the armed conflicts in the country (M=4.05). The study further realized that the respondents were uncertain regarding whether the Somali society would be better off if it was based on the cultural values of your clan (M=.37), that because of your clan origin, it gave you a lot of the strengths you have, e.g. political, economic, social and so on (M=4.34), that clan is a very important and gives you protection of all kinds (M=4.09), that exclusion of certain clans from the national politics escalated the conflict (M=4.20) and that the military regime practised clannism within the society (M=4.11), the study also established that respondents disagreed with the assertion that certain clans deserve to take political leadership in Somalia than other clans (M=2.65), disagreed that It is bad to forsake your clan even if they are doing something bad (M=2.66), disagreed that revenge is a must at any cost for the victims of the clan members (M=2.32), expressed uncertainty
regarding if national interests collide with the clan interests, one should side with his or her clan (M=3.57), were neutral regarding whether each clan should put its interest first and other clans’ interests second (M=3.89) and disagreed that the Somali state collapsed due to the existence of clannism (M=2.29). It was further established that the Somali state collapsed due to bad political leadership and economic collapse (M=4.18), while uncertainty was expressed regarding the assertions that Somali state collapsed due diplomatic mistakes, e.g. 1977 war, kicking out of Soviet Union, Execution of the 10 Sheiks (M=3.57), that clan system is what made Somalia a failed state (3.57), that if a fellow from your clans comes into power, the livelihood of the your clan would improve anyhow (M=3.34) and finally it was disagreed that if national resources or political positions are not enough, one is justified to give his or her fellow clan members because they need as others need you are in power for them first (Mean=2.25).
The role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime in escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia

The table below shows results for the respondents opinions about the role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dvn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Clan-based rebellion in Somalia exploded due to the politicized clan identity.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Clan-based rebellion in Somalia erupted for the protection of each clan’s interest without much consideration of other clans’ interests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Clan-based rebellion in Somalia after their success to overthrow fell apart because of the clash of interests of the clans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan based rebellion involved defining the ruling clans in general terms as enemies to be defeated and cleansed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan-based rebellion led to massive revenge killing against the ruling clans which led inter-clan warfare after the state collapse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan-based armed factions were united only to expel regime from the power but did not have a clear-cut plan of what would come next to fall of the regime</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan-based rebellion led into competition over controlling the state power and resources among clans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan-based rebellion in Somalia was a good indicator for forthcoming State collapse and civil wars</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Clan-based rebellion was fragmented uprising and didn’t have coordination and united strategic leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology-based rebellion could have been better than clan-based rebellion as ideologies would have given the dissenters sense of direction and long-term vision to achieve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels were not coordinated and end up into inter-clan and intra-clan conflicts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan-based rebellion leads proliferation of arms to the civilian which paves the way civil war</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All the rebels that ousted the military regime entered inter-clan and intra-conflicts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary data

From table 8 above, the results indicate that the Clan-based rebellion in Somalia exploded due to the politicized clan identity, (M=4.00), that The Clan-based rebellion in Somalia erupted for the protection of each clan’s interest without much consideration of other clans’ interests (M=4.17) and
that the Clan-based rebellion in Somalia after their success to overthrow fell apart because of the clash of interests of the clans (M=4.09). It was expressed with uncertainty that clan-based rebellion involved defining the ruling clans in general terms as enemies to be defeated and cleansed (M=3.52). The study further revealed that clan-based rebellion led to massive revenge killing against the ruling clans which led to inter-clan warfare after the state collapse (M=4.31), that the clan-based armed factions were united only to expel regime from the power but did not have a clear-cut plan of what would come next to fall of the regime (M=4.08) that Clan-based rebellion led into competition over controlling the state power and resources among clans (M=3.98), that the clan-based rebellion in Somalia was a good indicator for forthcoming state collapse and civil wars (M=4.10) and that the Clan-based rebellion was fragmented uprising and didn’t have coordination and united strategic leadership (M=4.23). This study further established that ideology-based rebellion could have been better than clan-based rebellion as ideologies would have given the dissenters a sense of direction and long-term vision to achieve (M=4.41), that rebels were not coordinated and end up into inter-clan and intra-clan conflicts (M=4.09), that clan-based rebellion leads proliferation of arms to the civilian which paved the way civil war (M=4.13), and that all the rebels that ousted the military regime entered inter-clan and intra-conflicts (M=3.99).
The role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts.

