

IGAD IN INTRA-STATE CONFLICT IN UPPER NILE, SOUTH SUDAN

BY

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Master of Conflict Resolution and peace Building
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my own research work, except for the acknowledged literature, which is cited. I have not submitted this research work in whole or in part for the award of a degree or diploma in any other institution.

Signed

AJANG ATEM JOSEPH


Date 06/11/2016

APPROVAL

This is to certify that this dissertation has been submitted to the University Academic Board of Examiners with my approval as University Supervisor.

Dr. Chrisostom Oketch (PhD)

Sign.....

Date

DEDICATION

I dedicate this book to Col. Gai Chatiem Puoch, the defence attaché in the Embassy of the Republic of south Sudan in Uganda.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I acknowledge Col. Gai Chatien for the support he made to me during my studies at Kampala international(KIU)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AUPSA	African Union Peace and Security Architecture
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
SADC	South African Development Co-operation
US	United States
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
NGOs.....	Non-governmental Organizations
ECOWAS	Economic Cooperation of West African States
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement In Opposition
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army In Opposition
EAC	East African Community
UNDP	United Nations Development Programs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force

ABSTRACT

The study on the role of IGAD in Intra-State Conflict was carried out from Upper Nile State of South Sudan. The study was guided by four specific objectives: (i) To establish the role of IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan; (ii) To examine the effects of intra-state conflict on peace and security in Upper Nile State, South Sudan; (iii) To identify the challenges faced by IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan; and (iv) To examine the possible measures to the challenges faced by IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. A descriptive survey research design was adopted for the study using a sample size of 108 participants who were interviewed individually and in Focus Group Discussions. Study findings revealed that IGAD performs the role of capacity building in the Horn of Africa and networking with other regional blocs in peace security; the conflict has brought economic crises in the region and greatly affected investment and rendering people homeless as well as refugees; funding is one of the challenges faced by IGAD and the lack of impartiality by member states; and reconciliation being one of the measures used among warring parties. The study recommends that the warring communities should always undertake the initiative to solve their problems without influence of external actors who have their own agendas and the need for IGAD to network with African Union force in beefing up security.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This opening chapter describes the background of the study comprising of the historical, theoretical, conceptual and, contextual perspectives. It includes the statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research objectives, research questions, scope of the study, and significance of the study.

1.1 Background of the Study

Since decolonization of Africa, the power struggle within and between African governments has resulted in civil unrest and intra-state warfare. These conflicts have been the target of peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives of the Western powers, the United Nations (UN), European Union and neighboring African states. States, regional and international organizations have intervened, for example, to relieve humanitarian suffering, to defend and promote democracy, to defuse hostile transnational movements, to determine the outcomes of civil wars, and to build (and transform) the institutions and capacities of 'fragile' or 'failing' states (Holzgrefe, 2003). With the success African Union has experienced in quelling violence and civil unrest through regionalism, many hopes this interdependence of states through regional integration has may be a possible remedy for African turbulence. This study sought to evaluate the efficacy of IGAD in promotion of international peace and security response to regionalism and peacekeeping efforts in Upper Nile state of South Sudan.

1.1 Background of the Study

African security can be simplistically defined as the ability of African nations to ward off all forms of threats to its survival ranging from external aggression to challenges of economic, political, social and cultural deprivations while coping with the challenges of political development and good governance. The issue security is usually explained by the stability and predictability of the system, and the level of negotiation. In an increasingly interdependent world, the pursuit of security by nations precipitates a feeling of insecurity in many other nations. After their independence in the 1960s and in response to the various sources of insecurity in Africa and the international environment, around 32 newly emerging African states formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 following the beginning of the "demise" of European colonialism (Elaigwu, 1996).

1.1.1 Historical Perspective

In 1954 an agreement was signed that provided for self-determination and self-governance for Sudan on 1 January 1956 after more than fifty-five years of colonization by the British. The British had ruled Sudan divided in an Arab North and African South until 1946, when it decided to reverse this policy and unite the country. Nevertheless deep disparities remained. When the government in Khartoum renounced promises to establish a federal system in 1954, it led to mutiny of Southern army officers in Torit in Eastern Equatoria. "On 18 August of that year, just months before Sudan was to declare independence, a locally-recruited unit of soldiers called the Equatoria Corps rose against the immanent government in Khartoum" (Schomerus, 2008: 18). Several groups

emerged and gradually developed in the Anya Nya movement that spread from the Equatorias to Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. The war lasted seventeen years until the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which provided some autonomy for the South in exchange for the rebels laying down their arms.

The clashes between the Arab-run state and the peripheries are rooted in marginalization in the economic development process and exclusion from power structures.” (Jok, 2007). Dissatisfaction in the south persisted and increased autonomy of the South was again limited. In response to the abolition of the federal structure a rebel movement was formed in 1978 known as Anya Nya II, and started attacks from Ethiopia from 1980 onwards. Then in 1983 Colonel Gafaar Nimeiry, who had taken power in Khartoum through a coup d’état in 1969, instituted the Shari’a Islamic law in the whole country, including the South. This proved to be the final drop for the predominantly Christian South, which felt more and more oppressed by the predominantly Islamic North. After mutiny of a group of Southern soldiers in Bor and Pibor, John Garang was sent to deal with the problem, but he joined the Anya Nya II movement and formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), marking the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war. Soon thereafter, conflict grew between the SPLA and Anya Nya II and the latter joined the government.

In Khartoum a coup d’états in 1985 and various changes of government followed until in 1989 Omar Hassan al-Bashir took power and ruled the country through the

Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation. He allied himself with Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF) that had been influencing Khartoum politics since 1979. Al-Bashir was then appointed as president of Sudan in 1993 and the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation was dissolved. Exploiting the tensions between Southern groups, Al-Bashir used various proxy forces to fight within and against the South. Further complicating the conflict was the discovery of large oil reserves in the South in the late 1970s. Production was predominantly controlled by the north and formed an extra motivation for continuation of the conflict on both sides. Oil production was used to finance the conflict, oil fields became strategic targets, oil related development such as roads eased military movements, and foreign interests in oil not necessarily aligned with the promotion of peace (c.f. Switzer, 2002: ECOS, 2010).

The SPLA claimed to fight for John Garang's vision of a federal Sudan with equal rights for all citizens. This, however, was criticized by some as an attempt to bring the south under SPLA that is Dinka control. "In the early 1980s Equatorians supported the expulsion of Dinka and other Nilotic peoples from their region and, in response, a belief developed in SPLA ranks that Equatorians had never truly 'supported the struggle'" (Schomerus, 2008). SPLA-commanders Riek Machar (Nuer), Lam Akol (Shilluk) and Gordon Kong (Nuer) attempted a coup against Garang in 1991. Whereas Garang advocated for a united secular and democratic 'New Sudan', Machar advocated a

politically independent South Sudan. Machar broke away with the SPLA-Nasir faction after a failed coup.

Machar's Nuer militia attacked the Bor Dinka in Garang's home territory in 1991. More than 100,000 people (almost all civilians) were estimated to be killed in this attack and the victorious Nuer looted and took cattle with them back North. This is one of the most raw and still persistent wounds in the South (and in Jonglei in particular) and still affects the relations between Dinka and Nuer today (Young, 2007).

Machar signed the 'April 1997 Peace Agreement' with the NIF, through which seven armed groups used by Khartoum as proxy were symbolically combined into the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF). The alliance between Khartoum and the SSDF was maintained by providing resources, providing cash payouts to senior commanders, playing the 'ethnic card' and drawing upon popular prejudices against John Garang and the Dinka ethnic group as the SSDF was primarily Nuer (Small Arms Survey, 2006). Within the SSDF Machar, unable to push for a referendum on southern self-determination in exchange for his cooperation against the SPLA, became frustrated and ended his alliance with the Government of Sudan (GoS) in 2000. He briefly formed the Sudan People's Defense Force (SPDF) before re-joining the SPLA. Paulino Matieb took control over the SSDF forces, and "became a potent symbol for disaffected Nuer and other southerners who had rejected Garang's leadership" (Young, 2007). Garang never entered full negotiations with the SSDF and always tried to lure individual commanders to defect, only to marginalize these defectors afterwards (Young, 2005).

