

**WAR, CONFLICT, AND ITS IMPACT IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA: A  
CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN**

**BY**

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
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## DECLARATION

I, **Nyathiec Elizabeth Autiak** declare that I am the author of this research report and I have not submitted it to any other institution for purposes of any academic qualifications other than for a Bachelor of International Relations at the department of Political and Administrative Studies, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Kampala International University.



Signature



Date

### APPROVAL

This research work has been undertaken through my guidance and supervision and I thereby approve it.

Ibembe John Daniel

Supervisor

Ibembe

Signature

18/06/2019

Date

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this project to God Almighty my creator, my strong pillar, my source of inspiration, wisdom, knowledge and understanding. He has been the source of my strength throughout this project and on His wings only have I soared.

I also dedicate this work to my parents; my late mother, Aluel Kuot Kuach and my father, Autiak Kuoc Malek who encouraged me all the way and whose encouragement has ensured that I give it all it takes to finish what I have started.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU:	African Union
CPA:	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPA:	Compromise Peace Agreement
DUP:	Democratic Unionist Party
EU:	European Union
ECA:	Economic Commission for Africa
FIB:	Faisal Islamic Bank
FBI:	Foreign British Investigation
GBV:	Gender Based Violence
G. H.O.A:	Greater Horn of Africa
IGAD:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IC:	International Community
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IDPs:	Internally Displaced Persons
ILO:	International Labour Organization
JMEC:	Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
MFC:	Mechanized Farming Corporation
NIF:	National Islamic Front
PBEA:	Peace Building Education and Advocacy
SPLA:	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM:	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLA-IO:	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SAPs:	Structural Adjustment Programmes

SDSR:	Strategic Defence and Security Review
TGONU:	Transitional Government of National Unity
UNMISS:	UN peacekeeping Missions in South Sudan
USG:	United States Government
UN:	United Nations
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UK:	United Kingdom
USA:	United States of America
UP:	Umma Party
UDU:	Umma and Democratic Unionist
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNO:	United Nations Organizations
USD:	United States Dollar
USAID:	United States Aid Development
UNICEF:	United Nations Children Education Fund
WB:	World Bank
WHO:	World Health Organization

## ABSTRACT

Less than two years after independence, December 2013, violent conflict broke out in South Sudan that affected civilians who encountered sexual violence, destruction of property, death and displacement creating social and economic challenges in the country. This is devastating for a nation that is less than two years old and fought vehemently to become independent from the south and was expected was growth and development and not internal war and conflict. Most importantly, it would be adequate to address and comprehend the causes and impact of the conflict in Africa's newest kid South Sudan.

This thesis focuses on issues surrounding South Sudan conflict from the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement in 2005 to the sharing of power between the government led by SPLM leader Salva Kiir and the opposition leader Riek Machar. The underlying issues are delicate and intrinsic that require the international community to comprehensively address the challenges and obstacles that continue to create violence which mainly affect the vulnerable in the society i.e. children and women.

**Key words:** war, conflict, impact, Greater Horn of Africa.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.0 Introduction

This chapter highlights the topic and the lines of inquiry taken to contextualize and conceptualize the problem of war, conflict and its impact in the horn of Africa with a specific thrust on South Sudan.

#### 1.1 Background Information

South Sudan was the world's newest nation, in the Centre of Africa bordered by six countries Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. It was rich in oil, but following decades of civil war it was also one of the least developed regions on earth only fifteen percent of its citizens owned a mobile phone and there were very few tarmac roads in an area. These made the Nile River, which flowed through regional centres, an important transport and trade route. Cattle were also central to life in South Sudan; a person's wealth was measured by the size of their herd. South Sudan continued to threaten peace and security (Dias, 2015).

Dias (2015) argued that tensions between North-Sudan and South-Sudan remained due to unresolved issues regarding border issues and oil. This conflict, which had been as a “civil war of interlocking civil wars”, had led to the perpetration of grave human rights violations, crimes against humanity and severe humanitarian crises in the countrys South, Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions. An apparent breakthrough, marked by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011 (Dias, 2015).

Since South Sudan overwhelmingly voted to break away from Sudan in 2011, the government's main concern had been to get oil flowing followed disagreements with Khartoum production only resumed in April clarifies Dias, (2015). There have been a few small-armed rebellions, border clashes and deadly cattle feuds, but these have all taken place far from the capital, Juba. Signs of friction within the governing Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) party came in July when President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka the country's largest group, sacked his deputy Riek Machar, who was from the second largest community, the Nuer (Bubenzer & Stern, 2011).

According to Bubenzer, & Stern, (2011), it was started as a political squabble and had escalated into ethnic violence. President Kiir believed and pointed the finger of blame at Mr. Machar. Machar on the other hand denied the accusations, but was publicly criticized President Kiir for failing to tackle corruption and said in July as quoted by Bubenzer, &Stern, (2011), that he challenge him for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM's) leadership. Mr. Machar also has a chequered history with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), leading a

breakaway faction in the 1990s. The army had split and there have been clashes around the country (Bubenzer, & Stern, 2011).

The South Sudanese Civil War was a conflict in South Sudan between forces of the government and opposition forces. In December 2013, a political power struggle broke out between President Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar. The president accused Mr. Machar and ten others of attempting a coup d'état. Machar denied trying to start a coup and fled, calling for Kiir to resign. Fighting broke out between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in opposition (SPLM-IO), igniting the civil war. Ugandan troops were deployed to fight alongside South Sudanese government forces against the rebels (Dias, 2015).

Dias, (2015), cites in January 2014 the first ceasefire agreement was reached despite that fighting still continued and would be followed by several more ceasefire agreements. Negotiations were mediated by "IGAD " (which included the eight regional nations) called the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the African Union, United Nations, China, the EU, USA, UK and Norway). As a result, a peace agreement known as the "Compromise Peace Agreement" was reached and signed in Ethiopia under threat of United Nations sanctions for both sides in August, 2015 states Dias, (2015). Machar returned to Juba in 2016 and was appointed Vice president. Following a second breakout of fighting within Juba, Machar fled again and went to exile in the North-Sudan Khartoum.

Dias, (2015), argues over three hundred thousand people were estimated killed in the war, including notable atrocities in the 2014 Bentiu massacre. Although both men have supporters from across South Sudan's ethnic divides, subsequent fighting has had ethnic undertones. President Kiir's Dinka ethnic group has been accused of attacking other ethnic groups and Mr. Machar Nuer ethnic group accused of attacking the Dinka. Because of the conflict, more than one million people displaced inside South Sudan and more than four hundred thousand people have fled to neighbouring countries, especially Kenya, North Sudan, and Uganda says Dias, (2015).

This polarization was reflected in leadership distribution that even at the time when Sudan independence in 1956, the Southern Sudanese had a meagre share in administrative positions Dias, (2015). According to Dias, (2015), out of the eight hundred posts, only four junior posts of Assistant District Commissioners and two Mamur were given to the southern people. This is because of this unequal development, with southern Sudan, the neglected region experienced economic marginalization and social injustice that contributed to the unrest that erupted between the north and the south of Sudan in 1955 (Dias, 2015). Furthermore, the north side even tried to Islamize and Arabise the south and it was due to this fact, that first sparked conflict. The northern leaders in Khartoum have never tried to address this imbalance between regions, and this was indeed the main cause of this conflict (Dias, 2015).

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

Barely one year after its independence in 2011, South Sudan, had experienced several challenges like lack of justice and accountability, poor governance, ethnic violence, border demarcation issues of north and south, cattle raids, political, poverty, hunger, intra-government armed conflict, religion difference between Christians and Arabs, cultural and traditional beliefs, and widespread of violent crimes cites Bubenzer, & Stern, (2011).

Mass killings along ethnic lines have been witnessed continuously even though both Mr. Kiir and Mr. Machar have prominent supporters from other communities. Forces backing Mr. Machar have seized the key town of Bentiu, capital of the oil-producing Unity State. The country was awash with guns after the decades of conflict and there was a history of ethnic tension, which politicians would whip up if they believe that would help them gain, or remain in, power states (Bubenzer & Stern, 2011).

Craze, (2011), observed that under international pressure, the two sides signed a peace deal in May in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. An apparent breakthrough, marked by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. The deal paved way for a permanent ceasefire followed by the formation of a transitional government, the drafting of a new constitution and, eventually, fresh elections (Craze, 2011).

A previous truce, agreed in January, collapsed in acrimony, with a swift resumption of hostilities. The latest accord was also fragile, but increasingly urgent Aid agencies have warned that the country faced severe food shortages and potential famine if relief supplies remain blocked and if displaced farmers are prevented from returning home (Craze, 2011). Fears on the reduction in oil production could have repercussions on world markets. Many foreign nationals have been evacuated, with the United Nations (UN), which has more than seven thousand and five hundred troops on the ground and had requested reinforcements, had promised it would not abandon civilians says Bubenzer, and Stern (2011).

The government of South Sudan agreed to accept four thousand extra peacekeepers in a bid to avoid an arms embargo threatened by the United Nations Security Council, but said the details the deployment discussed. The announcement came after a meeting in the South Sudanese capital, Juba, between President Salva Kiir and the U.N. Security Council, led by U.S. months of conflict in the young country of South Sudan had placed seven million people in need of humanitarian assistance half of them children. The fighting had forced more than one point five million people to flee their homes, and many are living out in the open without protection from heat or severe rains. The conditions in Bentiu, the capital of oil-rich unity state, represented a particularly appalling situation. Families were living knee-deep in water and fighting continued

threaten their safety. Women and girls risked sexual violence, given cramped conditions and the breakdown in social and cultural norms because of the violence (Bubenzer & Stern, 2011).

Sudanese farmers were not able to engage in farming and therefore threaten food production. More than one third of South Sudan's population nearly five million people were facing severe food shortages. Unless malnutrition treatment was scaled up immediately, thousands of children were likely to die. UNICEF was on the ground working to help the children of South Sudan. To date, UNICEF and its partners have screened five hundred and eighty nine thousand children against malnutrition and immunized more than three hundred and twenty eight thousand children against measles.

There was still a long way to go, and UNICEF cannot do its work without the help of South Sudan. This research paper gives analysis of the impact of conflict in South Sudan. It analyses the impact on South Sudan's people and the impact on the economy, and economic development (Craze, 2011).

### **1.3 Objectives of the study**

1. To analyze the internal power struggle between the two dominant ethnic tribes of Dinka and Nuer focusing on their relation to the conflict in South Sudan
2. To address the impact of oil resources, unfair power position allocation and how they contribute to conflict in South Sudan
3. To identify the challenges of a peaceful resolution of South Sudan conflict

### **1.4 Research Questions**

The research study will answer the following questions:

1. How does an unfair power position allocation, oil and border issue contribute to conflict in South Sudan?
2. How does an ethnic, religious and cultural difference contribute to conflict in South Sudan?
3. What are the challenges towards peaceful conflict resolution mechanism in South Sudan?

## **1.5 Research Hypothesis**

The research paper hypothesizes the polarization and arming of communities along ethnic lines in this conflict, and its ready manipulation by powerful elites, was a key factor that risked a rapidly deepening and widening war with serious regional humanitarian and political consequences. The future, therefore, was a replete with several challenges that necessitating that the SPLM/A employs foresight and builds capacity so as to lay conducive ground to handle identity and citizenship-related concerns within the South and beyond its new borders where ethno-cultural affinities and boundary contiguities overlap.

## **1.6 Significance of the study**

The significance of this study was important and critical towards understanding the impact, causes and consequences brought about by the conflict in any part of society. The impact on various aspects such as political, economic and social spheres in South Sudan was a clear indication that conflict was not advocated for in any place in society. Having the understanding and knowledge of how to try to avoid the conflict, which generated negative impacts affected individuals in society as a whole? However, South Sudan's conflicts were rooted in the creation of the state; the study contends that oil money was indeed a key component in Sudans war.