The table below indicates results for the respondents perception about the role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicization of clan identity led the failure of reconciliation efforts among Somali clans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan in Somali society is a divisive by its nature and cannot lead conflict resolution and reconciliation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts need compromise, give and take but clan politics does not know that at all</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clans do not compromise over their clan interests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan-based politics and conflicts doesn’t make conflict resolution the priority but rather than winning or &quot;being right&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali clans are unable to forgive and compromise over political matters but able to take revenge, resist and jeopardize political matters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan politics is based on your clan always wins and others win too.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan politics is based on your clan always wins but others loose</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan Parties pretend to reason to reach settlement, but have no intention to do</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan politicians are incompetent, careless about how their actions impact others and Lack of trust among them</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan politicians put themself above all and Protect their own interests than that of the clan and the country</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan politicians are conflict entrepreneurs who ignore the war and its impact on the society but focus on benefiting from the situation and make maximum profits</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan politicians are warlords and are not the right stakeholders to come to resolve conflicts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan based power sharing produces corrupted clan politicians and divisive leaders who only ignite hostilities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan based power sharing means rewarding warlords</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In clan based power sharing, clan politicians deprive the educated people to come in the power</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know-how based power sharing gives a chance to the competent people who can resolve the conflicts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan based power sharing is not fair and ignites further hostilities within the clans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The formula of 4.5 clan-quota system is based on the principle that no major clan is essentially superior to any other clan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 clan-quota system is non-functional and unfair and it is the formula that led the failure Somali reconciliation efforts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary data
From the table 9 above, the results indicate that Politicization of clan identity led the failure of reconciliation efforts among Somali clans (M=4.00), uncertainty was expressed by the respondents regarding whether clan in Somali society is a divisive by its nature and cannot lead conflict resolution and reconciliation (M=3.67), and there was disagreement regarding the assertion that conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts need compromise, give and take but clan politics does not know that at all (M=2.64). It was also realized that Clans do not compromise over their clan interests (M=4.04) and that clan-based politics and conflicts do not make conflict resolution the priority but rather than winning or "being right (M=4.18). The study results indicated a disagreement with the assertion that Somali clans are unable to forgive and compromise over political matters but able to take revenge, resist and jeopardize political matters (M=2.53) and also disagreed with the assertion that clan politics is based on your clan always wins and others win too (M=2.05). The results further reveal that clan politics is based on your clan always wins but others loose (M=4.12), disagreed that Clan Parties pretend to reason to reach settlement, but have no intention to do (M=2.23) and expressed uncertainty over clan politicians’ being incompetent, careless about how their actions impact others and Lack of trust among them (M=3.45). The results further revealed neutrality to the assertion that the clan politicians put themself above all and Protect their own interests than that of the clan and the country (M=3.44), were uncertain whether the clan politicians are conflict entrepreneurs who ignore the war and its impact on the society but focus on benefiting from the situation and make maximum profits (M=3.23). It was established that the respondents disagreed that clan politicians are warlords and are not the right stakeholders to come to resolve conflicts (M=2.85), that the clan based power sharing produces corrupted clan politicians and divisive leaders who only ignite hostilities (M=2.53), and that clan based power sharing means
rewarding warlords (M=2.69). Uncertainty was expressed regarding the assertion that in clan based power sharing, clan politicians deprive the educated people to come in the power (M=3.69), while it was established that know-how based power sharing gives a chance to the competent people who can resolve the conflicts (M=4.21). The study revealed that the assertion that clan based power sharing is not fair and ignites further hostilities within the clans was disagreeable (M=2.34), agreed that the formula of 4.5 clan-quota system is based on the principle that no major clan is essentially superior to any other clan (M=4.23) and disagreed that the 4.5 clan-quota system is non-functional and unfair and it is the formula that led the failure Somali reconciliation efforts (2.33)
CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
As guided by the objectives, this chapter involves discussion of the findings, and gives conclusions while giving critical attention to with existing literature from other scholars in the field makes recommendations basing on the findings. The chapter suggests possible areas for future studies as well.

Discussion of the findings

Existence of Clannism in Somalia
The study findings indicated that the clan is integral in Somali society and influences all aspects of Somali life e.g. political, economic and social. This finding can best be explained by the example raised by Moore (2007) about the writing by Muhammad Farah Aidid that “the very fact that this social structure – clans- has been continuing for thousands of years without much change despite colonial rule and an oppressive military regime under Siad Barre shows its strength, utility, and capability to solve the various problems and exigencies of their difficult life”. This positing justifies the value Somalis have in their clans by the virtue of clans transcending generations including colonial and despotic eras to their existence today.

The revelation that the clan system is not the basis for conflicts rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions and conflicts justifies the confidence which the Somali community have in their clan systems. They are fully aware of the deliberate efforts by clan leaders who manipulate social political and economic systems by casting tribal cards that
are provocative, suppressing and oppressive to other clans. As a result inter clan and intra clan conflict is exacerbated in society.

The study found that certain clans in Somalia are more attractive and generous to be lived in their areas than other clans. This finding concurred with an earlier revelation by Gundel (2009), that it is common in the Somali tradition that weak clans seek protection from the stronger clans by entering contract with them. Such agreements are known as Gaashaanbuur, meaning “pile of shields”. These submissions by weaker clans are born out of sheer admiration and willingness of the receipient clans to receive the submissive clans. Though Gundel (2009) further argues that there exists varying degrees of adoption and incorporation within stronger lineages and that these range in degree of dependent status with associated inferiority from neighbour (deris), appendage (saar - parasitic creepers), followers (soo raac), to pretenders (Sheegad - those who claim to be what they are not.) In the case of sheegad, the weak group may assume the lineage affiliation of its protectors and may claim a common agnatic origin (Gundel, 2009).

The study revealed that when respondents think about how certain clans have treated other clans, they felt an overwhelming anger for the whole clan not the perpetrators. This revelation points to how clannism in Somalia is very much defined so much that stereo typing is common practice. This revelation concurs with World Bank report (2005), position that mistakes from a kinsman in highly tribalistic and clan stratified societies are bound to be aggregated and generalized as typical characteristic behaviours by the represented tribe or clan. Relatedly there is bound to be high use of derogatory terms for people of the same clan or tribe background in societies where there is high existence of clannism just like this study revealed.
This study revealed the respondents expressed neutrality when requested to choose between clan identity and national identity; which one was superior of the other. This finding can be justified by the argument raised by Wolters (2007), with a case from Central Asia. He argues that being a member of a certain clan binds that person to special rules of reciprocity in the course of contact with other members of his/her kinship group. Somalia has been a kin to clan arrangements over time; clans date back to pre-colonial period, they resisted the colonial storm and post colonial dictatorships. While contemporary political commentators stress nationalism, Somali history is decorated with clan milestones long before the nation of Somalia took shape. The founders of the country expected the previously warring clans to share pride in a national belonging 'Somalia', which required compromise of their clan pride. The response therefore of mixed reaction between national and clan identity could be a ripple effect of the above argument.

