

**RESETTLING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN RIFT VALLEY
PROVINCE OF KENYA
A CASE STUDY OF IDP CAMPS IN NAKURU DISTRICT**

BY

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A CASE STUDY OF IDP CAMPS IN NAKURU DISTRICT**

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Master of conflict resolution and peace building**

By:

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DECLARATION A

“This dissertation is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any other academic award in any university or institution of learning”.

Alauda

Name and Signature of Candidate

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Date

DECLARATION B

"I/we confirm that the work reported in this dissertation was carried out by the candidate under my/our supervision".



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
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APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation entitled "Resettling internally displaced persons in Rift Valley Province of Kenya, a case study of IDP Camps In Nakuru District" prepared and submitted by Robinson Alianda Akaka in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building has been examined and approved by the panel on oral examination with a grade of passed.

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
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

GRRC-	Government Resettlement and Reintegration Committee
GOK-	Government of Kenya
IDPS-	Internally Displaced Persons
KANU-	Kenya Africa National Union
KARCS-	Kenya Red Cross Society
MOSP-	Ministry of Special Programme
NLP-	National Land Policy
PEV-	Post Election Violence
USIP-	United States Institute of Peace
UNDP-	United Nation Development Programme

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ABSTRACT

This study was to establish the major challenges that face the resettlement of internally displaced persons in Nakuru district. The study was based on three objectives. That to establish the challenges in resettling internally displacement persons, find the challenges encountered by the government in resettlement process and assess the efforts of the non-governmental organizations.

The review of literature indicated that although there are many scholars who have written about election related displacement in Kenya, none had mentioned the inherent challenges of resettling people after violence. The study therefore was focused on unearthing the major challenges that have hampered resettlement efforts.

The study wads undertaken in Nakuru district and targeted the IDPs in the camps with a sample size of 80.Simple random sampling technique was used to select the respondents .The major tools of data collection were questionnaires and focused group discussion. The data was both qualitative and quantitative.

The study found that majority of the IDPs were not satisfied with the governments efforts (3 6.6%) and suggested a change of strategy (76.5%).The initiatives by the NGOs was applauded, mainly the Red Cross society of Kenya (60.3%)

From the findings of the study, the researcher concluded that the overall resettlement plan has not succeeded and recommended that there is need to harmonize the activities of all the stakeholders involved in the resettlement to foster reconciliation.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Kenya post election violence displaced more than 600,000 persons within the country. Although violence induced displacement is not a new phenomenon in Kenya, the magnitude speed and intensity of this displacement were unprecedented. Clashes in the 1990's, also around general election, displaced hundreds of thousands of Kenyans, many of whom remain displaced today. The new coalition government made resettlement of internally displaced (IDPs) a top priority by launching "operation Return Home" in May 2008.

On June 17, 2008 United States Institute of Peace (USIP) had a panel discussion on this subject. Panelist Dr. Jacqueline Klopp of Columbia University placed the current displacement within the larger context of the recurrent violence and displacement in Kenya. Warigia Bowman, from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, highlighted the need of IDPs, particularly vulnerable population, as they pertain to relief and justice. A pattern of violence and associated displacement around Kenyan elections began to form with the advent of multiparty politics. The Kenya Human Rights Commission reported that from 1991 to 1996, more than 1,500 people died and almost 300,000 were displaced in the Rift Valley especially Nakuru District, Nyanza and Western Provinces as a result of politically motivated clashes. As the 1997 general elections approached, violence broke out again, this time in the Coast Province, against those suspected to support the opposition party. Estimates place the number of deaths from these clashes at more than 100, with more than 100,000 displaced. According to the U.N office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, at the end of 2007, there were still 380,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the 1990s clashes.

The amended constitution that reinstated multiparty general elections in Kenya requires a successful presidential candidate to not only obtain a plurality of the presidential votes but also win a minimum of 25 percent of the presidential votes in at least five of the eight provinces. This provision has been the underlying mitigation for violence particularly in communities that had long benefited from the patron-client relationship with the ruling KANU party. Overtime ethnic groups suspected of supporting the opposition have been systematically displaced and disenfranchised.

Forced evictions and displacement were also crucial in releasing land for the relocation to consolidate political support. This process has been facilitated by inadequate laws and weak judicial system which allowed land to be used as a patronage resource. Following the clashes of the 1990s the government slowly consolidated and legitimated land and property improperly acquired as a result of the ethnic violence. Those that had been pushed out of their land and property could not seek redress through the legal system, since the authorities were unlikely to enforce the law, in their favour. As a result, the Madoadoa (a derogatory term in Swahili meaning “sports”-denoting “outsiders” not belonging to the Rift Valley) were temporarily evicted from various parts of the valley mainly in Nakuru and Uasin Gishu districts.

In response to the massive displacement, the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) and other relief organizations established about 200 camps to provide shelter, food and social services for approximately half of the IDPS. The other half sought refuge in the homes of friends, and family members. Although there were some gaps, the KRCS and other relief organizations in Kenya largely responded efficiently and met many of the IDPS initial needs.

Internal displacement in Kenya is often traced to the onset of multi-party politics in the 1990s, though in some quarters it is linked to the effects of land alienation during colonial times. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), which ruled Kenya from independence in 1963 to 2002 as a de facto one-party state, is widely associated with instigating violence targeting sections of the population affiliated to or suspected of supporting opposition parties. In particular, violence largely stemmed from a determination on behalf of KANU leaders to maintain a one-party political system of governance. As several politicians and church leaders made calls for an end to one-party rule and urged that term limits be imposed on the presidency, KANU leaders, notably from the Kalenjin and Maasai communities, responded with calls for “majimboism”, rule by ethnic majority according to region or “ethnic regionalism” would require all ‘outsiders’ in the Rift Valley to return to their “motherland”, according to a parliamentary committee which investigated ethnic clashes in 1992. Against this backdrop of political and ethnic instigation, KANU youth groups and KANU politicians stated their intention to push through a Majimbo constitution, which Kalenjin-associated groups perpetuated a cycle of violence resulting in the displacement of thousands. IDPs were forced to sell their land and property below market value, others abandoned everything, while those with share-holding certificates in land-buying companies were thrown out and their plots redistributed. By early 1993, the ethnic clashes ended, with over 1,500 people killed and an estimated 300,000 displaced and dispossessed. IDPs had moved into displacement camps in church

and school compounds, forests and in nearby towns, where they received humanitarian assistance from churches and mosques, local and international NGOs, the UN and the government.

While many local government leaders addressed public gatherings to warn citizens of potential violence, district officers who arrested perpetrators of violence were promptly transferred and the perpetrators released without being charged. In addition many local leaders were complicit in the violence that took place, and a number of these officials still hold government positions today. Research findings indicate that many IDPs in the Rift Valley still fear returning home as those responsible for committing acts of violence in the 1990s continue to hold official positions of power and authority. Indeed, numerous IDPs expressed a continued lack of confidence in security authorities to provide protection upon

Despite resettlement programmes in place and international attention to clash victims, local government officials on a number of occasions forcibly dispersed IDPs to make them in-visible to visiting diplomats, human rights groups and the media. Often lured with a promise of resettlement, IDPs, mainly of Kikuyu origin, were transported in government army trucks and abandoned in Central Province, their supposed “ancestral home”. A second forcible displacement followed as the government tried to disperse IDPs in the locations where they had been dumped, virtually entrenching the invisibility of IDPs in southern Kenya. In one instance in December 1994, local police and KANU youth groups raided Maela camp which housed roughly 10,000 predominantly Kikuyu people, and without any warning the camp was razed and some 2,000 Kikuyus were transported to their ‘traditional home’ in Central Province where they were questioned about their ethnic identity. Those who were allowed to remain in Maela camp were left without shelter and humanitarian agencies were denied access by the government. Such acts alluded to a continuing government process of emptying the Rift Valley Province of certain ethnic groups.

After the demolition of camps and dispersal of IDPs, structures that had been put in place to address IDP protection and assistance needs at the Office of the President were disbanded or assigned other duties. The government no longer recognized the existence and protection needs of IDPs, and despite widespread knowledge of the realities on the ground, IDPs were judged a “sensitive” issue and national and international NGOs, donors and the UN maintained a disciplined silence on the matter. This was largely because they did not wish to contradict the government’s position, while others argued IDPs were internal security issue that lay outside their mandate. Despite resource constraints, a number of organizations gave discreet assistance through church groups, such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) and the Catholic Diocese of

Nakuru (CDN), which continue to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs in the Rift Valley today.

Over the last 15 years, IDPs in the Rift Valley have gradually scattered in search of livelihood opportunities in urban and peri-urban settings or the countryside far away from their former homes. This has not only made them less visible and reduced their chances of receiving assistance, but also reinforced a perception that there are no IDPs in Kenya.

After clashes erupted again in 1997 prior to the general elections, the then President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in All Parts of Kenya, commonly known as the Akiwumi Commission. The Commission found that violence was triggered by unaddressed land ownership issues dating back to the colonial administration, which pitted pastoral groups such as the Maasai and Kalenjin ousted from the fertile 'White Highlands' of the Rift Valley by British settlers, against agricultural groups, mainly Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya, who came to occupy the land after independence. The Akiwumi Commission recommended that those who had been displaced during the clashes be identified and assisted to resettle back on their farms, "with appropriate security arrangements made for their peaceful stay thereon".

Similarly, in 2003 a parliamentary motion narrowly passed on "assistance to the ethnic clash victims", with most KANU MPs, who at the time were members of the opposition, vowing to resist its implementation. During the debate, the minister of state, Office of the Vice-President and Ministry of National Reconstruction, said the government would form an implementation committee to identify "genuine" victims, establish the status of the land from where victims were expelled, study all reports on ethnic clashes and ask the Ministry of Lands to identify land for settlement of victims who are too traumatised to re-turn to their stolen lands. Like many of the above recommendations, the establishment of such a committee appears to have foundered, as no information on the committee's composition or mandate has ever been made public.

In 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), a coalition of a dozen political parties defeated KANU in general elections and now held the majority in Parliament. The current president of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki was also a member of NARC and with his election and the consolidation of the NARC in government, IDPs and their advocates had high hopes that displaced persons would be compensated or allowed to return home. In fact, the NARC Manifesto promises to implement the recommendations of the Akiwumi Report, which as noted above includes a recommendation to resettle and assist those displaced during clashes. Unfortunately, and as will be discussed further

below under national response, while the NARC government has made some efforts to address the IDP situation, a comprehensive response focusing on durable solutions for IDPs is still lacking.

In addition, under the NARC government ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley and elsewhere have continued, and thousands of Kenyans displaced during the 1990s throughout the country remain unable to return. Government-sponsored evictions have also aggravated ethnic tensions and in one area, the Mau Forest, led to the displacement of roughly 15,000 people. The evictions follow recommendations made by what is commonly known as the Ndung'u Report, released by a presidential commission tasked to analyze illegal land allocations in the country. While many in Kenyan civil society agree that the Ndung'u Report's recommendations should be implemented, especially in regards to protecting water catchment and environmental protection areas, the evictions taken place thus far have not adhered to the report's recommendations, and have been characterized by violence, forced displacement, and other human rights abuses. As will be elaborated upon in section II, the Ndung'u Report has been used to further political ambitions and on the way incited tensions and violence between communities. The continuation and escalation of such events, compounded by the many IDPs who have been unable to return, has protracted the situation of IDPs in the country and evidenced the need for a comprehensive response which addresses the root causes of violence, and which is based on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Currently, violent clashes continue to take place between different ethnic groups in and around the Rift Valley. The lack of a comprehensive mechanism to assess the protection and assistance needs of IDPs has made obtaining accurate information extremely difficult, if not impossible. Reports on displacement are sporadic, lack accurate data, and are often based on second hand information. The Rift Valley also contains large numbers of people displaced in the 1990s who are either unwilling or unable to return. In 2002, it was estimated that Nakuru District, headquarters of the Rift Valley Province, hosts approximately 10,000 displaced households, and the current status of these people remains unclear. As violence along ethnic lines has continued to cause displacement, and as will be illustrated below the lack of adequate security and protection continues to impede return, it is likely that IDPs recorded in 2002 remain displaced. The number of IDPs in the Rift Valley has also risen due to government evictions as a result of the recommendations from the Ndung'u Report. A comprehensive number of those displaced by evictions does not currently exist, and the estimates that do exist are based on specific instances of eviction in specific areas and vary greatly.