As long as these revenues continued to be used to finance the conflict, there will be no equitable peace in South Sudan claims Feyissa, and Höhne, (2010), with the unresolved issues and continued violence in Darfur and Abyei. However, large parts of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), covering the future of other contested areas Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile have not been implemented claims Feyissa and Höhne, (2010). Essential issues, included oil and border demarcation, have not been resolved between North Sudan and South Sudan concludes Feyissa and Höhne, (2010).

Justifiable, after decades of brutal civil war that left two and a half million dead, the devastated and vastly underdeveloped southern part of Sudan secured independence in 2011. The worlds youngest nation came into existence amid great challenges. Secession from Sudan marked a major milestone and a fresh opportunity for South Sudanese. However, massive state corroding corruption, political instability within the ruling party, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), and persistent over deeply tensions with Sudan over the sharing of oil revenues left South Sudan deeply vulnerable to renewed conflict Feyissa, and Höhne, (2010).

Challenges of humanitarian concerns of the estimated 1.8 million people who remain displaced from their homes today, 1.35 million are within South Sudan and four hundred and fifty three thousand and six hundred thousand have fled to neighbouring countries. Nearly one hundred thousand civilians are currently sheltering on U.N. bases around the country, at South Sudan. Efforts to combat famine have been successful, but humanitarians warn that this requires a

Herculean effort. Continuing to sustain that level of response may not be possible if the violence continued Feyissa, and Höhne, (2010).

It was important to examine the challenges facing South Sudan's conflict particularly at this time when South Sudan needs peace. This research study was my opportunity to emphasize on the causes of the conflict, how it was a security threat to South Sudan. Challenges to Peace in South Sudan for it gained independence as one of the most fragile and underdeveloped countries in the world. The path to a lasting peace would require addressing not just the immediate challenges presented by the current conflict, but those that existed long-before independence achieved. These include, but were not limited to, corruption, political party reform, inter-communal violence, and tensions over oil-sharing revenues with North and Sudan.

Other researchers expected to benefit from tided problems bedevilling the country. In order to help identify what appears as impediments to expected transformation of South Sudan. However, this study may not capture all of these issues in one sweep. Therefore, it seeks to focus on the question: In spite of successful conduct of referendum, why was it that the CPA may be impotent to arrest the cycle of conflicts and bring about stable-peace and transformation in the post-referendum South Sudan? Put differently, though the referendum had come and gone and the two-state solution seem imminent, will all be well with North Sudan and South Sudan henceforth. It could be claimed that, regardless of the validity of the justification, delays in implementation at times not only exacerbated the existing mistrust between the parties but also entailed political crisis that could have had far-reaching consequences. A case in point is SPLM/As temporary suspension

### **1.7 Scope of the Study**

The scope of this study would cover the literature on the war and conflict and its impact on South Sudan going on for decades. The conflict between the North and South Sudan had tremendously contributed towards its negative impacts and consequences which left thousand dead, millions misplaced, caused hunger due to farmers not tilling the land because of violence that had led to humanitarian assistance, of food, medical, water, shelter and so on.

### **1.8 Conceptual Framework**

According to Miles and Huberman (1994), pp.18 a conceptual framework referred to visual or written product, one that “explained, either graphically or in a narrative form, the main things to be studied were the key factors, concepts, or variables and the presumed relationships among them”. The conceptual framework diagram above explained the relationship between two variables of the Study i.e. Economic (Independent variable) and Insecurity (dependent variable).

Conflict in South Sudan was caused by a number of factors that included the racial of African and Arabs, ethnic tribes, religious of between Muslim north versus Christian south, cultural, poverty, unemployment of many youth, discrimination and marginalization.

September 7, 2016 the analysis basis had economic challenges issues in South Sudan. The macroeconomic policies that were used in this analysis are drawn from the recent conflict erupted on December 15, 2013. The conceptual framework that was established for South Sudan in order to manage the contemporary economic challenges the country was facing.

South Sudan challenges of economic crisis that this research draws relevant information from different data sources. The analysis discussed in this economic research presented a conceptual framework that helped us to understand economic challenges that South Sudan had experienced. Based on this framework; a detailed review of the literature was analyzed in the research. This analysis helped us to understand how government and individuals in South Sudan scrutinized the conflict and economic crisis that South Sudan had experienced since the recent conflict erupted on December 15, 2013. While knowing how the South Sudan would manage the contemporary economic challenges the country faced. The framework of understanding would focus on questions of why do peace agreements fail or succeed and what kind of socio-political relationship exists before, now and would in the coming period with lasting implications for stability in North Sudan and South Sudan. In engaging these complexities, the conflict that tore the country apart for nearly twenty seven months resulted from the disputed eruption between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the former vice president Riek Machar. Because of the power struggle between the two top leaders, political crisis spiralled and a fierce fighting began, a fighting that later on spread across the country within days. Within days thousands of civilians were killed and displacement of civilians occurred on a massive scale. An estimated over one million South Sudanese have fled their homes since 15 December 2013.

In order for the Republic of South Sudan to address the economic challenges that the country was experiencing in terms of oil prices declining, South Sudan would replicate macroeconomic policies that Ghana took in managing their inflation. Importantly, the devaluation of South Sudanese pound would save the country of South Sudan from economic breakdown. For instance, when Ghanas economy plummeting, the government of Ghana began to devalue their currency. If South Sudan embraces the road to economic transformation that Ghana took, the country of South Sudan would overcome the contemporary economic challenges that its confronting currently. Its important for the government of South Sudan to come up with macroeconomic policies that would help the country from inflation and many other factors that are disrupting economic activities in the country. The government of South Sudan would examine the Ugandan Economic Recovery Program of 1987 and see if it would help them strength South Sudans economy and lower inflation that was surging (PaanLuel,2016)

Insecurity of South Sudan is as a result of unemployment, more than half of South Sudanese children are not in school the highest proportion in the world. Therefore, many young South Sudanese including those with certified degrees and other academic credentials end up misspending greater part of their lives in illegal activities like being rebels that constitute insecurity in the country. The growing insecurity had further affected investment and development programmes. Access constraints such as bureaucratic impediments, insecurity, and poor road conditions were hampering relief operations across South Sudan. Despite these challenges, USG partners continued to provide emergency relief commodities and other humanitarian assistance to populations in need.

The political perspective of the Republic of South Sudan, three years into its independence, has suffered a tremendous political and social upheaval as divisions within the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and fragmentation of its army, has turned into major violence engulfing significant parts of the country. What started as a political dispute has been interpreted through a lens of old, deeply bitter narrative of ethnic rivalry between Dinka and Nuer, and was exacerbated by a host of complicating unresolved political, economic and social issues. The polarization and arming of communities along ethnic lines in this conflict, and its ready manipulation by powerful elites, and was a key factor that risks a rapidly deepening and widening war with serious regional humanitarian and political consequences. However, due to all the challenges South Sudan was faced which led to further low capital and slow economic growth.

### **1.9 Limitations of the study**

It acknowledged that the research presented in this paper bases on aggregated and second hand data. Consequently, the presented pieces of information were only reliable if the data, which was used to conduct the analysis, was reliable as well. It was attempted to only use reliable sources of data and, whenever there was doubt about the reliability, the concerns were stated within the section of the analysis. However, the use of aggregated data was a weak point of this paper. Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that the lenses of Marx analysis framework do not aim at an analysis within the social conflict and conflict approach and that another framework might have been more suitable.

The use of Marxism method based upon personal linking, but the experience in conflict analysis and the methods of the framework were comprehensive in an extensive way, so that it was possible to implement the social conflict and conflict model in scheme. Concerning future research, one has to point out the importance of more reliable and, first of all, more data. Access to social services in wide areas of South Sudan, and complement this with qualitative data on potential conflict information, the analysis would be far more reliable.

Overall, the social conflict and conflict model proved to be a possible way, to investigate the underlying causes of South Sudans current politically induced civil war. Nonetheless, there was further need to find more reliable explanatory variables and proxies thereof. The main limitations of this study is the fact that the study relies on available literature documented by various scholarly and researchers.

#### **1.10 Operational Definition of Terms**

**Greater Horn of Africa:** This is a peninsula in Northern Africa. It is hundreds of Kilometres to the Arabian Sea and lies along the southern side of the Gulf of Aden. The area is the eastern most projection of the African continent it includes the following countries; Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan.

**Conflict:** This is fighting between two or more countries, or fight, battle, an armed conflict.

**War:** This is a state or period of fighting between countries or groups. It is a state of armed conflict between different nations or states or different groups within a nation or state.

**Impact:** The action of one object coming forcibly into contact with another has a strong effect on something or a powerful effect that something especially something new has a situation.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter brings out the key concepts and theoretical perspectives that guided this research. The major concepts in this paper include: war, conflict, and its impact in the greater horn of Africa basically to understand the internal power struggle between the two dominant ethnic tribes of Dinka and Nuer focusing on their relation to the conflict in South Sudan, the impact of oil resources, unfair power position allocation and how they contribute to conflict in South Sudan and to identify the challenges of a peaceful resolution of South Sudan conflict experiences that occurred to them in their past but viewed in their current situations as detailed in later chapter.

#### **2.1 Theoretical Framework**

##### **Social Conflict Theory**

Social conflict theory was a theory that viewed society as a system of groups that were not equal, and therefore consistently generate conflict and change. Social scientists were divided on the question whether social conflict would be regarded as something rational, constructive, and socially functional or something irrational, pathological, and socially dysfunctional. This had important consequences, particularly for conflict resolution. There was also significant polarity among theoretical approaches. There were two contending approaches: the classical and the behaviourist. The classical approach focuses on the macro level of analysis. It was primarily concerned with analyzing the interaction of groups. These groups divided along many different cleavages: national, institutional, ethnic, class, and ideological to name but a few. The classical theoretician was concerned with the interaction of groups at the conscious level. The behaviourist focused on the micro level, the unit of measurement being the individual rather than the group.

The social conflict theory explains the causes of war and conflict in South Sudan Collier, (2002). The theory contends that the conflict in South Sudan depends on the interested in gaining access to the resources and capital of the higher class. South Sudan was likely to face recurrent conflicts because of the two major factors involved in the foregoing analysis. First, over politicization would persist, the stagnant socioeconomic situation, which prevailed before and which had been exacerbated by it, would result in many more over politicized behaviours.

Second, tribal horizontal relations and the attendant equality driven demands for control of political power would generate bitter competition over political power. This was likely to all tribes other than the Dinka and the Nuer. However, the two super tribes would figure

prominently in the competition. According to Marxism point of view social class and inequality emerges because the social structure was based on conflict and contradictions. The contradiction in interests and conflict over scarce resources between groups was the foundation of social society (Collier, 2002).

Social conflict theory was the classic example of materialism. Karl and Friedrich Engels argued that all of human history was as a the result of conflict between classes, which evolved over time in accordance with changes in society's means of meeting its material needs, i.e. changes in society's production. The macro-oriented paradigm in sociology views society as an arena of inequality that generates conflict and social change. Key elements in this perspective were that society was structured in ways to benefit a few at the expense of the majority, and factors such as race, sex, class, and age are linked to social inequality (Miguel, 2004).

South Sudan conflict was undoubtedly, individuals, social classes, and professional groups have been active in the events surrounding the military conflict. President Kiir, his enemy former vice-President Machar, and a cohort of military and bureaucratic officials have personal and professional interests and ambitions that fuel the conflict to a certain extent. They do not have specific forms of capital that they need to protect. The major theoretical perspective in sociology called social conflict theory.

