

THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA INFLUENCE ON DRC/RWANDA RELATIONS

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In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Award of the
Degree of Master of International Relations and Diplomacy

September, 2014



DECLARATION A

MUDAHERANWA Regis, I declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any other academic award in any university or institution of learning.

MUDAHERANWA Regis

Name and Signature of the Candidate

Regis

12/10/2013

Date

DECLARATION B

confirm that the work reported in this thesis was carried out by the candidate under our vision.

Anyama Chappes

and Signature of Supervisor

12.10.2014

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis entitled “**THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA INFLUENCE ON DRC/ RWANDA RELATIONS**” has been prepared and submitted by **Mudaheranwa Regis**, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for award of the degree of Master of Art in International Relations and Diplomacy, Kampala International University. The Thesis has been examined and approved by the panel on oral examinations with a grade of_____.

Grade: _____

Name and Sig. of Principal, CAST

Name and Sig. of DVC, CHDR

DEDICATION

I dedicate my dissertation work to my family and many friends. A special feeling of gratitude to my loving parents, Mudaheranwa and Langwida whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity ring in my ears. My Sisters, Brothers and Friends, have never left my side and are very special and I will always appreciate all they have done.

I dedicate this work and give special thanks to my wonderful sons King, Kevin and Regis Junior for being there for me throughout the entire master's program.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo
DDRRR	Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR	Forces Armee Rwandaise
EAC	East African Community
FARDC	Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FNL	Forces Nationales de Libération
FOCA	Combatant Forces Abacunguzi
GoE	Group of Experts
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IR	International Relations
PALIR	Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda
POW	Prisoner of War
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RDR	Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
TPJC	Tripartite plus Joint Commission
UN	United Nations
USNCC	United States National Counter Terrorism Centre
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL TERMS

International relations: Is a branch of politic science concerned with relations between nations and primarily with foreign policies.

Liberation: French *libération*, from Latin verb *liberare* to set free, as from oppression, confinement, or foreign control. The act of liberating or the state of being liberated. The process of striving to achieve equal rights and status.

M23: This is a rebel Group formed by FARDC dissidents. Letter “M” stands for Movement, whereas, the figure “23” stands for 23rd of March, the date where CNDP signed the agreement with Kinshasa Government.

Rebellion: is an act of refusing allegiance to and opposes by force an established government or ruling authority.

Reporter: The term reporter is commonly known in Militarized institutions to identify officers and men who joined belligerents’ force willingly as opposed to the term Prisoner of War (PoW)

Rwandaphones: The Kinya-Rwanda-speaking Community/population in DRC.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis was to gain an in depth understanding of exactly what role FDLR play in the relations of DRC and Rwanda. Surveys were administered to both Congolese and Rwandans. Respondents from DRC were chosen from refugees, where sample size of 188 respondents was selected from total population of 370. FARDC officer was 01, and from M23 rebels, 25 respondents were chosen, whereas, the respondents from Rwanda were chosen from RDF (01 Officer) and from FDLR rebels, 20 respondents were chosen from the total population of 21. The researcher compiled the questionnaires and discovered that, the attitudes of respondents from above categories towards FDLR are almost same and they simply consider them (FDLR) as evils and source of conflict in DRC/Rwanda common border in particular, and in the Region in general. According to respondents of the study as well as the authors who wrote about Rwanda/DRC relations, indicated the reluctance and weakness of International community and DRC respectively. Both countries citizen's attitude revealed their lack of confidence in International Community and DRC willingness to cease its support to FDLR rebels, the group that was considered as a barrier to relations of DRC and Rwanda. The researcher again, (through questionnaires and Interviews) revealed that, FDLR continue to carry out serious human rights violations and sow fear along DRC/Rwanda common border, provocative acts that have been happening for Over 20 years since the Genocide in Rwanda. It (FDLR) has made many promises to disarm. Results are all that matter, and military pressure is needed –the researcher has found – for results/permanent solution.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

The genesis of foreign policy construction in the modern world tends to lie within a framework that encompasses several factors, including but not limited to, security affairs, the economy, and ethnic groups. Thus, in addition to basic factors that influence the foreign policy agenda, historical experiences, especially those related to violence, form an important component of foreign policy development. The incorporation of such matters is particularly evident with nations that do not possess military or economic capabilities to assert themselves on the international stage. Alex M & Karl D. R (2010).

The rebellions

Rebellions (Worldwide) started many years ago. The reasons for rebel movements to exist are multifold. According to Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1989; rebellion is an act of refusing allegiance to and opposes by force an established government or ruling authority.

One major explanation, developed by Ted Robert Gurr, for why some people do eventually rebel can be viewed through "grievance theory". This theory holds that if people are mistreated long enough and badly enough, they will eventually, given the chance, take up arms against their oppressors. However, the Proponents of the greed theory suggest that armed conflicts are caused by a combatants' desire for self-enrichment. Both theories were challenged by David Keen, a professor at the Development Studies Institute at the London School of Economics. His ideas look into the specifics of complex emergencies, which is a term officially defined by the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as: "A multifaceted humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires a multi-sectoral, international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program. Such emergencies have, in particular, a devastating effect on children and women and call for a complex range of responses" (David, 2000).

Rebellions, by groups outside the military establishment of a country and which aim to overthrow a government, are the most common type of political conflict in most African countries. These rebellions are generally initiated by urban elites who are dissatisfied with the way the government had treated them

and their region or ethnic group. They mobilise a section of their regional or ethnic supporters, acquire arms clandestinely and often supported by a neighbouring country and sometimes by an outside power as well. Initial grievances of the leadership of such a rebel group would vary from being blocked from achieving political power, under representation of their region/ethnic group in the government and administration, their region deliberately neglected from access to development funds, to blockage of their ethnic groups from the private sector, and allocation of their land to other ethnic groups. (Adedeji, 1999).

Keen discusses how a conflict can never be simply a greed scenario. His definition of a “complex emergency” demonstrates this broader term and all of its various implications, and will help a researcher to determine civil wars in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, whether its “Greed, grievance or complex emergencies” as stipulated by scholars of these theories. Throughout history, many different groups that opposed their governments have been called rebels. (E.g.; Over 450 peasant revolts erupted in south-western France between 1590 and 1715). In the United States, the term was used for the Continentals by the British in the Revolutionary War, and for the Confederacy by the Union in the American Civil War. Most armed rebellions have not been against authority in general, but rather have sought to establish a new government in their place. For example, the Boxer Rebellion sought to implement a *stronger* government in China in place of the weak and divided government of the time. The “Jacobite” Risings attempted to restore the deposed Stuart Kings to the thrones of England, Ireland and Scotland, rather than abolish the monarchy completely (Chambers, 1869).

In our African Continent, out of 54 countries that make up Africa, more than 50% have been, or are still in the war with different rebel groups; where some of countries like DRC, have more than 25 rebel groups on its soil (Gérard 2009).

The rebellions in African Continent started before the Second World War, and they were mainly against colonial rule, especially when Europeans began to introduce changes in an effort to increase revenues from the colonies. These changes included taking land from African people and giving it to the growing number of Europeans in the colonies. The other changes were the introduction of taxes like the hut tax and poll tax that forced Africans to work for European settlers. Africans were forced to work for

academic field within political science. (Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace)

The scope of international relations comprehends globalization, state sovereignty, and international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, and nationalism, economic development and global finance, terrorism and organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism, and human rights.(Hans, 2009)

Relations between DRC and Rwanda

After World War II, both countries were under Belgian colony. And in 1931, the Rwandan royal family flees from Nyanza following his passive resistances between him and Belgian colonizers. Retrieved from Central Intelligence website: <http://www.ciafrica>

In early 1950s Shortages of lands reported in Masisi. The original Hunde population starts struggling to find land, as most have been confiscated and given to Rwandan migrants by the colonizer at the same time, Belgians shift their policy by bringing mostly Hutus to Masisi, further complicating local ethnic relations. In Rwanda also, they stopped collaborating with the Tutsis, who were demanding immediate independence, to the more patient Hutus. Retrieved from Central Intelligence Agency website: <http://ciafrica.wordpress.com/2013>).

In October, 1971, Mobutu launched his “authenticity” campaign aimed at creating a national identity rooted beyond tribal divides. Zairians are ordered to drop their European names, and European suits are banned from the country. Shortly after, the Rwandaphone of Masisi are stripped from their lands in favor of Hundes, Nandes and Tembos, considered more “Zairian”. The same year, Zaire adopted a citizenship law that denies Zairian nationality to all Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda of DRC, in reaction to growing Tutsi economic power in North Kivu. March, 1993, Governor Kalumbo calls for the extermination of all Tutsis. Attacks from the Hunde and Nandes against the Congolese Tutsis, leading to an estimated 14,000 deaths between 1993 and 1996. In 1994, April 6 the genocide against Rwandan Tutsis started. In the process, tens of thousands of Hutus are also killed, most by the Habyarimana regime for resisting or simply not participating to the genocide. June tens of thousands of Rwandan

Hutus flee to neighboring Zaire. Within them, thousands of genocidaires, FAR and Habyarimana government members cross the border with weapons and vehicles.

Rwandan refugee camps are militarized for the second time, this time in Zaire, with the newly created FDLR militia recruiting (often forcibly) and training troops in them.

The FDLR launch regular attacks against Rwanda, killing Tutsis during the night and seeking harbor in Zaire refugee camps at daytime. Until 1996, random Rwandans cannot go further north than Ruhengeri for security reasons. The FDLR also attacks and kills Congolese Tutsis in their areas of control in Zaire. Paul Kagame asks the UN and President Mobutu to move the camps away from the Rwandan border. Nobody listens. Retrieved from <http://ciafrica.wordpress.com/2013>

In 1995, the Zairian Parliament orders all people of Burundian and Rwandan descent, with no exception, to be repatriated to their countries of origin. Rwanda starts training a Tutsi rebellion in the East. 1996. Rwanda invaded Zaire for the first time, through the support to a local rebel group called AFDL led by Laurent Desire Kabila, a Congolese rebel from Fizi. First use of proxies in the Congolese context

FDLR's origin

In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) defeated the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) and toppled the government that had instigated the genocide of the Tutsi minority and of its Hutu opponents. The former Rwandan civilian and military authorities fled with almost two million Hutu into Tanzania and Zaïre. The drawn-out presence of Rwandan refugees in the region has sustained a series of rebellions by refugee warriors against the new regime in Kigali from bases in eastern Congo/Zaïre (Adelman, 2003).

The FDLR was formed after negotiations between the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR) and the remnant Hutu military command agreed that the ALiR be dissolved. Paul Rwarakabije (Current Head of Rwanda Corrections Service) was appointed commander in chief of the entire force, but ALiR had to accept the political leadership of the FDLR.

From this time onwards, FDLR has been carrying out hostilities along the border between DRC and Rwanda in particular and in great lakes in general, where the objective of toppling Rwanda Government and continuing Unfinished agenda of killing Tutsis is still their primary objective, where, it (FDLR) has

been carrying out atrocities, mainly directed to Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese whether inside or outside DRC. Examples of these atrocities happened in Dec 19th 1997, Hutu insurgents crossed the border from DRC to attack Congolese Tutsi sheltering in Rwanda (Mudende camp), killing over 320 refugees. The survivors fled to the Nkamira transit Center, which was also attacked on June 22nd 1998, resulting in the death of 84 more Tutsi.

In August 13th 2004, FDLR crossed the common border between DRC/Burundi and attacked Gatumba refugee camp, near Bujumbura, (the capital of Burundi), and massacred at least 152 Congolese civilians and wounded another 106. (Human Rights Watch Report-September 8, 2004)

For those who still living in both Kivus also are being harassed, terrorised, kidnapped, raped and sometimes killed by FDLR. Unless this problem is solved, it remains as a menace to Congolese and Rwandan relations, and according to Crisis Group; they recommended Rwanda and the wider international community alike to solve the FDLR problem once and for all, non-violently if at all possible, but by military force if necessary. (Africa Briefing 2005)

In 1999, ALiR fighters killed a group of American and British tourists in Bwindi National Park in Uganda. The U.S. State Department soon placed ALiR (Current FDLR) on a list of terrorist organizations (Rebecca & Colin, 2008).

The Rwandan genocide and the subsequent flight of the *genocidaires* into the Democratic Republic of the Congo spawned eastern Congo's complex crisis one that has led to the deaths of many Congolese and threatens the future of millions more. The world has had 19 years to take action against the perpetrators of the genocide and those who now terrorize eastern Congo, where international response remains sorely inadequate. Absent of an international action plan to finally remove this scourge, Congo and Rwanda relations will continue deteriorating (Adelman, 2003).

When the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* and Rwandan Hutu authorities crossed into eastern Congo in 1994, they continued with their original agenda. Former Rwandan authorities, who recognized themselves as a government in exile, began making preparations to return to power in Rwanda; refugee camps in eastern Congo were ideal grounds for new recruitment. Mugunga refugee camp (10KM from Goma), became the military headquarters. Administrative and political networks quickly took shape. (Adelman, 2003)

In 1995, conscious that their responsibility for the genocide was damaging to their political efforts and relationships with the international community, the *genocidaires* adopted a new name the Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda, or RDR. The RDR developed into a political body whose main objective was to mobilize the international community in the return of refugees.

In mid of 1996, the EX-FAR and Interahamwe have already re-organised and formed two Divisions, one operating from North Kivu and another one from South Kivu (Adelman, 2003).

Rwanda Government could not allow this to happen, and started planning pre-emption operations from both Kivus. In October 1996, fighting erupted in South Kivu, after EX-FAR and Zairian forces started killing Banyamurenge (Adelman H., 2003).