1.2 Statement of the problem

In Kenya election violence is not a new phenomena, it dates back to 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 when there was election violence leading to internally displaced persons in Kenya. The 2007, post election violence was worse in terms of magnitude, speed and intensity, which not only resulted to national outcry but International. Research, carried out by Warigia Bowman and Kenya Human Rights commission reports that the reasons for post election violence in 2007 and before was due to multiparty politics, but the idea of resettling people after the violence and displacement, had not been fully researched on. The Internally Displaced persons have not been fully resettled, which is an indication of various challenges at hand, despite the efforts. It is therefore for this reason that the researcher wants to assess the challenges in resettling internally displaced persons.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study was to find out the challenges facing resettling Internally Displaced persons in Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province Kenya

1.3.1 Objectives

- i) To find out the challenges in resettling internally displaced persons in Kenya.
- ii) To find out the government initiatives in resettling the internally displaced persons in Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province Kenya.
- iii) To find out the role played by NGOS in resettling internally displaced people in Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province Kenya.

1.4 Research questions

- i). What are the main challenges encountered in resettling the Internally Displaced Persons in Nakuru District?
- ii) What initiatives has the government of Kenya tried to employ in resettling the Internally Displaced Persons in Nakuru District?
- iii) What are the roles of NGOS in resettling Internally Displaced Persons in Nakuru District, Rift Valley Province Kenya?

1.5 Significance of the study

The research findings will be beneficial to the Kenyan government to change its strategies of resettling Internally Displaced Persons who are still held in transit camps, the general public to

embrace peace and uphold the spirit of reconciliation and may help future researchers who may wish to further the study on election violence and resettlement in Kenya.

1.6 Scope of the study

The study was undertaken in Nakuru District, in Rift valley province. It covers approximately 18500 square kilometers. The specific area of study will focus on the IDPS and the provincial administration officers in Molo division. The study was undertaken over a period of six months. The choice of Nakuru district was because of its history violent clashes after every election.

1.7 Assumptions of the study

The following were the assumptions of the study;

- i).The respondents were truthful in providing the information required by the researcher.
- ii).The data collection instruments were reliable and valid.
- iii).The effect of other extraneous variables affecting the work performance of respondents was limited.

1.8 Definitions of operational terms

Fait Accompli-	Mission accomplished.
Hierarchy-	The way things are arranged in order or occur systematically.
Vigilante-	A group of armed people with sole intention of protecting their communities and properties.
Population-	The entire elements of importance from whom the researcher chooses a sample.
Internally Displaced-	People moving away from their original homes but not crossing international border.
Disaster	Any catastrophic event accompanied by huge losses.
Compensation-	A form of token reward for the loss incurred.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of related literature on the resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons in Nakuru District, which include Molo and Rongai Divisions and the problems encountered in resettling them by both the government, non-governmental organization and other international bodies. It also looks at selected factors related to internally displaced persons. The researcher has also reviewed literature on the effects of the internally displaced persons in Nakuru District. Conceptual frame work highlighting the relationship among variables of study and others of interest are also covered in this chapter.

(Josph:2009) Deng (2009) notes that internal displacement has been a permanent feature of Kenya history from colonial times onwards. Starting with the eviction of natives from their ancestral land to make way for settlers in colonial Kenya to recent violent eviction accompanying the 1992, 1997 and 2002 elections. Some of the already existing causes of population displacement were exacerbated by the post election violence. A particular disturbing feature of the PEV is that some of the IDPS had suffered successive displacement as a result of previous elections related violence.

The election related 1992 and 1997 ethnic clashes resulted in displacement of thousands of people. According to the Kiliku Report (Exhibit 136A), and estimated 54,000 people were displaced in the 1992 clashes. The Justice Akiwumi led commission which was appointed in 1998 to inquire into the tribal clashes that rocked the country since 1991 did not make any findings, as to the number of persons displaced as a result of the clashes either in 1992 or 1997. Kimemia notes that the internal displacements following the widespread violence that hit Kenya after the announcement of the 2007 Presidential election results were unprecedented in terms of the number victims and the widespread nature of the phenomenon. While previous displacement concentrated in the multi ethnic regions of Western, Rift Valley and Coast, the 2007 PEV resulted in massive countrywide displacements both urban and rural in contrast to the past.

Klopp (2009) notes that the exercise was not carried out voluntarily or with sufficient consultation from IDPS and civil society. He continues that, “the active involvement of the military in the closure of camps, placement condition on assistance and the decision to proceed with the return of

IDPS without assurance of security leads some to question the voluntary nature of the process. “It is interesting the way in which we think about IDPS. They become people who should be managed, although they were active citizens prior to the displacement. We should think of IDPS as a resourceful people with skills and rights. Without that approach, the government is making many avoidable mistakes.” Bowman (2009: 184) further notes that involving IDPS in the resettlement process foretells placing the instigators of violence against IDPS into powerful positions within an operation that requires the rebuilding of trust for a traumatized people. This step also assures that the vulnerable populations such as orphans, abandoned children, the elderly, victims of sexual assault and the terminally ill will be protected.

While the civil society has been highly engaged in resettling the IDPS the government has hardly included these efforts in the general strategy. Tension and localized violence in some areas continue to prevent large scale reintegration or return of the displaced communities (GOK: 2008; 14). The government of Kenya notes that those who attempted to return faced attacks in various areas despite the existence of newly built police camps. On July 17, 200 persons who attempted to return to Ngirimoli, Kanyake and Kipkellion district in the Rift Valley were displaced once more to Nakuru district. The group cited continued insecurity and lack of food and shelter. Inadequate funding has hampered the delivery of basic services and adequate compensation to IDPS. The Government of Kenya’s efforts to secure support from the International Community has met very little success (<http://www.usip.org>). Out of the 130 billion shillings earmarked for the entire resettlement exercise less than one billion has been raised. For IDPS who has lost significant amounts of wealth and property in the violence the 10,000 shillings offered is insufficient to rebuild their lives. They remain in camps hoping for more support.

According to Klopp (2009: 33) the reality on the ground sharply contrasts the success stories lauded by the government. Rather than return to their homes, IDPS leaving the campsites have established more than 134 transit camps near their previous residences, particularly in the farming areas of Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Transzoia, Kwanza and Molo Districts. IDPS farm and work during the day but spent the night at the transit camps, fearful of their hostile neighbours. In Nakuru District for instance, some observers believe that the vast majority of the 60,000 IDPS who are estimated to have left the government sponsored camps now live in transit camps. The continued existence of these camps reflects the degree of unsolved hostility and inability of the government to assure its citizens’ safety.

As the government continues to announce the hundreds of thousands of IDPS who have returned or perhaps more accurate to transit camps-there is the temptation to declare the resettlement process a *fait accompli* rather than make preparations for long term engagement to address a rather complex problem (UNDP: 1997: 42).

2.1.1 Causes of Violence and Displacement

The nature of violence and the extent to which they are linked or not linked, must be carefully looked not to divert from the real sources of conflict.” Due to the strong political undertones of displacement in Kenya, IDPS have become a very sensitive issue. As a result displaced persons tend to “disappear” from consciousness and are re-imagined as the poor, without appreciation for their peculiar circumstances. As the IDPS move out of sight, the cause of violence and displacement move out of mind, leaving the underlying conflict unresolved. In turn, this increases the probability for even more election related violence in future. Kenya 2007 post-election violence is rooted in the ethnic dispute between Kalenjins and Kikuyus and was fuelled by the results of December 2007 elections. Kalenjins believe that the Kikuyus have marginalized them for far too long by dominating the major sectors of the economy of the country at their own expense. The immediate cause of the violence was the announcement of the elections results while there are other inherent factors that contributed to the violence. The causes of the violence are:

Electoral violence: It is worthy to note the magnitude of the Kenya violence of 1992 and 1997 multi-party general elections that drew national and international concern. This same political violence repeated itself in year 2007 general elections. It has been observed that Kenya violence does come every 5 years (Otieno, 2008). Kenya 2007 post-election started after the former president Kibaki was re-elected as the president but the opposition party(ODM) felt the election was manipulated and this unleashed a violent reaction from ODM supporters against the Kikuyus and PNU supporters. There were cases of large scale-burning, looting, killing and maiming.

A feature of the violence was that it happened wherever the majority of ODM supporters were present (e.g. Rift Valley, Nyanza, Nairobi slums and Mombasa) and this was directed by groups of youth (Bayne, 2008). It was argued that Kenya violence was about controlling the state (Landau et al 2009).

Land disputes: Kenya land problems dates far back to pre-colonial period when powerful communities acquired the land of the less-privileged through conquest. It was a period like the Hobbesian state of nature where the most powerful takes all; the powerful groups dominated the weaker ones and appropriated the resources particularly grazing lands. That system of economic

relationship endured the colonial period and the perceived injustices and deprivations manifest themselves in recurring cycle of violence throughout the country. These dispossessed communities continued to exist on the fringe of the economic arrangements even to this day. For example, much of the organized violence at Rift Valley was caused by the land dispute because Rift Valley was occupied by pastoralists, while the central highlands were occupied by the Kikuyu and other communities involved in agricultural activities.

The allocation of land after independence was disproportionate and marginalized certain ethnic groups. The Kalenjins in particular felt that they had been schemed out in the land redistribution exercise and reacted violently displacing many Kikuyus in the process. The Kalenjins were of the view that the Kikuyus were allocated some of their fertile lands and the Kalenjins promised to return to *majimbo* constitution in order to uproot the Kikuyus and reclaim their ancestral lands. Kenya land problem is politically oriented and fuelled the 2007 post-election violence because one ethnic group wants other to move out. It has been argued that since 1990s 'certain leaders have exploited ethnic grievances over perceived historical injustices' (Bayne, 2008). It has also been argued that a struggle over land has always been the characteristic of Kenya political life (Landau et al 2009). The land dispute also reflected in the 1992 and the 1997 violence, this indicates that the quest for land control is central to the political life of Kenya.

Ethnicity and ethnic animosity: This factor is a corollary of the foregoing and was one of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. What began as a reaction to a fraudulent election soon transformed into ethnic violence because there were discriminations in allocation of resources based on ethnicity. The effect of this can also be seen in some countries in Africa e.g. Burundi and Rwanda. The demonization of other in Kenya led to heated violence between the ethnic groups especially the Kalenjins and Kikuyus. Just like the dispute between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi respectively, politicians in Kenya politicized the existing differences between the ethnic groups and this led to the violence that occurred at Rift Valley, Western, and Coast Provinces.