### **Conflict theory**

Conflict theory emphasized the social, political, or material inequality of a social group that critiques the broad socio-political system. Conflict engenders interaction at a level more intense than that of competition. Conflict, competition, and cooperation are inherently interdependent; conflict occurs when competing-groups' goals, objectives, needs or values clash and aggression, although not necessarily violence was a result.

Conflict theory was important for understanding the nature of political conflict itself in order to find solutions to seemingly intractable problems in South Sudan. Social structures were created through conflict between people with differing interests and resources. Individuals and resources, in turn, influenced by these structures and by the "unequal distribution of power and resources in the society (Miguel, 2004). A commonly accepted fact in conflict analysis was that the mere existence of causes for conflict, did not explain why a conflict actually erupted. For this to happen, it needed trigger events and people, who used the underlying causes to start a violent conflict. A single trigger condition seems unlikely to be the only reason for a conflict to turn violent; hence, this paper considers Collier et al.s feasibility hypothesis that conflict would occur when it was feasible, problematic and insufficient (Miguel, 2004).

Mills argued that the interests of these elite were opposed to those of the people. He theorized that the policies of the power elite would result in "increased escalation of conflict, production of weapons of mass destruction, and possibly the annihilation of the human race. The purpose of this section was to explore the themes and schools of thought of conflict theory. This was done in order to define the scope and variety of conflict so that the conflict in South Sudan can be put into perspective.

In 2013, after a year of escalated change in government and in the party, included the dismissal of Vice-President Riek Machar and the entire cabinet in June, fighting between Nuer and Dinka SPLA soldiers broke out in Juba on December, igniting the South Sudanese Civil War. A rebellion rapidly spread around the country, with defected troops loyal to Machar and the SSLA took over Bentiu, Malakal and Bor. Immediately after the initial mutiny, eyewitness accounts also cited SPLM Dinka troops assisted by guides in house to house searches to Nuer homes and killing civilians in Juba (Miguel, 2004).

Similar door-to-door searches of members of the Nuer ethnicity reported in the government held capital city of the Upper Nile State, Malakal. Tried to explain this transformation were perspectives in sociology and social philosophy that emphasized the social, political, or material inequality of a social group, that critique the broad socio-political system, or that otherwise detract from structural functionalism and ideological conservatism.

Conflict theories draw attention to power differentials, such as class conflict, and generally contrast historically dominant ideologies. It was therefore a macro level analysis of society. According to the conflict perspective, society was constantly in conflict over resources, tensions between North Sudan and South Sudan remain, due to unresolved issues regarding border issues and oil conflict drives social change.

For example, conflict theorists might explain the movements of the 1960s by studying how activists challenged the racially unequal distribution of political power and economic resources. Civil war of interlocking civil wars had led to the perpetration of grave human rights violations, crimes against humanity and severe humanitarian crises in the country's South, Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions As in this example, conflict theorists generally see social change as abrupt, even revolutionary, rather than incremental (Miguel, 2004).

In the conflict perspective, change came about through conflict between competing interests, not consensus or adaptation. Conflict theory, therefore, gave sociologists a framework for explaining social change, thereby addressing one of the problems with perspective. Certain conflict theories set out to highlight the ideological aspects inherent in traditional thought.

## Economic theory

Economic theory focuses factors particularly poverty, illiteracy and falling income; the argument was that poverty and unemployment breed violence demonstrated in form of looting of assets or natural resources particularly in poor states with weak institutional capacity to repress armed uprisings says Miguel, (2007), an argument Collier, (2002) agrees to. Similarly, following increasing body literature on causes of political instability and conflict by scholars Collier and Hoeffler, (2002) and Miguel et al, (2004), cross-country evidence suggests two sets of theories to explain causes of instabilities, first political repression theory; this notion suggests that conflict and political instability occur in undemocratic and socially divided societies. Where ethnic groups that feel oppressed tend to form armed insurgencies against the state, such occurrence was also common in a socially divided where people feel marginalized due to extreme poverty or lack of jobs (Miguel, 2004).

Economic theory, according to Hoeffler and Collier 1998 article “on the economic causes of civil war” which offered an extensive statistical analysis of war economies, economical motivation of rebel groups, to make economic returns. The 2004 article offered two strings of argumentation, the economic causes the greed base argument, and the socio-political causes, the grievance arguments (Collier, 2002). Those two strings follow, as Collier points out, the two lines of thought, of political scientists and economists. He argued that rebellion is dependent on two variables motive and opportunity.

While political scientists would prefer focus on the motives behind rebel action, economist would look into the opportunities for rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Going into detail about the motive and opportunities for conflict, Collier claims that from a political scientist point of view, conflict emerges when grievances were sufficiently acute that people want to engage in violent protest (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

While an economist perspective argues that some rebellions those with favourable opportunities for violent rebellion can be seen as “an industry that generates profits by looting” (Ibid.). This introduced a dichotomy scale for conflict motivation: greed versus grievance. The economic argument implicates that rebels, as rational actors, do a cost benefit analysis, before engaging in violent behaviour, since they have to sustain their insurgency, with returns from their actions.

In their essay, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), present statistical formulae which can be used to explain the occurrence of greed rebellions. According to their arguments, an economically motivated rebellion can only emerge, when the looting or extortion of financial assets usually primary commodities would generate enough profit to risk the consequences of taking up arms against the government forces on the short run, since these will aim to kill rebels and suppress rebellion (Collier 1998). This captures the levels of conflicts that make it challenging and

complexity of the post-colonial state and the structures of governance associated with it. The economic cost of various wars and conflicts were also likely to be huge given the massive destruction of property and profound socioeconomic disruptions. Some view the conflict as the single greatest barrier to the regions socioeconomic development (Mwaura, Baechler and Kiplagat 2002).

The conflicts have also made the South Sudan one of the largest source of refugees in the World, estimated in 2008 at 1,248,565, with about 8.5 million internally displaced (World Bank 2008, UNDP 2008). In addition, the conflicts have led to gross human rights abuses. The South Sudan government often accused by human rights organizations of atrocities against citizens including disappearances, torture, and incarceration of journalists without due process of law.

In the context of South Sudan, the growing economic and lifestyle gap between the ordinary citizens and political elites or ruling class was detrimental to many particularly young people who were challenged by lack of basic services, underdevelopment, and lack of education, poverty and high unemployment rates. This economic gap has resulted into increased xenophobia against foreign migrant workers as well as South Sudanese youth from the Diaspora seen by local youth as having stolen their jobs and living better lives.

Furthermore, the unemployed and destitute youth been easily mobilized and often end up primary recruits to rebel groups and militias spearheaded by prominent politicians and leaders. The young were formidable force for the government as well as for rebel groups; in the 2013 intra-government armed conflict, both parties to the conflict recruited young males to fight for their battles and this was because youth provide cheap and reliable labour.

South Sudan has plunged into civil war, economic collapse, and creeping international isolation. The countrys elites have built a kleptocratic regime that controls all sectors of the economy, and have squandered a historic chance for the development of a functional state. These predatory economic networks play a central role in the current civil war, because much of the conflict is driven by elites attempting to re-negotiate their share of the politico-economic power balance through violence. This report maps out the corruption and the conflict-financed system in South Sudan described the likely channelling of illicit money flows. The primary goal of this report was to focus on the mechanics of the system, rather than specific individuals or their networks of facilitators and enablers. While seemingly focused on the government, the report acknowledges that the rebels were also part of this kleptocratic system in the past, and were likely to be involved again in the event of a negotiated settlement. The SENTRY continued in-depth investigations into illicit economies, funding streams, and supply chains of the armed opposition.

## 2.2 Empirical Literature

The root cause of internal conflicts among Southern Sudanese from the past governments to this present government of Southern Sudan were based on an unfair allocation of positions (question of power) and resources on geographical and ethnical basis. One single tribe had always maintained a dominant role over other tribes. South Sudan; as its known locally and internationally was a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society with more than sixty eighty ethnic groups. If the majority do not consider the importance or role of the minority groups, then problems or tribal conflicts would always be on the rise until this question of power and or resources was addressed accordingly, and in a pragmatic manner (Dias, 2015).

The South Sudanese Civil War was a conflict in South Sudan between forces of the government and opposition forces. In December 2013, a political power struggle broke out between President Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar Dias, (2015). The president accused Mr. Machar and ten others of attempting a coup d'état (Dias, 2015). Machar denied trying to start a coup and fled, calling for Kiir to resign. Fighting broke out between the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People Liberation Movement in opposition (SPLM-IO), igniting the civil war. Ugandan troops were deployed to fight alongside South Sudanese government forces against the rebels. The civil war only came to stop in January 2014 as indicated by Dias, (2015), as the first ceasefire agreement was agreed upon.

Fighting continued followed by several more ceasefire agreements. Negotiations were mediated by "IGAD (which included the eight regional nations called the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as well as the African Union, United Nations, China, the EU, USA, UK and Norway) (Dias, (2015). A peace agreement known as the "Compromise Peace Agreement" signed in Ethiopia under threat of United Nations sanctions for both sides in August 2015. Machar returned to Juba in 2016 and appointed vice president. Following a second breakout of fighting within Juba, Machar fled again and went to exile in the Sudan (Dias, 2015). At least three hundred thousand people died in this war, including notable atrocities such as the 2014 Bentiu massacre. Although both men had supporters from across South Sudans ethnic divides, subsequent fighting has had ethnic undertones. Mr. Kiirs Dinka ethnic group has been accused of attacking other ethnic groups and Mr. Machar Nuer ethnic group has been accused of attacking the Dinka. More than one million people have been displaced inside South Sudan and more than four hundred thousand people had fled to neighbouring countries, especially Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda, as a result of the conflict (Dias, 2015).

In July 2013, (Dias, 2015), indicated that President Salva Kiir removed his vice-president Riek Machar and all members of the government in a sweeping cabinet reshuffle. In a separate decision, Pagan Amum, secretary-general of South Sudans ruling party the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), was chastised for publicly criticizing the governments

performance. These decisions came because of an internal power struggle among the leadership of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) that had been building since July 2005, shortly after the death of the movements leader John Garang in a suspicious helicopter crash (Morrison and Cooke, 2012).

Conflicts among the Souths leadership surfaced following Machars dismissal, when he announced his intention to run for president in the 2015 elections. Machar was supported by a number of former officials who had been sacked by President Kiir, including Pagan Amum, secretary-general of the SPLM; Deng Alor, Sudanese minister of state for foreign affairs before partition; and Rebecca Garang, widow of the movements founder John Garang argued Dias, (2015).

According to LeRiche and Arnold, (2012), stated in a meeting of the South Sudanese leadership that took place from November 23-25 to make long overdue decisions on fundamental issues including the constitution LeRiche and Arnold, (2012). President Salva Kiirs opponents have continued to accuse him of tailoring the constitution to concentrate power in his hands, and claim that he was rapidly turning into a dictator with absolute power. Based on party rules, elections should be held every five years, but have been delayed since April 2010. Those criticizing President Kiir and his governments performance began spearheading a drive within the party to change its leadership, as well as the governments, through tactical political action alongside a media campaign, both of which would focus on how Kiir was running a security state and restricting freedom of the press and freedom of speech (LeRiche and Arnold, 2012).

The National Liberation Council at Nyakuron when opposition leaders Dr. Riek Machar, Pagan Amum and Rebecca Nyandeng voted to boycott the meeting. LeRiche and Arnold, (2012), reported that clashes broke out in the Munuki neighbourhood late on 14, December in South Sudans capital, Juba, between members of the presidential guard. President Kiir also claimed that the fighting began when unidentified uniformed personnel started shooting at a meeting of the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM).