The study results also indicate that certain clans have to be blamed for the escalation of the armed conflicts in the country. This finding can be justified by earlier finding a World Bank study that Somali clans or sub clans have the tendency of providing support to their leaders for the sake of the success of their clan or sub clan. In addition to that, strong clans and sub clans provide protection against external attacks and support themselves, compared to the weak clans and sub clans who cannot provide the same level of benefits to their members (World Bank, 2005). This form of discrimination is a source of conflict in the sense that the discriminated become infuriated and plot to revenge which escalates conflict in the society. This study identifies not hiring, or not promoting, someone of a certain clan as such discriminating clannism forms that have intensified conflict in Somali society.

There was disagreement from the respondents to the assertion that certain clans deserve to take political leadership in Somalia than other clans. The
Somali people have already tested the impact of such clannism sentiments and therefore detest any form of practices that may perpetuate clannism. Menkhaus (2003), had earlier indicated that it was the government of Siyad Barre’s (1969-1990) practice to prefer one clan against the other which promoted divide and rule policy in Somalia. Menkhaus (2003), argues that this forced the unfavoured clans to resort to destructive clannism which has afflicted Somalia since 1990 and which has made reconciliation and cooperation much more difficult to achieve.

It is not surprising that the respondents still disagree with the assertion that it is bad to forsake your clan even if they are doing something bad and that revenge is a must at any cost for the victims of the clan members. Revengeful practices have partially led to the protracted armed conflict in Somalia. This was the case in what Moore (2007), describes as the ‘neglected clans formed political parties that spread across the country to resent the clannism practices of the late Siyad Barre’s regime. In effect, the protectionist tendencies to the loyal clans against the regime non-loyal clans only served to intensify the relations.

The study results indicated that the respondents expressed uncertainty regarding if national interests collided with the clan interests, one should side with their clan and whether should each clan put its interest first and other clans’ interests second. This response could be attributed to a healing process that is taking route in Somalia. With globalization and other associated trends like elitism, improving education opportunities and increased information access through channels like the internet, the Somalis are tending to appreciate the values of capitalism. Capitalistic tendencies promote individualistic tendencies unlike the socialist tendencies which agitate for social approaches with the clan as unit of identification. While the impact of nationalism should not be blamed as well especially with the return
of peace in some regions of the country where it has been demonstrated that Somalia has the potential to rise above clannism and conflict to contributing to her national development with production and human resource development. This mixed reaction is possibly a step away for an historically clannism drenched country. These arguments justify another finding that that clan system is what made Somalia a failed state.

There was uncertainty expressed by the respondents regarding the assertion that Somali state collapsed due diplomatic mistakes, e.g. 1977 war, kicking out of Soviet Union, Execution of the 10 Sheiks. This finding is tandem with existing literature which says that while it is true the Somali state collapsed, it is injustice to attribute it entirely to political factors as indicated above. The failed state is attributed to several factors ranging from social, religious, economic and political factors some of which were historical while others were unfolding at the time.

This study reported that it was disagreed that if national resources or political positions were not enough, one was justified to give his or her fellow clan members, since because you are in power for them first. This finding still points to a possible recovery trend by the community from the clutches of clannism. There is need to appreciate the role of international community in shaping international and national trends in the global village. The Somali nationals are track benchmarking the best practices in governance and leadership. One can easily argue that the failed state situation was experienced in Somali only served but as a lesson to the nationals.
The role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia

The results from the study established that the Clan-based rebellion in Somalia exploded due to the politicized clan identity, inequity in the distribution of state resources, irresponsible leadership and bad governance. The resultant unaddressed grievances raised by the clans not in power in Somalia relate to what Heleta (2008), notes that a widely shared sense of grievance among people is a necessary condition in a rebellion. He argues that four preconditions may lead to a mass unrest, rebellion, or revolution and he raises; widespread sense of disappointment with the conditions of life, incoherence of political leadership, Combination of economic and political feelings of deprivation and the myth or ideology of change. Therefore, it was not surprising that there arose clan based rebellions against Barre’s regime his his hench men practiced the preconditions Heleta (2008) raises.

The study also revealed that the Clan-based rebellion in Somalia erupted for the protection of each clan’s interest without much consideration of other clans’ interests. In societies where clannism is entrenched in the cultural values, people struggle to advance their clan interests against others’. As a result there is competition created for the limited resources available which tend to gravitate towards the clans with more authority; preferably those in power. It can never be surprising that armed conflict takes shape in such circumstances.