It has been argued that "ethnic loyalty and coherence has been a central feature to Kenyan politics since independence. Control of the state is core to political competition because it means access to and disposal of resources, and patronage through which ethnic elites can remain in power" (Kamungi, 2001). This is evidenced in the differences between different ethnic groups where the Gikuyu, Embu Meru Association (GEMA) tribes occupy the most productive areas of the country during the Kenyatta regime while the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana Samburu Association

(KAMATUSA) occupied the less productive area. Also, Kalenjin tribe accumulated so much power during the reign of Arap Moi. Kenyans were made have grown accustomed to a fact of their national life – that some ethnic groups are superior to others and thus should have better deals in the social, economic and political equation of the country. The resulting inequity and injustice, frustration and animosity are what have haunted Kenya every other few years in the form of violent conflicts.

Economic and political inequality: Belonging to the superior and government favoured ethnic tribes gives one an edge over the less privileged tribes in accessing the political and economic resources of the country. Economic and political inequalities were one of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya and this depended on the regime in power. It was observed that Kikuyu and Central Province had been enjoying the economic and political resources of Kenya before and after independence at the expense other regions or tribes (Stewart, 2008). The attempt to correct the economic and political differences of Kikuyu over the Kalenjin and Luo resulted in violence. Since economic and political dominance of one group over others often results in violence because of feeling of marginalization by the less-privileged group, Kenya had at all material time been a time bomb waiting to explode and had only had, what may, at best be described as a lull or an uneasy peace.

Media: Although, some media house played a positive role by calling for peace but some indigenous and vernacular media houses fuelled the ethnic tensions by encouraging violent acts especially at the height of the violence.

Impunity: It has been argued that impunity characterize some of the African countries political life (Landau et al 2009; Ellis, 1994). This is very true of Kenya as much as many other African countries experiencing political transition from authoritarian or dictatorial regimes to multi-party democracy. Impunity characterizes the political scene of Kenya since the establishment of multi-party system in the 1990s and this has encouraged violence during elections. The inability of the government to hold accountable the perpetrators of the 1990s violence under the regime of president Kibaki despite the indictment of many senior politicians bred a culture of impunity in Kenya's political violence history. This act of impunity encouraged some politicians to incite violence, manipulate electoral process without ever being prosecuted. This act of impunity was thus repeated all over again in 2007 election hence, the post-election violence we witnessed.

Class war: The level of vandalism that occurred during 2007 post-election in Kenya could be described as class war. There is wide margin between the rich and the poor in Kenya. Unemployment, illiteracy, and impoverishment have caused many youth to engage in crimes and violence. The active involvement of youth could be seen in Kenya 2007 post-election violence as a reflection of the harsh socio-economic conditions of many youths who were involved directly in the incitement of violence with politicians and vandalization of properties.

2.1.2 Government of Kenya initiatives for resettling the displaced people in the Rift Valley Province.

There are two types of needs; that is physical/primary and secondary/social/psychological needs. Primary needs are from the basic requirements of life and are universal. The intensity varies from one person to another. Secondary needs represent the needs of the world and spirit rather than the physical body. Many are developed as people mature e.g. need pertaining to self esteem and sense of duty. Both primary and secondary needs have complicated the Kenya's government efforts to resettle the internally displaced persons. The GOK should therefore consider the effect of any proposed action on the secondary needs of the IDPS (Newton & Davis; 2002).

2.1.3 Resettlement efforts by the government

In January 2008, the ministry of special programme established the mitigations and resettlement department. The Kenyan government through MSP injected Kshs. 1 Billion to resettle the IDPS. Overall Kenya's preparedness to disasters whether Natural or Man-made is wanting. Dr. Sam The Director of Nairobi Women's Hospital speaking of his interaction with the centre, states as follows; "Without giving excuses, the post election caught us all unaware, but the general response was that when we called on the National Disaster management or whatever they called they asked us what did we expect them to do and my understanding would be they would be telling us what to do."

The current national response to conflict-induced IDPs is limited to ad hoc humanitarian assistance during the heat of crises. Recommendations made by the various commissions of inquiry and task forces discussed above have not been implemented largely due to the involvement of powerful political personalities in perpetuating violence. Given the politicized nature of displacement in Kenya, it appears that concrete action to settle IDPs on their land or to prosecute instigators of violence is unlikely to take place. This situation is aggravated by the diminished capacity of civil

society to engage the government on IDP issues, as exemplified by the feeble attempts of KHRC, and the evident lack of coordination and practical action amongst other stakeholders.

While not addressing IDPs as a distinct policy or programmatic issue, several NGOs including the Kenya Land Alliance and Oxfam view internal displacement as part of a wider problem, and in this regard are involved in seeking solutions to 'root causes', such as in-tractable land issues. In this regard, the Kenya Land Alliance in partnership with other NGOs and the government have collaboratively developed a draft land policy, while Oxfam has been actively involved in conflict management activities, and contributed to the development of a draft Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Transformation.

There is a dire need to harmonize the various initiatives on IDPs which have taken place at a national level; such a harmonization would ideally lead to a more consistent and predict-able government response to the protection and assistance needs of all IDPs in the country. Such a response demands a strong policy and legal framework in which a response structure is outlined, government offices and NGOs are tasked with responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms are put into place to ensure all actors fulfill their responsibilities.

The draft Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Transformation, developed by the Office of the President, acknowledges the above need by stating:

“A national policy on the Internally Displaced should be formulated and implemented that provides guidelines to government authorities and other actors on the provision of relief and humanitarian assistance to IDPs, facilitating their reintegration and provision of basic amenities such as medical and education facilitates. The Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’S) policy should call for the enactment of laws that recognize IDPs and affords them the protection owed to them under international human rights law. The national land policy should provide for a land tenure system that is sensitive to the human rights of IDPs. Peace initiatives in communities where IDPs are from will be supported and facilitated in assisting in the reintegration of the IDPs back into the community and creating a culture of peace that will promote security for members of the community. Internally displaced persons will be resettled and recognition given of the new structures that exist where women are heads of households.”

The government’s recognition of the need for an IDP policy is positive, and now it must provide the necessary political will to both formulate and implement what is noted above. Moreover, the numerous government initiatives which relate to IDPs, such as the recommendations in the

Ndung'u Report and the draft Land Policy, the limited amount of direct humanitarian assistance provided by the government, and the existence of the IDP Task Force show that despite the problems associated with all of these initiatives, there is a certain degree of willingness within the government to respond to and address the needs of conflict-induced IDPs. The work of the government must now be consolidated to ensure that all IDPs in Kenya benefit from a national response which is coordinated, predictable, and allows IDPs to exercise their basic human rights

2.1.4 Nongovernmental organizations efforts to resettle the IDPs

In his briefing to the UN Security Council, emergency relief coordinator John Holmes noted that “Kenya’s humanitarian needs following the post election violence would have to be addressed for so many months to come and his own office was looking for at least a year a head, even if quick and effective political settlement of the immediate crisis was found.” He continued that the UN would reinforce its work alongside the Kenyan Red Cross society on the basis of a strategic analysis of the needs, a clear action plan and contingency planning in case the situation deteriorated. The UN would also look hard at how to reorient its development programs for Kenya to reflect the need to deal with deep underlying problems which come to surface.

Given that Kenya’s IDPs are not an obviously visible social problem compared to IDP populations in Kenya’s neighbouring countries like Uganda or Somalia, the lack of consistent response from national NGOs to internal displacement is not surprising. Most of the NGOs interviewed for this report indicated that they “do not address IDP issues directly”, nor have a specialised programme on IDPs, but that they are “interested” in following the issue.

The Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), which ostensibly spearheads advocacy activities on behalf of IDPs in Kenya, does not have a mainstream operational programme on IDPs. Rather, the IDP issue is a part of larger KHRC programme activities. In 2004, the KHRC did attempt to create a larger programme on IDPs by launching an IDP Stakeholders Forum, which aimed to bring together NGOs, representatives of IDPs from different parts of the country, and religious groups. The initiative, while indeed positive, collapsed a few months after it was launched due to a disengagement of NGOs, or what KHRC termed a “projectisation of issues” – NGOs felt that they were stepping outside of their mandates by engaging on IDP issues.

KHRC currently does support a network of IDPs, known as the National Network of Kenya IDPs. The Network includes IDP members from throughout the country, except from the northern region. The Network, coordinated by elected committee members, maintains up-to-date data on the names

of IDPs, household sizes, areas of origin, location and sizes of land abandoned (where applicable), and current livelihood activities. The committee members, who are IDPs themselves and are elected by their communities, are their recognized representatives and spokespersons. They disseminate information to and from IDPs on all matters pertinent to their protection and humanitarian needs, such as participation in government initiatives including the National Taskforce on IDPs, accepting food relief and informing on progress made in lobbying for durable solutions.

To a certain degree, the Network does serve as useful forum to bring IDPs together and consolidate advocacy efforts. However, Network members expressed concern regarding the role of KHRC and the limited amount of time KHRC devotes to advocating on IDP issues. Currently the Network lacks autonomy from KHRC as well its own resources, and a number of its members expressed a desire to register as an independent organisation. As the Network is the only structure in the country which exists solely to address IDP issues, adequate resources should be provided to promote and enhance its work.

Generally, the activities of NGOs are not coordinated and appear to be in competition with each other. In addition, there is a glaring lack of capacity and expertise on IDP issues, reflected in that many respondents had never heard of the Guiding Principles. Indeed, this scenario is grim; the lack of pressure and sustained advocacy from civil society only reinforces inaction by both the government and the international community.

2.1.5 Challenges encountered in resettling the displaced

According to Noor (2007), the multiple causes of displacement make it very difficult for the government of Kenya to devise comprehensive policies and interventions to deal effectively with IDPS.-

They conclude that there exists a gap in the level of response to disaster including one that makes specific reference to IDPS. Government of Kenya offers conflicting progress on resettling internally displaced persons; while some of them lauded the resettlement as a success others claimed the GOK lacked enough funds to resettle the IDPS.

In Kenya's National Reconciliation and Emergency Strategy, there was a proposal to establish the Government resettlement and Reintegration Committee (GRRC) to study the causes of displacement and proposes legislation, policy and other mechanisms to mitigate future

occurrences. While the formation of the GRRC is a sign that the government is willing to engage the IDP issue, its limited mandate undermines its potential effectiveness (Raphael: 2009).

The challenges of resettling the IDPS was well captured by Kenya's president Mwai Kibaki launching the resettlement programme he noted, "I am aware of the fears and reservations expressed by some of the displaced people with respect to the ongoing resettlement programme," "I want to assure them that the government has put in place adequate security arrangements for their safety. Moreover, the current resettlement initiatives are the outcome of intense reconciliation efforts by grassroots peace committees and the local leaders." In humanitarian update covering 1-9 May the UN office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported on 12 May that "due to the sudden and unexpected nature of the operation, serious concerns had raised about the lack of consultation and participation planning for return. Bekoe (2009: 42) notes that the government of Kenya lacked a comprehensive strategy to resettle the IDPS, "some piecemeal requests for support from the international community are coming from line ministries at district level emphasizing the need for greater consultation and development of a more comprehensive return plan. OCHA further notes that the involvement of the military in the operation added psychological pressure on IDPS to return to areas like Nakuru and TransNzoia. The IDPS ability to make informed decisions about their choice to return may have been compromised by the sudden and expedited nature of the operation and conditions in places of the agency noted. Kenya's response to IDPs has and continues to be varied. While numerous policy documents and official government commissions have recognised the existence of IDPs or "victims of clashes", a lack of political will has hindered any process aimed at tangibly improving conditions for IDPs or seeing that they are provided with durable solutions. "The government of Kenya doesn't want to talk about IDPs, that is why there are no figures", stated one diplomat in Nairobi. An NGO representative echoed this thought by stating that the "government won't accept internal displacement, because acceptance comes with responsibility". Accepting and responding to IDP issues in Kenya necessitates addressing unresolved issues of land and property, as well as ethnic elites' struggle for the control of political and economic resources. Such issues are highly controversial and question the very notion of democracy in Kenya. As a result they are either avoided altogether, hindered by senior government officials as is the case with the Ndung'u Report, or efforts are disingenuous from the start. Thus despite the attempts of the government to address IDP issues, of which many have been described above and are further detailed below, there is a common perception amongst IDP stakeholders that the initiatives undertaken thus far have not had the full backing of the government and as a result will provide little if any concrete benefits to IDPs, especially in the long-term.