Former Minister of Higher Education Peter Adwok said that on the evening of 15 December the meeting of the National Liberation Council had failed, President Kiir told Major General Marial Ciennoung to disarm his soldiers of the "Tiger Battalion," which he did as stated by LeRiche and Arnold, (2012). Adwok then controversially claimed that the officer in charge of weapons stores opened them and rearmed only the Dinka soldiers. A Nuer soldier passing by questioned this and fighting then started between the two and attracted the attention of the "commander and his deputy to the scene." Unable to calm the situation, more soldiers got involved and raided the stores. It culminated in the Nuer soldiers who took control of the headquarters. The next morning, he said that Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)

reinforcements arrived and dislodged the mutineers and explained standard procedure (LeRiche and Arnold, 2012).

Conflict among the Southern tribes of South Sudan was a home to dozens of tribes that derive from three main groups. The largest was the Nilotic group, representing 65 percent of the population and the tribes with the greatest political influence. Within this group, the Dinka President Kiirs tribe make up 40 percent, and the Nuer the second major group and former Vice-president Riek Machars tribe, accounts for about 20 percent (Morrison and Cooke, 2012). Pagan Amum, secretary-general of the SPLM, and Lam Akol Ajawin, one of the historical leaders, belong to the Shilluk, which represents 5 percent of the population. Ajawin disagreed with John Garang, and became an ally of Khartoum, where he lived until the SPLM split. He only recently returned to Juba after having received assurances (Morrison and Cooke, 2012).

In 1984, Eprile, (1994), acknowledges during the civil war between north and south and following the collapse of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, Riek Machar joined the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the Sudan People Liberation Movements (SPLMs military wing). In 1991, he led an uprising within the SPLA after him and others, including Lam Akol, disagreed with Garangs desire to maintain the unity of Sudan. Machar and his supporters were in favour of complete secession as indicated by Eprile, (1994).

As a result, a bloody conflict ensued, causing more casualties than all the wars between the North and South. In 1997, Machar made an agreement with the Khartoum government. The agreement enabled President Al-Bashirs regime to use Machars forces to secure the oil fields in the war-stricken areas, and in doing so, weakened the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). However, Machar returned to Garangs movement a few years later, and after Garangs death, he was chosen as Kiirs vice president (Morrison and Cooke, (2012).

The likely Consequences of the conflict though both sides had agreed to meet for talks in Addis Ababa because of regional and international pressures, armed clashes had been ongoing for the last two weeks, and the rebels have recaptured Bor, Jongleis state capital, from the governments army. President Kiir agreed to negotiations without preconditions, and released eight of the eleven officials detained in the aftermath of the proclaimed military coup. In light of the most recent confrontations, it was clear that the rebels two main objectives were the oil fields and securing a military presence on the ground. Would the South split into more than one state, the oil fields would become the controlling partys economic pillar (Morrison and Cooke, 2012).

Morrison and Cooke, (2012), stated that this is particularly important, as oil was the only source for the Republic of South Sudan, making political concessions over the control of the oil fields key to any negotiations. Currently, Machars forces were in control of strategic areas, strengthening their negotiating position. The present conflict shows that two centres of power

exist in South Sudan, regardless of the outcome of any negotiations. As a result, the structure of the South Sudanese state continued to be drawn on tribal lines (Morrison and Cooke, (2012).

This assessment was confirmed by the speed with which President Kiir sought assistance from neighbouring states, such as Uganda, which threatened to intervene to prevent the presidents forced removal after the rebels exposed his militarys weakness. It appeared, then, that negotiations would take place to simultaneously maintain Kiirs government and grant some of the rebels demands (Morrison and Cooke, 2012).

Zainelabdin, (2011), argued that the effects on South Sudan, the Souths secession had a major impact on the Norths economy, with the loss of more than 70 percent of its oil revenues. To meet the resulting annual budget deficit, Sudan relied on transit fees imposed on the Souths oil, estimated at two US billion dollars. The importance of this revenue was confirmed when President Al-Bashir stopped the flow of the Souths oil across the Norths territory in retaliation for the Souths support for the rebel movements in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile state. An economic crisis ensued wherein the value of the Sudanese pound fell sharply against the US dollar, reaching only 13 percent of its former value. The economic downturn and budget deficit pushed the Sudanese government to remove fuel subsidies, leading to the outbreak of wide-scale protests in September 2013, which the authorities put down after the deaths of hundreds of people (Matheson, 2012).

Sudan most likely experience further economic difficulties as the Souths conflict could halt the flow of oil. It would be difficult for the government to take any economic measures to meet the deficit, such as imposing additional taxes, after the latest protests. Additionally, the Sudanese government cannot seek Arab financial aid because of its controversial foreign policy and alignments. Furthermore, the conflict over the oil fields in the Unity and Upper Nile states, both of which have long borders with Sudan, would lead to the flow of large number of refugees into Sudan. This would create financial, logistical, and security burdens on the Sudanese government that it would be unable to cope with. Instability in the border regions will also have a negative effect on border trade, which benefits both countries (Matheson, 2012).

Lastly, the border regions had witnessed considerable tension between the North and the South over the past year, with armed clashes occurring in the Abyei region, in addition to the South Sudanese Armys attack on Sudanese oil facilities at Heglig. The Sudanese government also accused South Sudan of backing the revolutionary front fighting the Khartoum government in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which also led to a serious economic downturn in the North and South (Matheson, 2012). However, the South was more affected because of its economic vulnerability. After several rounds of talks, however, the two came to an agreement and the flow of oil resumed. After this crisis, President Kiir developed a more realistic and understanding

position regarding the North; his opponents, Pagan Amum and Deng Alor in particular, however, have adopted a hard-line stance (Zainelabdin, 2011).

The International and Regional Perspectives of South Sudan represents a confluence of interests for the US, Europe, and China. For the US, South Sudan holds special geostrategic importance, especially following the creation of the US Africa Command AFRICOM. At the same time, the presence of Chinese companies in the region represents an economic challenge for the Americans, who seem interested in investment opportunities in agriculture, mining, and forestry. Before the secession, the Sudanese government held long-term contracts with China that prevented it from gaining a foothold in the Souths vital oil industry (Matheson, 2012).

According to Matheson, (2012), the British also have interests by virtue of having been the colonial power in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. All of these parties, along with their regional partners, are now moving fast to contain the situation in South Sudan before it spirals out of control. Neighbouring states, such as the Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, were concerned as they were witnessing unrest on their own soil. Additionally, the outbreak of a new civil war in South Sudan would have significant effects on its neighbours Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, as they each have growing economic interests in the country. Hence, these regional and international parties will exert substantial pressure to restore internal consensus and stability to South Sudan. They would also be keen to maintain the flow of the Souths oil since without the production and marketing of oil; the South became a burden on the International Community (Matheson, 2012).

Muchie, (2013), observed that it was clear South Sudan was facing its most crises since coming into being two years ago; it also seems that the seeds of this crisis were inherent in its very existence. Separation, which was touted as a solution to centuries of dominance by the Arab and Muslim North over the Christian and African South, has not ended the problems of the nascent Southern state, thereby implying that the secessionist solution was not, in fact, and the right choice. The solution was, and remains, tied to a state of citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. South Sudan does not need to undergo another long and bitter conflict to realize this fact (Muchie, 2013). Mengisteab, (2011), cited that South Sudan achieved its independence in 2011 led by the leading liberation movement, the Southern Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM and its national army, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), are fragile coalitions of various militia and political entities that often fought against each other during the previous civil war. President Kiir did an admirable job in bringing almost all these factions and militia together in the final run up to independence. Several other holdouts were brought in later. But much of this coalition building was achieved by adding the various militias to the national army, but never fully integrating them. Political alliances were covered over but

did not resolve competing political claims. Both the party and the army were unable to contain the competing ambitions and dissensions that have now come into the open (Muchie, 2013).

Muchie (2013) claimed the first of the developments that led to today's conflict was growing unhappiness within the government about the way President Kiir was managing affairs. Some leading members of the ruling party in particular felt that the President ignored the party in filling positions, ignored in fact the cabinet, and made decisions based on the advice of a narrow group of advisors from his home area, greater Bar El Ghazal. Parallel with these concerns were growing violations of human rights by the regime. Human rights advocates, journalists, and NGOs both indigenous and international were being harassed (Muchie, 2013).

A prominent journalist was assassinated in late 2012 with the government security apparatus suspected. President Kiir initially accepted but later rejected the U.S. offer of FBI help for investigating the matter. The U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan, Susan Page, was outspoken about these matters during the fall of 2012. They were the subject of my last visit to Juba in December 2012 (De, 2015).

At the same time as these problems were growing, the party faced another internal crisis. Vice President Riek Machar indicated that he was moving to challenge President Kiir for the SPLM leadership and thereafter for the presidency in the election of 2015. That challenge would come to a head at the party conference scheduled for 2014. Machar is extremely controversial within the SPLM. A leader of the Nuer, the second largest ethnic group in South Sudan, he had split from the SPLM and fought against it for years during the civil war observed (De, 2015). In 1991, his forces were involved in a major massacre of Dinkas, the largest ethnic group in South Sudan. That has never been forgotten, even after Machar united back with the SPLM in 2001. President Kiir subsequently invited Machar to be Vice President. But theirs was a difficult relationship. President Kiir assigned Machar only limited authority or responsibilities (Zainelabdin, 2011). Machar's ambitions thus posed a major challenge for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Denied a path to the presidency, Machar could be a threat, either by leaving the SPLM and forming an opposition party or worse, by drawing on his Nuer forces from within the SPLA and posing a military threat. On the other hand, providing him a path to the presidency would surely arouse strong opposition within the SPLM (Zainelabdin, 2011).

The tragedy was that the party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), was not up to meeting this challenge. President Kiir, in particular, chose not to use the party machinery to try to defuse or resolve it. Throughout 2013, he bypassed or delayed party mechanisms. In July, he dismissed Machar and the entire cabinet. The Secretary-General of the party, Pagan Amun, was suspended and put under investigation for inciting unrest. In addition, there is where the two developments began to intertwine.

Dissenters within the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), frustrated by their differences with President Kiir, drifted toward Machar not as presidential candidate, but as an ally in calling for more party democracy and authority as stated by Mengisteab, (2011). They also chose, in a joint press conference on December 6, 2013, to accuse the government of giving away too much in the negotiations with Sudan, an odd charge coming from among others Pagan Amum, who had also been the chief negotiator with Sudan for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). This alliance, if you can call it that, was diverse ethnically as well as in terms of factions, including for example the widow of SPLM leader John Garang. President Kiir considered all of them hostile to his presidency and more of them than Machar harbouring presidential ambitions. There was no meeting of the minds (Zainelabdin, 2011).

Zainelabdin (2011) says things spiralled thereafter out of control. Whatever the origin of the fighting that started on December 15, President Kiir saw this as a coup by Machars forces. Whether it was or not is not entirely clear. In any case, Machars compound was attacked, and the party dissenters were jailed. Machar fled to the field and his army supporters left the SPLA to fight for him. Another sometime integrated, sometime outsider militia leader, Peter Gadet, joined Machars forces. A former Governor of Unity State, dismissed by President Kiir, also joined Machar and is now the lead negotiator for Machar in the talks in Addis (Zainelabdin, 2011). The coalition and unity that President Kiir had painstakingly built in the run up to independence has been unravelling.