Toppling of Mobutu did not solve the original cause of war, insurgency started and Rwanda again conquered a large area of DRC, where they (Rwanda troupes) fought with Interahamwe Militia, DRC troupes, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Sudan and Angola among others. (Adelman H., 2003)

Backed by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, a newly-formed Congolese rebellion known as the Rally for Congolese Democracy, or RCD, took control of the Kivus. Kabila on the other hand, absorbed a large number of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* into the Congolese army, where the group renamed itself the Liberation Army of Rwanda, or ALiR. Two branches of ALiR developed at this time. One group, located in western Congo, fought alongside the Congolese army on the frontline of the conflict. Another branch remained on the Congo/Rwanda border, launching guerilla incursions against Rwanda. During the years that Rwanda was at war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ALiR/PALIR also tested the strength of the Rwandan army by attacking provinces in northwestern Rwanda. ALiR/PALIR had infiltrated the area until a Rwandan offensive forced them back into eastern Congo in the early fall of 1998. In 1999, ALiR fighters killed a group of American and British tourists in Bwindi National Park in Uganda. The U.S. State Department soon placed ALiR on a list of terrorist organizations, the affair that lead to the birth of the FDLR in 1999, following the signing of the Lusaka Accords, the peace agreement that would eventually provide for the withdrawal of foreign armies from the Congo. (Rebecca & Colin, 2008).

FDLR's new strategies against current geopolitics.

The FDLR renamed its military wing Combatant Forces *Abacunguzi*, or FOCA. Following Laurent Kabila's assassination in 2001, his son and successor Joseph facilitated the movement eastward of the western forces, led by Col. Sylvestre Mudacumura, consolidating the FDLR-FOCA in its hideout in eastern Congo, where they waged a proxy war against the RCD and Rwanda. Under international pressure, the Congolese government outlawed the FDLR-FOCA in 2002. Yet they remain in the Kivus, where they commit appalling atrocities. They function, as one U.N. demobilization officer described to ENOUGH, as "a state within a state." (Rebecca & Colin, 2008).

The FDLR often collaborate with local defence militias called "*Mayi-Mayi*" and the Congolese army. Congolese soldiers, paid little to nothing, sell their weapons to the FDLR in exchange for minerals or other resources. The good example is Army chief of Staff Hamis Gabriel, who mentioned in the "UN Group of Expert's" Report. Some army Units have also been accused of giving Uniforms to the FDLR. The poorly trained and ill-equipped Congolese army sometimes uses the FDLR as a "backup" force and participates with them in joint patrols. (Rebecca & Colin, 2008).

According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Centre, the FDLR is believed to be responsible for about a dozen terrorist attacks committed in 2009. On October 4, 2005, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement demanding the FDLR disarm and leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately. Under an agreement reached in August, the rebels had pledged to leave Congo by September 30. It has been involved in fighting from its formation on 30 September 2000 throughout the last phase of the Second Congo War and the fighting which has continued since then. (USNCC, 2010).

On 30 July 2002 Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a peace deal known as the "Pretoria Accord". The talks centered on two issues. One was the withdrawal of the estimated 20,000 Rwandan soldiers in the Congo. The other was the rounding up of the ex-Rwandan soldiers and the dismantling of the militia known as Interahamwe. (DECLARATION 004/Vol. II/ 2002: The Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC)

Following RDF withdraw, Kinyarwanda speaking Congolese, who were in National army, were openly harassed and/or killed. Relatives and parents have been experiencing difficult life as they were also

killed, raped or forced to flee their homes by FDLR, and sometimes by Government Forces. This encouraged formation of different rebel groups in different periods and names, but with same objective of protecting their people, who have been experiencing difficult moments, especially frequent attacks by FDLR rebels. In February 2005, a meeting between the Congolese Government and the FDLR leadership was held in Rome and facilitated by Sant Egidio, an international conflict resolution group. Rwanda refuses to engage in dialogue with the FDLR what it terms a “genocidal military organization” and declined the invitation to attend (Rome, 2005).

On March 31, 2005, the FDLR released a declaration condemning the 1994 genocide and agreeing to voluntary disarmament. In their declaration after the Sant’Egidio talks, the FDLR asserted the following four main points: Agreed to end the armed fight; to voluntary disarmament, and to no longer engage in an offensive against Rwanda; Condemned the genocide and its authors. Agreed to fight against genocide ideology and ethnic hatred; Vowed to cooperate with international justice mechanisms, Condemned terrorism and human rights violations in the Great Lakes region. Vowed to fight impunity; Wished for the return of Rwandan refugees to their country according to international norms, and with the help of DRC, Rwanda, and the international community. This agreement, signed by FDLR President Ignace Murwanashyaka, was hailed by the international community as a small victory. However, Murwanashyaka’s agreement was contingent upon the “opening of political space” in Rwanda and the FDLR have not implemented the deal. Murwanashyaka lives in Germany, and, according to a United Nations panel of experts, he maintains command and control over the FDLR forces and has been involved in arms trafficking. The U.N. Security Council has ordered

Murwanashyaka’s assets frozen and imposed a travel ban. The Rwandan government wants him extradited to face genocide charges. Hutu leaders on trial for organising Congo atrocities from Germany, Retrieved from the Local Germany’s News: <http://www.thelocal.de/20110501/34735>

Generally, the current diplomatic atmosphere between two states is not responsive. Congo Government and International community have been accusing Rwanda of helping in formation of these groups (Congo Rebels), allegations which deteriorated already fragile relations between two states.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Rwanda and DRC relations have been deteriorating for two decades. The efforts to resolve this problem have not gained momentum. The diplomatic progress between the two nations is at risk of erosion. This poor relation has been also influencing (Negatively) the geopolitics of the entire Region. General efforts, whether Internationally, Continentally, Regionally and even between individual countries (Rwanda and DRC) have been made but with poor results. Why continuous poor results? Were these efforts genuine ones? Will the diplomatic relations improve soon? These and many other problems necessitated this study and be answered

1.3 Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

To explore the role of the Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in influencing DRC and Rwanda Relations since 1994

1.3.2 Specific objectives

- (i) To determine the extent of FDLR activities in Eastern DRC and examine whether these activities were normal ones.
- (ii) To examine whether these activities continued to be atrocious or provocative to Rwanda's interest and if they (activities) amount to Rwanda's intervention in DRC.
- (iii) To establish the efforts that were put in place to halt/Contain FDLR operations and propaganda in the DRC (By EAC, AU, UN)
- (iv) To establish whether there is a significant relationship between the extent of FDLR existence in DRC, and the level of both State Relations.

1.4. Research Questions

The main questions to be addressed in this research were:

- (i) What is the extent of FDLR activities in Eastern Congo?
- (ii) What are the efforts put in place by different stake holders (Like UN, AU, ICGLR, etc...) on FDLR activities in Congo?
- (iii) What is the level of state relations between Rwanda and DRC?
- (iv) Is there any significant relationship between the extent of FDLR activities and the level of state relations between Rwanda and RDC?

1.5. Significance of the study

This research will allow the researcher to fulfilment the Requirements for award of the degree of Master of international relations and diplomacy of Kampala International University.

The findings of this research are beneficial to different stakeholders (E.g.; UN, AU, EAC), who for couple of decades have been dealing with this issue, but most especially, both Governments (DRC and Rwanda) in general and Congolese citizens in particular, who may play a big role in this matter.

The researcher's findings shall be used as a tool to review strategies that were put in place, and see applicability of the recommendations provided in this thesis.

Furthermore, the research is useful to many other researchers who would in future carry out a similar research in related topic and it will avail them with secondary data.

1.6 Scope

1.6.1 Scope of the Study

To conduct an investigative and extensive research on the poor relationship between DRC and Rwanda, the course, consequences and definitely; proposed solutions to the problem.

1.6.2 Content Scope

In terms of content, the study focused on the Democratic forces for Liberation of Rwanda activities in Eastern Congo and influence on DRC/Rwanda relations. FDLR activities in DRC is the independent variable which intended to come to an end and have a finite life, while its activities and its presence in

Congo is generally intended to have a long or indefinite life. A relation is a unique undertaking and follows a specific methodology to achieve a beneficial change with a specified outcome.

DRC/Rwanda relation Success was conceptualized as quality of the relationship between the two countries.

1.6.3 Geographic Scope

After processing all the necessary information and documentation for the study the researcher proceeded to DRC refugee's camp, Centre for Demobilization and Reintegration (Mutobo-Rwanda), and Ngoma District (Rwanda) to collect data from M23 Prisoners.

1.6.4 Time Scope

The study covered the period from *late 1994*, (the time immediately after EX-FAR had crossed the border to DRC) Tomid, 2014.

1.7 Assumptions of the Study

The diagnosis of the long and outstanding problem was communicated to all people who matter; then, implementation of recommendations (Especially combining efforts to disarm FDLR) assisted to restore relations between these two permanent neighbours.

1.8 Organization of the Thesis

This study is organized into five chapters: chapter one is the introductory which highlights the study background tracing deeply the origin and organization of the revel group in DRC among other things. It also explained the study objectives, research questions, significance of the study and the scope of the study. Chapter two is basically empirical and theoretical reviews examining the study or the work of the international and regional governments in resolving the protracted armed conflict in DRC. The chapter finally examines the existing literature gap. Chapter three covers the study methodology with specific focus on research design, sample size and techniques, instruments used for data collection NB: Continue with other chapters, state what their focus is one etc. You may write it in two paragraphs.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The overall goals of this chapter were firstly to establish the significance of the general field of study, and then identify a place where a new contribution could be made. The purpose of this review is to show the researcher understands of the current literature on and around his topic. However, its purpose is not only to demonstrate that he have a good grasp of academic work in his chosen field, it should also identify what is not known and not agreed on. This is after all why he is doing this research: to address what is not known or agreed on. Again, this literature review does not need to explain every piece of academic work in his chosen field. Rather it needs to identify a specific gap in the literature and review shall identify the key themes, authors and ideas for his specific topic.

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda is the primary remnant Rwandan Hutu rebel group in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is often referred to as simply the FDLR after its original French name: the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda. It has been involved in fighting from its formation on 30 September 2000 throughout the last phase of the Second Congo War and the fighting which has continued since then. It is composed almost entirely of ethnic Hutus opposed to Tutsi rule and influence in the region. (ICG, 2003)

For over a decade, people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), particularly in the Eastern provinces, have been preyed on by the region “armed groups -both state and non-state. This group evolved from the remnants of the extremist -Hutu movement that executed the 1994 Rwandan genocide, killing over 800,000 people from all of Rwanda’s ethnic groups: Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. At the end of the genocide in mid-1994, the *génocidaires* were forced out of Rwanda to the neighbouring eastern DRC. Since this time, rape, forced labour, looting and the torture of civilians have been the FDLR’s trademarks in the eastern DRC (USNCC, 2009).

2.2 Definition of Terms

Democratic Forces

The word Democratic meaning Relating to, relates/appealing to, or available to the broad masses of the people (Wilson, 2006). As far as military science is concern, Forces is defined as an organized body of military personnel or police.

Liberation

French *libération*, from Latin verb *liberare* to set free, as from oppression, confinement, or foreign control. The act of liberating or the state of being liberated. The process of striving to achieve equal rights and status. It means again the act of liberating or the state of being liberated. The act or fact of gaining equal rights or full social or economic opportunities for a particular group. (Oxford, 1989).

2.3 Genesis of FDLR

On 1st October 1990 Forces of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked Rwanda from western Uganda in an effort to reclaim a homeland, and to force the government of President Juvenal Habyarimana into a power-sharing agreement. But Habyarimana and his army, the Rwandese Armed Forces (FAR), were able to call upon foreign support, among them were Zairian Armed Forces. In Keane's "Season of Blood", (Fergal Keane) he noted that "RPF guerrillas invade Rwanda from Uganda. After fierce fighting in which French and Zairean troops are called in to assist the government, a cease-fire is signed on March 29, 1991 "This time, the Rwandan army begins to train and arm civilian militias known as Interahamwe for the next three years Habyarimana stalls on the establishment of a genuine multi-party system with power-sharing. Throughout this period thousands of Tutsis are killed in separate massacres around the country. (Fergal, 1997).

When the ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* and Rwandan Hutu authorities crossed into Eastern Congo in 1994, they continued with their original agenda. Former Rwandan authorities, who recognized themselves as a government in exile, began making preparations to return to power in Rwanda; refugee camps in Eastern Congo were ideal grounds for new recruitment. Mugunga refugee camp (10KM from Goma), became the military headquarters. Administrative and political networks quickly took shape. Zairian

Government assisted this move directly, whether materially or morally, sometimes on individual basis, done mostly by high ranking military officers from FAZ.

During the Rwandan Hutu exodus in July 1994, entire ex-FAR Units carrying their weapons and the former authorities carrying with them Rwandan hard currency, foreign reserves, vehicles and looted goods crossed into Zaïre. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in response to the arrival of the refugees set up refugee camps near Goma in North Kivu and near Bukavu and Uvira in South Kivu, along the borders with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

Due to the scale and speed of the refugee influx, proper screening of the refugees did not take place. Under international humanitarian law, criminal elements suspected of having committed crimes against humanity and genocide cannot be provided refuge, but must be held accountable for their crimes. However, armed criminal elements and *bona fide* refugees were not separated in Zaïre, alleged *génocidaires* were not arrested but were offered sanctuary in the refugee camps, and soldiers of the *Forces Armées Zaïroises* (FAZ) sold back to the Rwandan extremists those arms taken from them when they crossed the border.

According to Gérard Prunier, he noted that they had taken 17 billion Rwandan francs, most of which was deposited in Zairian accounts directly controlled by Zaïrian President Mobutu Sese Seko (Prunier, 1995).

Human Rights Watch reported that additional assets were already found in banks in Zaïre, as well as Kenya, Tanzania and the Netherlands, which continued to be available to the former government (HRW, 1995).

The Rwandan rebellions in Congo/Zaïre derived from an ethnic Hutu ideology that impinged on the genocide ideology, as the leaders of the rebel movements stemmed from the ringleaders of the genocide. (Clapham, 1998).