The existence and number of IDPs in Kenya has remained controversial. Different officials in the former and current governments have, at different forums, given different ‘positions’ on the matter, with some declaring that Kenya is overburdened with refugees from war torn countries and does not host any IDPs on its territory.

Pressed by officials from various government ministries and departments at meetings with UN agencies, donors, and at regional inter-ministerial forums the government of Kenya obliged. However, in February 2006, the then Minister for Lands and Settlements said the government was looking for land to resettle displaced persons. The Minister noted that there are not more than 10,000 IDPs in Kenya and warned NGOs quoting figures in excess of 300,000 to stop exaggerating numbers. The NRC/IDMC team was also told by a government official in Nairobi that NGOs often overstate figures “for their own benefit” and that the 300,000 figure was an exaggeration.

Thus the official government position on IDPs remains unclear, however for many stake-holders, the NARC government’s manifesto, which promises to implement the recommendations of the Akiwumi Report, including the resettlement of and/or compensation for IDPs, reflects the current government’s official position on IDPs.

2.1.6 Land Acquisition

To address perceived historical land grievances, there a growing push to enact the first National Land Policy (NLP), drafted by the Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) a non-profit, non-partisan network. Klopp sees this policy as a first step in creating systematic treatment of land and property in Kenya to reduce the likelihood of illegal land seizures. In order to buttress this effort, there needs to be ongoing dialogue to ensure that it envisions and facilitates the changing relationship between land, alternative source of wealth and opportunities for livelihood for many Kenyans. As Klopp noted, “There needs to be serious public discussion in Kenya about the land grievances, The issue of land is one of the most politically sensitive in Kenya, and while it is also one of the most pressing social issues, it has been “swept under the carpet” by the government. In many ways, the problem of IDPs in Kenya is a reflection of broader issues of land ownership. In reality, the government may not be able to provide the entire IDP population with land. Yet even when resources are limited, according to the Guiding Principles the state has an unequivocal responsibility to ensure equal access to assistance and protection to all IDPs without discrimination.

The government has made a number of attempts to regularise and normalise land allocations and ownership, through the Ndung’u Report (despite its lack of implementation), as well as through a


land policy, which is still in draft form and has yet to be tabled before Parliament. The draft land policy makes no explicit reference to IDPs, however it does note the need for a resolution of historical injustices related to land grievances which date back to colonial land policies and resulted in the mass disinheritance of communities of their land. The policy requires the government to establish suitable mechanisms for restitution, reparation and compensation of historical injustices. The policy further requires the identification of vulnerable groups, through a determination process, to facilitate redistribution of land and resettlement.

As the process of land formalization continues in Kenya, the government has an ongoing responsibility to ensure access to protection and assistance for IDPs, where ever they are located. Further research is also needed on the relationship between IDPs and Kenya's large squatter population, as the government has resettled squatters on a number of occasions. IDPs and squatters may overlap, as if squatters were forced to live on illegal land due displacement, they are IDPs.

While resettlement may be an ultimate goal, the Guiding Principles note that all displaced persons have the right to an adequate standard of living, and that IDPs should be provided with, at a minimum, essential food and potable water, basic shelter and housing, appropriate clothing and essential medical services. Thus while plans for resettlement in Kenya are ongoing, the government has an obligation to ensure the protection and assistance needs of IDPs are met

2.2 Theories

According to Abraham Maslow (1954), human needs are an important part of human nature. Values, beliefs and customs differ from country to country and group to group but all people have similar needs. The human needs are arranged in a heretical order, often shown as a pyramid. Maslow based his theory on healthy, creative people who used all their talents, potential and capabilities.



2.2.1 Psychological needs

The Government of Kenya has grappled with the issue of resettling IDPS because it has never taken time to understand the needs of the IDPS. Peter (2009) noted that most IDPS had to leave their home with nothing except the clothes on their back. The situation was aggravated during the height of the violence when basic services were not available and the supply lines were blocked. The IDPS depended mainly on relief food and basically had no way of earning a living. He further noted that during the initial stages of the violence, there were concerted efforts by both local and international NGO's and well wishes to provide food, water and other basic needs to the residents in IDP camps. However, as the violence subsided, the burden of providing sustenance to the IDPS was left mainly to the Government and the Red Cross. The IDPS complained that the food rations were drastically reduced. Kariuki, chairman of Nakuru IDP Committee noted that access to basic facilities such as medical/health services, education social and economic services, was generally more difficult for IDPS and their families than it was in general due to the violence being experienced at that time.

2.2.2 Safety and security needs

Initially, IDP camps were set up on an ad hoc basis without any planning. The first port of call was in areas which were considered secure for settlement. These included police stations, administration camps, trading centers and churches. However, because the camps set up in ad hoc for show security soon became a much concern, with numerous thereafter of attack coming from the outside. Illustrative of this situation is the testimony of Angelus Kauru the officer commanding police Division of Nakuru. "... During the skirmishes we were ferrying people from the interior to various police stations and churches. There were various IDP camps at the time, we had one at the divisional headquarters which is at the police station, Holy Family Catholic Church we had another, The Central Police Station, there was also another one Bondeni there was another one and also at Afraha Stadium. When we realized that these people were almost being attacked in these camps, they requested to be moved to a safer place and that is when we started moving them to one central place for ease protection."

IDPS in most camps organized themselves into representative committees to access services, security and other matters. Young men were mobilized in what is commonly referred to as vigilante groups to provide security within the camps. Another security problem was that individuals who had to seek food, water or other services outside the camps. Some women became


victims of violence when they sought food or water outside the camp. Most of the IDPS left their homes under emergency conditions not knowing where to go or their ultimate destination. In certain circumstances the IDPS left while under attack from marauding gangs of youth. The Kriegler Commission investigating the post election violence was told of instances where the general public and police were fully involved in the evacuation and protection of IDPS. Individual and institution involved in the protection of IDPS risked particularly during the time of intense violence. In both Rongai and the Maasai Mau Forest (in molo), the violent evictions resulted in human rights abuses and the destruction of property, both of which were carried out with impunity. In addition, the evictions not only resulted in displacement but also led to increased tensions in surrounding areas. In areas located near Likia, the NRC/IDMC team interviewed a number of displaced who, due to security concerns, slept in towns or in neighbours houses and then returned home to cultivate their fields during the day. Interviewees alleged that police officers posted to the area provided ineffective security due to a lack of ammunition, and held biases against their community. The number of police officers deployed was also found to be inadequate, and their role is further undermined by a lack of transport and food. IDPs also alleged that police deployed were often inebriated and that they hardly made any arrests or follow-ups on security incidents. On one afternoon, the NRC/IDMC team itself observed an inebriated contingent of police officers in the area, highlighting the lack of adequate security and protection and further evidencing the need for professional security forces able to build confidence with local communities.

The lack of security was further demonstrated when the NRC/IDMC team visited one Kikuyu compound which had been partially destroyed, allegedly by Kalenjins. While an in-depth analysis of the relationship and history between the Kalenjins and Kikuyu is outside the scope of this study, in an effort to ease tensions there is an immediate need to enhance and support existing peace and reconciliation efforts

2.2.3 Self esteem and Belonging

The major challenge that faced the internally displaced people is the loss of self esteem. Cornelius (2008) notes that violent and sudden displacement from place one considers their home is often the worst form of loss entailing as if dues, a sense of loss of self. Most of the IDPS had no other home apart from the place they were evicted. Displacement meant not only loss of a home but loss of friendships and other relationships, economic and personal life built over many years, dispersal of relatives, a loss of memories that constituted ones being. That most of the displacement was violent in nature means that whatever intervention the government makes, it regrettable cannot make up for the mental and psychological trauma associated with displacement.

2.2.4 Conceptual Framework



CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), research can be defined as a process of arriving at effective solutions to problems through systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of data. Research methodology on the other hand refers to a systematic way of solving a research problem from the research study (Kothari, 2007). Methodology refers to procedures that are followed in conducting the research. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) suggest that a detailed description of the steps involved in conducting a study helps the researcher to understand the study better. This chapter presents a systematic description of methods that the researcher will use when carrying out the study, how the respondents will be obtained and the rationale for the selection population, sample design, data collection tools and procedure for data collection, and data analysis including the tools used.

3.1 Research Design

A Research design may be defined as the plan and structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions. It is a strategy for the research and the plan for which the strategy is to be carried out. It specifies the methods and procedure for the collection, measurement and analysis of data (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). The authors, Cooper and Schindler, examine three types of research designs; exploratory, descriptive, causal/experimental studies. Bell (2004) outlines some of the common approaches to research including case study, ethnographic style, experimental design, narrative inquiry, and surveys. Further, the research may be qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative research involves designs, techniques and measures that produce data in form of words rather in numbers. Observation or ethnographic style and interview are considered the best methods of data collection in this type of research. Quantitative research on the hand produces discrete numerical and quantifiable data. Suitable designs of study under quantitative research include experimental, causal-comparative and correlation research designs (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). According to Cooper and Schindler (2006), survey, though not the only methodology of a quantitative researcher, it is the dominant one. This study was descriptive by design because it aimed at defining the state of internally displaced persons as it exists in Kenya at present. The study was both quantitative and qualitative. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), in descriptive survey, which is typically quantitative, a researcher may include open ended

items where respondents are given an opportunity to express their views thus yielding qualitative data. The objectives of this study led to questions that yielded both quantitative and qualitative data. The respondents were given an opportunity to express their views on challenges of resettling them from their camps.

3.2 Population of the Study

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a population can be defined as an entire group of individuals, objects or events that have a common characteristic that is observable. In determining the scope of research, the researcher was searching for a hot spot for perennial election violence and therefore appreciates the role of the government in the success of the resettlement program. Further, since the researcher's aim was to determine what the government of Kenya was doing as far as the resettlement of the IDPS is concerned, Nakuru district was chosen for the study in recognition of the fact that most of the worst forms of violence took place there.

The target population for the purpose of this study therefore constituted IDPS and provincial administration officers working in the greater Nakuru district and specifically in the Molo division. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) recognize the fact that where the target population is too high, an experimentally accessible population can be used for the purpose of the research. This accessible population is also referred to as a survey population. The survey population chosen by the researcher for the purpose of the study constituted the IDPS camps accessible to the researcher.

3.3 Sample Size

A sample refers to a subset of the population. According to Kothari (2004, p. 152), sampling involves the 'selection of some part of an aggregate or totality on the basis of which a judgment or inference about the aggregate or totality is made'. A sample should be a good representative of the total objects in the population. According to Bell (2004), when carrying out a survey, the researcher should ensure that a sample is truly representative of the population. This means that the sample should bear the characteristics of the population under study. Kothari (2004) asserts that sampling is necessary where the population is too large to be studied effectively. Other rational for sampling given by the author include the fact that it enables more accurate measurements and it also saves time and money. For the purpose of the study, 10% of the total population will yield a representative sample which was approximately 80 IDPS in number, .According to Mugenda and

Mugenda (2003, p. 42), 'for descriptive studies, ten percent of the accessible population is enough'.