In this situation of course, ethnic factors have played a role and once fighting began, became even more prominent. The fact that President Kiir and most of the SPLM leadership is Dinka, and Machar is a leader of the Nuer, is not irrelevant. In addition, once the dogs of war have been let loose, ethnic differences become the vehicle of mobilization, and the source of massacres, human rights violations and hatred as stated by Mengisteab, (2011). However, it is important to remember that the sources of discontent within the SPLM were not ethnically based, and the most prominent of those who sided with Machar in the press conference of December 6, and are now in prison, are not Nuer. The underlying political issues that need to be addressed go beyond ethnicity (Mengisteab, 2011).

The weakness of South Sudans political institutions will be a continuing factor in addressing these needs. A comparison with South Africa is perhaps useful. The ANC in South Africa had decades of political development before coming to power in 1994. The ANC was a political movement with an armed wing that was developed much later. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was born from the decades of fighting in the bush. It is an army with a political wing. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) government that took office 2010 was in many ways still more a liberation army than a government (Zainelabdin, 2011). The weakness of political institutions, the overlap of party and government, and party and army, all

contributed to the inability of the SPLM as a party to resolve these growing developments. by comparison, the ANC faced and resolved a major challenge to its leadership in 2008, even causing the resignation of the president, Thabo Mbeki, without bloodshed or unrest. The SPLM was not at all able to manage such a crisis (Mengisteab, 2011).

In looking ahead, the immediate need to is stop the fighting and allow for humanitarian access to all who need it, with protection for all those within United Nations peacekeeping missions in South Sudan(UNMISS) camps. However, the political talks that follow need to address the underlying issues that led to this disaster. There cannot be a simple return to the status quo ante, with Machar once again Vice President all the rest. There has been too much blood, and it would not solve anything. The hard task ahead was to develop a new political structure, defining more clearly the democratic rights of all South Sudanese, that laid down the rules of political competition, and which allows for development of stronger political institutions, not only the leading party, the SPLM, but others argued Mengisteab, (2011). South Sudan has not yet developed a permanent constitution. This process, if placed under independent leadership, such as by a Supreme Court judge, could be such a vehicle. But the process will have to be opened up much wider than previously, with active citizen, church, and civil society participation (Zainelabdin, 2011).

Further, Mengisteab, (2011), addresses that the long process of integrating, disarming, and ultimately reducing the size of the military forces and militia must be undertaken. But that can only be undertaken in a context within which fighting has stopped, the cease-fire is well monitored, and a credible political process is under way. All of these are hard tasks and they will demand a much more active and participating role of the International Community than heretofore. Institutions take time to develop and without proactive outside participation, South Sudans institutions, demonstrably weak, are not likely alone to be up to these demands. A new partnership between South Sudan and the international community forged to preserve all that has been invested in this new nation (Zainelabdin, 2011).

### **2.3 Conflict Analysis of South Sudan**

The Republic of South Sudan, three years into its independence, had suffered a tremendous political and social upheaval as divisions within the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and fragmentation of its army, had turned into major violence engulfing significant parts of the country states De, (2015). What started as a political dispute was interpreted through a lens of old, deeply bitter narrative of ethnic rivalry between Dinka and Nuer, and was exacerbated by a host of complicating unresolved political, economic and social issues. The epicentre and arming of communities along ethnic lines in this conflict, and its ready manipulation by powerful elites, was a key factor that risked a rapidly deepening and widening war with serious regional humanitarian and political consequences (De, 2015).

This needed and the gap in publically available and joint humanitarian analysis, and the Protection Cluster held a workshop with a number of field based protection actors to consolidate existing information and analysis from the field and Juba. This information presented a baseline of sorts from which to develop a deepening understanding of the threats, risks and vulnerabilities that civilians were facing directly and indirectly from the conflict. Further and more detailed work was planned to build upon this process in the coming months to allow the humanitarian community to enhance its response and inform conflict-sensitive programming, as well as informed discussions about longer-term humanitarian action needed in 2015. This report set out some of the macro trends in South Sudan as well as in the greater regions, with a particular emphasis on the of the conflict. The information contained herein was also meant to complement the work of research institutions and other bodies currently producing analysis on the context (De, 2015).

The analysis points out some of the key challenges of the South Sudans education system that pertain to massive gaps in service delivery, insufficient infrastructure, inadequate training for teachers, a large out-of-school population, gender inequities, low literacy rates and struggles to translate education into meaningful employment. Little attention had been paid to educations transformative potential to strengthen national identify and build peace, harmony and social cohesion within the country (De, 2015).

Although many South Sudanese according to Zainelabdin, (2011), have endured successive conflict over many years, the analysis reveals that education offers hope for a new generation. The provision of education and other social services can serve as a peace dividend for the new Government, reduce poverty through vocational development and diversified economic opportunity, and contribute to building peace (De, 2015). Efforts are needed to increase public understanding of education as a pathway for peace and development, reaching out to pastoralist groups and isolated or marginalized minorities and enable them to participate in the political system. Equitable access to education would be crucial for diffusing competition between groups.

#### **2.4 The root causes of South Sudan conflicts**

The South Sudan conflict would be viewed as conflicts, which had existed mostly between the two largest tribes, the Nuer and Dinka. The division among these people groups had started as early of pre-imperial era. But most of South Sudanese conflicts were mainly and seriously between these two major tribes, the Nuer and Dinka with others minor tribes oblige to form along these lines as early as of 1983, 1991 and 2013 as stated by Doornbos, (1992). Although, these two tribes share common way of life and social practice as Nilotic people group, they have their own political interest and ideology difference; nevertheless, their minor difference had devastated South Sudan, their communities and people of South Sudan in general. Nevertheless, these differences can be since as politically motivated in nature.

Even though the history of difference between these two tribes were dated back to early time, the most serious record of bitterness and division were made worse and spearhead by the formation SPLM/A in 1983 and the splits in 1991 (Doornbos, (1992). Since its formation, SPLM/A introduced the new Sudan vision under secular state which was contradictory to separationist vision of NYA I and II fighters and movement mainly Nuer dominant. This divergent view and ideology had given rise to a war, which was termed a Unionist SPLM/A and separatist movement ANYA II & I (Doornbos, 1992). This conflict has pitted the Nuer and Dinka allies against intruders, the Unionist movement SPLM/A comprised of Nuer and Dinka allies. It was a tough time, which South Sudanese had gone through, and it was a point where the major difference ripens between the Nuer and Dinka (Doornbos, 1992).

SPLM/A under the leadership of late John Garang had introduced a new political ideology, the united Sudan under secular state contrary to NYA I and II fighters objectives and ideology, the independent South Sudan as political agenda. Among these differences between these two rival ethnic groups, their present in either side were pre-dominantly on favour of their ethnic ties. This was said that, under Dinka led a movement, followers who were dominantly from Dinka ethnic group while in other hands under the lead of Nuer ethnic group, majority in the movement happened to be Nuer but the present of Dinka and Nuer at either side were unavoidable. From this concept, we can see that politic unite Nuer and divide them (Doornbos, 1992).

## **2.5 Past Conflicts Concerns in the Horn of Africa**

The USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and USAID's Office of Food for Peace funding will support life-saving assistance including logistics, nutrition, protection, and food security and livelihoods support, as well as health and water, sanitation, and hygiene services for conflict-affected populations in South Sudan (Doornbos, 1992). Access constraints such as bureaucratic impediments, insecurity, and poor road conditions were hampering relief operations across South Sudan. Despite these challenges, USG partners continued to provide emergency relief commodities and according to the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as indicated by Muchie, (2013), has urged South Sudans leaders to “get the job done” by fully implementing a peace deal or face a U.N. arms embargo and sanctions. His warning followed meetings in Nairobi on Monday with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and foreign ministers from Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan to discuss escalating violence in South Sudan and the deployment of a U.N. protection force (Muchie, 2013).

According to Kerry as stated by Muchie, (2013), it was up to the people, the leadership of South Sudan to lead and to do the things that they had promised to do. Fighting in the capital Juba last month has raised fears that the five-year-old nation could slide back into civil war. The violence prompted the United Nations to authorize the deployment of four thousand extra U.N. troops to

bolster a U.N. mission there; warning South Sudan it would face an arms embargo if it did not cooperate (Muchie, 2013).

South Sudans government initially said it would not cooperate with the new U.N. troops which will be under the command of the twelve thousand strong UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (Muchie, 2013). However, since then it had said it was still considering its position. Kerry said the force was not an intervention force that would challenge the sovereignty of the country. Its main task would be to protect property and civilians in Juba South Sudan secured its independence in 2011, but by December 2013 the long-time political rivalry between Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and Machar, a Nuer, had led to civil conflict that often followed ethnic lines. The two men signed a peace deal in August 2015, but spent months wrangling over details while sporadic violence flared. Crucial elements of the deal, such as integrating the government and former rebel forces not been carried out (De, 2015).

The fighting had killed thousands of people and driven more than 2 million people from their homes, with many of them fleeing to neighbouring states. Ask whether the United States was willing to help South Sudans economy recover, Kerry said as quoted by De, (2015), it would only do so if the nation's leaders implemented a peace agreement and was doing whatever necessary to stabilize the country. That if they choose not to do that, then we, who had been the largest donor in the world to the government of South Sudan, would have to rethink what we are doing. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said on Monday he and regional states were committed to giving momentum to the planned deployment of extra U.N. troops to South Sudan and said the countrys leaders needed to recommit to a peace deal.

Regional states Muchie, (2013), quoted Kerry which had pushed for sending the new troops to help South Sudans twelve thousand strong U.N. mission, UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), had agreed on the immediate implementation process” of meetings and steps to “guarantee some momentum builds up. About two years of conflict that pitted troops loyal to President Salva Kiir against those of his former deputy, Riek Machar was supposed to have ended with a peace deal last year (Muchie, 2013). However, fighting persisted and flared again in Juba. After the latest violence, Machar, who had returned to the capital in April to resume his post as vice president, withdrew again to the bush and was picked up this month by U.N. peace keepers in Democratic Republic of Congo with a leg injury.

Kiir had again sacked him and appointed a new vice president. Kerry said it was up to South Sudans leaders, political parties and neighbours to work out what is best or not best with respect to Machar says De, (2015), but all sides had to stop fighting. All parties were urged to recommit in word and deed to the full implementation of the peace agreement states Kenyan Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed as quoted by De, (2015).

South Sudan secured its independence in 2011, but by December 2013 the long-time political rivalry between Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and Machar, a Nuer, had led to civil conflict that often followed ethnic lines. The fighting had killed thousands of people and driven more than 2 million people from their homes, with many of them fleeing to neighbouring states (Muchie, 2013).

According to Kerry, who pledged new humanitarian aid to South Sudan worth \$138 million, said the new U.N. troop contingent was “not an intervention force” but would protect civilians and support those working to ensure peace prevailed. In the latest flare-up in July, Washington particularly concerned by an attack on a Juba hotel by uniformed men who killed a U.S. funded journalist and raped civilians, including aid workers (Muchie, 2013).

South Sudanese government officials said that just because the perpetrators were uninformed did not mean they were either under the command of the government or the opposition. South Sudans First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai had arrived in Khartoum on Sunday holding a special message from President Salva Kiir Mayardit to his Sudanese counterpart, Omer al-Bashir. Gais first visit to Sudan comes just weeks after he replaced former rebel leader Riek Machar as vice president after clashes in Juba left hundreds dead in July. He was received at Khartoum airport by Sudans First Vice-President Bakri Hassan Salih and a number of cabinet ministers (Muchie, 2013).

According to the minister in South Sudans office of the President, Mayiik Ayii, Gai was going to Sudan with a message of commitment of President Salva Kiir to establishing a very robust and productive relationship in the fields of diplomacy, economic trade and political ties between the two countries in pursuit of mutual interest argues Muchie, (2013). Ayii mentioned other objective of the mission was to assure the Khartoum of the commitment of the government to implementing peace agreement and move forward.