2.4 The extent of FDLR activities/hostilities in Eastern Congo

The internal structure of FDLR, their leadership, ideology and organisation together with external support, alliances and relations with the host communities greatly influence their operations, character of their movements as well as general effect to relations between two States. The Rwandan rebels have

contributed to contracted conflict and insecurity in eastern Congo/Zaire, but the local Congolese reality has in turn affected the Rwandan Hutu rebellions.

The FDLR has enlisted refugees who remained in eastern Congo, but rebels also infiltrated Rwanda and Burundi continually to recruit Rwandan Hutu to the rebel cause. Incessantly crossed the border into Rwanda killing civilians, stealing cattle and destroying infrastructure and military targets. The ALiR and FDLR continued to conduct hit and run operations against Rwanda.

At the outset, the rebels pursued the previous regime's policy of ethnic killings. During the north western insurgency between 1997 and 1998, Hutu militants killed Tutsi genocide survivors, although many of the new recruits were less prone to ethnic killings and more occupied with overthrowing the RPF-led regime. The insurgents also killed Hutu found in the new administration who were considered to be RPF collaborators (*ibyitso*), resuming the policy of eliminating the Hutu opposition. They also destroyed Rwandan infrastructure and targeted foreign aid workers so as to hamper the new government's reconstruction efforts and disrupt foreign aid (Raft, 2002)

In subsequent incursions into Rwanda, Hutu rebels primarily targeted military assets and civilian infrastructure trying to destabilize the regime, rather than targeting civilians. In May 2001, the rebels staged their last major offensive against Rwanda, known as operation *Oracle du Seigneur*. The FDLR (ALiR I wing) infiltrated north-western Rwanda from North Kivu. Commanding officers ordered their forces not to harass civilians in an attempt to gain their support, but a small number were reportedly killed during the attacks (*HRW, 2006*).

The Hutu rebels found staunch allies in Mobutu Sese Seko, an ally of the former Rwandan regime, and the FAZ troops until 1996, and in Léonard Nyangoma's CNDD-FDD. Between 1994 and 1996, FAZ troops, who profited from the affluent Rwandan ex-government and military, permitted the Hutu extremists to go on with their illicit activities and to regroup and raid Rwanda (African Rights). The FDLR currently uses territories controlled by the *Forces Nationales de Libération* (FNL), which has taken over CNDD FDD staging grounds, to infiltrate Rwanda, recruit new rebels and to procure arms (United Nations Security Council, 2005). The rebels' military muscle has significantly weakened over

their long years in exile. Although they were given a boost by Laurent Désiré Kabila's assistance in the second Congo war, and though their capacity ebbed and flowed according to circumstance and/or external assistance, the rebel forces have been steadily on the decrease. By late 1996, the ex-FAR raised a military force between 50,000 and 70,000 troops (Amnesty International, 1995). The FDLR troops consisted of one division of three brigades, plus one more incomplete brigade. After fighting for Kinshasa, troop numbers were down to little more than 7000-8000 men, according to the FDLR. But this figure does not take into account the probable recruitment and training of three supplementary brigades, as reported and denounced by the Rwandan government. After the ALiR/FDLR merge, for logistical reasons, an operations centre for troops present in southern Kivu remained in Kamina. (Prunier, 2006). The FDLR are an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 combatants, many with families and other dependents. The majority are strategically settled in mountainous or rainforest terrain in North and South Kivu. Although geographically isolated, the FDLR have excellent communication networks, enabled by solar power, that keep them in touch with the outside world and their leadership abroad. Combatants go through a strict indoctrination process, and follow orders. They function, as one U.N. demobilization officer described to ENOUGH, as "a state within a state."

This "state" is able to financially function because of the abundance of mineral resources largely gold, coltan, and cassiterite in the regions under their control. A recent report by the U.N. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo found that the FDLR either dig for the minerals themselves or they tax local diggers (UNSC, 2001). Minerals are then either transported by road or by air to buyers in larger cities like Goma or Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. The FDLR, like many other rebel groups in eastern Congo, are also known to set up roadblocks along supply routes under their control and tax traders.

The FDLR often collaborate with local defence militias called "*Mayi-Mayi*" and the Congolese army. Congolese soldiers, paid little to nothing, sell their weapons to the FDLR in exchange for minerals or other resources. Some army units have also been accused of giving uniforms to the FDLR. The poorly trained and ill-equipped Congolese army. Today the FDLR is supported by a "far-reaching international Diaspora network involved in the day to day running of the movement, the coordination of military and arms trafficking activities and the management of financial activities" (UN). Some of this activity takes place in Canada. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has records of thousands of dollars of

Western Union transfers, sent from Canada to the FDLR in the eastern DRC as well, records of phone conversations between known RUD (an FDLR splinter group) military commanders and Canada during the period of September 2008 and August 2009 (UN, 2006).

On May 9, 2009, the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) killed 86 people including 25 children, and wounded 24 others including 1 child in an assault and armed attack in Nord-Kivu, DRC. Again, on May 9, 2009, the FDLR killed 86 people including 25 children, and wounded 24 others including 1 child in an assault and armed attack in North-Kivu, DRC. (USNCC, 2010)

Following the recent developments in the DRC, the FDLR, has repeatedly attacked civilians, such as in January 2012, when it killed twenty-six people in South Kivu. It has also been involved in the recruitment of child soldiers. Human Rights Watch notes that between April 2012 and May 2013 alone, the FDLR murdered 314 civilians in various attacks. Thus, though it has been weakened in recent years, the FDLR remains an important element of the conflict in the DRC. (UNSS, 2009).

When confronted with the facts, Reverend Mtikila confirmed to them that he had indeed hosted the FDLR officials (GoE, 2014).

2.5 Diplomacy, International Relations and Conflicts between States

International Relations

International relations are an exceptionally important aspect of citizenship in a global society. As our world becomes smaller and smaller through communication technology, rapid air transportation and a complex international economy, the value of peaceful and cooperative relationships between nations is increasingly important. As political activity, international relations dates from the time of the Greek historian Thucydides (460–395 BC), and, in the early 20th century, became a discrete academic field within political science. (International Relation”, Columbia Encyclopedia)

The scope of international relations comprehends globalization, state sovereignty, and international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, and nationalism, economic development and global finance, terrorism and organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism, and human rights. (International Relation”, Columbia Encyclopedia)

Inter-States Conflicts

It may be useful, however, to start with a general statement of caution. A recent major African Workshop on conflicts cautioned: “Africa is a vast and varied continent made up of countries with specific histories and geographical conditions as well as uneven levels of economic development. The causes of conflicts in Africa reflect the continent’s diversity and complexity. While some causes are purely internal and portray specific sub-regional dynamics, others have a significant international dimension. Notwithstanding these differences, African conflicts show a number of crosscutting themes and experiences” (Adedeji, 1999).

The issue of intervention for human protection purposes has been seen as one of the most controversial and difficult of all international relations questions. With the end of the Cold War, it became a live issue as never before. Many calls for intervention have been made over the last decade – some of them answered and some of them ignored. But there continues to be disagreement as to whether, if there is a right of intervention, how and when it should be exercised, and under whose authority.

External military intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial both when it has happened as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda. For some the new activism has been a long overdue internationalization of the human conscience; for others it has been an alarming breach of an international state order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the inviolability of their territory. For some, again, the only real issue is ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others, questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of precedent loom much larger.

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 brought the controversy to its most intense head. Security Council members were divided; the legal justification for military action without new Security Council authority was asserted but largely un argued; the moral or humanitarian justification for the action, which on the face of it was much stronger, was clouded by allegations that the intervention generated more carnage than it averted; and there were many criticisms of the way in which the NATO allies conducted the operation. (Abdalla, 2002).

In other cases, conflict has been directed towards the capture of resources and towards plunder. The weakness of state structures and institutions in many countries has heightened the challenges and risks

of nation building, and sometimes tempted armed groups to try to seize and themselves exploit valuable assets such as diamonds, timber and other natural resources, not to mention the raw materials of drug production.

These internal conflicts are made more complex and lethal by modern technology and communications, and in particular by the proliferation of cheap, highly destructive weapons which find their way into the hands, among others, of child soldiers. Many occur in desperately poor societies or societies where there is a single valuable commodity like oil or diamonds which rapidly becomes the fuel which sustains a full-time war economy.

In these places, the state's monopoly over the means of violence is lost, and violence becomes a way of life with catastrophic consequences for civilians caught in the crossfire.

Conflicts can be categorised in various ways depending on the type of criteria one uses. For example Salim classifies conflicts in Africa as follows:

- (i) Boundary and territorial conflicts,
- (ii) Civil wars and internal conflicts having international repercussions,
- (iii) Succession conflicts in territories decolonised,
- (iv) Political and ideological conflicts,
- (v) Others including those related to transhumance and irredentism. (Salim, 1999)

Similarly, Collier & Binswanger (1999) classify conflicts into (a) loot seekers and (b) justice-seekers, classification which is based more on value judgment rather than analytical criteria. Nevertheless, both Salim and Binswanger use what they consider to be the objectives of the rebel groups as criterion for classifying conflicts.

In general, most writers tend to think of conflicts in Africa as being political conflicts such as wars between states, armed rebellion against states (ranging from small-scale low intensity conflicts to large scale civil war), armed secessionist rebellion (also of various scales), and coup d'état. Indeed, most

African conflicts which are reported and which draw international attention, are those which fit the above description.

Conflicts between state and rebellions trying to overthrow them vary in intensity, scale, and duration depending on many factors. These factors also vary depending on the depth of the grievances, the political indoctrination of the supporters, the quality of the leadership, the strength and weakness of the state, support from neighbouring states and that of super powers as well. During the cold war, these types of rebellion were favorites of the super powers. The more these powers were involved, the longer and bitter the conflict became. In both cases, the rebels seem to have built a strong military force and some civilian support. In both cases, support from neighbouring countries is crucial; in both cases, critical support from an outside power is also very important, especially in the case of the Rwanda. (Abdalla B, 2002).

There are other political conflicts mainly rebellions and civil wars which are well known. Yet we do not really know the extent of the urban and rural conflicts as described above. Indeed there may be more of these latter types of conflicts than the political conflicts. And if this is the case, the policy implication here is serious. While the states are more concerned with rebellions against them, the real arena and drama of conflicts in most African countries may be somewhere else. And the state's normal reactions to these "other" conflicts are simply to send the police, paramilitary and the army to quell the conflicts. As we will point out below, different conflicts emerge under different political, social and economic conditions. Similarly, their causes may be different. And unless these issues are properly understood by the states, it will be difficult to manage and resolve these conflicts in the short term, let alone tackle their long-term root causes. Lack of comprehension of their conflicts by African states has led to the present situation where there are no strategies, policies or mechanism for dealing with on-going conflicts in their countries. Still less are there any strategies for tackling the long-term causes and conditions of conflicts (Abdalla, 2002).

2.6 The level of state relations between Rwanda and DRC

In 1990s, the Hutu rebels found staunch allies in Mobutu Sese Seko, an ally of the former Rwandan regime, and the FAZ troops until 1996. Between 1994 and 1996, FAZ troops, who profited from the

affluent Rwandan ex-government and military, permitted the Hutu extremists to go on with their illicit activities and to regroup and raid Rwanda (African Rights 2008).

The outcome of these poor relations was an outbreak of Congo war I (one) and subsequent wars from this time to date, where relations between Rwanda and the Congo reached an all-time low. The two countries were directly and indirectly at war, with Rwanda using local rebel proxies to fight some of its battles, while Congo armed, trained and supported the Hutu *genocidaires*, who, for simplicity, can be grouped into the FDLR rebels (A Global Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, 2006).

In the last days of October 2008, a strategic U-turn took place. A series of bilateral meetings between Congolese and Rwandan officials began on 28 October in Kigali with a meeting between the Foreign Ministers Alexis Thambwe Mwamba and Rosemary Museminali. At an exceptional regional summit in Nairobi on 7 November, which brought together Kabila and Kagame, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Great Lakes Region, Olusegun Obasanjo, noted that the head of the Congolese state had got closer to his Rwandan and Ugandan counterparts. On the basis of the American proposition, Kabila and Kagame concluded a secret agreement in November. The agreement's existence was publicly confirmed on 5 December when the Congolese and Rwandan Foreign Ministers announced in Goma that the armies of both countries would launch anti-FDLR operations and that direct negotiations would be opened between CNDP and Kinshasa.

Again, in late 2008, the governments of Rwanda and Congo agreed on a wide range of issues and agreed to launch a joint military offensive against the CNDP and the FDLR. They also agreed to restore full diplomatic relations and to activate economic cooperation. In January 2009, Rwanda and Congo launched a joint military operation in eastern Congo. The military operation dislodged and seriously weakened the CNDP forces. In January, the leader of the CNDP, General Laurent Nkunda, was arrested inside Rwanda, after he fled eastern Congo. The FDLR forces were also dislodged from their stronghold in North Kivu and forced to retreat. More than 2,000 Rwandan refugees returned home in January and February, as well as some FDLR militia members (UNSC, 2009). In late February 2009, Rwandan troops pulled out of Congo as part of the agreement with the Kabila government.

On 22 December 2008, the United Nations Security Council voted Resolution 1856, which urged the two governments to reinforce their cooperation to make a start on disarmament and repatriation of the

FDLR. The United Nations officials also acknowledged the rapprochement they had encouraged. They feared however that by negotiating in secret and from a position of weakness, the Congolese president might have been forced to accept a change in economic and political power in Kivu, which would benefit a legalised CNDP. They anticipated a deterioration of inter-community tensions based on the perception of the domination of the Tutsi community in North Kivu (ICG, 2010). Congo's western allies had requested Kinshasa to neutralize the FDLR, but at the same time refused to deploy their own contingents to Kivu. At the time of the announcement of operation "Umoja Wetu", the incapacity of FARDC to conduct operations on the ground without putting the population in danger was known to western diplomats.