3.4 Sampling Design

Sampling design refers to the method of selecting the items to be observed in a given study. There are two types of sampling design; probability and non-probability. Non-probability, also purposive, deliberate or judgment sampling refers to a sampling procedure where the researcher deliberately chooses the items to be studied and the choice remains supreme. The danger of personal bias cannot be overlooked. On the other hand, probability sampling, also random sampling, refers to a procedure where every item in the population has an equal chance of being selected. Random sampling yields a more representative sample thereby allowing generalization to the larger population and use of inferential statistics (Kothari, 2004).

Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) outline the four common procedures under random sampling as simple random sampling, stratified random sampling, systematic random sampling and cluster random sampling. Under systematic sampling, the target sample is generated by picking an arbitrary starting point and then picking every *n*th element in succession from a list. The *n*th element chosen depends on the survey population and the desired sample size. For example, every 10th element in a population of 1,000 yields a sample size of 100. Simple random sampling involves giving a number to every item in the accessible population, placing the numbers in an urn then randomly picking the numbers. Random numbers may also be generated through computers. Simple random sampling techniques assume that all the elements of the population are identifiable and numbered prior to sampling, which is many times not feasible. Cluster sampling techniques are used when it is not possible to obtain a sampling frame because the population is either very large or scattered over a large geographic area. Cluster sampling involves selection of an intact group. All the members of such an intact group are then included in the sample and each member becomes a unit of observation.

Lastly, the Stratified sampling technique involves partitioning the entire population of elements into sub-populations also referred to as strata, and then selecting elements separately from each sub-population. The sample size and the appropriate representation in each stratum are then determined. The representations from each stratum can either be proportional or equal. This is then followed by selecting a random sample in each stratum using simple random sampling techniques. One main advantage of stratified random sampling is that it ensures inclusion in the sample, of

subgroups, which otherwise would be omitted entirely by other methods because of their small numbers in the population.

For the purpose of this study, simple random sampling was used. The accessible population having been the IDPS from the camp, the desired sample was drawn randomly. Random sampling provided results that could be generalized to the larger population since it gave more representative data. Further, data collected through random sampling allowed the researcher to apply inferential statistics (Orodho, 2004).

3.5 Research Instruments

Data may also be classified as either qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative data are discrete numerical data. Qualitative data on the other hand, are data in the form of words rather than numbers. Qualitative data is concerned with qualitative phenomena such as attitudes and emotions. (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

Data can also be classified into primary data and secondary data. Primary data are collected afresh and for the first time and therefore original data. Secondary data on the other hand refers to data that have already been collected by some other person and analyzed already (Kothari, 2007). Data analysed for the purpose of this study was both qualitative and quantitative due to the nature of questions asked. Findings and recommendations were based on primary data that was collected from the field by the researcher.

There are various tools available to a researcher for the purpose of collection of data. Some of the common methods of collecting data according to Kothari (2007) include observations, interviews, and questionnaires. Use of Focus groups is another method of data collection that is considered by Cooper and Schindler (2007) as a form of group interview. Observation involves collection of information by looking and does not require researcher to communicate verbally with the subject of research (Chandran 2004). Observation is mainly used in studies related to behavioral sciences. It can also be used as a scientific tool when systematically planned and recorded and is subjected to controls on validity and reliability. If done accurately, observation eliminates subjective bias. Observation also provides information that is happening currently and is independent of respondent's willingness and/or ability to respond. However, observation is very expensive, time consuming, provides limited information and is ineffective for data collection where subjects are not accessible for observation (Kothari, 2007). Ethnography, which relies heavily on observation

is more intense and involve longer periods. Ethnography is mainly used by social scientist (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

Interview involves presentation of oral-verbal stimuli and in reply in terms of oral-verbal responses (Kothari, 2007). Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) define an interview as an oral administration of a questionnaire or an interview schedule. Interviews may be administered in person and through telephone. It may be direct interview of the respondent or indirect interviewing of other persons with knowledge on the subject. Interviews may be structured or characterized by flexibility of approach in questioning i.e. unstructured. Interviews have the advantage of providing information in greater depth, provide an opportunity to restructuring of question, enable obtaining of personal information and the most spontaneous reactions from informants, and also allow for application of observation. Interviewer can also overcome resistance. However, interviews are very expensive- especially in widely spread and large populations, there is a possibility of bias for both interview and respondent, and are time consuming. It may also be difficult to access certain people especially high profile executives (Kothari, 2007)

A questionnaire refers to an instrument delivered to the participant via personal or non personal means that is to be completed by the participant (Copper & Schindler, 2007). Questionnaire as a tool for study have the advantage of low cost, being free from bias, allowing time for well thought out answers, wide and large access to respondents, and production of dependable and reliable results. However, there are disadvantages of a low rate of return of dully filled questionnaires, limited use i.e. on educated and co-operating respondents, control over questionnaire once sent, inflexibility in terms of difficulty of amending the approach, possibility of ambiguous replies/omissions of reply altogether slowness and difficult.

Focus groups is defined by Copper and Schindler (2007, p. 212) as 'a panel of people (made up of 6-10 participants), led by a trained moderator who uses group dynamics principles to focus or guide the group in an exchange of ideas, feeling and experiences on a specific topic'. According to Kumar (2005), the broad topics discussed are developed prior to the discussion by either the researcher or by the group. Discussion points emerge as part of the discussion. Copper and Schindler (2007) assert that focus groups are often used as an exploratory technique but may also be a primary methodology. The authors provide other venues for focus group interviews as; telephone focus group, online focus groups, and videoconferencing focus groups.



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Two tools of data collection were used for this research; questionnaires and personal interview. The questionnaire method was appropriate for the study since it enabled the researcher to obtain answers to the same questions from a large number of respondents enabling description, comparison, and relating of findings of the research (Bell, 2004).

The questionnaire was formulated in sections such that each section was aimed at answering a particular research question and thereby meeting the various research objectives. With regard to this therefore, the first section answered the first research question, section two, the second question while section three addressed the third and fourth questions. Both structured and semi-structured items were used to collect data. Most of these items were based on a Likert scale format. A Likert Scale adds up responses to statements representative of a particular attitude. It is often used in survey design to get around the problem of obtaining meaningful quantitative answers to restricted closed questions. Respondents were asked to indicate their strength of feeling about a particular issue on a 1-5 rating scale. Using this Scale with the closed questions generated statistical measurements of respondents' rating of a particular item.

The final research question was met through a semi-structured personal interview with a panel of IDPs from selected camps. The structured interview questions ensured that similar questions were asked to those interviewed. Further, section four of the questionnaire also addressed some questions to the initiatives by NGOs to resettle the IDPs. The time and resources constraints could not allow for a more intensive study with more than the two tools of data collection.

3.6 Data Collection Procedure

Questionnaire pre-testing refers to the assessment of questions and instruments before the beginning of a study in order to improve the quality of the questions before starting the study (Cooper & Schindler, 2007). Pre-testing of a questionnaire enables the researcher to ascertain whether it will attract the required responses from the respondents. The questionnaire that was used in this study largely embraced the features of Fitzgerald's Sexual Harassment Questionnaire (SEQ) which, according to Willness *et al.* (2007), is valid and its use ensure comparability of studies across findings. However, to ensure the desired responses to all the research questions given the fact that the SEQ concept had never been tested in the local (Kenyan) context and that the tool was meant to collect other data besides government's initiatives, piloting of the questionnaire with IDPs not included in the sample was seen to be necessary.

According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003, p. 79), “The number of cases in pretest should not be very large. Normally the pretest sample is between 1% and 10% depending on the research sample”. Ten questionnaires were distributed by the researcher to IDPS in one camp for the purpose of piloting. The subjects were encouraged to make comments and suggestions concerning instructions, clarity of questions and relevance as prescribed by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003). Corrections and improvement were made on the instrument where necessary.

The respondents were expected to fill in the questionnaires and return them to the interviewer. The questionnaires were either presented to the respondents in person by the interviewer or sent to them through electronic mail. Further, the researcher also interviewed the District officer and the chief to establish the extent of resettlement programme. Focussed Group Discussion was also conducted by the researcher and the IDPS.

3.7 Data Analysis

Data analysis involves giving estimates to unknown parameters and testing hypotheses in order to draw inferences (Kothari, 2007). According to Cooper and Schindler (2007), data analysis is the process of editing and reducing accumulated data to manageable size, developing summaries, looking for patterns and applying statistical techniques. Data was analysed as required to meet the objectives of the research. The data was analyzed following the process of data cleaning, organizing, coding, data entry, data processing and interpretation of results. Analysis was done by aid of Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software. Data was summarized and presented in of form of percentages, graphs and coefficient scores by aid of SPSS.

In analyzing the level of awareness of sexual harassment, percentages and average scores were used. Coefficients/average scores were used to show the relationship between the various stakeholders involved in resettlement of IDPs. The analysis allowed the researcher to arrive at the necessary conclusions and recommendations.

In analyzing, responses to a single Likert item were treated as *ordinal data* (the assumption was that respondents perceived the difference adjacent level as equidistant). Further, responses to several Likert items were summed, and treated as *interval data* measuring a theme i.e. loss of property, disruption of normal life, relationship with rival community and governments resettlement strategy. The respondents’ level of agreement with an item was thus summed-up for each item with values ranging from 1-5. A scale of 1 represented a strongly unfavorable attitude

(strongly disagree), 2-disagree, 3-neither agree or nor disagree, 4-agree, and 5-strongly agree (strongly agree). According to Copper and Schindler (2007), scores may be summed to measure the participant's overall attitude. It is important to note that where a number of item were used to determine a theme, negatively worded statements, the assigned numerical values were reversed

3.8. Ethical considerations

The respondents were assured that the information they gave was purely for research purposes. The information provided was to be kept confidential and the respondents were not suppose to give their names anywhere during the research.

3.9. Limitations of the study

Some unanticipated occurrences occurred like language barrier which hindered some respondents from filling the questionnaires. Not all IDPS were co-operative with the researcher due to fear and stigma which are associated with what they went through and they could not like to be reminded of the same. In this case the researcher availed questionnaires to those who were available and willing to participate until the required sample was attained. Another major limitation of this research was the availability of resources. The area occupied by IDPS in Kenya is quite large and diverse. To be able to carry out the research exhaustively immense financial resources were required for engaging many research assistants to help in carrying out this research. Due to this limitation, a representative sample of the total population was selected for the purpose of the study.

There was also the limitation on the availability of literature on election violence in Kenya. The researcher had to rely mainly on foreign journals on the subject of study. Further, the researcher was not able to access some of the provincial administration officers for the purpose of interviewing them. However, the provincial administration officers who were accessible provided the information required by the researcher.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the data collected. Analysis and discussion of the findings is also presented. Both structured and semi-structured items were used to collect data. Some of the items were based on a Likert scale¹ format. In analysis, responses to a single Likert item were treated as *ordinal data* (the assumption was that respondents perceived the difference adjacent level as equidistant). Secondly, responses to several Likert items were summed, and treated as *interval data* measuring a theme. The respondents' level of agreement with an item was thus summed-up for each question with values ranging from 1-4: *Strongly agree* had a value of 4, *agree*, 3, *Disagree* 2, and *strongly disagree* 1. The following formula was used to calculate ordinal responses (example).