Then on January 2005, with much international pressure, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Nairobi, formally ending war between North and South. The CPA started a six year interim period which contained the possibility for an independent South through a referendum in 2011. During the 6 year period the South gained a large degree of autonomy and the country was ruled by a Government of National Unity consisting of the GoS and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). The referendum started on 9 January in 2011, and the official results released on 8 February showed that 98,83 per cent voted for independence (SSRC & SSRB, 2011). The date set for independence is 9 June 2011 while many challenges remain. Creating a unified south proves difficult, as there is little trust between various groups within the South. Several 'private armies' within the SPLA remain loyal to their commanders whose authority trumps regular chain of command, and reportedly as little as 30 per cent of the SPLA is under control of the SPLA command (Evoy & LeBrun, 2010). Furthermore, tensions remain high and fighting has again erupted between the north and the south in Abyei, as well as between different tribes in the south as exemplified by the recent violence in Upper Nile state.

Conflict resolution traditionally starts at the community level in South Sudan although capacities to do so vary throughout. Common disagreement within the community can be resolved within the community, with additional help from traditional leaders and sometimes the police. Examples of security promotion by the community themselves

include having “an alarm system that works with drums to warn people when danger is coming” and using “spears and clubs”. Peace conferences are organized with outside assistance to address cattle raiding and conflict between communities. The lack of permanent success of these conferences is often attributed to lacking participation of the entire community rather than only chiefs and spokespersons for sections of the community. Moreover, (Schomerus & Allen, 2010) found that such meetings according to some Sudanese even undermine the establishment of a strong rule of law, because people could reconcile without a justice component. However, in places where chiefs remain a respected and representative authority, inter communal dialogue rightfully remains an important feature in mitigating inter communal conflict. Moreover, dialogue should be accompanied with practical and contextualized follow-up to enhance the feasibility of sustainable and peaceful outcomes.

African Union in conflict resolution; show that the AU has indeed began to administer complex, costly and dangerous peacekeeping operations - formerly the preserve of the United Nations. Thus, the Peace and Security Council loosely modelled on the UN Security Council, which was created as a response to increasing cases of conflicts in Africa, has become the most visible evidence of Africa’s growing security capacity. Where peaceful resolution had failed in conflict resolution in Africa in the past therefore, the AU had even resorted to military intervention. (AU Summit, 2002).

The AU's first military intervention in a member state was the May 2003 deployment of Peacekeeping forces of soldiers from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi. AU troops were also deployed in Sudan for peacekeeping in the Darfur conflict, before the mission was handed over to the United Nations on 1 January 2008. The AU has also sent a peacekeeping mission to Somalia of which the troops are from Uganda and Burundi. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/africanaunion>).

1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective

This study was anchored on two theoretical perspectives on intervention, namely realist and the game theories. The realists believe that states do not act unselfishly in the international system, as they are inclined to pursue parochial national interests (Morgenthau, 1967). According to this school of thought, when states conduct peacemaking interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, apparently on behalf of the international community, they do so not only to secure political and diplomatic support and consensus but also to camouflage their own national interests. Globalists, on the other hand, believe that the post-Cold War international system constitutes what can loosely be called a global community. Thus when states undertake peacemaking interventions, they do so primarily to alleviate human suffering.

According to the realist perspective, intervention can still be best understood in terms of power and interest while the globalist's view international law and moral principles as also playing significant roles (Sassy, 1990). Thus, while globalists have justified expanding international intervention, realists warn that hegemony may cloak their

interests in the language of the common good and may claim to be acting in the name of the international community. For instance, Sub-regional hegemony often tries to obtain multilateral consensus after initiating and orchestrating peacemaking interventions, "in order to achieve their hidden agendas in the target states." (Lyons& Mastanduno, 1995:12).

The realist paradigm suggests two factors that are likely to be important in the decision to undertake a peacemaking intervention: power and interest (Robert et al, 2010) the globalist paradigm suggests two completely different factors: international law and morality as bases of intervention in other state's conflict. The study will be anchored on the realist or struggle for power and survival theory by Morgenthau, 1967. Realism assumes that all human beings inherently seek to increase their power. Morgenthau (1967) further argues that success is the degree to which one is able to impose hegemony over other(s). The choice of these occasions will be determined by a careful calculation of the interests involved and the power available. In regards to intervention, Morgenthau argues that "most of the interveners secure their national interest where their power gives them a chance to succeed. In international politics, states are always concerned about national interests such as security and wealth. This theory further assumes that when states conduct peacemaking interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, in order to secure political and diplomatic support (Morgenthau, 1967). It is on this theoretical background that the current study seeks to interrogate realism in

relation to the regional intervention in South Sudan conflict peace and security in intra-state of Upper Nile.

The Games Theory by (Myerson, 1991) is a branch of applied mathematics that is used in the social sciences (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory). Games theory attempts to mathematically capture behaviour in strategic situations or games, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others (Myerson, 1991). Games theory has been widely recognized as an important tool in many fields. According to Ofoegbu (1980), the games framework of international relations focuses attention on rational choices and conflict resolution. Other notable contributions to the evolution of games theory include the works of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), Morgenstern (1963), W.H. Rikert (1962), and Thomas Schelling (1960).

1.1.3 Conceptual Perspective

Conflict refers to some forms of friction, disagreement, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group (Rakhim, 2010). The researcher conceptualized the term conflict as opposing interests between parties in a zero-sum situation, and power struggle between the parties that seek power as ultimate means to achieve their goals (Robert, 1990). The study further operationalizes intrastate conflict as organized armed violence within a country that results in at least 200 fatalities (Regan, 2001).

1.1.4 Contextual background

South Sudan that attained independent status on 9 July 2011 from Sudan is the world's newest country. This independence was gained after more than five decades of liberation war in which an estimates 2.5 million people perished. Independence was finally gained through the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in, Naivasha , Kenya. South Sudan is a vast country with multi-ethnic population and endowed with natural resources including oil. Soon after independence the founding President of the country died in a helicopter crash (Wel, 2013). After fighting so long for freedom from domination communal conflicts, particularly in the Jonglei State persisted. The unity of southerners has always been tenuous, and in the post-independence era it became it is further threatened by the seemingly inevitable competition for resources, political power and other spoils of the state-building process.

The South Sudanese Civil War is an ongoing conflict in South Sudan between forces of the government and opposition forces. It began on the evening of Sunday, 15 December 2013, at the meeting of the National Liberation Council at Nyakuron, when opposition leaders Dr. Riek Machar, Pagan Amum and Rebecca Nyandeng voted to boycott the meeting. President Salva Kiir ordered the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Army General Marial Ciennoung, commander of the Presidential Guard (The Tiger Battalion) to leave the meeting venue and return to the barracks to disarm the troops. After disarming all ethnicities within the guard, Marial allegedly ordered that the Dinka members be re-armed. His deputy, from the Nuer ethnicity, began to question this order and a fight ensued when surrounding officers saw the commotion. The Nuer

soldiers also re-armed themselves. Fighting erupted between the Dinka elements of the Presidential Guard and the Nuer elements, lasting from Sunday night until Monday afternoon. Civilian casualties began when the Dinka elements of the SPLA began targeting Nuer civilians in the capital city of Juba. (Sudan Tribune 2013)

It was on 27th December 2013 when the IGAD led mediation process for south Sudan was set up and three special envoys were appointed by the IGAD's member of states in responses to the ongoing crisis in the country with mission of mediation and support all parties to achieve a sustainable inclusive and comprehensive peace in South Sudan (office of IGAD F. A. Q, 2013). Three envoys, from Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan shuttled between Juba and Addis Ababa where peace talks are held. Their efforts led to session of hostilities which have often been violated. IGAD was established in 1986 and is a successor to Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) and had a narrow mandate on issues relating to Drought and Desertification. This mandate was reviewed in mid-1990s to make the organization a fully-fledged regional political, economic, development trade and security. The regional body comprises of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. As it can be seen the South Sudan conflict places several regional interests at stake, thus creating dynamic perspectives.