The two governments of Rwanda and DRC tried to cooperate on a wide range of issues, including on security matters. Rwanda helped facilitate dialogue between the Kabila government and some political groups in DRC on issues related to the 2006 elections. Moreover, Rwanda agreed to help find a political solution with General Nkunda, as requested by President Kabila. But the process did not go far because the Kabila government launched a campaign against General Nkunda. Rwandan President Kagame stated in August 2007 that he remains very concerned about the activities of the remnants of the Interahamwe and FDLR forces. He asserted that these forces are currently reorganizing in eastern Congo. In November 2007, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda signed an agreement in Kenya "on a common approach to end the threat posed to peace and stability" in the Great Lakes region. The parties agreed to end political and material support to armed groups in the region. The government of the DRC agreed to disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia and to hand over those individuals wanted by the government of Rwanda and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). According to the agreement, those who do not wish to return to Rwanda will be placed in a camp away from the border until a solution is found. In January 2007, several dozen rebel groups and the DRC government signed the Goma Accord, primarily focused on ending the violence in Eastern Congo. Since the signing of the agreement, while progress has been made, there have been a number of reports of ceasefire violations and sexual violence against civilians. (ICG, 2010).

The first change in alliance involved Nkunda and Rwanda. A United Nations experts report in December 2008 publicly confirmed the existence of Rwandan support for the CNDP (NUSC, 2008).

During an interview with Crisis Group on 30 January 2009, President Kagame explained that his intelligence services had sent a message to General Nkunda requesting him to end the crisis. The position of the rebel general was abruptly weakened while Numbi secretly negotiated his eviction with his rival within the CNDP, Bosco Ntaganda. The founder of the CNDP was finally in the negotiation of a failed integration attempt with the CNDP at the beginning of 2007. Numbi belonged to the President's inner circle until his arrest in June 2010 for his presumed role in the assassination of the human rights activist, Floribert Chebeya. Arrested in Gisenyi, Rwanda, during the night of January 2009 (ICG, 2010).

On hearing the news of his arrest spontaneous demonstrations broke out in the Congolese Tutsi refugee camps in Rwanda. (ICG, 2010) The Rwandan Chief of Defence Staff, James Kabarebe, convinced Colonel Sultani Makenga and other CNDP officers close to Nkunda that the Kigali-Kinshasa rapprochement necessitated their integration into the FARDC. (ICG, 2010).

Granting a general amnesty for rebellion and liberating CNDP prisoners, continuing direct negotiations and launching offensives against the FDLR were not enough to consolidate the CNDP integration within the Congolese army. Kinshasa unofficially offered additional guarantees, (ICG, 2010).

The second change of alliance involved the FDLR and the Congolese authorities. Since their arrival in Kivu after the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the FDLR openly collaborated with successive regimes in Kinshasa until 2002. From 2002 to the end of 2008, the Congolese leaders closed their eyes to the cooperation, which despite being officially forbidden still existed between FARDC officers and the rebel Rwandan group. Taking a different approach to this strategy, President Kabila resorted to force to disarm the FDLR (ICG, 2010).

The launch of the joint DRC-Rwandan operation "Umoja Wetu" (Our Unity) on 20 January 2009 was viewed as treason by the FDLR leadership (ICG, 2010). The third change of alliance consisted of organising a political and economic rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda. The new Kinshasa-Kigali axis is counterbalancing the privileged relationship that Congo maintained with its traditional Angolan ally since the 1998 war (ICG, 2010). In December 2008, the Congolese and Rwandan governments announced the re establishment of diplomatic relations and the effective re-launching of the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes (CEPGL) (Clapham, 1998).

This new rapprochement was ratified in Goma on 6 August 2009 during the first bilateral summit between the two Heads of State since the 1996 war. While it is likely that a restricted group of foreign representatives had access to the contents of the secret agreement, the diplomats from numerous international partner organisations in the Congo were not aware of it (ICG, 2010).

Congo's western allies had requested Kinshasa to neutralize the FDLR, but at the same time refused to deploy their own contingents to Kivu. At the time of the announcement of operation "Umoja Wetu", the incapacity of FARDC to conduct operations on the ground without putting the population in danger was known to western diplomats. Irrespective of their views on the chances of successfully disarming the FDLR by force, some embassies hoped that the participation of the Rwandan army in this first joint operation would weaken the FDLR enough to please Kigali. No country or international organization expressed any opposition to the agreement between Kabila and Kagame. (ICG, 2010).

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Over the past years, the FDLR has reportedly intensified its recruitment campaign. Until recently, the FDLR reportedly received assistance from some Congolese government forces and in the past coordinated military operations with the Congolese army, where elements of the former Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe militia were given a safe haven in eastern Congo and carrying out many attacks inside Rwanda and against Congolese civilians. (ICG, 2010).

The FDLR also receives assistance and guidance from Rwandans in Europe, Africa, and the United States. The government of Rwanda submitted a list of FDLR, Interahamwe, and other militia leaders in early 2008 to United States government officials. A number of these FDLR leaders still live in the United States and none have been extradited to Rwanda; probably because the United States does not have an extradition treaty with Rwanda. The United Nations, the United States, and some European countries have imposed sanctions, including travel ban, on some FDLR leaders. In October 2010, French security arrested a top leader of the FDLR in Paris, Callixte Mbarushimana (*Benjamin, 2009*).

On November 4, 2008, German authorities released the secretary general of the FDLR, Callixte Mbarushimana, who was arrested in Frankfurt in July 2008. The State Department criticized the release of the FDLR official and blamed the group as the “root cause of instability in eastern Cong” (FCO, 2009).

In October 2010, French authorities arrested Mr. Mbarushimana, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for five counts of crimes against humanity and six counts of war crimes committed in DRC.

In January 2009, Rwanda and Congo launched a joint military operation in eastern Congo. The military operation dislodged and seriously weakened the CNDP forces. In January, the leader of the CNDP, General Laurent Nkunda, was arrested inside Rwanda, after he fled eastern Congo. The FDLR forces were also dislodged from their stronghold in North Kivu and forced to retreat. More than 2,000 Rwandan refugees returned home in January and February, as well as some FDLR militia members (UNSC, 2009).

As part of an earlier agreement, those CNDP forces willing to join the Congolese army were integrated. Rwanda also welcomed FDLR forces willing to return home. However remnants of the FDLR continue to target Congolese civilians. In late April 2009, United Nations officials accused the FDLR of

committing serious atrocities against civilians in Lubefu, a town north of Goma. Human rights organizations criticized abuses carried out by government forces against civilians (UNSC, 2009).

After the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the completion of Operation Umoja Wetu, the government of Congo, with the support of MONUC forces, launched Operation Kimia II. In eastern Congo, government forces targeted FDLR militia, especially in mining areas. According to a December 2009 report by the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, “the role played by MONUC in Kimia II continued to be focused on assisting FARDC with planning and on providing logistical support, including tactical helicopter lift, medical evacuation, fuel and rations” The report also stated that MONUC provided military support to government forces. (UNSC, 2009).

Kimia II operations involved an estimated 16,000 government forces in North and South Kivu. However, Government forces reportedly engaged in serious abuses against civilians, while FDLR forces retaliated by attacking civilians as well. (BENJAMIN, 2009).

According to Human Rights Watch, “the attacks against civilians have been vicious and widespread. Local populations have been accused of being collaborators by one side or the other and deliberately targeted, their attackers saying they are being punished” (UNSC, 2009). Human Rights Watch reported that an estimated 1,400 civilians were killed between January and September 2009. MONUC forces have been accused of providing support to government military units engaged in serious human rights abuses (BENJAMIN, 2009).

Human rights groups also criticized MONUC for failing to protect civilians. United Nations officials assert that despite the many challenges, MONUC has made every effort to protect civilians. United Nations Special Representative for the DRC Alan Doss stated that the primary objectives of Kimia II were to “protect the population; to put an end to the threat of the FDLR; and to re-establish the authority of the Congolese state” (UNSC, 2009).

On December 31, 2009, the government of Congo ended Operation Kimia II and in February 2010 launched Operation Amani Leo. According to United Nations officials, the objectives of Amani Leo are to protect civilians, remove negative forces from population Centers, re-establish authority in liberated areas, and restore state authority. According to a directive signed by Congolese military Chief of Staff General Didier Etumba and MONUC Force Commander Lieutenant General Babacar Gayer, Congolese

and MONUC forces “will concentrate on controlling strategic areas in order to ensure that armed groups, notably FDLR elements, will not be able to retake territory and inflict reprisals.”¹⁴ The Congolese government and MONUC also agreed “the deployment of Military Police at the battalion level in order to prevent and sanction violations of human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law by their own forces. A zero tolerance policy for human rights violations will be strictly enforced” (UNSC, 2009).

2.7. The efforts that were put in place to ban FDLR and/or to strengthen Rwanda/DRC Relations

There have been various initiatives to end the FDLR threat, but none of them has led to tangible results. The lack of good will on the part of the DRC government and lack of commitment on the part of the international community seem to have been the major factors underlying the failure to neutralize FDLR. These initiatives include:

(a) UN Resolutions concerning FDLR

Over the last decade or so, the Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions condemning the atrocities committed by FDLR and urging the group to lay down arms. Some of these resolutions are:

- (i) On 24 February 2000 with the resolution 1291, the U.N. Security Council authorized the deployment of a maximum of 5537 military personnel in the DRC, including 500 military observers. (Louis C, 2008).
- (ii) With Security Council Resolution 1376, the Security Council launched the third phase of the deployment of MONUC troops, in the East of DRC. The site for the logistical base was planned to be Kindu. (Louis, 2008).
- (iii) By **Resolution 1445** the Security Council authorized the increase of military personnel to 8500. The principle of two independent intervention forces was also approved. MONUC had to support the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) process, but without using force. (Security Council Resolution 1445)
- (iv) **Resolution 1533**, In the preamble of the resolution, the Council expressed concern at the presence of armed groups and militia in North and South Kivu and Ituri in eastern Democratic

Republic of the Congo. It subsequently condemned the illegal flow of weapons into the country and was determined to monitor the arms embargo imposed under Resolution 1493 (2003).

- (v) **Resolution 1565**, regarding reinforcement of 5,900 military personnel and defines the mandate which is still valid today. The strategic military objectives of the MONUC force were; Proactively contributing to the pacification and general improvement of security in the country, providing support for conflict resolution in politically volatile areas, improving border security through regional confidence-building mechanisms, such as the Joint Verification Mechanism, and effective patrolling and monitoring of the arms embargo, Gathering and analysing military and other information on spoilers. Harmon & Keith (2009).
- (vi) **Resolution 1804, (2008)** regarding the continued presence of Rwandan armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Groups such as the FDLR and the Interahamwe perpetuate violence in Eastern Congo to exploit the rich natural resources. The Resolution demands that the Rwandan armed groups lay down their arms, release all child soldiers and put an end to gender based violence.
- (vii) On 18 November 2008, a draft resolution spearheaded by the French Foreign Ministry was presented before the United Nations Security Council, to require the reinforcements which would help to prevent the atrocities that continue to be committed against civilians on an ever greater scale here in North Kivu, on the border of Rwanda and Uganda... Since August 28, fighting has intensified in many areas, causing deaths, rapes, lootings, forced recruitment and further displacements of civilian populations. (BBC, 2008).
- (viii) **Resolution 1925**, the Council emphasized the illicit trade of natural resources and arms trafficking as major factors contributing to the conflicts in the region, and greater regional efforts were needed to tackle the issue, including legal action against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
- (ix) **Resolution 1952** (November 29, 2010). The UN renewed sanctions on the Democratic Republic of Congo on November 29, 2010. Resolution 1952 added an interesting new component. The resolution includes guidelines for importers, processors and consumers buying Congolese minerals, which are the source of funding for many rebel groups. The resolution language is

weak and non-binding, but it is significant. It is the first time the Council has acted so broadly on the role that natural resources play in conflict


(x) **Resolution no. 2014/55**, UN Security Council emphasised that, FDLR is no ordinary rebel group; as stated, this is a deeply dangerous outfit whose leaders and members fled to DR Congo in 1994 after carrying out one of the worst genocides known to man - the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The Council demands FDLR, to disarm and disband.

(xi) **Resolution 2136** (2014), renewing arms embargo, “*reiterating* its deep concern regarding the security and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC due to ongoing military activities of foreign and domestic armed groups, *stressing* the importance of neutralizing all armed groups, including the democratic forces for the liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the allied democratic forces (ADF), the lord’s resistance army (LRA), and various mayi mayi groups, in line with resolution 2098 (2013).

(xii) **Resolution no. 2147**.....*Expressing* deep concern regarding the sustained Regional threat posed by the FDLR, a group under UN sanctions whose leaders and members include perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.....and “have continued to promote and commit ethnically-based and other killings in Rwanda and the DRC”, and *stressing* the importance of permanently addressing this threat, *Expressing concern* that the FDLR, as well as other armed groups, continue to have freedom of movement in the DRC, noting with deep concern reports indicating FARDC collaboration with the FDLR at a local level and welcoming in this regard the plans by the FARDC, supported by MONUSCO, to neutralize the FDLR, and stressing the need to put such plans into sustained action. Actually, almost all Resolutions concerning the situation in the DRC had been never concluded without mentioning FDLR; e.g. Resolutions 2021 of 2011 and 2098 of 2013.

Comments/Challenges on these Resolutions

The United Nations must go beyond mere adoption of resolutions that condemn the continued hostilities by the DR Congo-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The (Security Council) Resolution is one thing, eliminating the FDLR threat is quite another.



When asked by The New Times-Rwanda, of February 04, 2014, Golooba-Mutebi, a lecturer at Makerere University, said there was every reason to believe that MONUSCO is well aware of the collaboration that exists between the Congolese army and FDLR militia. "I am not aware of any efforts to fight FDLR on the part of either FARDC or MONUSCO and its Force Intervention Brigade. After the defeat of M23, they turned their attention to ADF (Ugandan rebel group) which is hundreds of kilometres away from where M23 used to operate, the same area where FDLR are based at the moment," he said. UN has maintained a peacekeeping force in DR Congo for the last 15 years, with the bulk of the force in the same regions where FDLR maintains strongholds.