Table: 1- Formula for calculating ordinal response

	<i>strongly disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>agree</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	Total	Average score
Q11. I am satisfied with the compensation offered by the government	6	20	22	10	58	3.31 or 82.8% i.e. 3.31/4
Total score for the Item is	6x1	20x2	22x3	10x4	192/58	

Source: Kathuri and Pals (1993)

¹ A Likert Scale adds up responses to statements representative of a particular attitude. It is often used in survey design to get around the problem of obtaining meaningful quantitative answers to restricted closed questions. Respondents were asked to indicate their strength of feeling about a particular issue on a 1-5 rating scale. Using this Scale with the closed questions generated statistical measurements of Respondents' rating of a particular item.

4.1 Respondents' Profile

Out of the anticipated number of respondents (100), only 73 were eligible for analysis (after data cleaning). This represented a response rate of 73%. The proportion of the respondents by sex is shown in the table below.

Table 2: Respondents' Profile

Gender	Frequency of response	Percent
Female	34	47.2
Male	39	52.8
Total	73	100

Source: Primary Data

Proportionally, 34 (47.2%) of the respondents were female while 38 (52.8%) were male. When the respondents' sex was further disaggregated by age, the following is what emerged.

Table 3: Age of IDPs in the Camps

Age	Female	Male	TOTAL
18-24 years	4	7	11
	11.8	18.4	15.3
25-40 years	19	13	32
	55.9	34.2	44.4
41-50 years	6	10	16
	17.6	26.3	22.2
51-60 years	5	8	13
%	14.7	21.1	18.1
TOTAL	34	38	72
%	100	100	100

Source: Primary Data

The near absence of the youth in the age group of 18 -24 can be attributed to most of them looking for work in far away places. The fact that most of them were the prime targets of the post election violence means that they were the first to seek refugee else where. Many youths because of self esteem could not share the same tends as their parents

Overall, most of the respondents (44.4%) were aged between 25-40 years, followed by the 41-50 years, 51-60 years. The 18-24 year olds were the least represented in the camps. Meanwhile, most of the female respondents were between the 25-40 year categories (55.9%) so were their male counterparts (34.2%). These figures shows that majority of the IDPs in the camps were in their most productive age.

The table below shows the duration the IDPs had been in the camps.

Table 4: Duration of IDPS in the Camps

Duration in years	Frequency of response	Percent
4	1	1.4
More than 4	1	1.4
3	68	94.5
2	3	2.7
Total	73	100

Source: Primary Data

The results shown in the figure above show that a bigger proportion of respondents (94.5%) had been in camp for 3 years and followed by those that had been there for two year (2.7%). A few had been there for four years (1.4%) or more (1.4%). The fact that a large percentage of the internally disciplined persons had stayed in the camp for 3 years can be explained by the breakout of the post election violence of the year 2008. Since post election violence has been a periodic phenomenon in the greater rift valley, it explains why some of the IDPs had stayed in the camp for more than three years.

4.2. Aftermath of Violence

The following are items related to the aftermath of the post-election violence and how they were rated

Table 5: Aftermath of Violence

STATEMENT	AGREE	STONGLY AGREE	DIS-AGREE	STRONGLY DIS- AGREE	
I lost all of my property.	35	33	1	3	3.38 (84.5%)
Some of my family members were killed.	5	5	34	12	2.14 (53.5%)
My normal life was disrupted.	31	33	1	7	3.22 (80.5%)

Source: Primary Data

The respondents strongly indicated that they lost their property as a result of the violence (84.5%), that their lives were disrupted (80.5%) and that some of their family members were killed (53.5%). The massive displacements due to post election violence led to loss of property as the main grievance for the IDPs. This was clearly evident from the few household items that were seen during the research. However, this could not be independently be verified because some of them might have given them to their relatives or the response was as a result of seeking sympathy

4.3 Resettlement of IDPS

4.3.1 IDPs' relationship with evicting community

The following items relate to respondents' attitude towards their evicting communities

Table 6: IDPs' relationship with evicting community

STATEMENT	AGREE	STONGLY AGREE	DIS-AGREE	STRONGLY DIS- AGREE	Rate
1. I can forgive my tormentors.	42	8	2	5	2.93 (73.3%)
2. The rival community is ready to welcome you.	16	4	1	15	2.25 (56.3%)
Total (theme)					2.59 (64.8%)

Source: Primary Data

The findings shown above show that the respondents were, to a high degree, willing to forgive their tormentors (73.3%) and were 56.3% satisfied that their tormentors were willing to welcome them back. The overwhelming number of IDPs (who are willing to forgive their tormentors (73.3%) is a testimony to how desperate they are to put back their life on track. To reinforce their

future, 56.3% believed that their tormentors are willing to forgive them. This finding points out to the fact the challenge of resettling the IDPs lies somewhere else. This is because the response shows that they are ready to forget their past and engage with the rival community to foster peace. The high relationship on the liker scale (64.8%) affirms this.

Overall, the relationship with evicting community as theme was rated at 64.8% satisfaction on the Likert.

4.3.2 IDPs willingness to go back home

The respondents were further asked to state their willingness to return home. The findings are shown in the table below.

Table 7: IDPs willingness to go back home

Statement	agree	Frequency of response	Percentage
Are you ready to go back home?	Strongly agree	60	8.6
	Disagree	7	10
	Strongly disagree	4	5.7
	Don't know	15	20
	total	73	100

Source: Primary Data

A total of 55.7% of the respondents 'agreed' that they were willing to return to their homes, 10% 'disagreed', 8.6% 'strongly agreed', 5.7% were completely not willing to go back, while 20% remained neutral.

Overall, the respondents were 71% on the Likert willing to go back home. The high number of IDPs who are willing to go home (55.7%) Brings to fore the fact that there are some catalytic actions that needs to be initiated to enable them go back to their original homes. Many of the IDPs lost all their property (84.5%) and resettlement to them means starting all over again, worse still some of them had lost their family members (53.5%) and could not afford to be haunted by the memories of the past. This is shown strongly by 10% of them who did not feel secure to go back home despite all the response on Likert scale of 71% shows that many of the IDPs were ready to return to their original homes.

Given the overwhelming willingness to return to their homes, the IDPs were then asked to state why they had not left the camp. The reasons for not leaving are shown in the table below

Table 8: Reasons the IDPS remaining in the camps

Why haven't you left the camp?	Frequency of response	Percent
1.Got no money to resettle	34	46.6
2.Still waiting for government's promise to resettle	17	23.3
3.Have no where to go	12	16.4
4.Have no money or land	9	12.3
5.Not ready because of insecurity	6	8.2

Source: Primary Data

The majority had not left the camps due to lack of money for resettlement (47.6%), 23.3% were still waiting for government's promise to resettle them, 16.4% had no where to go (destitute) while 8.2% were due to insecurity. When asked to state how much they have so far received from the government, 98.6% said they had not received a cent. The issue of finance stood out as the main stumbling block to the resettlement of the IDPs. Majority of the IDPs (98.6%) confirmed that they had not received any money from the central government of Kenya to facilitate their resettlement. Security also stood out as a stumbling block to resettlement (8.2%). Being the main player in the resettlement, majority of IDPs were looking up to the central government for resettlement (23.3%). This indicates that the government had not played its part effectively.

4.3.3 Appraisal of government's resettlement Strategy

The table below shows how the respondents appraised items related to government's resettlement strategy.

Table 9: Appraisal of government's resettlement Strategy

STATEMENT	AGREE	STONGLY AGREE	DIS-AGREE	STRONGLY DIS- AGREE	Rate
The government compensation funds are enough.	4	4	7	45	1.45 (36.3%)
The government has addressed all of your needs in the camp.	4	3	8	47	1.4 (35%)
The government needs to change the resettlement strategy	37	8	1	2	3.06 (76.5%)

Source: Primary Data

The results shown above reveal that the respondents were dissatisfied with the adequacy of the government's compensation funds (36.3% satisfaction), the way the government had addressed their needs in the camp (35%) and they overwhelmingly requested for a change (76.5%) in the government's resettlement strategy.

In Overall, the figure below shows the way the respondents rated the government's resettlement strategy.

Table 10: Government Strategy for resettlement

Statement	Level of agreement	Frequency of response	percentage
How do you rate the government resettlement strategy	Excellent	9	12.7
	Very good	4	5.6
	Good	33	45.1
	Poor	27	36.6
	Total	73	100

Source: Primary Data

A total of 12.7% rated the strategy as 'excellent', 5.6% said it was 'very good', 45.1% 'good', while 36.6% said it was 'poor'.

In echoing these sentiments, focus group discussants asserted:

"the government's resettling strategy is very poorly coordinated, insensitive and without coherence".

To make the strategy more acceptable, the respondents suggested for the following.

Table 11: General strategy of resettlement by the Government

Comment on the general strategy used by the government to resettle the IDPs	Frequency of response	Percent
1.The government is slow and poor in handling resettlement issues	23	31.5
2.Nothing has been done to this camp	14	19.2
3.Doing really good as others have been given Land and others money	8	11
4.Fair	6	6.2
5.Not good because the assigned staff either discriminate against or want to be bribed	5	6.8

Source: Primary Data

A majority (31.5%) said the government was slow and poor in handling resettlement issues, government assigned staffs either discriminated against or wanted to be bribed (6.8%) while 19.2% said the government had done absolutely nothing.

The focus group discussants said;

“we need better shelter and the government should provide better security”

Contrary to these negative assertion, 6.2% of the respondents applauded the strategy and termed it ‘fair’ and a further 11% said it was good because other IDPs had already been given land to relocate to or compensated with money.

The responses about the government’s initiatives clearly shows that many of the IDPs were not satisfied with the government’s efforts in resettling them (31.5%). The 45.1% of the respondents who felt the government was doing well believed that some of their colleagues had been given land (11%). The 36.6% who rated the governments’ efforts as poor was due to the fact that there was no clear strategy in the provincial administration to resettle them. The focused group discussion improved on the governments’ strategy to be overhauled and all the bureaucratic tapes removed. Of urgency to the IDPs was the issues of decent shelter since many of them were left in the cold during the prolonged rainy season. This, they complained made them susceptible to diseases.

4.3.4 Other agencies involved in the resettlement

The study also sought to establish the availability if other agencies collaborating with the government to offer resettlement support to the IDPs. The table below shows the findings.

Table 12: Other agencies involved in the resettlement

A part from the government, what other organizations have been involved in resettling the IDPS?	Frequency	Percent
Habitat	2	3.2%
Kenya Red Cross	38	60.3%
UNDP	3	4.8%
UNHCR	20	31.7%
Total	63	100%

Source: Primary Data

Kenya Red Cross (60.3%) was the most active organization assisting the government to resettle the IDPs, followed by UNHCR (31.7%), UNDP (4.8%) and Habitat (3.2%). Apart from resettlement, some of these organizations have been providing food to the IDPs either fortnightly (3%), monthly (10.4%) or weekly (1.5%). The government, according to the respondents supplements these efforts by providing food either fortnightly (14.8%) or monthly (29.6%).

When asked to state whether these organizations have promoted any reconciliation between the warring communities, 60.6% answered in the affirmative.

Table 13: Reconciliation efforts by NGOs

Question	Explanation	Frequency	Percent
Have these organizations promoted peace between communities?	Yes		
	1.Are helping the poor	2	2.8
	2.The preach peace	8	11
	3.They organize seminars	12	16.4
	4.They help in looking for lost persons	2	2.8
	No		
	1.Have never seen them	7	9.6
	2.They concentrate on other tasks	4	5.5
	3Dont know	6	8.2
	4.Dont think its their duty	1	1.4

Source: Primary Data

The Red Cross was the leading NGO in the resettlement of the IDPs (60.3%). This, from the focused group discussions was as a result of their fast response to disaster. However, the provision of food by all the NGOs was not structured and ranged from a weekly (1.5%) to monthly (10.4%). The organizations were also at the fore front to reconcile the IDPs and their enemy community. They used different methods like organizing seminars (16.4%)), preaching peace (11%) and helping the poor(2.8%). However, some IDPs had never seen or heard of these NGOs (9.6%) or thought it was not their duty (1.4%).