## **2.6 The effect of civil war in South Sudan**

Lee, (1998), states The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government took 25 years to subdue Sudan. This was especially difficult in the South, where until the 1920s; government consisted largely of punitive military expeditions and periods of exceptional violence Lee, (1998). To pacify and govern the North, the new rulers promoted the political and economic influence of Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, head of the Khatmiyya sect and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, head of the Ansar sect. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman reconstituted and to some extent secularized the Ansar organization, which became the Umma political party, while Sayyid al- Mirghani patronized the emergent nationalist movement, led by Ismail al-Azhari, and transformed the Khatmiyya followers into the Democratic Unionist Party,(DUP) (Lee, 1998).

While the British concentrated on economic, political and infrastructural developments in the North, such as the Gezira scheme, the railways and the introduction of modern civil

administration, it allowed the West and South to stagnate under the "native administration" of chiefs and sheikhs argued Lee, (1998). This policy towards the South amounted to total separation of South, North tribal structures maintained little or no effort to promote social or economic development, and education with English rather than Arabic as the lingua franca was elementary and minimal. The result was not only isolation of the South from the North, but also from the rest of the world. In the 1930s and 1940s nationalist political activities in the North developing at a rapid pace. Catalyzed by internal and external developments associated with the Second World War, the political pressure led to independence in 1956 (Lee, 1998).

The colonial powers only began to loosen their grip on Southern Policy in 1948, when the Juba Conference was allowed to take place, and southern chiefs agreed with northern nationalists to pursue a united Sudan. The crash programme of integration that then occurred was too little, too late. In 1953 the 800 administrative posts vacated by the British were 'Sudanised' (Williams, 2013). The northern politicians allocated a mere four posts to the Southerners; an insult but also an indication of how education in the South had lagged behind. In the south, 'Sudanisation' was tantamount to 'Northernisation'. As independence approached, the Southerners saw their British administrators being replaced by Northerners. In 1955 the southern garrison at Torit mutinied on hearing that they were to be transferred to the North. Their rebellion formed the nucleus of the Anyanya separatist movement, which was to fight Sudan's first civil war for seventeen years (Williams, 2013).

The 1972 Addis Ababa Accord since independence the Sudan has alternated between civilian and military rule in a fruitless search for economic development and the resolution of the Southern problem. In July 1971, when Nimeiri was returned to power after a short-lived coup supported by the Communist Party, he severed all connections with the 'socialist' countries and rushed headlong to embrace the West and the prospects held out by its 'free market' philosophy (Lee, 1998). For his grand new plans to succeed, peace was crucial. In 1972, following negotiations with Joseph Lagu - who only two years previously had brought the Anyanya movement under his sole command - Nimeiri and Lagu signed the Addis Ababa Accord that brought an end to 17 years of civil war. The basis of the agreement was regional autonomy for the South, but it left several key issues only half answered (Ohaegbulam, 2005).

The years between 1972 and 1983 were years of uneasy peace. Many Equatorians were unhappy about what they felt was the hegemony of the Dinka in the Regional Government, which became the major source of wealth and social prestige in the South. The balance of power between Equatorians and Nilotes was altered in 1979 with the fall of Idi Amin in Uganda and the return Sudan of many well-qualified Equatorian professionals and administrators. Most Southerners were disdainful of the way Nimeiri interpreted the Addis Ababa Accord to redraw the

of the South to include the Bentiu region, where oil had been discovered, into the North (Lee, 1998).

This feeling was compounded when central government ignored the concerns of local people when it gave the go-ahead for the construction of the Jonglei canal through the swamps of the Sudd. Southern politicians were also divided amongst themselves. Equatorians against Dinka and Nuer, Anyanya 'haves' against Anyanya 'have-nots'. Nimeiri tried to exploit these divisions to his own advantage and began manipulating the course of events by appointing and dismissing senior southern politicians (Ohaegbulam, 2005). These machinations culminated in the "redivision" of the South in 1983. Three regions were created out of the one autonomous region, and the single regional government was abolished. While Equatorians rejoiced, the unseated Dinka and Nuer felt humiliated and deceived. The spectre of a new civil war began to haunt the South, but this time the Nilotic tribes were bound to be the major actors.

In the same year that Nimeiri re-divided the South, a number of mutinies took place, notably the one at the garrison at Bor, which then became the nucleus of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) of Col Dr John Garang. The SPLM/SPLA, the SPLA, unlike the Anyanya movement, announced that it was not fighting for an independent South: its declared aim was a unified secular and democratic Sudan. The SPLA saw itself as an integral part of the struggle of all the marginalized groups in Sudan, including the Nuba and Fur. John Garang had repeatedly called for a national constitutional conference to agree on a secular and democratic constitution for the whole country (Ohaegbulam, 2005). It has always been questionable, however, whether the SPLA would be able to maintain this position in the face of huge practical and psychological obstacles, not least that most of its rank and file were motivated to fight by ethnic and religious differences. During the early years of the movement, Ethiopian government support was crucial to the SPLA, and since Ethiopia had problems with its own secessionists it would have been unwilling to assist in action likely to lead to a re-drawing of international frontiers (Metz, 1991).

Internal dissent in the SPLA reached crisis point in August 1991, when a break-away group the 'Nasir faction' called for the overthrow of Garang and for a separate South, abandoning all ambitions for a unified secular state clarifies Metz, (1991). Although they failed to unseat Garang, they revived the principle that 'self-determination' took priority over unity, and voiced a common southern attitude that the difference between the Islamic Front regime and the opposition and Democratic Unionist Party was minimal: that Northerners could not be trusted. It is now debatable how long Garang and his supporters - the 'Torit faction' can keep to their original slogans (Metz, 1991).

The end of the Cold War has meant diminishing strategic importance in the global sense for Sudan, but other considerations have come to the fore and are gaining momentum. The Islamic fundamentalist movement has expansionist ambitions, and the people of neighbouring Egypt

have an ever-growing demand for water. In the shifting sands of the new politics of the region, participants are forced to reconsider their course of action, and the SPLA is no exception the Koki Dam Agreement, March 1986. Following the overthrow of Nimeiri in 1985, the 'National Alliance' of radical political forces that led the popular uprising met the SPLA/SPLM at Koki Dam in Ethiopia and reached an agreement on a basic formula for peace, including the of a constitutional conference. The Koki Dam Agreement was endorsed by the Umma Party and rejected by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Islamic Front (NIF) (Metz, 1991).

The Umma Party leader and new Prime Minister Sadie al-Mahdi soon abandoned Koki Dam, however, having successfully revived the old maddest alliance of Jalapa and western Beggar and obtained huge arms supplies from Libya and Iraq. He began to pursue the war with renewed vigour, arming the Murahaleen militias, whose loyalty to him would be greater than their accountability to the law and the state states (Metz, 1991). By the end of 1988 the DUP was sufficiently concerned about Sadiq's intentions that it negotiated the 'November Accords' with the SPLA/SPLM, agreeing in principle to freeze the Islamic Sharia laws pending a constitutional conference, to implement a cease-fire and cancel the state of emergency imposed by Sadiq in 1987. The popularity of this agreement was demonstrated when DUP leader Mohamed Osman al- Mirghani was given a hero's welcome at Khartoum airport on his return (Metz, 1991).

Faced with massive popular endorsement of the November Accords and implicit condemnation of his own stance - Sadiq al-Mahdi turned to the NIF for support, setting up a new coalition government which excluded the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). But the army had become convinced of the futility of the war, and in February 1989, dismayed by the lack of political resolve, issued an ultimatum to Sadiq: unless there was progress towards peace, and the militia was disbanded within one week, the army would step in (Ohaegbulam, 2005). Eventually Sadiq capitulated: the National Islamic Front (NIF) left the government and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) returned. Negotiations were started with the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA); a cease-fire was achieved fairly quickly, and the UN famine relief programme Operation Lifeline was resumed. The Constituent Assembly agreed to freeze the Islamic laws, and a date - 18 September 1989 - was set for convening the constitutional conference. Sadiq was due to meet Garang in Addis Ababa on July 4 (Ohaegbulam, 2005).

The meeting never took place. On June 30, with perfect timing, a military coup staged by the National Islamic Front (NIF) aborted the peace process and with the favour of 'jihad' unleashed a reign of terror in the North as well as the South (Ohaegbulam, 2005). The new regime escalated the war in the south to new levels of brutality with the backing of radical Islamic and Arab countries. Iran, especially, became a source of enormous military and economic support. The has been single minded in its resolve to solve the 'southern problem' finally with a programme of

Islamisation and Arabisation. The DUP and Umma Party both regard the South as a natural extension of their economic base, their strategic resource reserve, and they would rather see the continuing devastation of war than accede to southern demands for self-determination (Ohaegbulam, 2005).

## **2.7 The Causes of the conflict in South Sudan**

Few wars were ever fought in the name of their real causes: instead, they were fought under old banners and old slogans, based on memories of past conflict. Because these memories fade so slowly, they obscure from the valiant warriors the possibility that they might be fighting for reasons no longer relevant or valid and even, on occasion, against their own interests. This is partly the case in Sudan's current war as claimed by Ohaegbulam, (2005). Although the major cause for the conflict is now the struggle over resources, most fighters on both sides remain convinced that the war is all about ethnicity, cultural identity and religion. Trying to explain this transformation in the nature of the conflict, by discussing the major elements of the process.

The Cultural-Ethnic Divide Sudan was such a vast country that for long periods most Sudanese tribes were able to live in their homelands in relative isolation from each other, free to develop their own cultural values and norms. Only when forced to move from their traditional habitats by reason of ecological degradation or political coercion did they have to confront alien cultures and peoples. These points of contact between strong ethnic identities, whether Arab or African, were also the areas of friction and potential for low or high intensity conflict (Ohaegbulam, 2005).

When Southerners were in conflict with the North, their identity with the region and self-image as black Africans come first, while at the local level tribal attachment was predominant. Apparent unity is more complex than it seems, and long and bitter conflicts have often divided neighbouring peoples. In the North, although there are evident regional and tribal loyalties, they often give way to class-based distinctions as stated by Ohaegbulam, (2005). The Fragility of the Dry lands the southern fringes of Sudan's semi-desert zone used to have sufficient rainfall to support the cultivation of drought-resistant millet and a few other crops, but even this subsistence production had become virtually impossible because of three spells of drought in the last two decades. Savannah covered about 25 per cent of Sudan, known as the central rain lands, where agro-pastoralism is the principal method of land use. Rainfall averages 800mm per annum across this belt of acacia and tall grass, where the more fertile soil supports sorghum, millet, sesame, groundnuts and cotton (O'Ballance, 1977).

This belt extends to the rich savannah in the South which gave way to the tropical forest and swamp in Equatoria, large areas of which were not suitable for raising livestock because of the presence of the tsetse fly. The fragility of the arid and semi-arid lands is evident. Awareness of seasonality and careful utilization of resources was supplemented with herd diversity and

selective use of certain environmental niches in specific seasons of the year. The sequence of environmental security building was based on utilizing the richer southern zones in the event of long periods of drought (O'Ballance, 1977).

This movement of people and herds from one ecological zone to an area already occupied by different ethnic groups is already a recipe for tension, requiring delicacy of negotiation. Conditional agreements used to be reached when the need for sharing land was occasional, but now that the need is permanent the strains are greater (O'Ballance, 1977). Mechanized Farming in the Central Rain lands The total area under legal or licensed large-scale irrigated and rained mechanized schemes increased from less than half a million hectares (one million feddans) in 1968 to about five million hectares (9 million feddans) by 1986 (Poggo, 1999). An equal area was farmed illegally by the same methods. These large-scale private schemes took over great stretches of traditional farm land, water points, grazing lands and herding routes, displacing millions of small producers. Large areas of forest were cleared (including about 95 per cent of the forest in eastern Sudan) that made way for the giant agricultural schemes, and with the trees went vital local sources of revenue from fuel wood and gum Arabic (Poggo, 1999).