(b) Other Efforts

(i) Lusaka Agreement

UN decided to deploy its force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The first liaison officers arrived in the DRC on 3 September 1999. In November 1999 the number of liaison officers totaled 39, distributed in the capitals of the warring countries (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia) including 24 who were stationed in Kinshasa. In January 2000 they reached the number of 79 and they were spread over the whole territory of DRC. Their mission was to liaise with all the warring factions, give a technical assistance and prepare the deployment of military observers. (UNSC, 1999)

(ii) Pretoria Agreement

On 30 July 2002 Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a peace deal known as the 'Pretoria Accord'. The talks centered on two issues. One was the withdrawal of the estimated 20,000 Rwandan soldiers in the Congo. The other was the rounding up of the ex-Rwandan soldiers and the dismantling of the militia known as Interahamwe. (DECLARATION 004/Vol. II/ 2002:

(iii) Bilateral engagements

The Abuja meeting: On June 25, 2004, President Kabila and President Kagame met in Abuja and agreed to respect the 2002 Pretoria Agreement. The two Presidents also agreed to set-up a joint verification mechanism to ensure that Rwandan rebels are disarmed and demobilized. President Kagame proposed:

To jointly (DRC and Rwanda) appeal to the UN to change the mandate of MONUC to include a forceful disarmament of Ex-FAR/Interahamwe.

To carry out joint operations against Ex-FAR/ Interahamwe.

To Authorize Rwanda to carry out operations against Ex-FAR/ Interahamwe in Eastern DRC on the same model that exists between Sudan and Uganda.

To put RDF forces under DRC command in operations against Ex-FAR/Interahamwe. (Irin Africa, 2004)

(iv) International Conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR):

The Dar Es Salaam ICGLR accepted to prevent any direct or indirect support, delivery of arms or any other form of assistance to armed groups operating in the region, as well as deny use of any territory by armed groups to carry out acts of aggression or subversion against other Member States;

The conference also committed itself to implement, in an effective and sustainable way, the regional Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) programmes, including those that benefit former child soldiers and female ex-combatants.

Specifically, one of the five priority projects under the Peace and Security Cluster of the ICGLR is on the disarmament and repatriation of the FDLR.

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(v) **African Union**

On 10 January 2005, the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting in Libreville, Gabon, resolved to disarm Interahamwe Militias and Ex-FAR in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which is still a major threat to Rwanda's security.

(vi) **The Rome Agreement:**

In February 2005, a meeting between the Congolese Government and the FDLR leadership was held in Rome and facilitated by Sant'Egidio, an international conflict resolution group. Rwanda refuses to engage in dialogue with the FDLR—what it terms a “genocidal military organization” and declined the invitation to attend. On March 31, 2005, the FDLR released a declaration condemning the 1994 genocide and agreeing to voluntary disarmament. In their declaration after the Sant'Egidio talks, the FDLR asserted the following four main points.

- Agreed to end the armed fight, to voluntary disarmament, and to no longer engage in an offensive against Rwanda.
- Condemned the genocide and its authors. Agreed to fight against genocide ideology and ethnic hatred. Vowed to cooperate with international justice mechanisms.
- Condemned terrorism and human rights violations in the Great Lakes region. Vowed to fight impunity.
- Wished for the return of Rwandan refugees to their country according to international norms, and with the help of DRC, Rwanda, and the international community.

(vii) **UN Statement October, 2005**

On October 4, 2005, UNSC demanded the FDLR disarm and leave the Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately. Under an agreement reached in August, the rebels had pledged to leave Congo by September 30. It has been involved in fighting from its formation on 30 September 2000 throughout the last phase of the Second Congo War and the fighting which has continued since then (USNCC, 2010).

DRC Government set the 15th Jan 2008 as the Ultimatum for FDLR to leave her territory. DRC warned Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) to disarm and leave DRC soil as soon as possible. It was based on an accord reached in November 2007 in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, between Rwanda and the Kinshasa government.

(viii) **Tripartite Plus.**

All tripartite Plus meetings agreed to end the threat of negative forces including FDLR especially the meeting of 16 September 2005 in Bujumbura which set the deadline of 30 September 2005 for FDLR to disarm or otherwise face measures intended to compel them to do so. In April 2007, Chiefs of General Staff of DRC, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda held a meeting in Bujumbura and adopted on 19th April four scenarios to uproot negative forces in the region: actions undertaken by the DRC defense forces, separate planned operations, combined phased operations and appeal to the international community. But later on, DRC gave contradictory messages that they would not accept the use of force against FDLR.

In a statement released after the Tripartite plus Joint Commission (TPJC) meeting in Lubumbashi, DRC from 6 to 8 June 2007, the Tripartite Plus member countries reaffirmed their commitment to political and military efforts aimed at eliminating the threat posed by negative forces. These efforts would include, among others, the denial of negative forces' safe haven, fundraising, movement (including visas) and access to media, including the leaders of militias operating in eastern DRC, especially FDLR.

Concerning the FDLR, William Swing said that, given that the voluntary repatriation failed, military action was going to be applied.

Meeting under the auspices of the TPJC in Kigali from 27 to 28 August 2007, the army commanders from Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda drew a new time table for the resumption of military action against negative forces operating in the DRC.

The defence heads agreed that the offensives against the FDLR would begin before the end of September 2007. During the meeting, army chiefs established a joint planning cell that would help to develop operational plans.

Tripartite Plus Joint Commission (TPJC) meeting held in Kampala from 15 to 17 September 2007 expressed frustration at DRC's failure to eliminate rebels operating on its territory including the FDLR.

It endorsed the conclusions of the previous TPJC meeting in Kigali, and the 20 September meeting of Operations and Intelligence chiefs in Kisangani to establish a Joint Planning Cell.

The four respective foreign ministers also jointly communicated to the UN Secretary General their observations and recommendations with respect to MONUC's role in addressing the threat of negative forces.

(ix) **Nairobi Agreement**

Joint communiqué of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda on a common approach to ending the threat posed to peace and stability in both countries and the Great Lakes region; Signed in November 2007 by representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Republic of Rwanda pledging a common approach to address the threat posed to their common security and stability by the ex-Forces armées Rwandaises (FAR)/Interahamwe.

The agreement was facilitated by the United Nations and witnessed by the United States of America and the European Union (EU). A joint monitoring group was established to implement the Communiqué.

(x) **The Arrest of FDLR Executive Secretary**

On November 4, 2008, German authorities released the secretary general of the FDLR, Callixte Mbarushimana, who was arrested in Frankfurt in July 2008. The State Department criticized the release of the FDLR official and blamed the group as the "root cause of instability in Eastern

Congo.” In October 2010, French authorities arrested Mr. Mbarushimana, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for five counts of crimes against humanity and six counts of war, crimes committed in DRC

(xi) **Operation “UMOJA WETU”**

Rwanda and the DRC made an agreement to rout out elements of the FDLR from eastern Congo. Retrieved from All Africa website: www.allafrica.com

On 20 January 2009, 1,000 Rwandan soldiers poured over the border into eastern Congo near Goma and were working, according to United Nations officials, as advisers for the Congolese troops. [www.nytimes](http://www.nytimes.com) (2009).

First reports of fighting came on 24 January, when the Congolese army reported they killed nine FDLR militiamen. As the results, African Union chief lauds operations against FDLR during his visit to DRC and later to Rwanda (The New Times Rwanda of 27th Feb 2009).

(xii) **Operation Amani Leo (January 2010), KIMIA I & II, and other operations:**

These operations were carried out by DRC, Rwanda and MONUC/MONUSCO. Their objectives were to protect civilian populations and eliminate the threat of the FDLR and other armed groups in North and South Kivu. On 2nd July 2014, foreign ministers from African nations announced a six-month suspension of military intervention to allow the (In the a meeting in Angola), dissident Rwandan group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), to disarm and end years of fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Angola’s Foreign Minister Georges Chikoti told the Angola Press News Agency that the rebel group’s efforts would be reassessed in three months. (<http://monusco.unmissions.org>)

FDLR Structure, organization, tactics and strategies

The internal structure of rebel movement its leadership; ideology and organization together with external support, alliances and relations with the host communities greatly influence the character of the

movement and the outcomes of its rebellion. The Rwandan rebels have contributed to contracted conflict and insecurity in eastern Congo/Zaire.

By late 1995 Ex-FAR and Interahamwe were launching raids across the border into Rwanda from these camps. Efforts by the United Nations to send the refugees back home were repeatedly blocked by the Hutu militants, who depended on UN supplied food and fuel.

U.S. officials agreed that the camps were a problem requiring a solution, and had discussed several options with Kagame, including air strikes to hit at the extremist bases. Information about the camps was exchanged between the two countries. (Washington Post, 2006).

President Kagame himself visited Washington in early August 1996 to discuss the situation with senior Clinton administration officials. He later said that he had been seeking solutions from Washington, but left disappointed. U.S. officials said Kagame had warned that the camps in Zaire had to be dismantled and had hinted that Rwanda might act if the United Nations did not. They said they expected that Kagame might try something, but did not know when he would do it and what form it would take. (Washington post, 2006).

Again, in 1995, conscious that their responsibility for the genocide was damaging to their political efforts and relationships with the international community, the *genocidaires* (*Interahamwe*) adopted a new name the Rally for the Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda, or RDR. The RDR developed into a political body whose main objective was to mobilize the international community in the return of refugees.

The increased intensity of cross-border attacks by the EX-FAR and Interahamwe led the Rwandan government to secretly arm the ethnically Tutsi Banyamulenge and organize the creation of a proxy rebel group, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

In mid of 1996, the EX-FAR and Interahamwe have already re-organised and formed two Divisions, one operating from North Kivu and another one from South Kivu. Rwanda Government could not allow this

to happen, and started planning pre-emption operations from both Kivus. In October 1996, fighting erupted in South Kivu, after EX-FAR and Zairian forces started killing Banyamurenge.

While Kabila was completing his rebellion, the ALIR remnants reformed and recruited new Hutu fighters from eastern Zaire. Army for the Liberation of Rwanda becomes active in eastern Zaire by early 1997. The ALiR's political wing, the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR), maintained the old goal of overthrowing the Kagame government and regaining power, to which it added the objective of expelling the foreign invaders, thereby giving it more appeal to local populations. There were also concerns that it intended to continue the genocide against the Tutsis. Even before regaining a military presence, a letter allegedly sent by the ALiR threatened to kill the American ambassador to Rwanda and other U.S. citizens in retaliation for support to Rwanda (Gérard, 2009). However, toppling of Mobutu was not solution to the original cause of war, insurgency started and Rwanda again entered DRC, where they (Rwanda troupes) fought with Interahamwe Militia, DRC troupes, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, Sudan and Angola among others.

Backed by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, a newly-formed Congolese rebellion known as the Rally for Congolese Democracy, or RCD, took control of the Kivus. Kabila on the other hand, absorbed a large number of ex-FAR/*Interahamwe* into the Congolese army, where the group renamed itself the Liberation Army of Rwanda, or ALiR. Two branches of ALiR developed at this time. One group, located in western Congo, fought alongside the Congolese army on the frontline of the conflict. Another branch remained on the Congo/Rwanda border, launching guerilla incursions against Rwanda. During the years that Rwanda was at war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ALiR/PALIR also tested the strength of the Rwandan army by attacking provinces in north western Rwanda. ALiR/PALIR had infiltrated the area until a Rwandan offensive forced them back into eastern Congo in the early fall of 1998(Rebecca and Colin, 2008).

2.7.1. FDLR sympathizer/Supporters

Different sources indicate different stake holders in FDLR survival, but mainly;

2.7.2 The DRC Government.

It is an open secret when someone says about relationship between the FDLR and the Congolese army. The relations have oscillated between deep collaboration and overt hostility. Whenever the Congolese government has felt under attack by forces allied to Rwanda, it has reached out to the FDLR for help.

The groups regularly met and exchanged operational information; the FARDC supplied the FDLR with ammunition and instructions to employ against M23 combatants. (UN Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC). The report continues to mention other alliances that between August and October, local FARDC commanders coordinated ambushes and attacks against M23 with FDLR.

2.7.3. The UN Stabilising Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) and FARDC

According to the New Times Rwanda, FDLR has been receiving material and moral support from UN Mission in Congo, and here I quote “MONUSCO has continued to turn a blind eye to the plight of the Congolese citizens by ignoring the atrocities committed by FDLR as well as providing them with emergency relief supplies, it has emerged”. The New Times continues writing that the force, with more than 20,000 peacekeepers, maintains a friendly relationship with the top commanders of the DRC-based terrorist group, whose members are largely responsible for the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. According to this paper, several former FDLR defectors, who crossed to Rwanda over the last years, spoke of different incidents when MONUSCO came to the militia group’s rescue, including bailing them out with food supplies. Jonas Niyonsaba, 23, a former FDLR fighter who returned to Rwanda in May, said MONUSCO provided food to an FDLR unit, led by one Lt. Kayitana, that had occupied Nyabyondo town near Masisi, North Kivu province, after the latter dislodged the Congolese army, in February, 2012. (Retrieved from the New Times Rwanda Website: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/>)

Similar allegations surfaced in November 2009, where two medical doctors facilitated by some officials of the UN mission in DR Congo (MONUC) entered DRC jungles to treat ailing FDLR overall commander Maj. Gen. Sylvester Mudacumura. The physicians, who were identified as Jerome Gasana and Francois Goujon, are said to have entered the Walikale region Under MONUC’s highly guarded secret and sensitive operation. (<http://www.newtimes.co.rw/>)

In other developments also, earlier, in April 2008, a BBC investigation found that MONUC troops had traded arms and UN rations for gold, ivory and drugs from FDLR. The New Times also indicated that the FDLR defectors told the paper that the terrorist group and Congolese army have resumed their “old alliance” in the wake of a new war pitting government troops and mutinous soldiers, who operate under the name M23 Movement. In the same interview with the New Times, Niyonsaba (Defector) said “We used to buy bullets from FARDC soldiers or sometimes we could negotiate on a friendly basis and they gave us bullets for free”. (Benjamin A., 2009).