Upper Nile State, of South Sudan, an area that has recently been hit by insecurity due to activity by rebel militia groups. By October 2010, received a significant number of South Sudanese returning from North Sudan ahead of independence. "Independence is

likely to worsen conflicts over land in Upper Nile as more returnees arrive from the North," a resident of Malakal, who declined to be named, told IRIN. "More sensitization is needed for people to understand that things won't change overnight." In February and March, rebel militias engaged the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in fierce fighting in the town of Malakal, displacing hundreds of civilians. Andrea Maya Felo, deputy governor of Upper Nile State, told IRIN in Malakal, the state capital: "As a government, peace and reconciliation is our priority - reconciling the Shilluk dominant community in the state among themselves those pro-Dinka and those against the Dinka; we even spoke to the Shilluk king recently about the establishment of a peace initiative and he welcomed the idea. He promised to work with us."

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Violent internal conflict broke out in the Republic of South Sudan on 15 December 2013 when long-standing tensions within the country's ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), broke out into armed conflict in the nation's capital, Juba. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) split between forces loyal to the Government (President Salva Kiir) and forces loyal to former Vice-President, Riek Machar. The violence spread rapidly amongst security forces in Juba, engulfing whole neighborhoods and resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths within days (Frontier Economics, 2015).

The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) was rapidly formed under the leadership of Dr. Riek Machar and its armed wing threatened to take over

Jubaby waging the wave's attacks towards the capital. However, Juba remained under government control as a result of the quick intervention of the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) in December 2013 at the invitation of the Government of South Sudan, as well as the support of allied militia groups. Soon disputes within SPM intensified and on 15 Decembers, 2011 the dispute broke out into an intrastate war pitting President Salva Kiir against his former Deputy Rierk Machar. The SPLM and its army (SPLA) quickly split resulting in the formation of the SPLA in opposition. The new war in South Sudan began with gun battle in Juba on the night of December 15, 2013 that has so far claimed thousands of lives and displaced 1.5 million people (HRW 2014, 6, 8). It is against this background African Union has taken the initiative to intervene diplomatically and mediate the warring parties to promote peace and security in South Sudan.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to assess the role of IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Africa in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

1.4 Objectives

- i. To establish the role of IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan
- ii. To examine the effects of intra-state conflict on peace and security in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.
- iii. To identify the challenges faced by IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

- iv. To examine the possible measures to the challenges faced by IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

1.5 Research Questions

- i. What is the role of IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan?
- ii. What are the effects of intra-state conflict on peace and security in Upper Nile State, South Sudan?
- iii. What are the challenges faced by IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan?
- iv. What are the possible measures to the challenges faced by IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan?

1.6 Scope of the Study

1.6.1 Geographical Scope

The study was carried out in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Upper Nile State borders Jonglei from the South, Sudan in the North, Ethiopia from the East and Western Barghazel State from the West.

1.6.2 Theoretical Scope

The study is guided by the two broad contending theoretical perspectives on intervention, namely Realist and Game theories.

1.6.3 Time Scope

This study focused on a period of 2013 – 2015 considering that this was the time when IGAD roles in promoting peace and security took shape.

1.6.4 Content Scope

The study was limited to the role of IGAD in promoting peace and security in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

1.7 Significance of the Study

To the peace makers and the government

The findings of the study contribute to the government of South Sudan and other regional bodies concerning solutions to the ongoing conflict and insecurity in South Sudan.

To future researchers

The study provides a basis for further research in other areas affected by conflicts in the country and at the same time providing literature for student's, researchers and other interesting readers.

Academicians

The study creates a platform for academicians to get detailed information on the promotion of international peace and security in intra-state conflict in Africa particularly the in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature of relevance to the study. It starts with a theoretical review, and a review of related literature in relation to the study variables. The study reviewed the literature in line with the specific objectives in order to identify the knowledge gaps.

2.1 Theoretical review

2.1.1 Realist Theory

The realists believe that states do not act unselfishly in the international system, as they are inclined to pursue parochial national interests (Morgenthau, 1967). According to this school of thought, when states conduct peacemaking interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, apparently on behalf of the international community, they do so not only to secure political and diplomatic support and consensus but also to camouflage their own national interests. Globalists, on the other hand, believe that the post-Cold War international system constitutes what can loosely be called a global community. Thus, when states undertake peacemaking interventions, they do so primarily to alleviate human suffering.

According to the realist perspective, intervention can still be best understood in terms of power and interest while the globalist's view international law and moral principles as also playing significant roles (Sassy,1990). Thus, while globalists have justified expanding international intervention, realists warn that hegemony may cloak their

interests in the language of the common good and may claim to be acting in the name of the international community. For instance, Sub-regional hegemony often tries to obtain multilateral consensus after initiating and orchestrating peacemaking interventions, "in order to achieve their hidden agendas in the target states." (Lyons& Mastanduno, 1995:12).

The realist paradigm suggests two factors that are likely to be important in the decision to undertake a peacemaking intervention: power and interest (Robert et al, 2010) the globalist paradigm suggests two completely different factors: international law and morality as bases of intervention in other state's conflict. The study will be anchored on the realist or struggle for power and survival theory by Morgenthau, 1967. Realism assumes that all human beings inherently seek to increase their power. Morgenthau (1967) further argues that success is the degree to which one is able to impose hegemony over other(s). The choice of these occasions will be determined by a careful calculation of the interests involved and the power available. In regards to intervention, Morgenthau argues that "most of the interveners secure their national interest where their power gives them a chance to succeed. In international politics, states are always concerned about national interests such as security and wealth. This theory further assumes that when states conduct peacemaking interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, in order to secure political and diplomatic support (Morgenthau, 1967). It is on this theoretical background that the current study seeks to interrogate realism in

relation to the regional intervention in South Sudan conflict peace and security in intra-state of Upper Nile.

2.1.2 Game Theory

The second theory that this study was anchored on is the game theory by (Myerson, 1991). Taken as a branch of applied mathematics that is used in the social sciences, the theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations or games, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others (Myerson, 1991). Games theory has been widely recognized as an important tool in many fields. According to Ofoegbu (1980), the games framework of international relations focuses attention on rational choices and conflict resolution. Other notable contributions to the evolution of games theory include the works of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), Morgenstern (1963), W.H. Rikert (1962), and Thomas Schelling (1960). Intrastate conflicts in Africa especially in African Union in promotion of international Peace and security in intra-state in south Sudan.

2.2 Inter State Conflict in Africa

To interrogate the concept of conflict, we must agree that conflict is as old as mankind. Experience has shown that conflicts are usually the result of incompatible interests. We also know that human beings are in one form of relationship or another. It is in these relationships that conflicts generally occur. (Dahrendorf 1959) Furthermore, Wasburn (1982) cited a posited that in every social organization, including total societies, there are some positions with the right to exercise control over others and this differential

distribution of authority becomes the determining factor of politically significant social conflict. In addition, to demonstrate that conflict pervades human existence.

Ball and Peters (2000:28) opine that although the possibilities of resolution of conflicts are numerous, the essence of a political situation remains: that of conflict and the resolution of that conflict. Halebsky (1976:95) has also maintained that society is importantly, though not exclusively characterized by relations of conflict. Furthermore, on the inevitability of conflicts, Ball and Peters (2000:34) have posited that the propaganda myths that propose the end of conflict, with the realization of certain social and economic changes, should not be accepted as the actual creation of a conflict-free society.

On causes of conflict, Ball and Peters (2003:31) are of the opinion that the diversity that gives rise to conflict need not have an objective base such as economic or racial differences. They at the same time recognize that all differences are not sources of conflict at public level because; the differences between tall men and short men do not give rise to political conflict. On his part, Halebsky (1976:101) has among other factors opined that: racial, ethnic, linguistic, and other cultural traits are frequent sources of group differences and conflict. However, it appears as if self-interest is at the root of all conflicts and it has in this regard, been posited that if we scrutinize some former wars in the world, conflicts therefore pervade the entire society. Thus, to engage in conflict resolution, would not be a curious African engagement.