There were Clan-based rebellion in Somalia after their success to overthrow fell apart because of the clash of interests of the clans. In clan pluralistic societies, even when there is success by the different clans to overthrow a common enemy (unifying factor), the moment the unifying factor is removed, the sharp clan differences resurface. This can be justified through
Ogundiya (2010), argument using the theory of Relative deprivation which suggests that it is a group’s perception of discrepancy between its value expectations and its value capabilities.” Therefore, it is the difference between what a group believes it should receive and what it believes it will receive. Clans usually find difficulties forming unitary governments and therefore, power consolidation becomes very difficult and it in itself becomes a cause of discontent. This is what was experienced in the post Siyad barre regime in Somalia and therefore the escalation of armed conflict.

It was revealed that Clan-based rebellion led to massive revenge killing against the ruling clans which led to inter-clan warfare after the state collapse. Ogundiya (2010) had already raised this issue in his argument that the broad typologies of armed rebellion in Africa includes; ethnic competition for control of the state and Warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse. In the Somalian case, clans had just ousted the Siyad Barre regime and what had ensued was a state of lawlessness where each clan competed for control of state resources and the general dissatisfaction in the service sector inspired many clans to scramble for authority to restore hope amongst their peers. This pitted one clan against the other, hence the conflict.

The finding that Clan-based rebellion in Somalia was a good indicator for forthcoming state collapse and civil wars holds when the argument that Clan-based armed factions were united only to expel regime from the power but did not have a clear-cut plan of what would come next to fall of the regime. It can be clearly argued that the clans were short of long term visionary leadership. Possibly were it existed it contrasted sharply from the other clans long term plans for the country. Leeson, (2006), portrayed the situation in Somalia in the late 1980s well in his discussion that the marginalized clans reacted in armed groups on clan basis. For instance the
Somali Patriotic Movement SDM (comprised largely of Ogaden Clan), the Somali National Movement SNM (comprised largely of Isaaq Clan) and the United Somali Congress USC (comprised largely of Hawiye Clans). All these armed factions were united against Barre and wanted to oust him from the power. However, their visions for the post Barre Somalia had interests of their kinsmen at the fore. No wonder this Clan-based rebellion led into competition over controlling the state power and resources among clans as this study found. This could only drift the country into another chaos, which definitely happened.

This study found that ideology-based rebellion could have been better than clan-rebellion as ideologies would have given the dissenters sense of direction and long-term vision to achieve. This relates to an earlier assertion by Moore (2007), that the warring clans were earnestly targeting Barre as a common threat without having a clear-cut plan to be implemented after the removal of Barre. He drive the issue home properly when he asserts that moreover, there was no plan of national reconciliation between the previously favoured clans and the clans that they were oppressed under Barre's regime, who were into the the power. As a result conflict could only be exacerbated.

This study's revelation that Clan-based rebellion leads proliferation of arms to the civilian which paves the way for civil war can be justified through a related finding that all the rebels that ousted the military regime entered inter-clan and intra-conflicts. Leeson (2006), argument that the seeds of clan based politics erupted into violence when Somali government crumbled gains strength when you consider Amnesty International (2005), finding which concurred with this study's finding that clan-based militias controlled different parts of the country and therefore, there were frequent warlord fights; killings of civilians; kidnapping for ransom; robbery and rape. These
occurrences made Somalia a den of war crimes and therefore only escalated the armed conflict.

The role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts

The results indicate that Politicization of clan identity led the failure of reconciliation efforts among Somali clans. This politicization of clan identity has been argued to not only stifle the flow of information from the central government to the masses but also been an impediment to the freedom of expression of majority opinions. The argument raises its credibility from the fact that clannism relates with static representation of the clan members by a few self styled leaders who are usually elders. They take themselves to be the ‘know it all’ which limits them from sharing reconciliatory information from central governments with the people they ‘represent’. Since they also dominate the reconciliatory information exchanges, they impede freedom expression by other clan members which creates challenges like misrepresentation of ideas.

Uncertainty was expressed by the respondents regarding whether clan in Somali society is a divisive by its nature and cannot lead conflict resolution and reconciliation. This may have been born out of the knowledge that the clan system has life immemorial been a social, economic and political conflict resolution strategy. Literature identifies the existence of council of elders upon which the conflict resolution was based. However, the existence of failed conflict resolution in the country’s history possibly explains the uncertainty of the respondents.
There was disagreement regarding the assertion that conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts need compromise, give and take but clan politics does not know that at all. It is erroneous to assert that clan politics do not know compromise, give and take provisions in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes. While clans have in many cases failed to reconcile with their nemesis, Somalia is on record to have resolved and formed Transitional National Government and Transitional Federal Governments at different times. The agreements leading to the formation of these governments involved a great deal of compromise, give and take provisions across all stake holding clans in the country. This finding also justifies the finding that there was disagreement that clans do not compromise over their clan interests.

Related to the above was the finding that there was a disagreement with the assertion that Somali clans are unable to forgive and compromise over political matters but able to take revenge, resist and jeopardize political matters. This finding can be justified through the success of agreements that brought two transitional governments to power. This position justifies another finding of disagreement by the respondents with the assertion that clan Parties pretend to reason to reach settlement, but have no intention to do so.

This study revealed that the respondents expressed uncertainty over clan politicians’ being incompetent, careless about how their actions impact others and Lack of trust among them. It should be noted that the same clan politicians are responsible for sustaining first the clan interests amongst the various clan stake holders. Besides, even the existing serving political leaders were identified from clan leaders after having demonstrated ability to preside over inter clan and intra clan matters. Related to this issue is the revelation that the results further revealed neutrality to the assertion that the clan
politicians put themself above all and Protect their own interests than that of the clan and the country.