The FDLR also receives assistance and guidance from Rwandans in Europe, Africa, and the United States. The government of Rwanda submitted a list of FDLR, Interahamwe, and other militia leaders in early 2008 to United States government officials. A number of these FDLR leaders still live in the United States and none have been extradited to Rwanda; the United States does not have an extradition treaty with Rwanda (Benjamin A., 2009).

Recently, on 26 June 2014, Rwanda’s Permanent Representative to UN, Eugene Richard Gasana, dispatched a stinging letter to the Security Council, expressing his country’s concerns over the worryingly close relations between FDLR and the international body’s senior officials. (Chimpreports, 2012).

Gasana told the UN president that on June 24, 2014, the Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations received a ‘Note by the Chair’ S/AC.43/2014/Note.19, in which the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo transmitted a letter dated the same day, by which Herve Ladsous, Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (through the Assistant Secretary General Dimitry Titov, who signed p.o) requested an exemption to the travel ban, in favour of United Nations Sanctioned individual Gaston Rumuli Iyamuremye (aka Victor Rumuli Byiringiro), referred to as President of the FDLR.

In his letter, Mr Ladsous stated that Gaston Iyamuremye would travel on June 25 2014 to Rome, Italy, in order to attend, the following day, a one-day meeting organised by the Sant’Egidio Catholic Community.

Mr Ladsous went on to assert that, in Rome, the FDLR leader would meet the team of Special Envoys and representatives led by Mrs Mary Robinson, Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the Great Lakes region, accompanied by Mr Frank De Coninck, Special Envoy of Belgium to discuss how to accelerate the “ongoing FDLR disarmament and surrender process” and to consider “the options available to achieve this objective.”

Gasana said Rwanda found this request “highly questionable, on both the procedure and on the motivation. Therefore, the government of Rwanda, through its Permanent Mission to the UN, objected to the request for travel exemption.”

Consequently, Chairperson of the 1533 Sanctions Committee, through note S/AC.43/2014/Note.19/Ad.1, informed that the exemption request was not approved and proceeded accordingly to inform the Department of Peacekeeping Cooperation (DPKO).

Interestingly, Gasana recounts, “we were informed that MONUSCO did not even wait for the decision of the 1533 committee before starting the process of airlifting a UN sanctioned individual, as well as other FDLR leaders, including individuals wanted by the government of Rwanda for their responsibility in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi.”

He added: “Indeed, while the request of the travel ban was pending, MONUSCO transported, by helicopter, Gaston Iyamuremye from Kanyabayonga to Goma, where he was transported to Kinshasa, through Kisangani, in a MONUSCO aircraft.”

2.7.4. Individuals

i. Steve Hege:

One of Hege’s articles titled: “Understanding the FDLR in the DR Congo: key facts the disarmament & repatriation of Rwandan rebels”, of 24th Feb 2009; He calls the FDLR “refugees” and writes that they are being “targeted” that is why they remain in the bushes. Hege gives the impression that the tens of thousands of genocide victims and survivors are actually the ones who need to be reigned in or else they will kill the FDLR militias.

In the same article, Hege emphasises legitimacy of the FDLR activities by saying that: “The FDLR must be viewed in light of the regional history of armed rebellions formed by refugees and/or political exiles who have eventually taken power back from undemocratic regimes”. In another article, Hege makes the argument that the FDLR are fighting back at Congolese rebels who are seeking “grazing land for cattle” meaning they are Tutsis.

ii. **President J.M Kikwete.**

The President of the United Republic of Tanzania, at the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the African Union, a meeting which involved parties concerned by the Addis Ababa Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic, he reportedly told participants that Rwanda should enter into talks with FDLR as a solution to long standing problem. (The New Times Rwanda of May 29, 2013). Some of the comments that given by different people, include that of Professor Pierre Rwanyindo, Director of the Kigali-based Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP). Rwanyindo told The New Times of that, negotiations with the FDLR are simply impossible and Kikwete seems to “ignore the history”. (The New Times Rwanda, 2013).

2.7.5. Statements and Speech marks about FDLR

- **Russell Feingold** (US special envoy to the Great Lakes Region)


“We have to get rid of the FDLR, not so much because of their military capacity, but because of what they represent...they will be attacked militarily if they don’t disarm. There will be no political dialogue,” (During US-Africa Summit).

- **Samantha Power** (U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations)

“The longer FDLR militants remain at-large, the greater the risk to all that has been achieved up to now” (She made remarks on August 7, 2014 during UN Security Council Debate on the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

2.8 Frameworks

(a) Conceptual Framework



As illustrated in the diagram above, the FDLR actions influenced not only relationship between two states, but also the dynamics of geo-politics in the Great lakes Region OF Africa, and International Community as well. Though this relation was unstable for couple of decades before Rwanda's Genocide against Tutsi, the fact is that the situation worsened in 1995, immediately after FDLR had commenced

its operations inside and outside DRC. Therefore, FDLR is considered as the “catalyst” for already fragile relations which existed before 1994 genocide against Rwandan-Tutsi.

The social impact of the Ex-FAR Interahamwe in the region has been appalling. The Great Lakes Region has been particularly affected by the internal movement and exile of large populations.

The displaced populations often live in squalid conditions characterized by lack of personal security, fragile food security and an absence of basic health and education services.

(b) Theoretical Framework

The application of a theory to a certain situation can give helpful contributions to the interpretation of events (Keohane, 1986). However, this is only possible “if the conditions for applicability are sufficiently well understood, and if the practitioner knows enough history to be able to place them in context” (p.2). In other words, for this thesis to properly answer the above mentioned research problem and thus give a valuable contribution to the scholarly field.

The study mainly focused on the Neorealist International Relations Theory, which is usually associated with Kenneth Waltz (1924–2013) and his 1979 book bearing the obvious name *Theory of International Politics*. The problem therefore will be viewed through the Neorealist lens, especially, Waltz claims that; the fundamental objective for any state is to **survive** – for if survival is not ensured, all other goals the state may have will be rendered unachievable. A more elusive version of the term survival is the slightly broader notion of “security.” As a matter of assumption, Neorealist highlight security as a key objective of states. Waltz tells us that states generally aim to maximize security. (Waltz, 2008).

However, as I will show the use of a single theory to analyse International Relations is not sufficient and consequently a numerous approaches are necessary to understand the complexities of the world we inhabit, especially, Machiavelli's view, on the international level of interaction between states, the volatility of the conditions under which states relate with one another, is anarchical. Accordingly, how we examines the nature of the international relations, whereby domestic affairs within states must be stable in order for the international system to create equality among states, as well as providing the conditions for democracy. Therefore, while Machiavelli does consider stable domestic affairs to be the precondition to the stability of international relations, the premises and arguments that he presents for

the conditions under which a state can be strong, do not differ greatly than those for the international system. For Machiavelli, on the international level, there should be an economic and social balance of power that keeps equilibrium among states, and provides the conditions for democracy. The state must, of its own volition, maintain the security of the state and at all times possess the means to defend themselves in case of foreign threats. As a result, if the preconditions are met and all states are virtuous, free of corruption, the people within the states are content in a society based on equality (both economically and socially); then there would be a positive effect on international relations, or more specifically, interstate relations.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

This study employed the descriptive survey design specifically the descriptive comparative and descriptive co relational strategies. Descriptive studies are *non-experimental* researches that describe the characteristics of a particular individual, or of a group. No other method of observation would provide this general capability. Consequently, very large samples are feasible, making the results statistically significant even when analyzing multiple variables. Many questions will be asked about a given topic giving considerable flexibility to the analysis.

3.2 Research Population.

Government officials, Ex- FDLR rebels, M23 rebels and Congolese refugees reside in Rwandan camps. The set criterion for sample selection of respondents is as follows: Age of the respondents was between below 20 –above 50 years of age, educational level Primary-Doctorate, according to Gender, the respondents will be both female and male.

3.3 Sample Size

Using convenient sampling, different respondents were part of the study for adequacy of various views on the topic of the study. The target of different populations was taken.

The study used the Krejcie & Morgan (1970) table to determine minimum sample size from a population of a given size.

The application of the formula as shown below gives n respondents. The number of respondents of each category was determined by using Krejcie and Morgan's table.

Table 1: Respondents of the Study

Category of population	Total Population	Sample Size	Percentage	Sampling Method
Members of RDF and FARDC	2	2		purposive
Congolese refugees based in Rwanda	370	188		Stratified
Members of M23 and/or CNDP	26	25		Stratified
FDLR deserters/Reporters	21	20		Stratified
Total	419	235		

Source: Ministry of Disaster report and RDRC report (2012 & 2014 respectively).

3.4 Sampling Procedures

The purposive sampling was used to select the respondents based on these criteria:

Government officials in the areas of study, From the list of qualified respondents was chosen based on the inclusion criteria.

The stratified random sampling was used to finally select the respondents with consideration to the computed minimum sample size.

3.5. Research Instruments

The research instruments used are Questionnaires, Interviews and Focus Group discussion as well. This involved face to face interaction, between the researcher and the participants through discussions. Babbie (2003) argues that interviews can be in two ways, namely: Structured interview in which the responses by the participants were brief and specific and unstructured interviews, where the responses were long, elaborated and not specific and the interviews were conducted in group (Focus Group Discussion) and individual. The researcher carried out interviews with the selected respondents using the interview guide because it is the most appropriate method which can be used to study the attitudes, values, beliefs and motives of people. It also has an element of flexibility.

3. 6 Validity and reliability of the instruments

3. 6.1 Testing the validity of the research instrument

The validity is the extent to which a measurement instrument actually measures what is designed to measure (Amin, 1999). The validity of the instruments of this study referred to the content of the Questionnaire. To make sure that the questionnaire measured what is intended to measure, to ensure the clarity of questions, their effectiveness and the time required to complete the questionnaire, the study assessed its content validity and reliability. To test the content validity, the research used experienced researchers in the domain in Rwanda and Uganda, to assess their suitability and relevancy of the research objectives of the study and research questions. They were asked to assess the validity of the questions in the questionnaire.

3.6.2 Ethical Consideration

The respondents were informed about the confidentiality of the responses and informed consent was requested from them which they may accept.

3.7 Limitations of the study

This research, as it is often the case with Political research, also encountered certain challenges. Most of the subjects (Especially from M23), were reluctant to volunteer information despite the assurance that they would remain anonymous. Some indicated after the interview that the study was controversial because it involved security in Eastern DRC. The researcher also discovered that others (Especially respondents from FDLR), were unwilling or unable to give details of their field experiences during focused group discussions.

CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

4.1 Introduction

To complete this study properly, it is necessary to analyse the data collected in order to test the hypothesis and answer the research questions. As already indicated in the preceding chapter, data is interpreted in a descriptive form.

This chapter comprises the analysis, presentation and interpretation of the findings resulting from this study. The analysis and interpretation of data is carried out in two phases. The first part, which is based on the results of the questionnaire, deals with a quantitative analysis of data. The second, which is based on the results of the interview and focus group discussions, is a qualitative interpretation.

Analysis of Questionnaires

Of a total of 245 questionnaires distributed, only 235 Completed questionnaires were the base for computing the results. The number of 188 was distributed to DRC refugees, 25 from M23, where, three non-responses and two with a lot of missing data were subtracted from the total sample size. This means that 05 questionnaires, out of 25 questionnaires distributed, were completely discarded from the analysis. The rest, twenty questionnaires were used to interpret the results. Finally, twenty questionnaires were distributed to Rwanda Demobilization Centre, where EX-FDLR soldiers are based.

Data gathered through the questionnaire was subjected to frequency counts. In other words, the subjects' responses for each individual question were added together to find the highest frequency of occurrence (i.e. the number of times that a particular response occurs). These responses to the questions, which are quantified, are then presented in percentage forms.

This analysis is presented in tabular form. The researcher uses tables containing a variable and in some cases, combines two or more variables in a single table.


4.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Table 2: Demographic information of the respondents from all three selected categories

Background information	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Male	71	30
	Female	164	70
	Total	235	100
Age	Below 20	99	42
	21-35	19	8
	36-50	33	14
	51 and above	84	36
	Total	235	100
Education Level	Certificate	82	35
	Diploma	94	40
	Degree	54	23
	Masters	5	2
	PHD	0	0
	Total	235	100
Marital status	Single	96	41
	Married	24	10
	Divorced	5	2
	Widow	110	47
	Total	235	100

Field data (2014)

Source:



Source: field data (2014)


The field data in Table 2 shows that, out of 235 respondents chosen for the study, 164 of them were female (representing 68.3%) and 71 were male (representing 31.7%). The table shows unfair gender representation in this camp, although males have poor representation as compared to the female. This is due to the consequences of war where majority of men are busy fighting in different armed groups; especially M23, as it will be shown in the next pages. Other fact the respondents raised is that many of men and boys have been taken by FDLR and other rebellions from the market, fields or roadblocks to be killed in the forests.

The marital status of the respondents indicated that the number of single was higher, however, the number of widows (47%) was not normal one compare to the rest of other categories, and this is due to war, where majority of men died on the battle field or taken by rebellions and killed as stipulated in the paragraph above.

Table also indicates that the ages of the respondents were divided into four categories; (below 20, 21-35, 31-50, 51 and above years of age). Majority 99 of the respondents were below 20 years (representing 42%), the lowest number 19 of the respondents were aged between 21-35 years

(representing 8%) this means that it is the interval of active ages where many of men and boys were on battle field, 33 of the respondents were aged between 36-50 years (representing 14%), 84 were aged 51 and above years (representing 36%) of respondents, it shows also that a good number of refugees were old persons whom they cannot resist against violence . These figures show that most of respondents are under inactive age category, and most of them were separated with their families due to conflict in the Eastern DRC.