In the example cases considered here, IGAD and relevant sub-regional organization either cooperated or failed to successfully cooperate, providing a study of the practice of the working relationship as it is unfolding in the present, regardless of the principles that exist in the legal agreements. East Africa/the Horn of Africa generally suffers from a void in regional leadership in peacemaking, despite IGAD's past leadership on the peace process that led to the resolution of the long-running war between the Government of Sudan and the Southern rebel groups. Strong institutional rivalry occurring in both South and West Africa between the AU and relevant sub-regional organization (and at times, the UN), where the principle of subsidiary is only claimed when it is politically convenient. Decision making on mediations and peacemaking remains fraught and stressed rather than reflecting true collaboration or implementation of the principle of comparative advantage.

The study carried out in Zimbabwe has been plagued by thirty years of pseudo-democracy, a legacy of racially-based land alienation, and a more recent profound economic collapse in the early 2000s. Elections since 1980 have often been accompanied by violence and intimidation, while the land reform issue has also caused internal crises over many years that have more recently resulted in external condemnation and concern due to the government's increasingly rapid and politicized takeover of white-owned farms. Robert Mugabe, liberation hero and head of government since 1980, has led his ZANU-PF party through three decades of political dominance, although not without using the state security apparatuses and other resources to help secure his political position.

Shortly after the June 2008 presidential run-off elections in Zimbabwe, the Annual AU Assembly Summit also took the events under consideration. The AU shied from condemning Mugabe's electoral tampering and political violence. Rather, the AU called on the parties to come together and resolve the crisis. The resolution also expressed the AU's support for the SADC facilitation, and recommended that SADC should continue to carry out the mediation process by establishing a local mechanism to speed a negotiated end to the crisis. Certain voices within the AU, however, did call for stronger action in the face of ongoing stalemate. By December 2008, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga called for an AU ousting of President Mugabe, specifically requesting that then-AU Chair Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete should implement a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. Privately, a diplomatic battle did ensue between Kikwete and Mbeki, with Presidents Kikwete, Mwanawasa of Zambia and Khama of Botswana urging an expanded mediation team and a more robust UN role. The efforts were strongly resisted by Mbeki.¹⁸ Mbeki did however help conclude the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 11 September 2008, bringing an end to the immediate political crisis.

The study in Kenya reflected on election-related violence, resulting in 3,000 to 6,000 deaths between 1991 and 1998, with large numbers displaced. Daniel Arap Moi's contentious presidency from 1978 to 2002, paved the way for a joint cross-ethnic opposition campaign and victory in 2002 led by Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki. However, by 2005, the co-ethnic government split over power sharing and constitutional disputes, forming the two sides that would confront each other in the 2007 election: Odinga's

Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU). The ODM was viewed as being dominated by ethnic Luo and Kalenjin, the PNU by the majority Kikuyu. The ethnic unease was largely rooted in concerns over land and power sharing, with the smaller ethnic groups weary of Kikuyu dominance. The Luo, Kenya's second largest tribe, more specifically felt excluded in the government and political system.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, under the umbrella of the All-Africa Conference of Churches, entered as the first external mediator, but found that he was unable to get the two parties to agree to international mediation. AU Chairman and Ghanaian President John Kufuor then went to Kenya in early January 2008 to lead the effort. He presented the parties with a document outlining steps to resolve the crisis. The PNU rejected the proposal for a possible re-run of the election that was favoured by the ODM. Near the end of the mission, Kufuor announced that the mediation would be further handled by a Panel of Eminent African Personalities, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The parties accepted.

The East African Community (EAC) was also active in trying to initiate mediation efforts shortly after Tutu's failed attempt. The EAC, led by its Chairperson Ugandan President Museveni as well as Tanzanian President Kikwete, contacted Kibaki and Odinga to have a regional meeting to resolve the crisis. However, the early effort was hindered by Museveni's preliminary endorsement of Kibaki's victory, leading to distrust between

Museveni and the ODM. Despite the first round of failure, Museveni tried again, acting on behalf of the EAC and the Commonwealth, to start a parallel initiative at the same time as the AU Panel was arriving. He met with both parties and proposed a solution through a judicial commission of inquiry, which was left hanging by the time Annan started his major mediation attempt. Similarly, IGAD made early attempts to hold talks with the parties, but their efforts were thwarted as the opposition ODM leadership claimed the talks could not be held with Kibaki since he was no longer the legitimate head of state. Positively, the IGAD team endorsed the efforts by Annan and pledged to avoid crowding the mediation process and complicating the situation with a multiplicity of peacemaking initiatives.

2.0

The final lead mediation team arrived in Kenya on 24 January 2008 and initiated the dialogue between the two negotiating teams, including five representatives from each of the political parties. For the first month of the process only indirect talks were held. The teams worked out an agenda and the issues that needed to be addressed, but after a few weeks, no agreement was yet reached over how to resolve the election predicament. After delays by the parties, Kofi Annan suspended the process and called for direct talks between Kibaki and Odinga, which he would facilitate. Annan contended that he could not let the parties hide behind the mediators any longer. The final talks included Annan, Kibaki, Odinga, former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa, and Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete (then-AU Chair), bringing a strong East African regional influence into the final power-sharing negotiations.

The Conflict and the parties Intense political competition ensued in Cote d'Ivoire after the death of the country's founding figure, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, in 1993. The first successful coup d'état occurred in December 1999. Three years later, civil war erupted in September 2002, when a section of the army took control of the northern half of the country. Three emerging rebel groups aligned under the name the Forces Nouvelles (FN), covering two-thirds of the country. Their grievances mainly related to their political alienation and marginalization by the southern-based government which had, over the years, tried to exclude Northern politicians on the basis that they are actually foreigners from neighbouring countries. The nationalist concept of ivoirité, introduced in the 1990s, marginalized and excluded from citizenship rights many who did not belong to the southern ethnic groups, or those who were unable to prove their indigeness.

Although the post-2010-election institutional relationship is the centre of analysis, I will first briefly recap the mediation efforts that preceded it. ECOWAS quickly initiated talks after the coup in 2002, leading to an initial ceasefire agreement which broke down by 2003, requiring further mediations under French and South African leadership. After years of international failure, President Gbagbo eventually proposed direct talks with the leader of the FN in December 2006, sidelining the international interventions and opting for a regional solution. Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, although considered biased towards the FN, offered and was accepted to facilitate the talks that lead to the OPA. ECOWAS supported the then agreed upon election (which was delayed over the next two years) by deploying an election observer mission including members

of its Council of the Wise, although the Council members have not played a high profile role in the post-election crisis.

In January, the new AU envoy, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, arrived in Abidjan to make a new attempt. Odinga's two official visits to Cote d'Ivoire were not fruitful and he was rejected as being biased by President Gbagbo. The AU sent its Chairperson, President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi, on an unannounced visit on 25 January to meet with the antagonists, even though Odinga was still officially the AU envoy at the time. Following Odinga's failure, at its 29 – 30 January summit, the AU created a panel of heads of state tasked with finding a way out of the crisis; the members included Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, then chair of the AU PSC, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, Idriss Deby of Chad, Jacob Zuma of South Africa and Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, who worked along with the AU Commissioner and ECOWAS President. The Panel worked throughout February, prepared to hold talks with both sides and create a binding solution to the crisis. However, the panel faced serious challenges from the outset, with members of the panel holding differing opinions about the possible use of force and Gbagbo supporters opposing the role of Compaoré on the panel, alleging he was an ally of Ouattara.

The application of the liberal peace model in Côte d'Ivoire has not proven successful. The negotiations held under the AU and UN from 2004 to 2005 led to a cessation of violence, but a failure to solve the underlying issues of the conflict. This problem

repeated in the 2007 OPA negotiations, which also failed to calm underlying political fault lines, hence creating the political space for the re-emergence of the crisis in late 2010. Another transitional, power sharing solution would only be a repeat of the past agreements and would not, in all likelihood, create a lasting and sustainable peace, nor restore democracy to the country, even if it would be accepted by the parties.