The study indicated that the respondents were uncertain whether the clan politicians are conflict entrepreneurs who ignore the war and its impact on the society but focus on benefiting from the situation and make maximum profits. This response points to mixed reactions from the respondents based on the argument that these leaders have been tested in terms of contributing to solve the conflict in the country. Nonetheless, there have been indicators of clan leaders being linked to war lords that benefit from the state of lawlessness. An example in this case is the proliferation of arms trade in the conflict affected regions linked to warlords in these regions (World Bank report, 2005).

The study revealed uncertainty regarding the assertion that in clan based power sharing, clan politicians deprive the educated people to come in the power. One of the effects of conflicts in societies has been its impact on the elite brain drain. More educated people have varnished abroad in search for greener pastures yet some have lost confidence in the system and therefore wouldn’t wish to associate with the activities of political heads. In the invent of leadership vacuum created, the clan politicians become an unnecessary evil.

While it was established that know-how based power sharing gives a chance to the competent people who can resolve the conflicts to rise to leadership ranks, this study disagreed with the assertion that clan based power sharing is not fair and ignites further hostilities within the clans was. Know-how based power sharing has been instrumental in propelling talent to leadership positions and a semblance of compromising leadership arising.
The study found that respondents agreed that the formula of 4.5 clan-quota system is based on the principle that no major clan is essentially superior to any other clan. This is justified in the ICJ report (2008) that the process that led to the creation of the Transitional Governments was based on clan system whereby each clan gets a portion of the government posts. There was an adopted formula of 4.5 clan-quota system which was first adopted during the establishment of Transitional National Government in 2000. It allocates an equal number of seats in parliament to each of the four major clan-families (the Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and Digle-Mirifle) and half that number to remaining minority groups (ICJ, 2008). The formula therefore, is representative enough of all clans especially where even the minority clans are given opportunity to be represented.

It is therefore not surprising that the respondents disagreed that the 4.5 clan-quota system was non-functional and unfair and it is the formula that led the failure Somali reconciliation efforts. True, by giving the minority half representation compared to the 4.5 quota of the major clans in Somalia seemed marginalization of the minority clans. However, attributing the failure of Somali reconciliation efforts to the quota system alone is an over exaggeration since a number of factors were at play. In any case the 4.5 clan quota system was a key resolution factor.
CONCLUSIONS

Existence of clannism in Somalia

The following conclusions are hereby made on the existence of Clannism in Somalia:

The Clan is an integral part of the Somali society. The Somali people have time immemorial depended on the structures of the clan to solve social, economic, political and religious issues. Besides, the clan has been the nucleus of cultural preservation. Therefore, all change that needs to be effective in Somalia should be integrated within the clan system for it to take root and be implemented with minimal resistance. However, it should be cautious not to repeat the mistakes of previous efforts to use the clan system to cause change in Somali society. This calls for the change agents introducing changes taking care of the need to strike a balance between all the clans major and minor alike.

The clan system per se has no problem and saying that it is the major source of conflict is misleading and only serves to discredit the system. The problems associated with the clan system are born out of the manipulative nature of the clan leaders who in a bid to achieve their vested interests manipulate the system. With transparent leadership, the clan system is able to deliver change and development in federal government arrangements.

It is also a well established fact that some clans in Somalia are more attractive than others. Therefore, it is common for smaller marginalized clans to affiliate with the major clans for security and other benefits. While the reasons for this are several, minority clans feel that the affiliation arrangements create more opportunities for them and improve their general status in the society. This is another way the clan system has delivered...
conflict resolution as the agreements entered on accepting the affiliation may involve non aggression between the unifying clans and several other peace delivering deals.

It is very difficult to disassociate Somalis form their clans. While they acknowledge to belong to an independent sovereign state of Somalia, it is common knowledge to see that the Somalis have an innate desire to belong to and associate with their clans. This study realised that the respondents could not chose between state and clan. Therefore, for peace to be achieved in Somalia, there is need to strike a balance in the conflict resolution efforts at both institutional levels of clan and state.

Clannism in Somalia is not the sole factor for the failed peace efforts in country. This is based on the judgement that attributing the failed state status in Somalia to only factors relating to clannism while ignoring other factors like foreign international relations, and other social economic alongside the religious factor is misleading. It is however, important to note that the clan system has made Somalia easy to manipulate by other players in the Somali question which possibly explains why peace has eluded this horn of Africa nation.

The role of clan based rebellion against Barre's regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia.

Clan-based rebellion in Somalia escalated the inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflict in the country. There was politicization of clan identity, inequity in the distribution of state resources, irresponsible leadership and bad governance practiced by the clan leaderships. This created grievances amongst the clans and pitted the beneficiary clans against the aggrieved. The Warlords exploited this situation and provided arms to the competing
clans which resulted into protracted wars since revenge was a common practice amongst the warring clans.

The diversity in clans meant that there were diversity in interests and therefore integrating the different clans interests into common interests to formulate a vision for the country proved to be a tall order. It was therefore, a matter of time that after the fall of Barre’s regime which hither to was the unifying factor amongst the warring clans, that these clans would draw swords against each other. A common vision would have definitely led the clans into compromise and possibly clamped the armed conflicts down.