4.4. Issues of security

The respondents were asked to state whether they felt secure in their respective camps. The figure below shows the proportion of those that felt secure or otherwise.

Table14: Issues of security

Statement	Levels of agreement	Frequency response	Percentage
Are secure in this camp	Yes	25	33.8
	No	48	66.2
	Total	73	100

Source; primary data

Overall, 66.2% of the respondents said they felt insecure while a paltry 33.8% felt secure. When further cross-tabulated by gender, more males (71%) than females (60.6%) felt insecure. Further statistical tests were thus conducted to establish the relationship between the feelings of security and sex. The findings are shown here below.

Table 15: Statistical test analysis

STATISTICAL TESTS	Chi-square	1-tailed p	2-tailed p
Chi-square - uncorrected	0.7608		0.3830934640
Chi-square - Mantel-Haenszel	0.7489		0.3868359094
Chi-square - corrected (Yates)	0.3708		0.5425894652
Mid-p exact		0.1998585619	
Fisher exact		0.2717655026	

Source: Primary Data

At a DF value of 1 (3.84)- $P \leq 0.05$, the study did not find a significant relationship between feelings of security and respondents' gender/sex i.e. all were likely to feel insecure regardless of sex/gender.

Perhaps due to understand the feelings of insecurity amongst the IDPs, 38% of IDPs said their relationship with the surrounding communities was poor.

And in case of emergency in the camps, 70.6% of the IDPs would run to the Chief's camp, 19.1% to police, 8.8% to Red Cross and 1.5% to World Vision as their first port of call.

However, the provincial administrators when asked what arrangement they had for the security of the IDPs, they said more police will be deployed and extra police posts established in the troubled regions. The difference in response to insecurity by the different groups (10.4%) could be to a smaller extent due to societal roles of males who are supposed to provide security. Moreover, in case of an attack the male were the prime targets. The government believed in forced resettlement as the response of the provincial administration showed.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of the major findings of the study, conclusions and recommendations.

5.1 Summary of the Study

The purpose of this study was to assess the challenges in resettling internally displaced persons in Kenya, a case of Nakuru district. The findings are organized according to variables, as they appeared in the questionnaire. The theme of the study was derived from the research objectives that guided the study. The specific objectives formulated for the study were to;

1. Find out the challenges in resettling internally displaced persons in Kenya.
2. Find out the governments efforts in resettling the internally displaced persons in Kenya.
3. Find out the initiatives by the non-governmental organization in resettling internally displaced persons.

The following is a highlight of the key findings and conclusions of the study.

The study found that the majority of the internally displaced persons were family units. This is shown by the near number of women (47.2%) and male (52.8%). The problem of resettlement of the IDPs was captured in the majority who have spend at least 3 year in the camps.

Many of the IDPs are traumatized to return to their original homes (80.5%), others had lost their property and had no way of rebuilding their lives a fresh. Majority of them were willing to forgive their tormentors (73.3%) but only 56.3% believed that their tormentors were willing to welcome the team. The reasons given by the IDPs not to relocate from the camps were varied but a majority wanted to be compensated first (46.6%) but others were unwilling due to insecurity (23.3%)

The study found that most of the IDPs believed that the compensation from the government was not enough (36.3%) and hence they could not move away from the camp until they are fully compensated. A Marjory (76.5%) were of the opinion that the government should change its resettlement strategy altogether 36.6% rated the governments strategy as poor because many government agencies wanted to be bribed in order to respond to their need on the slip side, 6.2% of respondents termed the strategy fair and a further 11% said the strategy was good.

The findings of the study showed that many NGOs had complemented the governments with the Red Cross in the lead (60.3%) UNHCR (31.7%) and UNDP (4.8%). The strategy developed by the organization for resettlement includes seminars (16.4%), preaching peace (11%), and looking for lost people (2.8%) However, security remained on issue that affected resettlement 66.2% responded felt insecure.

5.2 Recommendations

To the Government of Kenya:

Recognize existing displaced populations in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Disassociate land-ownership from being recognized as an IDP and ensure that all IDPs are afforded equal protection and assistance.

Support the collection of reliable and accurate data and information on IDPs throughout the country. While the government's IDP Task Force is positive step in the recognition of the existence of IDPs, as it used land ownership to determine the scope of displacement, its findings when released should not be viewed as comprehensive nor conclusive.

As recommended by the Office of the President, develop a national policy on IDPs as a means to assign responsibility and provide guidelines to government authorities on the provision and coordination of ongoing protection and assistance to IDPs. The policy, based on the Guiding Principles, should seek to ensure a consistent and comprehensive government response to IDPs throughout the country.

As required by Article 12 of the recently signed Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region, implement the Guiding Principles into national legislation. In this process the government should draw upon the model IDP legislation developed as part of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

Establish a clear government focal point with a strong mandate to address IDP issues and advise and guide other government ministries on their responses to the protection and assistance needs of IDPs. The focal point should be provided with adequate resources and the necessary political will to respond to IDP situations in an effective manner.

Continue to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to IDPs as long as needed, including vocational and small business training for youth groups as a means to combat idleness.

Implement the Ndung'u Report's recommendations – including that the government should urgently recover public land acquired illegally for private gain and settle landless on alternative and appropriate land and provide mechanisms, such as a land tribunal and commission to formalise and clarify land ownership.

Ensure the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as well as that civilians are protected from arbitrary displacement according to international humanitarian and human rights law.

Provide sensitization and training on IDPs and their rights to all levels of government representatives, including the central government, district officials and local representatives.

Encourage and support programmes initiated by civil society and church groups for IDPs in conflict-affected areas.

Ensure that all IDPs are able to exercise their fundamental human rights, including rights to freedom of movement and employment.

At the district and provincial level, ensure that displaced populations are provided with adequate protection through the deployment of increased numbers of civilian police, and ensure that they are held to the highest professional standard.

Promote and enhance the work of district and provincial peace committees in an effort to reconcile disputes and provide long-term solutions to IDPs.

Ensure that those who have committed human rights abuses and continue to perpetrate violence, including through arbitrary displacement, are brought to justice.

Using the UN Guiding Principles as a framework, ensure that all IDPs are able to obtain a durable solution, including a safe and dignified voluntary return, resettlement to another part of the country, and the facilitation of reintegration.

To the United Nations:

As recommended by the current UN Development Assistance Framework for Kenya, support the government to formulate a national policy on IDPs and ensure that relevant UN agencies and partners are made aware of IDPs and their needs as well as promote awareness on IDP issues.

Ensure that current IDP-related UN programmes, such as programmes on make its expertise on refugee protection available to the UN Country Team as it develops its strategic action plan and protection strategy.

Consider a stronger humanitarian presence in the country, through the appointment of a Humanitarian Coordinator and an expanded presence of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in conflict-affected districts.

Establish an internal displacement themed working group as means to coordinate response and assist in the development of a strategic action plan; conflict and disaster management include provisions to address IDP needs.

Conduct a comprehensive IDP profiling exercise to determine IDP numbers and demographic characteristics, as well as protection and assistance needs;

Develop a protection strategy and strategic action plan to guide the UN response to conflict-induced IDPs and assign sectoral responsibilities to different UN agencies.

Considering the global commitments by UN agencies as part of the cluster process, UNHCR should conduct trainings and sensitisations on IDP protection and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement for UN staff, the government, national and international NGOs.

Consider the recruitment of a senior IDP advisor.

Draw lessons from the UN's prior experience with IDPs in Kenya, and in particular to ensure that the historical causes of displacement are adequately considered and addressed in any response strategy or plan.

Support national authorities to develop mechanisms which ensure that government officials and local politicians who commit acts of violence or instigate conflict are brought to justice.

Ensure the coordination of both the international and national response to conflict-induced IDPs, including the work of local NGOs.

Support and strengthen the work of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights to respond adequately and effectively to internal displacement.

Through regular assessments, regularly report on conflict-induced displacement.

Engage with the government at the highest levels on issues related to conflict-induced displacement.

Ensure that drought-related food distribution to cover households affected by insecurity and conflict.

To international NGOs and the ICRC:

Develop programmes which respond to the protection and assistance needs of IDPs in Kenya, through conducting needs assessments and mobilizing the necessary re-sources.

Offer the relevant expertise, such as on shelter, education, and protection, to the overall international response to IDPs.

Support and collaborate with local NGOs when addressing IDP issues

The International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC) should continue to monitor conflict-induced displacement in Kenya and raise the profile of the issue with the government, donors, and UN officials.

Considering its conflict-related mandate, the ICRC should consider a more robust presence in conflict-affected districts in Kenya, including the Rift Valley. In deliberating on whether or not international humanitarian law applies in these situations, the ICRC should take into account that violence along ethnic lines has been ongoing in Kenya since independence and that violence continues to generate large-scale displacement.

The researcher therefore suggests specific research in other parts of the country, to establish the relationship between the electoral system and the continuous displacement of persons.

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Institute of Open and Distance Learning

Office of the Director

2nd July, 2010

To Whom It May Concern:


Dear Sir/Madam,

INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR RESEARCH

I have the Pleasure to introduce **Robinson Alianda Akaka -MCR/10017/81/DF** to you. He is a Student of Masters Degree in conflict Resolution and Peace Building at Kampala international University. He is carrying out his research on the **Assessment of the Challenges in Resettling Internally Displaced Persons in Kenya, a Case of Nakuru District**. He is at the data collection stage and your institution/ Organization has been identified as his area of study. It will therefore be appreciated if you can give the best assistance to him for a depend-

The university will be counting on your kind cooperation.

Thank you



J.S. Owoeye, Ph.D

Appendix II: Time Schedule

	DEC. 2009	JAN 2010	FEB	MAR	APRIL	MAY	JUN	JULY	AUG	SEP
Proposal Writing										
Presentation										
Data collection										
Data Analysis										
Report writing										
Submission of Report										

Appendix III: Budget Estimate

NO.	ITEM	COST (KSHS)
1	Stationery	3,000.00
2	Travelling expenses	2,500.00
3	Telephone bills	2,000.00
4	Miscellaneous	2,500.00
5	Lunch (4 people)	2,000.00
TOTAL		12,000.00

Appendix IV: Letter of Introduction

Dear Respondents,

My name is Mr. Robinson Akaka Alianda I am Second Year Student at Kampala International University and working on my Masters Degree in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building. The project I am working on is, 'Assessing Challenges in Resettling Internally Displaced Persons in Nakuru District at Molo and Rongai Divisions'. The study aims at making recommendations that can help improve the resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons in the Rift Valley Province. All the participants, site and data in this survey are completely confidential and anonymous. Your response and cooperation is highly appreciated.

Thanks

Yours Sincerely

Robinson A. Alianda

Appendix V: Questionnaire for IDPS

The information collected from this questionnaire will be handled with high confidentiality and will strictly be used for academic purpose by the researcher. Please ☒ tick where appropriate

SECTION A

1. What is your gender? Male ☐ Female ☐

2. How old are you?

AGE (YEARS)	18-24	25-40	41-50	51-60
Response				

3. For how long have you stayed in this camp?

DURATION (YEARS)	Less Than 1	2	3	4	More than 4
Response					

SECTION B

The following information will be used to determine the main challenges facing resettlement of the IDPS by the government. Please ☒ one of the choices provided. There are no correct or wrong answers.