2.3 The challenges faced by Regional Organizations in Promoting Peace and Security in intra-state conflict in Africa

The central procedural problem that has already been illustrated is that there are no definitive guidelines provided in the AU charter, the PSC protocol, or any other high-level document that define the process and entry point for mediation. this void allows for ad hoc procedures to be followed which may clash with the efforts of sub-regional organizations or other actors. in Madagascar, the au and SADC, tried to initiate mediation efforts and ultimately undermined each other attempts to act in the lead position, creating confusion and tension that took away from the focus on resolving the crisis. Without procedures being defined, regional or international entry will be left in the hands of political heavy weights that may or may not have an implementable, functioning peacemaking strategy and that may or may not be willing to commit to seeing out a durable peace.

Certain institutional weaknesses still need to be improved on within the AU itself. The AU December 2007 self-audit produced a strong critique of the administrative management of the organization under AU Commissioner Konaré. It described the relationship between the chair and the eight commissioners as dysfunctional, and that

there was a poor institutionalization of authority levels. There was no acceptance of a clear chain of command or a way to coordinate overlapping mandates, which are a frequent occurrence. The Commission was also under-staffed and relying heavily on short-term consultants rather than permanent staff, which undoubtedly contributed to the inability to institutionalize working relationships and coordination between departments. The unclear principles at the top are filtering through to unclear operations at all administrative levels.

Furthermore, the unresolved and unstipulated relationship between the AU Chairperson and the Chairperson of the AU Commission remains a source of possible tension within the AU. It is not clearly articulated whether there is any relationship of subordination or authority between the two, despite the fact that they share in some of the same powers related to initiating peacemaking activities and the use of their good offices. In the case where a former head of state is acting as Chairperson of the Commission (as it was under Alpha Omar Konaré) and another head of state is acting as the AU Chairperson, some clash of personality and authority is likely. The AU Chairperson, who is fully authorized to exercise authority in the realm of conflict management and giving directions to the PSC or Commission on the management of conflicts, holds a lot of independent decision-making power and influence, but often remains disconnected from the Member States and other decision-making bodies that make up the APSA. The high-level decision makers within the AU and sub-regional organizations often work outside of the stipulated protocols. The mediation process in Zimbabwe was considered

by the Chairperson of the AU and the Assembly of States of the AU, not the AU PSC. This is similar to decision-making on the Kenya mediation, which was taken by the AU Chairperson and the UN Secretary General. In Madagascar, the lead mediator Joachim Chissano, former head of state of Mozambique, unilaterally exerted his leadership position based on being the highest ranking person (a former head of state) among the various special envoys from the international organizations present. The highly political SADC Summit affirmed his appointment, while the AU was forced to simply accept his leadership of the Joint process. It is clear that in practice, the higher level political players make the big choices according to their own personal or political criterion, leaving the formal structures to simply endorse their choices.

While some of the challenges of differing regional capacities and principles have already been, the example cases make it obvious that two states – South Africa and Nigeria – play pivotal roles in African peacemaking within their own sub-regions and beyond. The debate over the pros and cons of having a hegemon at the helm in a regional organization is well-contested in the literature. Bjørn Møller (2005) argues that a hegemon can help facilitate the development of stable organizational institutions. The sub-regional organizations that are relatively strongest, ECOWAS and SADC, are those that rely on the commitment and resources of these dominant states. The absence of a clear hegemon in East Africa/the Horn of Africa, where there is a split hegemony between Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, has so far been an obstacle to the development of a working peace and security architecture in the sub-region,

Both South Africa and Nigeria walk a political tightrope in their regions, still working to overcome accusations of hegemonic ambitions after their involvement in near unilateral peace operations in Lesotho and Sierra Leone, respectively. Yet South Africa is consistently playing an influential role, either through current or past heads of state, as well as extending its peacekeeping capacities under UN or AU missions. In West Africa, Nigeria faces the choice of taking the lead in peace efforts or standing back because of political sensitivities, both domestic and regional. However, Clement Adibe argues that in contrast to SADC, ECOWAS has come far in institutionalizing the ad hoc mechanisms that were used in conflict management techniques and have replaced the political exigencies with more permanent mechanisms. This move has helped reduce some inter-regional tensions and the politicization of Nigeria relationship to ECOWAS. While this thesis does not intend to undertake a thorough critique of the South African or Nigerian approach to peacemaking, it is important to consider the countries willingness to cooperate and work collaboratively with the AU, SADC, ECOWAS and other organizations, including IGAD and non-African organizations.

Coordinated peacemaking involves the careful crafting of a coherent political strategy, building support and finding resources for that coherent strategy, and diminishing the possibility that other third parties – and interested outsiders – will undermine the peace process by pursuing their own agenda. This is not a simple task. In the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, the UNSG recognized, fifteen years ago, some of

the major problems that emerge when there is no sound working relationship between the institutions involved in peacemaking efforts: overlap and institutional rivalry, as well as the possible multiplicity of mediators. The analysis obviously applies not only to the UN and sub-regional organizations, but between the sub-regional organizations themselves. This problem has been increasingly identified by these organizations, although it has yet to be resolved.

Conflicting parties generally have different views of which organization or mediator would be better for the peace process (and would better serve their interests). For example, while states that have an advantage in a conflict prefer low-profile mediators who will not threaten their formal legitimacy, non-state actors or rebel groups may prefer a high-profile external mediator in order to advance their status and importance. Nonetheless, the important function that international actors can perform is to coordinate so that parties cannot shop among different mediators or different forums, undermining progress in coming to one unified solution. The 2009 Report of the Secretary General on enhancing mediation and its support activities, argued that a multiplicity of actors allows for forum shopping through which intermediaries are played off against one another, creating a fragmented response and further complications in the conflict.

The problem of institutional rivalry and competition between senior decision-makers in organizations that are supposed to be working together can become so deep as to completely undermine a peace process. Institutional tensions detract attention from the

conflict that is supposed to be addressed, wasting attention on the fight with the contending organizations. The 2010 AU Panel of the Wise Report also noted that coordination remains problematic where selective engagement of different parties and the pursuit of competing priorities often yields conflicts. It is usually quite evident to the parties, who see the divisions within the peacemaking effort and react by similarly not taking the process seriously or not putting their trust in the mediation process.

Inadequate funding is emblematic of member states' general unwillingness to provide the organization with sufficient financial resources. Indeed, since January 2006, just five member states (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa) have provided 75 percent of the AU's budget, with each of these five contributing 15 percent. Libya is suspected to have also paid the dues of other member states, perhaps raising its effective contribution to somewhere between 20 to 25 percent of the overall total.⁴² Thus, recent political turmoil in Egypt and Libya may have detrimental repercussions on the AU's finances.

2.4 Possible measures to the challenges faced by IGAD in intra-state conflict

The AU has grown in significance as a political actor and this trajectory is likely to continue. But it still suffers from major conflict management capability gaps, the sources of which are both technical and political. Politically, the United States should work hard with external partners and bilaterally with important African partners to forge agreement within the PSC on the political values which lie at the heart of the APSA. This must be based upon a realistic appraisal of the AU's conflict management capabilities

whereby expectations (of insiders and outsiders) are brought in line with continental realities. Without widespread agreement among PSC members on how to respond to critical issues such as unconstitutional changes of government, armed conflicts, or mass atrocities, no amount of technical reforms will deliver effective conflict resolution.

Increasing diplomatic and economic support for the UN Office to the African Union. Although the U.S. government has provided substantial assistance to the AU's peace and security architecture, the United States is not the only, or even the biggest, player in Addis Ababa. Washington should therefore ensure there is clear strategic coordination between its own assistance programs and those of the UN and the EU. While the United States, UN, and EU will naturally retain distinct programs and policies, their representatives should work hard to devise a coordinated delivery system for assistance to the AU that reflects the comparative advantages of each actor while remaining sensitive to the AU's limited capacity to absorb funds. In the short term, the United States, EU, and UN should support the newly established UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) because the UN has done much to bridge the AU's bureaucratic and infrastructural capability gaps in conflict management issues, most recently in support of the AMISOM mission.