With the fall of the regime in Mogadishu at the time, there was degeneration of service delivery across the country. People looked at the clan as the next point of power and therefore their expectation were by far higher than the clans could deliver. This meant that the clans had to scramble for resources which in a stateless situation could be achieved through scramble by the strongest. It was therefore not surprising that clans had to arm their kinsmen to strengthen their scramble for resources to enable them provide the much needed services to their people.

It is therefore not surprising that after the clans had got their grip on the hard earned resources, there came efforts to consolidate these resources into national coffers through rebuilding of the nation Somalia. The clans could only relinquish their resources to the central authority through assurances of provision of better services to their people. The failure by the unitary governments to deliver on their promises in now the reason a protracted was has persisted in Somalia.

However, it is misleading to attribute the persistent inter clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia today to clan based rebellion. The stateless condition in the country for a longer period had attracted international
players like the Alquaeda and other illicit business strategists into the country. These international players have escalated the armed conflict through arming of civilians and pitting one clan against the other to achieve their vested interests. They rather have lawlessness in Somalia than have an established government in the country which may build strength to stamp out their activities.

The armed conflict in Somalia would have stopped if it was based on ideology than clan sentiments. Ideology would have meant that the warring clans have identical and common visions for the restoration of stability in the country as opposed to the clan specific interests which are very difficult to integrate into common vision.

The role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts

The clan based politics stifled information flow and idea sharing platforms in the reconciliation process. The clan leaders turned themselves into the sole negotiators on behalf of the clan members without seeking opinions from the beneficiaries of the reconciliation processes. As a result the peace creation processes results seemed like they were being imposed on the clans which led to resistance of the conflict resolution efforts. In the end the efforts to reconcile the warring clans stalled and battles resumed.

The respondents contested the assertion that clan in Somali society is a divisive by its nature and cannot lead conflict resolution and reconciliation. It is on record that the clan system had delivered conflict resolution in the past. However, what ought to be noted was the manipulative nature of the clan leaders who had vested interests to achieve denied the clan system another chance to prove that conflict resolution and reconciliation could be achieved. In the case of Rwanda, the clan systems are delivering a
reconciliation amongst the Hutu and Tusi clans and tribes. In Northern Uganda, the Mat oput system is delivering reconciliation amongst the victims of LRA war and the war criminals. Therefore, the clan system can deliver conflict resolution and reconciliation anywhere including Somali community.

Relatedly, this study wishes to reassert its finding that the clan system fully acknowledges that for conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts to succeed, there is need for compromise, give and take. This is the tenet upon which peace can be delivered in conflict affected communities including Somalia.

The clan politicians are not conflict entrepreneurs who ignore the war and its impact on the society but focus on benefiting from the situation and make maximum profits. While in Somalia, some clan leaders have turned in warlords, it should be acknowledged that the rise to clan leadership position in Somalia follows deliberate social scrutiny and therefore, no sane clan would accept a warlord to assume leadership political position. However, the difference in character and personal values is what leads to some clan political leaders turning into self-styled warlords interested in protracted conflicts than an end to the armed conflicts.

It is also misleading to assert that the clan leaders deprive the elites of opportunity to assume political leadership. It is a known fact that war situation result into shuttering social systems including education systems. As a result, there is rampant brain drain and loss of the elite to armed conflicts. The surviving few elites shun political leadership positions since they associate them with shrewd and ignorant blood-stained systems. Therefore, the clan leaders have nothing to do than assume the leadership vacuums created.
The formula of 4.5 clan-quota system which is based on the principle that no major clan is essentially superior to any other clan as the potential to create reconciliation in the society. This formula gives the major four clans and the minority clans opportunity for representation in the parliament. This should be looked at as the first line towards reconciliation in the Somali multi clan setting. All the other intricacies could be given due attention after armed conflict has been achieved. However, the system has been denied opportunity to deliver an end to armed conflict in the country.

**Recommendations**

This study makes the following recommendations;

The clan system in Somalia is so entrenched in society that making efforts to deliver an end to armed conflict and reconciliation without its involvement would be a grave mistake. The Somali clan system has provided solutions to the people of Somalia for a long period of time, therefore, it has created confidence in the traditional Somalis and therefore they would be more confident with a peace process initiated and delivered by a familiar system.

Clannism is entrenched in the Somali cultural system. There is need to improve the system towards one that is not biased on the tenets of favouritism, non compromise and vested interest leadership. If these virtues can be improved through establishing a reliable education sector whose syllabi could be designed incorporating the reconciliation and compromise values.

The Somali people need to exploit their diversity in clans to their benefit other than it being a cause of misery. The diversity in clan comes with diversity in cultural values that are clan specific. They need to identify, record and preserve their rich cultural heritage to be the base for
reconstruction and building an attractive tourism industry to fetch the country foreign exchange in the future.

International bodies like the United Nations need to intervene with an objective of restoring peace in the country. While the clans have the potential to restore peace in the country, their efforts need to be complemented by international support. The support from the African Union has been commendable but the conflict seems to be stretching the under resourced forces. Besides, the military approach estranges the peace keepers from the population. This military approach needs to be complimented with humanitarian approach, religious approach so as to create confidence in the beneficiaries of the role of the international forces in restoring peace in Somalia.

Restoration of peace in Somalia calls for a comprehensive approach involving overhauling of the economy of Somalia alongside the social systems like education and health sectors. The natives need to be provided with options of livelihoods like domestic trade, agriculture and other means other than having to resort to armed struggles. If there are options beyond looking at clans for provision of the social safety and services, then the natives would consider abandoning their traditional practices against reconciliation and peace prevalence.