As for the Education of respondents, the results from the table above show that; 82 were certificate holders (representing 35%),The results further show that majority 94 of the respondents were diploma holders (representing 40%), 54 were bachelor’s degree holders (representing 23%). 5 were Master’s degree holders (representing 2%) and none of respondents were Ph.D. holders.



Source: field data (2014)

The information in the figure above also shows the number of respondents which they have spent in exile. The results disclosed that 9 of the respondents have been living in Rwanda for less than 5 years (representing 4%), 85 of the respondents (representing 36%) have at least 5-10 years living in Rwandan camps, and majority of the respondents (representing 60%) have been in this camp for more than 10

years. These results indicate that, the big number of the respondents started arriving in Rwanda early 1996, immediately after FDLR had started offensives against them.

4.3 FDLR Activities

Table 3: participation in cross border attack from DRC to Rwanda


Variable	Frequency	Percentage
A=Yes	16	80
B=No	04	20
TOTAL	12	100

Source: field data (2014)

Table 4: When did Attacks carried out on Rwandan territory?

VARIABLE	FREQUENCE	PERCENTAGE
A=Between 2005-2008	06	30
B=Between 2008-2011	02	10
C=Between 2011-2014	09	45
D=All above years	03	15
Total	20	100

Source: field data (2014)



Source: field data (2014)

The chart and a table above, indicate that, the cross border attacks were less frequent when relations of both Countries (DRC and Rwanda) were in good terms. The year 2008-2011, Rwanda and DRC initiated different “joint operations” against FDLR, the situation which made FDLR to lose control. Again, the years when relations deteriorated, is the time when FDLR attacks resumed, as it is shown above.

4.4 Effect of FRLR activities on Rwanda-DRC relations

Table 5: the presence of the FDLR in DRC affected Rwanda/DRC relations

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
A=Yes	19	95
B=No	01	5
Total	20	100

Source: field data (2014)

4.5 Reasons for joining the rebel group

Table 6: reasons M23 rebels joined the group

variable	Frequency	Percentage
= In order to revenge on our enemies	-	-
= Because all/some of my family members were killed	13	65
=In order to return back relatives from Rwanda refugee camps	4	20
= I was not satisfied with the government in place	2	10
=All above	1	5
TOTAL	20	100

Source: field data (2014)

The frequency and percentages (in table 6 and a chart) above show the reasons why M23 individuals joined the rebel group. As can be seen from this table, 65% of subjects indicated that, they joined the rebel rank because their families were threatened to be killed, 20% joined to help their relatives come back from refugee camps in Rwanda, 10% were not happy with the current DRC Government and only 5% indicated that all proposed answers to the question were applicable.

General Question to M23, FDLR and DRC Refugees.**Table 7: Activities carried out by FDLR**

Reasons	Frequency				Percentage			
	M23	FDLR	REFUG E	Average	M23	FDLR	REFUG EES	Average %
=Frequent attacks/killings against Tutsi communities in and outside DRC,	7	8	163	59	35	40	42	38
= Recruitment within DRC and in the Great Lakes Region in general	4	3	40	15	20	15	10	14
=Raping women in the DRC	3	2	120	41.6	15	10	31.3	18
= Illegal business (Mining, arms trafficking,	1	2	20	7.6	5	10	5.2	10
=All above answers are correct	5	5	40	16.6	25	25	10.4	20
Total	20	20	383	27.9	100	100	100	20

Source: field data (2014)

In the table above, majority of the respondents from M23, FDLR and those from Refugees, indicates that common most practice carried out by FDLR is “Frequent attacks against Tutsi Communities, in and outside DRC”, where the average percentage is thirty eight (38%). However, those who indicated that all proposed answers are true were also many (20% of respondents), which means that FDLR is a real threat in DRC and region in general as it was stipulated in previous chapters, especially, attacks carried out in Burundi on January 2, 1998 (The New York Times; Rebel Attack On Villagers In Burundi Kills 160), and Gatumba Massacres on August 13 2004. They are also several other attacks carried out in Rwanda in different periods as indicated in Chapter 2 of this Report.

4.6. Reasons for FDLR emergence

Various groups were interviewed, these included RDF, M23, FDLR they have different views:

According to RDF officer, whom I interviewed, started by explaining that FDLR counts among its number the original members of the Interahamwe that carried out the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. At this stage, FDLR's paramount interest is to survive either as individual members, groups within the group, or FDLR as a whole. Several accounts suggest that the last few years have registered a weakening of the group both in terms of members' moral, equipments and ammunitions, other resources, and support. While its members are drawn from several sources, it is accurate to say they include ex-FAR forces some of whom were involved in the genocide against the Tutsi -, Interahamwe militias who did participate in the killings and other like-minded individuals recruited over the years, initially from the refugees camps in Congo and Tanzania and, later on, from within Rwanda and in DRC.

On the other hand the respondents from FDLR for this question said that to be sincere, I don't know the reasons why FDLR was formed. But I think, these are the people who wanted to return back home (Rwanda). But their presence in DRC means two things. One, the weakness of DRC Government, and two is support of local population provided to FDLR (Materially and Morally)

They can be eliminated if all stakeholders/key players in this conflict will cooperate and decide on the way forward. What do you think the; UN, African Union and International Community in general; should have done in relation to FDLR Presence in DRC, which they have never done? All these organs should speak the same language on this problem which is "FDLR leave DRC and full stop" From the discussions, the researcher observed that there are divergent opinions regarding this question, however, majority indicated FDLR's primary objective that was to overthrow the Kigali Government, where the rest of the group indicated other reasons which include;

- Continuation of the genocide propaganda in and outside Rwanda,
- To return Rwandese refugees who are almost everywhere in the Great Lakes Region
- Two of them did not contribute to this question.

As to what are the reasons that make them continue to exist in the DRC, the discussions indicated that, the FDLR being on the DRC soil is the weakness/failure of the DRC Government and International

Community as the main cause. The group also indicated that FDLR core leadership is made up of former members of the Rwandan regime, who are guilty of the genocide crime (Most of them were indicted by the International Court and/or Courts in Rwanda) have no other alternative/choice, apart from continuing fighting, instead of returning back to Rwanda. Thus, continuing their propaganda to the innocent people, who sometimes have no enough information regarding Rwanda's current political situation.

4.7. Reasons for continuing existence of rebels and possibility of eliminated

“There is no justification for FDLR's continued presence in Eastern Congo; the origins of the FDLR have to do with the genocidaires those who were involved in the horrific crimes in the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, and they cannot simply be allowed to be comfortable in Congo, “The officer said. For them (FDLR continuing being there, they are different reasons, mainly because of extensive backing from, and cooperation from, the government of DRC. Other reasons include lack of commitment of International Community, especially, inefficiency of UN in implementing different resolutions against FDLR.

As to the question about who and how FDLR can be eliminated, the officer said that he strongly believe that the military option with regard to the FDLR has to be not only on the table, but ready to be used, because all other means to solve this problem were tried but in vain.

On what UN, African Union and International Community in general; should have done in relation to FDLR Presence in DRC, which they have never done. The officer said that nothing had been done by this institutions with regards to eliminating the FDLR apart from requesting it to surrender. But he said he has a hope, because FDLR is now becoming not only a Regional issue, but also an International threat, where these international instruments should take appropriate military action to root them out from DRC. Most of respondents indicated that its matter of time. One of them said that, “If Rwarakabije (Former FDLR overall Commander) and other high ranking officers left the group, why can't we expect that the time and conditions will determine the end of FDLR?” Others also indicated that, the International Community in general and the DR Congo in particular have an obligation and big role in this matter.

4.8. Rwanda's intervention in DRC.

During this study, many reasons for Rwanda intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo have been raised. Rwandans officials said that Rwanda has different interests in DRC, given these interests, it follows that the immediate goal of Rwanda is to eradicate FDLR and, to the extent possible, ensure - through diplomacy and enforceable agreements that DRC no longer harbors or supports such groups in the future.

According to this Officer, other reasons include the responsibility to protect. "The Kinshasa Government for long time failed to protect its own Citizens especially in both Kivus, where Kinyarwanda speaking communities have been in trouble for decades. He explained this while giving examples of DRC refugees who have been in Rwanda for almost 19 years and apparently no hope of returning back home as long as FDLR rebels are still living on their homeland.

When asked if the Rwanda's intervention was the best option for durable solution, respondents said that Rwanda intervened militarily after all other diplomatic means, had been failed. Military option was the best option because the threat caused by insurgents was high due to raids and attacks from nearby camps along DRC/Rwanda common border were frequent. So, pre-emptive action was inevitable to prevent and/or neutralize Militia plans. FARDC, respondents said that Rwanda's intervention to DRC has about three features, one being that of FDLR, others are; Border Protection and the Congolese Tutsi

A central justification for Rwandan military activity in the DRC has been the threat posed, both to border security, but also to Congolese Tutsi, by Hutu militias based in the DRC. Often, the Kinshasa government's inability to provide effective security in the Kivus against these groups has been used to justify the use of Rwandan force.

Rwanda's intervention and consequently the birth/formation of the different Tutsi rebellions in this area was a justification of the absence of an effective Congolese state, capable of policing its eastern most extremities, the Rwandan government needs these groups like M23 to work as buffers to protect its borders. It is also clear that, Rwanda has a reason to protect its sovereignty, and this has been clearly indicated in the responses provided by individuals in the Discussion groups, on the question of what they think on Rwanda's intervention in the DRC. After analysis, the researcher concluded that Rwanda,

like any other member of UN, has the primary responsibility for the protection of its people. Again, as long as the “Tutsi population” are still suffering and face a serious harm as a result of FDLR insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question (DRC) is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the Rwanda’s intervention becomes obvious and inevitable.

4.9. The future of Rwanda and DRC relations

When asked about the end of this problem, the officer responded that, “in politics only interests count” He said that no permanent enemy or friend. “The time when DRC will see that among many problems it has, FDLR issue comes first, then the Diplomatic Relations between two countries will normalize”.

There have been several interventions in DRC by different Countries, in their opinions, on why DRC ranks Rwanda as the first to be blamed for violating her Sovereignty, the respondents said that no wonder for DRC blaming Rwanda than any other stakeholder in this conflict. DRC is very aware that Rwanda has security concerns than anything else. They do understand the reasons for previous interventions of Rwanda in the DRC, because; RDF and FARDC operated jointly to hunt FDLR even before formation of FARDC (During Mobutu era). So, for DRC, they are aware that unless FDLR problem is solved, no assurance of the security in DRC in general, and particularly in both Kivus. Actually, the moment these two countries will sit and resolve their differences, especially on the issue of FDLR, then, relations maybe restored.

Discussions about FDLR activities in Eastern DRC, One of the participants in the focused group discussion said that, “the fundamental problem with Eastern Congo starts with the years of Mobutu. The issue of conflict was for long time characterised by identity of Rwanda-people living in this area, where Kinshasa regime considered them as the second class citizens”.

Another respondent said that, we have been living in the Eastern DRC for many years. Kinshasa Government segregated us, but the problem became worse immediately after the arrival of the Ex-FAR. They chased us away from our homes, our Government failed to protect us, those ones who managed when atrocities against Kinyarwanda speaking people in general, and Tutsi communities in particular begun. For that matter, the researcher found that FDRL who actually are the offspring of genocidaires,

were a real threat, not only for Rwanda, but also to DRC and obviously, a threat for relations of both countries.

According to the interviewees who took part in this study, they indicated that, not only FDLR/Interahamwe who harass them, even their Government has been for long time treating them as the second citizens in their own country. *“It is question of identities. We are Congolese who speak the same language as people in Rwanda, but we are Congolese”* One of the respondents emphasised during Focused group Discussion. The Government of DR Congo has long history of collaborating with FDLR and they often (DRC officials and FDLR) carried out several meetings before they attacked our villages. (Gihembe camp based respondent, 2014).

Another respondent from focus group, said that, the genocide ideologies are complicated to be tackled as longer as the theatres are still open for authors to spread this poisonous and ant-human theory. The respondent continue saying that her both parents were murdered by FDLR, and they left the tracts which they underwrote that “You Tutsi, leave our ancestor’s land or face similar consequences”

As the question of how they became residents of this camp, one of the respondents said; “On 11 December 1997, hundreds of our relatives were again slaughtered in the same refugee camp (Mudende) by FDLR, that time identified themselves as ALIR. The 15,000 survivors we were shifted to this camp. One of the participant in the group, reminded us about Kofi Anani’s (former UN Secretary General) declared regarding this particular incident; that “these atrocities were the continuation of the 1994 genocide”. Selective massacres by FDLR continued to target those they considered as Tutsis in the buses and schools and Hutus who refused to cooperate with the genocidaires.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

5.1. Introduction

The overriding objective of this study was To explore the role of the Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in influencing DRC and Rwanda Relations since 1994. Data analysis and interpretation revealed the following major findings under this objective.

FDLR is real threat to the region in general and to Rwanda in particular. The study covered FDLR different provocative operations which caused havoc, not only along borderlines, but also to the citizens of both nations, especially “Rwanda phone” communities in both Kivus.

The study also indicated the efforts and resolutions that were put in place to deal with FDLR. The researcher revealed that the matter has been under discussion of different stakeholders, whether between two countries, Region and on the International arena. The researcher learnt that, these efforts were not fruitful as they lacked practical applicability of these resolutions, henceforth, to miss the boat.

The study also revealed some other stakeholders of this saga, whether on local, National or International level, and the recommendations regarding this particular point were given in the next paragraphs. Specifically, these recommendations were directed to the DRC which has a key to this subject, and obviously, for UN mission in this country, which should have a spare key as it can play as a moderator and probably militarily in case FDLR fails to cooperate.

5.2. Summary

The researcher’s general objective was to explore the role of the Democratic Forces for Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in influencing DRC and Rwanda Relations since 1994.