Supporting the establishment of an AU mediation Unit. The AU's current approach to mediation has been ad hoc, ill-prepared, and based on little more than the hope of forging elite, top-down bargains, usually under arbitrary deadlines. To ameliorate this

problem, the AU is considering establishing a mediation unit within the commission. Such a unit could coordinate mediation support to AU officials and envoys as well as mediation capacity-building activities. To fulfil these functions, it should include a coordinator, two mediation experts, a senior administrator at headquarters, and an administrative officer who can be deployed in the field. It could draw envoys and technical mediation experts for deployment from a roster, which is under way with the help of German funding. The AU's liaison offices in countries in conflict or at risk of conflict should also have a senior staff member with training and experience in mediation. In addition, it would be beneficial to establish a mediation fund as a complement to the Peace Fund and appoint a mediation adviser to support the Panel of the Wise's efforts to design, manage, and evaluate peace processes, facilitate dialogue, and liaise with parties in conflict and other groups. The United States should provide strong political support to ensure this unit is established as soon as possible and help fund the recruitment and training of appropriate personnel.

Strengthening the tactical and operational elements of AU peace operations. The United States should devote additional resources to strengthening the tactical and operational elements of AU peace operations. The U.S. government should work to ensure that its African partner states factor the ASF into their national defense estimates and doctrine. In the short term, there are three obvious priorities. First, the United States should help the AU to establish an equivalent of the UN Department of Field Support, as well as a continental logistics base along the lines of the UN's bases in Brindisi and Entebbe. Second, the U.S. government should increase the resources available to ACOTA,

thereby allowing it to engage with more African partner states while deepening and intensifying the level of training and equipment it can provide to African peacekeepers. Washington might also consider how to forge enhanced partnerships with the continent's most effective peacekeeping contributors and how to expand the pool of ACOTA partner countries. To build sustainable local peacekeeping capacity in Africa, the United States must enhance its "train-the-trainer" programs, ideally going well beyond the details set out in the Global Peace Operations Initiative Phase II strategy. Third, the United States should also incentivize all PSC members send military liaisons/defense attaches to their missions in Addis Ababa to facilitate the effective functioning of the AU's Military Staff Committee.

Enhancement of the AU Commission's information management capabilities. Information management is a crucial but often neglected aspect of dealing with armed conflict. Without it, early- warning efforts are doomed to failure; mediation initiatives are unlikely to consistently generate the desired effects; and peace operations cannot be expected to succeed. The AU's dire lack of capabilities and limited human resources to gather and analyse information relevant to conflict management must end. Priority areas for action should include bolstering the PSC secretariat, enhancing the AU's ability to collect early-warning information, and developing the AU's capacity for institutional learning. Without the ability to evaluate missions, produce lessons learned studies, and generate recommendations for reforming existing practices and systems, the AU will never be able to conduct its own peace operations effectively.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology used in the study. It presents the research design, study population and sample size, data collection methods and instruments, data analysis, validity and reliability as well as the limitations to the study.

3.1 Research design

The research employed a descriptive survey design, aimed at giving a detailed account and in depth description of the views of the respondents. The descriptive survey design was important for descriptions of the study variables, explaining and interpreting conditions of the present and past events. The design further helped in examining how a phenomenon that occurred at a specific place (s) and time affected the participants. The study was concerned with conditions, practices, structures, differences and relationships that exist, opinions held, processes that are going on or trends that are evident.

3.2 Study population

The research population for this study was 150 as a target population and they consisted of IGAD representatives in Upper Nile State, South Sudan as well as local leaders within communities, NGO officials, and political activists.

3.3 Sample size

The researcher determined the sample size using the table by Krejcie and Morgan (1970, p.608).

Table 3.1: Population and Sample Size

Categories of respondents	Targeted Population	Sample size	Sampling Techniques
IGAD representatives	25	20	Purposive sampling
NGO officials	25	18	Purposive sampling
Political activists	30	20	Purposive sampling
Local community leaders	70	50	Simple random sampling
Total	150	108	

Source: primary data, 2016

3.4 Sampling Procedures

The researcher used both purposive and simple random sampling. The purposive sampling was used to select the respondents from IGAD representatives, NGO officials, Political activists, and simple random sampling used for the selection of Local community leaders.

3.5 Research Instrument

The main research tool used in this study was an interview guide. The interviews were conducted with IGAD representatives, NGO officials, Political Activists and the selected local community leaders.

3.6 Validity and reliability

To ensure that the data is reliable and valid, standard tests were carried out. The reliability test involved a test - retest exercise. This means the instrument was subjected to the representative sample. Reliability refers to the degree to which the instrument is consistent with whatever it is measuring Amin, (2005). A research instrument is said to be valid if it actually measures what is supposed to be measured Amin, (2005). Since validity is a measure of how the question asked makes sense to the respondent. In this case, content experts were identified consisting mainly of lecturers who looked into the wording of the instruments. Questions which were ranked as not clear were amended accordingly.

3.7 Data Gathering Procedures

3.7.1 before the administration of the questionnaires

- i. An introduction letter obtained from the College of Higher Degrees and Research to solicit approval to conduct the study in upper Nile State, South Sudan
- ii. After approval, the researcher secured a list of qualified respondents from the organizations and selected using purposive and simple random sampling techniques.

- iii. The researcher explained the nature and purpose of the study to respondents.
- iv. The researcher then selected research assistants who helped with conducting the interviews.

3.7.2 After data collection

The data gathered was edited and coded according to the study specific objectives. Thereafter, presentation of findings was done thematically.

3.8 Data analysis

Frequency and Percentage distribution was used in computing the profile of the respondents as to age, gender, education level, position in the institution and number of years in the present position. Content and verbatim analyses were used in compiling and presenting the qualitative responses from the study's participants.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

To ensure utmost confidentiality for the respondents and the data provided by them as well as reflect ethics practiced in this study, the following was considered:

- i. All responses were coded to provide anonymity of the respondents.
- ii. The respondents were requested voluntarily take part in the study.
- iii. Authors quoted in this study are recognized through citations and referencing.
- iv. Presentation of findings done in a generalized manner.

3.10 Limitations to the Study

Intervening or confounding variables beyond the researchers control such as honesty of the respondents and personal biases. However, to minimize such condition, the researcher requested respondents to be as honest as possible and objective.

The respondent sample was fairly big to interview all the participants. However, the researcher managed to reach out to those with relevant information as well as the use of Focus Group Discussions.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the research as well as their analysis and interpretation. Where necessary, aids such as tables and figures are used to illuminate the meaning of the data presented. The findings presented in the tables and figures are further explained to equip the reader with clear picture and understanding of the phenomenon under analysis.

4.1 General information

The 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its principles the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights. A new objective was to promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. The IGAD Secretariat was restructured to fulfill the new mandate and in due course it established a division responsible for peace and security. However, IGAD's institutional changes lagged behind real political processes within the region.

IGAD was very instrumental in the signing of the CPA on January 9, 2005. The CPA includes updates and amendments to previous protocols. The CPA itself is comprised of six protocols concluded between 2002 and 2005. The Machakos Protocol signed in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002, in which the parties agreed on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion. A six-year Interim Period, at the end of which, the people of southern Sudan were given the right to vote in a self-determination referendum to decide whether to remain united with Sudan or to secede.

4.1.1 The role of IGAD in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan

One significant capability of IGAD is its work in Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) through the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN is an IGAD institution dedicated to securing peace and stability in the region by influencing policy through a CPMR approach, producing and providing information to policy. This is differentiated from IGAD's mediation role, as CEWARN's CPMR mechanism investigates peace and security at a lower level in member states as opposed to higher level multi-country negotiations. Interviews with IGAD participants noted that:

IGAD is a building block of the African Union; a pillar of the AU Commission. Many IGAD policies originate through AU Heads-Of-State decisions, which IGAD implements into its regional development mechanisms. It works on issues that

are a priority for the Horn of Africa region, whereas other regional blocs such as ECOWAS will implement other AU policies in their regions.