**Possible areas of further studies**

This study suggests that a study on the relationship between cultural morals and armed conflict resolution in Somalia.

A study on the whether the plurality of clans in Somalia presents the country with development opportunities vis a vis the challenges posed by clannism.
This study further suggests a study on the role of international players in the escalation of armed conflict in Somalia.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: TRANSMITTAL LETTER

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST BY MOHAMED OSMAN MOHAMOUD MCR/42920/92/DF TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN YOUR ORGANIZATION

The above mentioned is a bonafide student of Kampala International University pursuing a Master of Arts in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building.

He is currently conducting a field research whose title is "Clannism and Escalation of Armed Conflicts in Somalia."

Your organization has been identified as a valuable source of information pertaining to his research project. The purpose of this letter, therefore, is to request you to avail him with the pertinent information he may need.

Rest assured any information shared with him from your organization shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. I very much thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Deputy Research Officer
Office of the Associate Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, (CHDR)
APPENDIX II

CLEARANCE FROM ETHICS COMMITTEE

Date________________

Candidate's Data

Name__________________________________
Reg.#__________________________________
Course ________________________________
Title of Study __________________________

Ethical Review Checklist

The study reviewed considered the following:

____ Physical Safety of Human Subjects
____ Psychological Safety
____ Emotional Security
____ Privacy
____ Written Request for Author of Standardized Instrument
____ Coding of Questionnaires/Anonymity/Confidentiality
____ Permission to Conduct the Study
____ Informed Consent
____ Citations/Authors Recognized

Results of Ethical Review

____ Approved
____ Conditional (to provide the Ethics Committee with corrections)
____ Disapproved/ Resubmit Proposal

Ethics Committee (Name and Signature)

Chairperson ___________________________
Members ______________________________

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APPENDIX III

INFORMED CONSENT

I am giving my consent to be part of the research study of Mr. Mohammed Osman that will focus on *Clannism And Escalation Of Armed Conflicts In Somalia*. I shall be assured of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality and that I will be given the option to refuse participation and right to withdraw my participation anytime.

I have been informed that the research is voluntary and that the results will be given to me if I ask for it.

Initials:_____________________________________

Date_________________________________
APPENDIX 1VA

FACE SHEET: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Gender (Please Tick):  ___(1) Male
                      ___(2) Female

Age

Qualifications Under Education Discipline (Please Specify):
(1) Certificate_________________________
(2) Diploma _________________________
(3) Bachelors ________________________
(4) Masters _________________________
(5) Ph.D. ____________________________

Other qualifications other than education discipline __________________________

Nationality
___(1) Somali
___(2) East African
___(3) African
___(4) Asian
___(5) Other
Number of Years of Managerial Experience (Please Tick):

____(1) Less than/Below one year
____(2) 2-4 years
____(3) 5-7 years
____(4) 8 years and above

Number of Research Publications

___(1) Below 4
___(2) 5-9
___(3) 10-13
___(4) 14-17
___(5) 18-21
APPENDIX V: QUESTIONNAIRE

Date:

Dear Respondent,

I, Mohamed Osman Mohamoud Osman, a student at Kampala International University, studying a Master of Arts in Conflict Resolution and Peace building; this questionnaire is prepared for the collection of data concerning the investigation “Clannism and Escalation of Armed Conflicts in Somalia”. The purpose of the questionnaire is only for academic reasons and the information that you provide here will be treated with greatest confidentiality. I kindly request you to answer the questions fully and genuinely.

Your assistance will be highly appreciated

A. Profile of the respondent

   Direction: Please tick in the box provided as your response.

1. Age:

   20-29 □ 30 - 39 □ 50 and above □

   □ 40 - 49 □

2. Gender:

   □ Male □ Female

3. Marital Status:

   Single □ Married □

   Widower □ Widow □

4. Educational Background:

   Primary level □ Bachelor Degree □
**Primary Education:**

- Secondary level
- Diploma

**Higher Education:**

- Master Degree
- PhD

**Direction:**

Please respond to the statements below and use the respond mode given below to answer the questions.

**Respond Mode:**

- Strongly Agree (SA): 1
- Agree (A): 2
- Neutral (N): 3
- Disagree (DA): 4
- Strongly Disagree (SDA): 5

1. To investigate the existence of clannism in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q#</th>
<th><strong>Objective 1</strong></th>
<th>SA (1)</th>
<th>A (2)</th>
<th>N (3)</th>
<th>DA (4)</th>
<th>SDA (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Clan is integral in Somali society and influences all aspects of Somali life e.g. political, economic and social</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Clan system is not the basis for conflicts rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions and conflicts</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Certain clans are more attractive and generous to be lived in their areas than other clans</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>When you think about how certain clans have treated other clans, you feel an overwhelming anger for the whole clan not the perpetrators.</td>
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<p>| | |</p>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Clan identity is superior to national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Despising someone's cultural background or physical appearance can be a form of clannism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Using derogatory terms for people of a certain clan background can be a form of clannism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Not hiring, or not promoting, someone of a certain clan can be a form of clannism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Rewarding or punishing people differently based on their clan origin can be a form of clannism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>It has to be blamed for certain clans for the escalation of the armed conflicts in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Somali society would be better off if it was based on the cultural values of your clan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Because of your clan origin, it gave you a lot of the strengths you have, e.g. political, economic, social and so on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Clan is a very important and gives you protection of all kinds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Exclusion of certain clans from the national politics escalated the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>The military regime practised clannism within the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Certain clans deserve to take political leadership in Somalia than other clans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>It is bad to forsake your clan even if they are doing something bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Revenge is a must at any cost for the victims of the clan members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>If national interests collide with the clan interests, one should side with his or her clan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20. Each clan should put its interest first and other clans’ interests second

21. Somali state collapsed due to the existence of clannism

22. Somali state collapsed due to bad political leadership and economic collapse

23. Somali state collapsed due diplomatic mistakes, e.g. 1977 war, kicking out of Soviet Union, Execution of the 10 Sheiks

24. If national resources or political positions are not enough, one is justified to give his or her fellow clan members because they need as others need you are in power for them first.