STATEMENT	AGREE	STONGLY AGREE	DIS-AGREE	STRONGLY DIS- AGREE	I DON'T KNOW
3. I'm an internally displaced person in Kenya.					
4. I'm not staying in my original home.					
5. I lost all of my property.					
6. Some of my family members were killed.					
7. My normal life was disrupted.					
8. I can forgive my tormentors.					
9. The government compensation funds are enough.					
10. The government has addressed all of your needs in the camp.					
11. I am ready to return home.					
12. The rival community is ready to welcome you.					
13. The government needs to change the resettlement strategy.					

SECTION C

14. Do you feel secure in this camp?

YES ☐

NO ☐

If NO, why? Mention _____

13. How much money have you received from the government as compensation?

(i) Kshs. 1,000 – 10,000 ☐

(ii) Kshs. 11,000 – 20,000 ☐

(iii) Kshs. 21,000 – 30,000 ☐

(iv) Over Kshs. 30,000 ☐

(v) Nothing ☐

14. How have you used the money from compensation?

(i) Buy food ☐

(ii) Bought land ☐

(iii) Build a house ☐

(iv) Any other? Mention _____

15. Why haven't you left the camp?

.....
.....

16. How has been the government response to your needs?

(i) Excellent ☐

(ii) Very good ☐

(iii) Good ☐

(iv) Bad ☐

(v) Very bad ☐

17. What is the frequency of relief food from the government?

- (i) Daily ☐ (ii) Weekly ☐ (iii) Monthly ☐
 (iv) Fortnight ☐

18. Have you received any material support from the government in reconstructing your house?

YES ☐ NO ☐

If YES above specify _____

If NO why? _____

19. What is the major guarantee of security within and around the camps?

- (i) Police posts ☐ (ii) Chiefs camp ☐ (iii) Vigilante groups ☐
 (iv) Any other _____

20. How do you rate the government efforts to provide security to the IDPS?

- (i) Excellent ☐ (ii) Very good ☐ (iii) Good ☐ (iv) Poor ☐

21. What is your relationship with the communities surrounding the IDP camps?

- (i) Excellent ☐ (ii) Very good ☐ (iii) Good ☐ (iv) Poor ☐

22. Comment on the general strategy used by the government to resettle the IDPs

.....

SECTION D

23. A part from the government, what other organization have been involved in resettling the IDPS?

- (i) Kenya Red Cross Society ☐
(ii) World Vision ☐
(iii) UNDP ☐
(iv) Habitat ☐
(v) Any other? Mention _____

24. How do you rate the organizations' effort as compared to the government efforts?

- (i) Good ☐ (ii) Very good ☐ (iii) Average ☐
(iv) Poor ☐ (v) Don't know ☐

25. How many times do the organization provide relief food to the IDPS?

- (i) Daily ☐ (ii) Weekly ☐ (iii) Fortnight ☐
(iv) Monthly ☐ (v) None ☐

26. Have these organizations promoted reconciliation between communities?

- (i) YES ☐ (ii) NO ☐

Explain

27. In case of emergency in the camps where would be your first port of call?

- (i) Chiefs camp ☐
(ii) Red cross Society ☐
(iii) World Vision ☐
(iv) Any other? Mention _____

28. What have been some of the approaches used by the Non governmental organizations to resettle the IDPS?

- (i) Voluntary ☐ (ii) Forced resettlement ☐
(iii) Non of the above ☐
(v) Any other? Mention

Appendix VI: Questionnaire for provincial Administration Officers

The information provided in this questionnaire will be treated with utmost confidentiality and used only for research purposes. Please tick where appropriate. There is no wrong or right answer

SECTION A.

Background information

1. What is your gender?

i. Male ☐

ii. Female ☐

2. What is your age?

i. 20-30 ☐

ii. 31-41 ☐

iii. 41-50 ☐

iv. 51-60 ☐

v. over 61 ☐

3. Marital status

i. Single ☐ ii. Married ☐

(iii) Widowed ☐ (v) Divorced ☐

(vi) Separated ☐

4. Government position held

a. Provincial Commissioner ☐

b. District Commissioner ☐

c. Chief ☐

d. Sub chief ☐

e. Village elder ☐

f. Any other? Specify

5. Level of education

a. Primary ☐

b. Secondary ☐

c. Tertiary colleges ☐

d. University ☐

e. Any other? Specify

SECTION B

1. What have been some of the major challenges of resettling the internally displaced persons in Nakuru District?
 - i. Lack of funds ☐
 - ii. Political interference ☐
 - iii. Poor conditions ☐
 - iv. Any other? mention
2. Is the resettlement programme a success?
 - (i) Yes ☐
 - (ii) No ☐
3. Approximately how many people are still in transit camps in Nakuru District?
 - (i) 0-1000 ☐
 - (ii) 1001-10,000 ☐
 - (iii) 10000-20,000 ☐
 - (iv) Over 20,000 ☐
4. What are some of the non governmental organization that have helped the government efforts in resettling the IDPs?
 - (i) Kenya Red cross ☐
 - (ii) World Vision ☐
 - (iii) European Union ☐
 - (iv) Any other?.....
5. How do you rate the NGOs contribution to the resettlement programme?
 - Good ☐
 - Very good ☐
 - Average ☐
 - Poor ☐
6. What are the government's security arrangements for the IDPs?
 - (i) Settling them ☐
 - (ii) Build police posts ☐
 - (iii) Reinforce chiefs camps ☐
 - (iv) Community policing ☐
 - (v) Any other?.....

7. Is there effective coordination of the provincial administration arms to provide security for the IDPs in the camps?

i. Yes ☐

ii. No ☐

Appendix 7: Interview guide for focused group discussion

1. How many Internally Displaced Persons are in this camp?

.....
.....

2. Whom do you solely blame for the problems encountered by IDPs?

.....
.....
.....

3. What would be the best way to deal with the problem of internal displacement in Kenya?

.....
.....

4. Where would you like to go when the transit camp is closed?

.....
.....

5. Mention some of the daily challenges encountered by the IDPs?

.....
.....

6. Which non governmental organizations have been helpful to the plight of IDPs?

.....
.....

7. Comment on the governments resettlement programme?

.....
.....

8. Have you ever been displaced before?

.....

9. What are your urgent pressing needs?

.....
.....

10. What else should the government do to improve its resettlement program?

.....
.....

Appendix VIII: Required size for randomly chosen sample

N	S	N	S	N	S	N	S
10	10	140	103	550	226	4500	354
15	14	150	108	600	234	5000	357
20	19	160	113	650	241	6000	361
25	24	220	140	700	248	7000	364
30	28	230	144	750	254	8000	367
35	32	240	148	800	260	9000	368
40	36	250	152	1200	291	10000	370
45	40	260	155	1300	297	15000	375
50	44	270	159	1400	302	20000	377
55	48	280	160	1500	306	30000	380
60	52	290	165	1600	310	50000	381
65	56	300	169	1700	313	100000	384
70	59	320	175	1800	317		
75	63	340	181	1900	320		
80	66	360	186	2000	322		
85	70	380	191	2200	327		
90	73	400	196	2400	331		
95	76	420	201	2600	335		
100	80	440	205	2800	338		
110	86	460	210	3000	341		
120	92	480	214	3500	346		
130	97	500	217	4000	351		

Source: Kathuri & Pals (1993)

N= Population size

S= Sample size

Appendix IX:

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL DETAILS

NAME:	ROBINSON ALIANDA AKAKA
ID NO:	20134358
TEL:	0726 - 132338
ADRESS:	P.O BOX 55 NAKURU
GENDER:	MALE
DATE OF BIRTH:	5 TH MAY 1977
NATIONALITY:	KENYAN
E- MAIL ADRESS:	aliandaro@yahoo.com
MARITAL STATUS:	MARRIED
LANGUAGES:	ENGLISH, KISWAHILI AND LUHYIA
RELIGION:	CHRISTIAN

EDUCATION BACKGROUND

1. 2008 – To Date
KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
P.O BOX 20000
KAMPALA – UGANDA
MASTERS OF ARTS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
PEACE BUILDING
2. 2004 – 2006
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
P.O BOX 43844
NAIROBI -KENYA.
POST GRADUATE DIPLOMA IN EDUCATION
3. 1997 -2001
KENYATTA UNIVERSITY
P.O BOX 43844
NAIROBI – KENYA
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
SECOND CLASS HONORS (LOWER DIVISION)

4. 1999 - SCAREN COMPUTER
P.O BOX 7564
NAIROBI – KENYA
CERTIFICATE OF COMPUTER PROFICIENCY
DISTINCTION
5. 1992 – 1995 KOLONGOLO SECONDARY SCHOOL
P.O BOX 2129
KITALE – KENYA
KENYA CERTIFICATE OF SECONDARY EDUCATION
MEAN GRADE B (PLAIN)
6. 1982 – 1991 BIKETI PRIMARY SCHOOL
P.O BOX 2102
KITALE – KENYA
KENYA CERTIFICATE OF PRIMARY EDUCATION
510 MARKS OUT OF 700

CAREER OBJECTIVE

To work in an institution that calls for total dedication, creativity and implementation of projects, evaluation and decision making.

AWARD

Third position in Physics, Kajiado District- Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education – 2005.

WORKING EXPERIENCE

1. 2001-2004

Organizing remedial classes for science subjects and mathematics

DUTIES

- Teaching Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry
- Coordinating the daily running of the tuition center
- Guidance and Counseling students
- Chairing meetings with other teachers

2. 2005 – ENOOMATASIANI – GIRLS SCHOOL

P.O BOX 97 NGONG HILLS

POSITION: TEACHER

DUTIES

- Teaching Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry
 - Organizing science symposia
 - Coaching girls soccer team
 - Guidance and Counseling
 - Science projects management.
3. 2006 – To Date – SHAH LALJI NANGPAR ACADEMY
P.O BOX 55 – NAKURU
POSITION: TEACHER

DUTIES

- Teaching Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry
- Chairing departmental meetings
- House master – Flamingo house
- Patron science club
- Organizing inter house competition
- Guidance and counseling
- Resolving conflict within the staff and students

VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE

- Ride with Rhino – Conservation of Lake Nakuru National Park- 2009
- Tree planting – Hyrax Hill, Nakuru -2008
- Visiting street children home – Free Area Nakuru – 2009

KEY SKILLS AND COMPETENCES

TEAM WORK

- Throughout my teaching experience I have used team work especially in sports to achieve success.
- I am a member of the school Guidance and counseling committee, P.T.A and class teacher.
- I am the head of science department where I use team work to achieve the department objectives.

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

- While maintaining a high level of professionalism as required by teaching standards, I have managed students and colleagues from diverse background.

EXTRA CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

- Basket Ball
- Foot Ball
- Judging talent shows and Drama
- Assessing students to be awarded trophies/prizes

HOBBIES AND INTEREST

- Watching T.V
- Socializing
- Reading Newspapers
- Traveling

REFEREES

1. JOHN NTUNGURANYI
PRINCIPAL – SHAH LALJI ACADEMY
P.O. BOX 55
NAKURU
CELL PHONE: 0722375818
2. MRS. J.M WACHIRA
PRINCIPAL – ENOOMATASIANI GIRLS SCHOOL
P.O BOX 97
NGONG HILLS
TEL: 045-25034
3. DR. MICHAEL LOKURUKA
LECTURER, EGERTON UNIVERSITY
CELL PHONE: 0726155273.



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