It was noteworthy that the Mechanized Farming Corporation, (MFC), was established in 1968, upon request from the World Bank to secure its first loan for the so called supervised sector and to facilitate credit to private farmers. The MFC supervised the expansion of mechanized agriculture into southern Kordofan, White Nile and Upper Nile Provinces (Poggo, 1999). By 1975, the World Bank provided half of the total loans for the agricultural sector, specifically for private rain fed mechanized farming (Poggo, 1999). The ecological and social stress caused by large-scale mechanized agriculture was well documented, and can be held responsible for three types of conflict. Conflicts between traditional farmers and owners of the big schemes, as documented by Ahmed: Cultivators were forced to sell their labour cheaply, pastoral nomads were driven out of the best areas of their traditional pasture and agro-pastoralists were forced to abandon one of two activities and change over to agricultural labour for low wages and a lower standard of living.

Conflict among local people in the vicinity of the schemes, because of scarcity of cultivable land, obstruction of animal herding routes or in the search for fresh grazing land. Conflict between the state, as major backer of the scheme owners, and the small farmers and pastoralists. This was the most serious of all as the state had often opposed the spontaneous resettlement of such people when stricken by drought. The very structure and location of the large-scale mechanized farms was a source of recurrent and continuous confrontation (Poggo, 1999).

In spite of the rapid increase in the area of land under cultivation and the increased export capacity, the overall effect of the new export-oriented policies was negative. The value of primary commodities in the international market declined steadily from the early 1970s

while at the same time oil prices soared to record heights. Foreign debt was growing, as were repayments and servicing dues (Poggo, 1999). The economic crisis came to a head in 1978, the IMF intervened and negotiated the first of several adjustment programmes. From then until 1984 the IMF concluded five agreements with the Sudan. As stated by (Poggo, 1999). The IMF structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), were directed towards curbing the government's budget deficit and encouraging the export sector, mainly through selective promotion of export crops and devaluation of the Sudanese currency. By greatly encouraging the expansion of mechanized farming, reducing the land available to traditional farmers and pastoralists, their monetary assets and reducing subsidies for basic needs and social services, the whole of agro-pastoralism - the livelihood of 14 million Sudanese began to collapse. Because agriculture was no longer geared towards the domestic market, the living conditions and ability of the labouring classes became a secondary issue (Poggo, 1999).

The IMF pressure on Sudan to export continued unabated, even during the famine years of 1982/85 (Poggo, 1999). During this period, the Sudan exported 621,000 metric tons of sorghum, prompting praise from leading IMF economists for an apparent success story: "an interesting example of the role of devaluation in encouraging non-traditional exports." Cotton versus Food Prior to the implementation of SAPs, wheat self-sufficiency averaged 48 per cent. After the SAP implementation had begun in 1978-87, the figure deteriorated to 26 per cent. This was a direct consequence of IMF bias against wheat production because it clashed with profitable export crops such as cotton (Poggo, 1999).

The area under wheat was halved to make way for increased cotton cultivation. The World Bank gave generous support to the rehabilitation of the Gezira and other irrigated cotton-growing schemes. In view of the depressed market for cotton, Sudan lost on both counts - foreign currency earnings and food security. Because of increased dependence on wheat imports, whether commercial or concessional. Political Coercion and the Privatization of the State the internal conflicts which have mushroomed in the Sudan from the mid- 1970s onwards have reflected the growing resistance of millions of dispossessed against the new economic regime based on export of resources. To implement these policies with their harsh effects on an embittered population, the commercial and financial interests of a significant part of the Jellaba required a new type of state, which was completely within the grasp of their elite group and endowed with strong powers of coercion (Williams, 2013).

Coercive acts against traditional cultivators and pastoralists were swift and brutal. When victims of famine and drought moved into the wetter zone in search of survival alternatives, they were often intercepted by the army. The only way left open for survival was to move to towns and relief centres to check out a degraded existence dependent on begging, charity and petty labour theft and prostitution. Even in the towns these people were treated as third class citizens. The

police were mobilized in arbitrary round-ups known as kasha, which sought to repatriate the migrants to their homelands, despite the fact that the land would no longer sustain those (Williams, 2013).

Williams (2013) observed that state aggression escalated in line with growing poverty and resistance. In 1983 Nimeiri introduced his harsh version of the Islamic Sharia laws, and the penalty of amputation was enforced on 200 people in eighteen months. All were displaced. Shamasa resistance continued, however, with the Shamasa providing the spark for the 1985 popular uprising which, in informal alliance with the impoverished middle class of public employees, teachers and professionals, overthrew Nimeiri's military regime. In 1986 parliamentary democracy was reinstated, but it did not take long for people to realize that very little had actually changed or was likely to change, since the same interest groups continued to implement the same policies as before (Williams, 2013).

Eventually the more ruthless business and finance segment of the ruling elite became impatient with the obstacles created by the new democratic atmosphere. The democratic checks and balances in the state apparatus and the judiciary, and the prospect of concessions to the South in the search for peace (Williams, 2013). They wanted the system dismantled and irreversibly destroyed, and so staged a putsch against an already weakened civilian government and intensified the war. The Move Southwards the mechanized farming reached southern Kordofan and the Rahad reserve area by the end of the 1970s. By 1989, some 60 per cent of the Rahad reserve was under illegal mechanized farming, and it is astonishing that the government has provided these illegal and unlicensed schemes with agricultural extension services and even fuel quotas indicated Williams, (2013).

The horizontal expansion of mechanized farming exhausts the soil very rapidly. Yields of sorghum, millet and groundnuts of the degraded land fell by as much as 80 per cent, and some 17m hectares have been lost to soil erosion. In some areas the land was depleted within 3-4 years by this large-scale version of shifting cultivation, which rolls like a fire-ball across the land, deforesting and destroying the soil before moving on. Its appetite for new land is rapacious and continuous, and the only natural direction for it to go is southwards (Williams, 2013). With the discovery of oil at Bentiu, the Jellaba became aware of a new form of wealth in the South to add to those of land and water. As far as the Jonglei canal was concerned, its construction during this period paralleled the agricultural expansion drive, even though it had been contemplated for several decades. By the end of the 1970s the South, which had been left to its own devices for so long, was moved into the sphere of interest of the Jellaba and their state (Williams, 2013).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter explained the various research methodologies applied in this thesis. The chapter addressed the data analysis, and data collection methods applied. It also addressed the limitations of the research study on the research topic on war, conflict, and its impact in the greater horn of Africa: A case study of South Sudan.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

The study used the descriptive, qualitative research design; based on small samples that provide insights and understanding of the problem setting for collecting data. Therefore, it is the most common research design and information gathering method used in social science. In any research process to be successful, there is need for an appropriate and credible methodology to be selected and critically analyzed and tools for data collection and analysis to be properly identified and applied. This chapter covered the research design, descriptive and qualitative data collection methods and data analysis towards representing the research topic.

The research design in this study took a qualitative research design method. This method used information and resources from previous works of scholars, and articles that represent the research topic. This process of the whole research process was significant to the rest of the dissertation research process as it tended to focus on collecting data from books, articles, and internet and journals written by previous scholars and writers on the research topic.

This helped me in coming up vital information to my research work as a whole. The types of data collection methods used mean that the focus of my dissertation research process moved in a descriptive and qualitative way.

#### **3.3 Data collection**

The study used secondary data collection methods; secondary data was obtained from sources that include the university library, e-journals, and other online sources, documentary survey, World Wide Web, published reports, published theses, and newspapers. For statistical purpose, the study relied on quantitative secondary data, which is defined as information expressed in numerical forms that can be measured in standard scales. In addition, in-depth and critical examination of existing research and writings on South Sudan conflict.

### **3.4 Data Analysis**

The study took a descriptive analysis, qualitative research method approach that is both theoretical and empirical in form; in that having looked into the theories as a platform for navigational guidance, it sought to understand the rationale behind the real-life issues in the South Sudan problems and process of decision.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CHALLENGES FACING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT

#### 4.1 Introduction

Many problems and challenges militate against efforts solving the South Sudan conflict. These include first, Dinka and Nuer political elites ambition for power that traced its origin long before but intensified in the early 1990s and the ensuing ethnic horse they used in mobilizing support that often caused atrocities in both sides (El Sheikh, 2010).

In the SPLM/A split of 1991 where Riek Machar & Lam Akol then senior deputies of John Garang attempted to oust the latter, Riek Machar ordered Nuer massacres against Dinka that consumed the latters over 2000 lives in Jonglei state and that gave rise to the subsequent protracted Dinka-Nuer conflict (El Sheikh, 2010). This has shaped the Dinka-Nuer relations that have long been characterized by hostility, enmities and hatred and thus “frictions between these two tribes have always raised the emotional potency of conflicts, disposition to arouse deep-seated anxieties to revenge, fears and insecurity and the ready degree of aggressiveness” El Sheikh, (2010).

Ethnic based killings and counter killings is the sign of the continuous animosity between Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups in South Sudan. Ethnicity has become a serious challenge for peace and stability in South Sudan. Stakeholders in the succession of South Sudan never knew that it would result into more killings as witnessed today. It was a new dawn for South Sudan, the new nation would bring the Dinka and the Nuer with their leaders together as one and build their nations but what has resulted are continuous conflict and killings as a result of political competition and other factors at play.

#### 4.2 Dinka-Nuer dominance

Dinka-Nuer dominance of the political spaces, military and public services and of the state's economic sources cited as a major hindrance to peace and stability in South Sudan. The dominance interpreted as a form of supremacy battle between the two major tribes and this continuous to cause chaos and mistrust among various government officials who believe their people not represented. Further, this dominance lessens inclusiveness in its public service, active institutional and plural governance development (Elbadawi & Kaltani, 2007).

#### **4.3 The autocratic nature of President Salva Kiir**

The autocratic nature of President Salva Kiir in his leadership has become a serious threat to national security and peace in South Sudan. South Sudan is a new nation that requires a more approachable and diplomatic leadership style that is able to bring the people of South Sudan together and not tore them apart as the president as continuously done. El Sheikh, (2010), asserts President Kiir engaged in dismissal of the entire cabinet and publicly elected state governors, which elites lack of democratic culture in solving their political differences often, arise in the ruling party SPLM. His inability to transform SPLM and SPLA to an effective civilian ruling party and professional army, respectively says El Sheikh, (2010), is a major challenge to peace and stability in South Sudan.

#### **4.4 Inability to disarm militia or incorporate them into the army**

Elbadawi and Kaltani (2007), argues that the inability of the government to either disarm or integrate the various armed militias into the society or incorporated to the national army through providing trainings for making them professional and enable it to command authority and provide security/protection to the citizens is lacking. What the government did was just incorporate these forces to the national army without the necessary trainings with higher ranks for their leaders meant to co-opt them and allowed into the state Elbadawi and Kaltani, (2007).

#### **4.5 Unhinged alliance**

A major issue in the South Sudan conflict is the fact that South Sudan was borne out of a post-independence political indulgence and preference marked by the non-attendance of any credible and meaningful reform (Natsios, 2012). The crisis in SPLM was evident immediately after the attainment of independence because it immediately erupted from the top leaders of the SPLM in fight of political power concludes Elbadawi and Kaltani (2007).