25. Clan system is what made Somalia a failed state

26. If a fellow from your clans comes into power, the livelihood of the your clan would improve anyhow

2. To find out the role of clan based rebellion against Barre’s regime on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q#</th>
<th>Objective 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Clan-based rebellion in Somalia exploded due to the politicized clan identity, inequity in the distribution of state resources, irresponsible leadership and bad governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SA (1) A (2) N (3) DA (4) SD (5)
2. The Clan-based rebellion in Somalia erupted for the protection of each clan’s interest without much consideration of other clans’ interests

3. The Clan-based rebellion in Somalia after their success to overthrow fell apart because of the clash of interests of the clans

4. Clan based rebellion involved defining the ruling clans in general terms as enemies to be defeated and cleansed

5. Clan-based rebellion led to massive revenge killing against the ruling clans which led inter-clan warfare after the state collapse

6. Clan-based armed factions were united only to expel regime from the power but did not have a clear-cut plan of what would come next to fall of the regime

7. Clan-based rebellion led into competition over controlling the state power and resources among clans

8. Clan-based rebellion in Somalia was a good indicator for forthcoming State collapse and civil wars

9. The Clan-based rebellion was fragmented uprising and didn’t have coordination and united strategic leadership

10. Ideology-based rebellion could have been better than clan-based rebellion as ideologies would have given the dissenters sense of direction and long-term vision to achieve
11. Repels were not coordinated and end up into inter-clan and intra-clan conflicts

12. Clan-based rebellion leads proliferation of arms to the civilian which paves the way civil war

13. All the rebels that ousted the military regime entered inter-clan and intra-conflicts
3. To examine the role of clan based politics and power sharing on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q#</th>
<th>Objective 3</th>
<th>SA (1)</th>
<th>A (2)</th>
<th>N (3)</th>
<th>DA (4)</th>
<th>SDA (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Politicization of clan identity led the failure of reconciliation efforts among Somali clans</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Clan in Somali society is a divisive by its nature and cannot lead conflict resolution and reconciliation</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts need compromise, give and take but clan politics does not know that at all</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Clans do not compromise over their clan interests</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Clan-based politics and conflicts doesn't make conflict resolution the priority but rather than winning or &quot;being right&quot;</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Somali clans are unable to forgive and compromise over political matters but able to take revenge, resist and jeopardize political matters</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Clan politics is based on your clan always wins and others win too.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Clan politics is based on your clan always wins but others loose</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Clan Parties pretend to reason to reach settlement, but have no intention to do</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Clan politicians are incompetent, careless about how their actions impact others and Lack of trust among them</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Clan politicians put themself above all and Protect their own interests than that of the clan and the country</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Clan politicians are conflict entrepreneurs who ignore the war and its impact on the society but focus on benefiting from the situation and make maximum profits</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Clan politicians are warlords and are not the right stakeholders to come to resolve conflicts</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Clan based power sharing produces corrupted clan politicians and divisive leaders who only ignite hostilities</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Clan based power sharing means rewarding warlords</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>In clan based power sharing, clan politicians deprive the educated people to come in the power</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Know-how based power sharing gives a chance to the competent people who can resolve the conflicts</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Clan based power sharing is not fair and ignites further hostilities within the clans</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>The formula of 4.5 clan-quota system is based on the principle that no major clan is essentially superior to any other clan</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>4.5 clan-quota system is non-functional and unfair and it is the formula that led the failure Somali reconciliation efforts</td>
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APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Directions: Please write your answers in the blank spaces:

Does clannism exist in Somalia at a level that can escalate armed conflicts?

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What role did clan-based rebellion or insurgency against Barre’s regime play on escalating inter-clan and intra-clan armed conflicts in Somalia?

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What role does clan-based politics and power sharing play on the failure of reconciliation efforts and escalation of further armed conflicts?

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CURRICULUM VITAE

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PERSONAL DETAILS

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EDUCATION BACKGROUND

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  Bachelor of Economics

2001 - 2004 Imam-Al Shafie Secondary School
Secondary Certificate of Education

1997 - 2000 Abubakar Al-sadiq Primary School

Primary Certificate of Education

OTHER COURSES

➢ 20th-December-2009: Methods of Inquiry: Research Methods in Political Science Course
   Department of Political Science University of Kansas
➢ 23th-January-2010: Strategic Procurement and Logistics Management Course
   African Institute for Social and Cultural Research

EXPERIENCE BACKGROUND

2007-2008: Teacher at Moallim Fatih School, in Dharkenley District
Mogadishu Somalia

2008-2009: Assistance at Office of Postgraduate Studies Mogadishu University

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➢ Arabic Good (Both written & Spoken)
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