Military intervention, when needed, is arranged by IGAD through consensus and is to be deployed internally in the region, with the aim to reduce reliance on foreign intervention. IGAD forces intervened during the 2006 Islamic Courts insurgency in Somalia and the IGAD Peace and Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) was the precursor to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). IGAD member states are the chief contributors to IGAD security forces. According to interviews with spokes person of IGAD on the strengths of IGAD and the areas the institution works in supporting stability in South Sudan stated that:

IGAD's approach to peace and security issues is unique, due to the nature of dealing with complex issues on a daily basis. The institution has developed a peace and security role that works on a local basis at the ground level. There are a number of specific areas in which IGAD plays an important role in contributing to stability in the Horn of Africa. Capabilities range from mediation to conflict-prevention and capacity-building between member states.

IGAD holds a role of investigating emerging crimes. It approaches issues including money laundering, terrorism, cyber-crime, organized crime and piracy on a case-by-case basis. IGAD is concerned with tackling the inland component of piracy as well as the maritime component. The work IGAD does in the area of emerging crimes contributes to regional and international stability.

Capacity building was one the role played by IGAD. Capacity-building in the Horn of Africa is a priority for IGAD. It works to facilitate multi-country approaches to regional concerns, particularly in cross-border issues such as transnational ethnic groups. IGAD encourages the harmonization of policies across countries, which contributes to stability-building throughout the region. Its capacity-building functions include a focus on migration, trade harmonization and the movement of goods and people. This was noted that by the NGO officials working in South Sudan swho had this to say:

IGAD works on a number of programmes, many of which are designed to enhance regional integration. This includes, but is not limited to, developing and regulating a free trade area in the region. IGAD's regional integration agenda is enshrined in the Minimum Integration Plan, which is based on the fundamentals member states, must adhere to as part of their membership. This is also an important contributing factor regarding security issues.

Controlling drought in the Horn of the region is another focus for IGAD. IGAD Heads Of States and the East African Community recently made a political commitment that drought must never turn into famine in the Horn of Africa again, following the 2011 East Africa drought. IGAD has formulated the Drought Resilience Initiative to operationalize policies aimed to support people between droughts. Responsibility for regional IGAD programmes is delegated to individual member states. The Executive Council assigns the lead role of various programmes to member states: According Political activists whom the researcher had face to face interviews noted that:

Infrastructure projects are led by Kenya, Uganda leads on peace and security issues, Djibouti leads on maritime security and South Sudan leads the trade homogenization agenda. Civil servants from member states are seconded to IGAD, and work for a period of time receiving their usual salaries alongside allowances depending on the city they are seconded to.

Employing civil servants from IGAD member states and assigning key roles to different countries is important to install a sense of ownership of IGAD, which translates into the security and diplomatic well-being of the IGAD region. The respondents from IGAD said that:

IGAD's approach to peace and security issues is unique, due to the nature of dealing with complex issues on a daily basis. The institution has developed a peace and security role that works on a local basis at the ground level in South Sudan.

IGAD holds a political role as well as a stabilization role. IGAD encourages its member states to live according to their constitutional rules, to adhere to the process of democratization and to maintain acceptable levels of governance. According to community leaders in Upper Nile State identified that:

IGAD is involved with NGOs and civil society in the region, and works on issues of good governance, parliamentary systems and female representation in politics, heading the IGAD Women Parliamentary Conference in 2009 in the case of Upper Nile State in South Sudan.

IGAD recently held a conference on federalism in Ethiopia, and works to expand dialogue on how federalism can benefit the region by allowing people to become more involved in local affairs, and how government resources can be mobilized to enhance development in this area.

4.4.2 Effect of intra-state conflict on peace and security in South Sudan

The effect of intra state conflicts on South Sudan can be approached from an economic point of view. With 76% of South Sudan's households surviving on subsistence activities, informal trade is predominate and large amounts of economic activity take place. Trade between South Sudan and its 4 most important regional trading partners – Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda has grown significantly in recent years, with exports from Uganda to South Sudan alone estimated to have increased from \$US 60 million to \$US 635 million between 2005 and 2008.

The current South Sudan civil war has had a particularly large negative impact on investment and trade between Uganda and South Sudan with trade between the countries stagnating in 2009 before declining in 2010 due to the increased insecurity faced by Ugandan traders. Trade fell further in the run up to the referendum due to growing instability and dropped further since the onset of civil war in light of the sensitivity of cross border trade to changes in local security conditions. According to Ngungi (2010), 77% of traders in South Sudan are from female headed households that are dependent on cross border trade for their primary source of income, meaning the fall in trade between South Sudan and Uganda is likely to affect the most vulnerable in South Sudan.

Majority of the respondents noted that the breakdown of law and order in South Sudan creates security threats to the South Sudanese people and its neighbors on how this happens. Consequently the respondents mentioned that; it leads to penetration of small arms into neighboring countries, refugees flock neighboring countries creating resource shortages and insecurity, the conflict can easily spread to hosting refugee countries and that any country with no law and order brings imbalance in the region/ neighbouring countries.

One of the respondent argued that "Given South Sudan's position as a regional oil producing country, conflict would close transnational energy corridors throughout Central/East Africa and negatively impact prospects for regional stability."

Another respondent added that "While there may be some positive impacts on the region (e.g. from investment being redirected from Sudan to other countries in the region), the evidence suggests that the net impact of conflict would be significantly negative."

4.4.3 Challenges faced by IGAD in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

Accordingly, the respondents noted that the biggest challenge has been; political interference as well as external interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. Others were: lack of credibility since one of IGAD members is directly involved in the conflict and also lack of partiality in mediation processes. Participants to the study also noted that IGAD member states and

Secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese socio-cultural dynamics, lack of public cooperation, lack of key security infrastructure in the country, lack of funds and resources and leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders. In relation to the above, a respondent reported that:

The peace process never developed trust and understanding between the parties, and in its absence and the failure to commit to wide-ranging reconciliation, the mediation followed Western practice and emphasized legal requirements and time-tables. But the great number of bodies and commissions formed to regulate, monitor, and adjudicate disputes have not managed to overcome the lack of trust between the SPLM and the GoSS, and as a result the implementation of the agreement is far behind schedule.

IGAD has stepped up its activities in peace and security over the last few years. The IGAD initiative for South Sudan is the foremost indication of new ambitions within the organization. Furthermore, since 2012, the IGAD early warning system (CEWARN), has an expanded mandate in terms of geographical scope and type of conflict matters to be covered. At the same time, efforts are underway to finalize a new IGAD peace and security strategy, adding post-conflict reconstruction and development to the organization's list of strategic objectives.

It was noted in an interview with an NGO participant that:

Few regional organizations or bodies have successfully intervened in the conflict between 2011-2016. However about 7,000 African Union troops have slowly

been deployed in Darfur on a very limited mandate, The UN secretarial council has been consistent across the country and emphasizes protection of civilians, human rights reporting, EAC, SADDG, ECOWAS and Church based organizations also participate somehow in ending the ongoing conflict in South Sudan.

Nevertheless, IGAD remains a small organization, with around 50 staff associated with peace and security matters. A risk is that ambition is growing more rapidly than the organization's capacity and that there is a disproportionate focus on fundraising for the new activities, rather than ensuring effective implementation of the activities in place.

4.4.4 Measures to the challenges faced by IGAD in intra-state conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan.

The study went on to investigate what measures IGAD has taken to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan. From the findings, most of the respondents revealed that; IGAD has sent its mission in South Sudan to help mitigate the crisis/ offered reinforcement, Employ early warning mechanisms to prevent conflict, Approval of Protection & Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, Special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on conflicts zones, Deployment of Monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM), built capacities of national security and built capacity of South Sudanese security organs.

One respondent noted that:

IGAD peace initiative introduced a well thought out DoP, workable relations with the belligerents, an institutional focus in the Sudan Secretariat, development of

the system of ambassador envoys, political and financial support from the IPF, and international legitimacy. It also carried out considerable work on a wealth-sharing agreement and on resolution of the problem of the marginalized territories that would figure in the subsequent CPA.”

The respondents were probed on the possible measures that have been tried by the government and community leaders to manage the conflict. In this regard, the most mentioned solution was; Reconciliation of warring leaders and South Sudanese society through negotiation and mediation.