The answers provided by respondents of this study, came as a compliment to the literature review, where both first and secondary data proved beyond doubt that the existence of FDLR in the DRC is an independent and enough reason for poor relations between DRC and Rwanda. The quick question which comes in the mind of a reader is; “After FDLR, the relations of Rwanda and DRC will be 100% assured?” The answer here is, “assurance is not automatic, there is couple of other factors that influences

relations of DRC and not only with Rwanda, but also other countries. These include the role of imperialism in this Country, DRC weak institutions which can't determine the foreign policy suitable for their Country, conflicts based on the abundant Minerals in the area, etc.

The researcher again conducted the thorough analysis on the respondents' opinions regarding the future of the relations between these two permanent neighbors. Observations indicated that, there is no hope for relations recovery because of FDLR as well as the poor commitment of the International Community.

Finally, the critical subject under this study was how the respondents perceive the general role of Rwanda in the entire narrative. Even if the respondents indicated that FDLR's influence on DRC/Rwanda relations is very substantial, on the other hand, the respondents indicated that, the Rwanda's several interventions were also a catalyst for these bad relations. However, most of the respondents stated that, the Rwanda intervention into DRC was very obvious and inevitable. Therefore, considering the essence of the term National Sovereignty, DRC could not bear this kind of intervention, thus poor relations with the so called invaders.

5.3. Conclusions

The results reveal that the big number of subjects, have the same responses to different questions regarding the role of FDLR in the relations of DRC and Rwanda. They (Almost all subjects) indicated that, upon arrival (FDLR), were able to regroup and coordinate deadly cross-border raids into their homeland. This group continues to fight in eastern Congo to this day.

The findings revealed that Congolese Tutsi were increasingly referred to as 'foreigners'. They have been vulnerable to attack from FDLR rebels, but also from indigenous Congolese militias who mainly were operating parallel with FDLR. Congo's Tutsi population continues to be subject to violent attack from late 1995 to date.

The results also proved that there were times when DRC and Rwanda knew the origin of their differences. For example, some of M23 members, indicated that, in 2009, Kinshasa approached Kigali with the aim of negotiating the integration of the CNDP into FARDC. As part of the deal, the RDF was

granted access to Congolese territory in order to neutralise the FDLR. During this time, FDLR became weak as it can be seen in the findings of the results in chapter four, where FDLR attacks reduced compared to other years. This therefore, indicates that, the bilateral agreement which initiated the joint operation, (with the aim to halt/neutralise FDLR), was a best practical experience which showed that the relationship between these two countries is possible.

5.4. Recommendations

Conclusively, all above observations and arguments are supported by following specific recommendations to the different stakeholders:

5.4.1. FDLR Rebels

The most significant foreign militia in the Kivus is FDLR; the researcher suggests that there will be no diplomatic recovery/improvement between two states, if FDLR problem is not solved. The threat to Rwandan borders and Congolese in the form of the FDLR is still very real. At this point, the researcher concludes that, the FDLR have not only committed atrocities in Rwanda but also continue to perpetrate them in foreign countries where they sought refuge (For example; the Killings in Gatumba-Burundi and massacres of tourists in Bwindi forest-Uganda). This threat represents itself in the form of anti-Tutsi militias in the Democratic Republic of Congo; consequently, Rwanda's policy priority in regards to regional politics continues to be the security of its borders, especially when faced with the prospect of countering an anti-government movement from abroad.

The researcher recommends that, the military operation is inevitable, and should depend on accurate intelligence. Information should be effectively shared between MONUSCO, DRC and Rwanda, whose cooperation is key.

5.4.2. International Community

There are number of facts appeared in the review of the literature, and later, were also proved (beyond doubt) by respondents from different categories (Under 4th Chapter). These are neighboring countries as well as UN officials; their role in assisting/helping FDLR to exist and operate on DRC soil was very

real. As long as these external influences are still vivid, FDLR threat continue to be real, thus, Rwanda/DRC relations will not normalise; therefore, the researcher recommends that;

The United States, European Union, and United Nations must work with the Congolese and Rwandan governments to deal with the FDLR. This includes increased support for demobilization, disarmament, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration.

The U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Congo, known as MONUSCO as well as Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), must increase its presence in FDLR-controlled areas and expand FDLR defection “corridors” where defectors and their dependents are safe and can start the demilitarization process.

U and/or UN to compel countries hosting militia groups to cease supporting FDLR and start to implement the decisions agreed upon regarding disarmament and repatriation of the members of the militia group.

Military action as agreed upon under the framework of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in Angola in July this year could lead to the group’s elimination, if supported by the AU. Therefore, AU needs to send in troops to disarm the militia and set up a special tribunal to try FDLR cadres who have been committing atrocities

Finally, the international community must put sustained high-level diplomatic pressure on the Congolese government to cut its ties with the FDLR.

Government of Rwanda

The government of Rwanda has demonstrated that it has extensive information about the group’s structure and deployments, and could help provide intelligence through ICGLR mechanisms or directly to the Congolese government, but also on the actual number of hard core genocidaires to be handled differently.

5.5. General Recommendations

Although the relations of Rwanda and DRC have deteriorating for two decades, there is still a hope of recovery, because neither Rwanda nor DRC has interest in the current chaotic situation prevailing in the

Region. Government of Rwanda has demonstrated the willingness of cooperation, especially the time when Laurent Nkunda was arrested, but on the other hand, DRC Government has never demonstrated the same, at least arresting a junior officer from FDLR ranks, the blacklisted terror/genocidal organisation based in eastern DR Congo and composed of remnants of the militia responsible for the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi for two decades. This therefore, shall need international and regional actors to take responsibility of disarming FDLR, not only for the sake of Rwanda/DRC relations recovery, but also, as a matter of rendering justice, because, some of its members are criminals roaming free after they committed massive atrocities in Rwanda.

Because of the current threat the FDLR is imposing to Rwanda, the researcher recommends the international community to take the responsibility and disrupt the command and control of FDLR leadership over combatants on the ground. This leadership includes exiles living in the United States and Europe.

First, the U.N. Security Council should expand the list of individuals for targeted sanctions. (Freezing of financial assets, limiting lines of communication, and imposing travel bans) and U.N. member states must aggressively enforce those sanctions.

Secondly, those countries where FDLR political leadership live and work (Mainly in Europe), must investigate those individuals to determine how their political activities affect their resident status. To help end impunity on the ground, the International Criminal Court, or ICC, should focus its investigation on FDLR leadership in the Kivus.

5.6 Areas for Future Research

The researcher is suggesting further research to deal with this subject matter by investigating the impact of poor leadership as the main cause for antagonism among states. This idea came in the mind of the researcher after almost all respondents, indicating the weakness of the DRC Government in handling security challenges, more especially, the number of different rebel groups operating on its soil. So, when a nation fail to address its internal issues, becomes very difficult to deal with International matters.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TRANSMITTAL LETTER FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Dear Sir/ Madam,

Greetings!

I am MUDAHERANWA Regis, student in International Relations and Diplomacy of Kampala International University, Uganda. Part of the requirements for the award is a Masters dissertation. My study is entitled **“THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA INFLUENCE ON DRC/ RWANDA RELATIONS”**. Within this context, may I request you to participate in this study by answering the questionnaires? Kindly do not leave any option unanswered. Any data you will provide shall be for academic purposes only and no information of such kind shall be disclosed to others.

Thank you very much in advance.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. MUDAHERANWA Regis

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRES, INTERVIEWS AND FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION

I. QUESTIONS TO BE ADMINISTERED TO DRC REFUGEES IN CAMPS

(Please tick the most appropriate answer)

SECTION “A”: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC

1. Sex

(a) Male

(b) Female

2. Age

(a) Below 20 years

(b) Between 20-35 years

(c) 35 years and above

3. Marital status

(a) Single

(b) Married

(c) Divorced

(d) Widow/er

4. Education Background

1) Certificate

2) Diploma

3) Bachelors

4) Masters

5) Ph.D.

SECTION “B”: THE ROLE OF FDLR IN INFLUENCING RWANDA & DRC RELATIONS.

1. How long have you been in this campus?

- (a) Less than 5 years ☐
- (b) Between 5-10 years ☐
- (c) Above 10 years ☐

2. Do you plan to return back to your homeland?

- (a) If FDLR disarmed and return back in Rwanda
- (b) If the government of DRC wants
- (c) If peace restores in Eastern Congo
- (d) Any suggestion..... (specify)

3. Do you know about FDLR?

- (a) Yes ☐
- (b) No ☐

4. If # 1 above answers is yes, then, how?

- (a) We were attacked by them ☐
- (b) Heard news on them from other people. ☐
- (c) None of above ☐

5. According to you, have the presence of the FDLR in DRC affected Rwanda/DRC relations?

- (a) Yes ☐
- (b) No ☐
- (c) I Don’t know ☐

6. If # 3 above answer is yes, then, how?

- (a) They attacked Rwanda Several Times ☐
- (b) Attacking Tutsi communities in DRC ☐
- (c) Collaborating with DRC Government/Military ☐

SECTION “C”: THE EXTENT OF FDLR ACTIVITIES/HOSTILITIES

1. What are the common activities do you know that were carried out by FDLR? ☐
- (a) Frequent attacks/killings against Tutsi communities in and outside DRC, ☐
- (b) Recruitment within DRC and in the Great Lakes Region in general. ☐
- (c) Raping women in the DRC ☐
- (d) Illegal business (Mining, arms trafficking, etc...) ☐

2. How do you think those activities have affected:
- i. Women (Please circle one or more possible answers below)
- (a) Trauma ☐
- (b) HIV/AIDS ☐
- (c) Divorce ☐
- (d) Increased Maternal Mortality Rate ☐
- (e) Others (Please Mention.....)
- ii. Children
- (a) School Dropout ☐
- (b) Child Soldier ☐
- (c) Trauma ☐
- (d) Increased Infant Mortality Rate ☐
- iii. General Population
- (a) State of fear among Communities in Both Kivus ☐
- (b) Loss of lives/Properties ☐
- (c) Description of Socio-Economic activities ☐

3. Have these (above) activities also affected other Nations?
- (a) Yes ☐
- (b) No ☐
- (c) I Don't know ☐
4. Have these activities contributed in formation of Rebel groups
- (a) Yes ☐
- (b) No ☐
- (c) I Don't know ☐

(d) Please if possible explain your answer

5. Have these activities contributed to Rwanda’s Intervention in the DRC?

(a) Yes ☐

(b) No ☐

SECTION “D”: EFFORTS TO GET SOLUTIONS

1. Have you know of any efforts to ban/fight or halt FDLR?

(a) Yes ☐

(b) No ☐

2. If # 1 above answer is yes, then, who among the following you have known have put efforts?

(a) Governments of Rwanda and DRC

(b) Media ☐

(c) MONUSCO (UN) ☐

(d) Others (Please Mention).....

3. In relation to Question 1, can you mention some of the efforts put in place?

.....
.....
.....

4. Have you been consulted about the role you can play in getting solutions to this problem?

5. If above answer is yes, who contacted you and what kind of ideas did you provide?

SECTION E: INTERVIEW FOR OFFICIALS

1. Let’s speak about FDLR

- i. In your opinion, what made them to emerge?
- ii. Why is it that they continue to exist in the DRC?
- iii. Do you think they can be totally eliminated in the DRC? And who can do this?

2. What do you think the

- (a) UN
- (b) African Union and
- (c) International Community in general should have done in relation to FDLR Presence in DRC, which they have never done?

- (d) Let's speak about Rwanda's intervention in DRC.
 - i. Was it because of FDLR activities?
 - ii. Is there any other reason which contributed to this intervention?
 - iii. Is this intervention the best option for durable solution?
- (e) According to you, will Rwanda/DRC at one time have cordial/mutual relations? And how?
- (f) There have been several interventions in DRC by different Countries, in your opinion, why DRC ranks Rwanda as the first to be blamed for violating her Sovereignty?
- (g) Anything do you think you can add which I did not ask you?

SECTION "F": GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

- Do you have some ideas relevant to what can be done to restore relations between Rwanda and DRC?
- Could you be having anything about this study you want to share with me?

END

APPENDIX C: PHOTOS

PHOTO 1: FDLR REBELS POSING FOR A PHOTO IN DRC JUNGLES.



PHOTO2: FDLR REPORTERS AND PRISONERS OF WAR (RDRC-MUTOBO)





Photo3: M23 Rebel Officers and Cadres listening to the Researcher's briefing before interviews



COLLEGE OF HIGHER DEGREES AND RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

24, June, 2014

**INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR MUDAHERANWA REGIS REG. NUMBER
MIR/40089/131/DF TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN YOUR ORGANIZATION.**

The above mentioned candidate is a bonafide student of Kampala international University pursuing a Master's of International Relations.



He is currently conducting a field research for his dissertation entitled "**The Democratic forces for the liberation of Rwanda influence on DRC/Rwanda relations**".

Your organization has been identified as valuable source of information pertaining to His research Project. The purpose of this letter then is to request you to avail him with pertinent information he may need.

Any information shared with him will be used for academic purposes only and shall be kept with utmost confidentiality.

Any assistance rendered to him will be highly appreciated.

Yours truly,



Dr. ES Kasenene
Deputy Principal, CHDR.

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

..... July 2014



**MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
KIGALI**

Mr. MUDAHERANWA Regis
Tel: +250 788353511
KIGALI

Subject: Permission to collect Data

Reference is made to your letter dated 20th July 2014 requesting a permission to collect data regarding your research thesis entitled **"THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR THE LIBERATION OF RWANDA INFLUENCE ON DRC/RWANDA RELATIONS"**.

I'm happy to inform you that, the permission to conduct your survey is granted, however, remember to provide a copy of any aggregate results to our administration after compilation of your report.

If there are any questions, please contact my office on +250788547530

Sincerely yours;

MUGANEZA André
Camp Manager