One of the respondents asserted that:

The National Congress Party (NCP), which holds power in Sudan, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which formed the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), to pursue peace. It guaranteed South Sudan the right of self-determination while committing both parties to make the unity of Sudan attractive; it established an arrangement for wealth and power sharing, elections and constitutional reform; it offered a framework for careful handling of dynamics in the „three areas“ of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile; and it ensured processes for compensating the victims of war.

The above was followed by promoting peace among South Sudanese communities, peace-building campaigns, commissions of inquiry, ethnic leaders for peace treaty negotiations, use of community elders at the local level and peace inquiries at the national level and use of non-state actors like local churches, musicians as well as regional organizations such as AU and IGAD.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter dealt with the discussion of the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

5.2 Discussions

The study was on IGAD in Intra-State Conflict in Upper Nile, South Sudan. The historical roots of the South Sudan conflict were found to be; skewed distribution of key resources especially oil and land, religious conflicts between Arabs and Christians, poverty, civil wars, ethnic conflict between the major tribes in South Sudan and dictatorial tendencies of the current South Sudan regime, weak institutional capacities, past injustices from the 20 year war with Sudan have not been addressed, concentration to state-building in-lieu of nation-building, North Sudan control of Sudan power, internal policies, external dynamics, lack of accountability and misapplication of formula of accommodation of political elites respectively.

IGAD in intra-state conflict in Africa in Upper Nile State, South Sudan was significant though capability of IGAD is its work in Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) through the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). CEWARN is an IGAD institution dedicated to securing peace and stability in the region by influencing policy through a CPMR approach, producing and providing information to

policy-IGAD's Role in Stability and Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa
www.chathamhouse.org makers. Military intervention, when needed, is arranged by IGAD through consensus and is to be deployed internally in the region, with the aim to reduce reliance on foreign intervention. Capacity building was one the role played IGAD Capacity-building in the Horn of Africa is a priority for IGAD. It works to facilitate multi-country approaches to regional concerns, particularly in cross-border issues such as transnational ethnic groups. IGAD encourages the harmonization of policies across countries, which contributes to stability-building throughout the region.

IGAD holds a political role as well as a stabilization role. IGAD encourages its member states to live according to their constitutional rules, to adhere to the process of democratization and to maintain acceptable levels of governance. According to community leaders in Upper Nile State. Effects s of IGAD intra-state conflict on peace and security in South Sudan. The estimates above are based on formal estimates of economic growth and trade between South -Sudan and its regional partners. However, with 76% of South Sudan's households surviving on subsistence activities, informal trade is predominate and large amounts of economic activity will go unrecorded.¹⁶¹ Available data indicates that trade.

The study identified the challenges faced by IGAD in intra-state conflict in Africa in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Accordingly, the respondents noted that the biggest challenge has been; Political interference as well as External interference and interests

from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. Others were: lack of credibility since one of IGAD members is directly involve in the conflict and also lack of partiality in mediation processes, IGAD member states and Secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese socio-cultural dynamics, lack of public cooperation, lack of key security infrastructure in the country, lack of funds and resources and leaders not respecting peace agreements as well as bias from regional leaders.

Therefore, the study found out that the major factor that has been sustaining the conflict in South Sudan was tribalism/ ethnic intolerance driven by political incitements. Others were; lack of will from the two crashing parties, external interference, greed for power/power struggle, pressure on a diminishing oil resource base from the local-level ethnic people, historical injustices e.g marginalization, colonialism, dependency syndrome, social cultural dynamics and IGAD member states and Secretariat display their lack of a genuine grasp of South Sudanese (lack of neutrality of IGAD).

Therefore, South Sudan peace process, although it was clear that the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission would be a critical mechanism to drive implementation, it was only after the agreement was signed that issues such as leadership, staffing, funding, and terms of reference were addressed. This created significant delays in establishing the JMEC, leading to a prolonged void of leadership to drive implementation. The expanded group of African and international partners, while critical in helping conclude the negotiations, did not establish a clear and shared vision for how to sustain regional and international attention after signature. Furtherer, the

involvement of *immediate* regional actors in peace talks is a double-edged sword. From the outset, the engagement of IGAD's frontline states– Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan was critical to the parties' calculations and approach to negotiations. The sometimes conflicting interests of these states some of which subsequently became overt or covert participants in the conflict likewise influenced their approach to the process, particularly during IGAD summits when senior regional leaders participated directly in mediation.

This was sometimes critical in advancing the process, and other times complicated progress, by fundamentally altering the direction of negotiations. In the eyes of some, this compromised the neutrality of the mediation. Consisting of IGAD states, the five African states mandated to play a role in the peace process by the AU, the AU Commission, the Troika, the EU, China and the UN have recently begun organizing themselves as a JMEC Partners Group. I will attend a meeting of this group in Nairobi next week. We believe this forum can serve to coordinate engagement from South Sudan's partners, much as the IGAD Plus formation did during the final days of the negotiations.

5.3 Conclusions

The study concludes that the most common other possible solutions to the conflict in South Sudan engaging in home based negotiations like those that took place in Somalia (fight against warlords). In addition the best strategy IGAD has employed in the

management of the conflict in South Sudan is engaging high diplomatic mediation such as IGAD secretariat and peace ambassadors which however has not worked. The study further concludes that the measures IGAD has taken to mitigate the security threats in South Sudan are; IGAD has sent its mission in Sudan to help mitigate the crisis/ Offered reinforcement, Employ early warning mechanisms to prevent conflict, Approval of Protection & Deterrence Force (PDF) to come to South Sudan, Special coordination with UNMISS peacekeepers battalion on conflicts zones, Deployment of Monitors through the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (MVM), Built capacities of national security and Built capacity of South Sudanese security organs.

The study concludes that the major factor that has been sustaining the conflict in South Sudan was tribalism/ethnic intolerance driven by political incitements. The most influential historical roots of the South Sudan conflict is the skewed distribution of key resources especially oil and land. Moreover, the oil resources helped in the perpetuation of the South Sudan conflict. This is majorly through oil resources being used to spread incitement and also procure weapons. In addition, the biggest impact of the South Sudan conflict on the national security of the country is proliferation of SALW across the horn of Africa.

Additionally, the biggest challenge IGAD has faced in its South Sudan conflict management efforts was political interference as well as External interference and interests from Uganda, Sudan, and other neighbouring countries. The study also concludes that few regional organizations or bodies have successfully intervened in the

conflict between 2011-2013, however about 7,000 African Union troops have slowly been deployed in Darfur on a very limited mandate, The UN Secretarial Council has been consistent across the country and emphasizes protection of civilians, human rights reporting, EAC, SADDCC, ECOWAS and church based organizations also participate somehow in ending the ongoing conflict in South Sudan.

5.4 Recommendations

IGAD should establish that breakdown of law and order in South Sudan creates security threats to the South Sudanese people and its neighbors. The most common way in which this happens is by leading to penetration of small arms into neighboring countries, this was followed by refugees flock neighboring countries creating resource shortages and insecurity, the conflict can easily spread to hosting refugee countries and that any country with no law and order brings imbalance in the region/ neighbouring countries.

There is need to realize that the warring communities can always solve their problems without influence of external actors as the case of Sudan. There is need of IGAD to beef up the African Union force with extra resources and equipment as the first step in a three-phased proposal by the UN to ease the crisis deployment of several hundred soldiers and police officers to help the AU troops.

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Appendix I

Interview Guide for the Respondents

1. How did IGAD help South Sudan to peacefully resolve the armed conflict as its member state?
2. Was IGAD's mediated peace considered fair by all the parties in conflict in South Sudan?
3. In your own understanding and analysis, did IGAD take any side in the current conflict in South Sudan?
4. How did the financial support from IGAD help in peace negotiation in South Sudan?
5. How has the current war affected the economy of South Sudan?
6. What is the state of humanitarian situation in South Sudan?
7. In what ways has the conflict divided societies of South Sudan?
8. What is the level of compliance with IGAD communiqués by the conflicting parties in South Sudan?
9. In your own analysis how will the proposed regional strong force help in bringing peace in South Sudan?
10. How will the sanctions imposed on individuals on both sides of the conflicting parties help in bringing peace to South Sudan?
11. IGAD approved a number of communiques on South Sudan conflict, how are these documents helping in the implementation of the peace agreement?