It is the fight and struggle for a common enemy that brought the SPLM top leaders together in bid to attain independence and exercise self-rule. After this achievement, it is now clear that the war and fighting left within the SPLM itself with top leaders fighting for positions and supremacy. According to Elbadawi and Kaltani (2007), SPLM is no longer a liberation movement but a ruling party that has to contend with many challenges of capitalism and neo-colonialism in the world politics today and therefore different ideologies claiming into play weaknesses the solidarity of the party as the government strives to absorb all underlying challenges.

#### **4.6 Corruption, weak legislative and regulatory enforcements**

According to Natsios, (2012), South Sudan fought immensely to attain independence from the north and this was in a bid to provide adequate and sustainable development to prosper the nation and its citizens or subjects. Lack of accountability of officials jeopardize the state-building endeavours and the much anticipated peace dividends of the independence such as peace and security, and infrastructural/ institutional development meant to provide public services in education and health care to the people of South Sudan.

The rampant fighting and the political instability witnessed today in South Sudan is because of accelerated by out of control corruption that is indicative of the country's weak legislative, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms. Corruption is now rampant in the military, legislative and other state institutions therefore this contributes to opposing members of the leadership that is engaging the citizens in calling for change and transparency in the SPLM government (El Sheikh, 2010).

#### **4.7 National question**

LeRiche and Arnold, (2012), assert South Sudan is in an apparent display that the right of states to self-rule is not a complete standard position above and outer surface of the class struggle in general. The standpoint for rebellion in exacting, but must be considered as secondary to this and to the viewpoint for conquer of capitalist society (El Sheikh, 2010). LeRiche and Arnold, (2012), says that Marxists recognize the right of a nationality to decide its relations with one more, democratically, what has been done in Sudan will only further intensify the anguish of the people of the Sudan region.

It is clear to state that national independence based on capitalism is clearly bound to fail or have trouble in sustaining and creating an enabling environment for growth and development. This is because Sudan as a country is barely standing on its feet is a bloody dead-end for South Sudan one in which the mass of South Sudanese with a large majority with many still having tribal and semi-tribal ties, are being used as pawns in a broader fight between the world's two leading capitalist powers El Sheikh, (2010).

#### **4.8 An unstable regime**

The deepening economic and social crisis in South Sudan, according to Natsios, (2012), the military in South Sudan caught up in the counter-insurgency campaigns in the Darfur and the East. Now the tearing off South Sudan along with control of the oilfields has presented a situation, which is potentially fatal to the Bashir regime concludes Elbadawi and Kaltani (2007).

The South Sudan regime since its succession from the north has been very unstable in regards to the leadership squabbles and fight for power. President Kiir and his former deputy have been engaged in supremacy competition which has resulted into conflict that has left several people killed and displaced making it the situation in South Sudan worse that it was initially.

#### **4.9 Interference with the civil society**

The challenge the civil society face in South Sudan is enormous as the government has continuously interfered with the role and mandate of the civil society towards addressing issues affecting civilians. Most importantly as observed by Collins, (2015). The civil society queried certain government approached to governance that was not part of the August 2015 peace agreement. This became a problem to the government for it hence their rejection and mistreatment by the government.

President Kiirs government has proceeded in implementing the controversial October 2015 decree to reconstitute the countrys administrative divisions, which was rejected by the opposition as well as some ruling party legislators, and which IGAD agreed as not in agreement with the peace accord as stated by Collins, (2015). This became a clear indication of the government non-commitment towards promoting peace in South Sudan and the civil society role in clarifies these flaws became a hindrance hence their mistreatment.

#### **4.10 Division of existing states**

The division of existing states is becoming a serious impediment to peace and conflict resolution mechanism and further can be a serious underlying driver to spreading conflict. One of the regions deemed as volatile is the instability in the greater Equatorial region as argued by Natsios, (2012). This is a serious challenge and a worrying symptom of conflict to escalate as most of these states might want to divide and become independent in future.

#### **4.11 Flaws in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement**

In addressing the underlying causes of the South Sudan conflict, one major problem in South Sudan is squarely blame the international community and international humanitarian intervention agencies for being responsible for the flaws in the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement. These flaws have contributed to the escalation of the conflict in South Sudan (Natsios, 2012).

#### **4.12 Lack of proper structural processes and construction**

The flaws in the peace agreement is that it only tended to concentrate on ending the north — south conflict and war and never put in places actions and strategies in regards to political, economic and social structures that would champion democracy, governance and institutional

transformation that would be implemented immediately after the agreement to make South Sudan a better nation.

#### **4.13 Lack of democratization mechanisms after the peace deal**

The CPA majored on ending the conflict and therefore did not put in place practical and implementable structures and mechanisms that would promote democracy in South Sudan. In a bid to end the violence, the CPA affected power-sharing mechanism that only allowed continuity of the coercive power of the two protagonists, which in turn hindered democratization. It further neglected other parties to the conflict that has since become voices of opposition and generated more violence in the South Sudan.

#### **4.14 External actors in South Sudan**

Existence of external players including the USA and China; These actors in one way or the other contributed negatively towards the implementation of the peace agreement in South Sudan. For example, China being a major commercial player in Sudan in both arms and oil and therefore they see this as a danger to their interests and contracts further contributing to their reluctant to end the conflict and violence.

#### **4.15 Lack of the international community to monitor and implement the CPA**

A major blow to the CPA role and goals was the lack of the international community, which did not do a better job in monitoring the implementation of the CPA. After the signing of the CPA the international community became reluctant and concentrated on other issues like terrorism issues in Darfur. As a result, a lot of time was lost and various processes fell behind schedule culminating to various challenges and obstacles to the CPA implementation.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusion drawn from the findings and recommendation made. The conclusions and recommendations drawn were focused on addressing the purpose of the study which was to assess the War, Conflict, and Its Impact in the Greater Horn of Africa: A Case Study of South Sudan in Kampala Uganda.

#### 5.1 Conclusion

In analyzing the research finding and previously published literature on South Sudan. This is to establish an international contact group to help secure peace in South Sudan. African Leaders should consider using the African Union Summit of January 2015 to request the formation to a contact group by the AU commission and or the UN Secretary General to facilitate coordination and discussion to ensure the protection of civilians and a swift end to the conflict.

Dramatically raise pressure on the parties to the conflict to end the fighting and implement the resolutions of Extraordinary Summit of the IGAD Heads of state and government of on 7th November 2014 with clear timelines and benchmarks for full compliance with the cessation of hostilities agreement. The parties to the conflict should commit an unconditional, complete and immediately end to all hostilities and to the immediate cessation of the recruitment and mobilization of civilians.

Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Board argues to: Consider, in the context of its effort to create a new security policy framework and defence policy, the problematic nature of insurgency and current counter-insurgency policy. To South Sudans church leaders: Facilitate local peace agreements as and when appropriate between the TGoNU, armed groups and armed youth, local communities and cattle keepers. To avoid further humanitarian crisis and provide security guarantees for humanitarian actors to access and serve displaced populations transparently and impartially. To humanitarian agencies: Maintain impartiality and transparency in accessing and serving displaced populations. Ensure adequate staffing and effective risk management strategies are in place, so that, when humanitarian access is secured, agencies can deliver necessary services to populations where they are located, and maintain impartiality and transparency in accessing and serving displaced populations. Ensure adequate staffing and effective risk management strategies are in place, so that, when humanitarian access is secured, agencies can deliver necessary services to populations where they are located, and those populations can feel comfortable accessing the assistance. To the UN Mission in South Sudan

(UNMISS): Accept and assist civilians fleeing active armed conflict and seeking protection inside UNMISS bases.

This analysis summarizes findings from conflict analyses undertaken as part of the UNICEF Peace Building, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) Programmed, funded by the Government of the Netherlands. The purpose of the report is to create actionable recommendations for the education sector in South Sudan to inform and shape peace consolidation and nation building. The analysis points out some of the key challenges of the South Sudans education system that pertain to massive gaps in service delivery, insufficient infrastructure, inadequate training for teachers, a large out-of-school population, gender inequities, low literacy rates and struggles to translate education into meaningful employment. Little attention has been paid to educations transformative potential to strengthen national identify and build peace, harmony and social cohesion within the country.

Although many South Sudanese have endured successive conflict over many years, the analysis reveals that education offers hope for a new generation. The provision of education and other social services can serve as a peace dividend for the new Government, reduce poverty through vocational development and diversified economic opportunity, and contribute to building peace. Efforts are needed to increase public understanding of education as a pathway for peace and development. reaching out to pastoralist groups and isolated or marginalized minorities and enable them to participate in the political system. Equitable access to education will be crucial for diffusing competition between groups.

End conflicts facilitate a genuinely comprehensive and inclusive solution to end South Sudans civil wars, and steer the country to a democratic transition. Increase accountability, fight official corruption, and introduce transparency measures. Give Sudans independent Auditors Chamber prosecutorial powers. Empower other accountability institutions, such as Sudans Chamber of Public Grievances (ombudsman chamber), according to well-established international standards. Reform the mandate, composition, and powers of the recently-formed National Anti-Corruption Commission in accordance with international standards and best practice. Protect the independence of the judiciary and the media. Support the tracing and return of stolen public funds. To the Sudanese opposition, civil society, academics, and institutional reform experts, the Enough Project recommends: Plan for integration and reform. Work for better coordination and integration of on-going initiatives for the development of alternative policies for the reform of economic sector and other sectors vital for the stability of the state in the event of transition to democracy. Research and document all stolen public funds and assets. Prepare plans for the recovery of these assets and for holding accountable those responsible for their diversion. To the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Enough Project recommends: Support illicit finance investigations. Provide technical assistance to civil

society efforts to enable them to identify, investigate, and document illicit financial flows from North Sudan, in particular from the diversion of oil revenue. Then, enhance accountability by supporting efforts to recover such funds.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

### **5.2.1. Collective action by the IGAD**

First and foremost, collective action by the IGAD region should be taken against any party responsible for any violation of cessation of hostilities. If the parties to the conflict continue to violate the cessation of hostilities agreement and escalate measured to directly intervene in South Sudan to protect civilians and restore peace and stability. Should it be required to implement the IGAD resolutions the AU, peace and Security Council, the UN Security Council and the entire International Community should render all possible assistance in the implementation of these resolutions in the interests of protecting civilians and securing a sustainable peace.

### **5.2.2. Engage in inclusive approach**

On the other hand, insist on inclusive approach to peace negotiations so that all South Sudanese people have a stake in their future. IGAD with the backing of the AU and the UNSC should continue to support the active participation of a broad range of South Sudanese religious leaders and civil society representatives in the peace process to ensure they have a central role in rebuilding their country. They should also secure the participation of the semi and fully autonomous armed groups operating in South Sudan so they are parties to any security arrangements and do not become spoilers.

### **5.2.3. Ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing processes take place**

In addition, ensure accountability, reconciliation and healing processes take root in South Sudan. The culture of impunity in South Sudan fuels atrocities and must be tackled if the reoccurring cycles of violence are to end. Any peace agreement should exclude amnesty for those responsible for serious crimes. It should require that during the Transitional Period South Sudan publicly commits to fair, credible criminal investigation and prosecution of serious crimes committed during the current conflict. The Government of South Sudan should request international assistance from the United Nations and African Union to establish a hybrid mechanism to try to the most serious crimes committed during the current conflict. Any peace agreement should also require South Sudan to establish a national body the Transitional Period that will promote truth-telling, reconciliation and healing. Any mechanisms established need to involve people at the grassroots level, be culturally appropriate and be owned and driven by communities.

According to the African Union peace and Security Council should publicly release a report of the AU commission of inquiry on South Sudan as soon as possible. This report should also be used as the basis for imposing targeted individual sanction. Such as assets freezes and travel bans, as outlined in the IGAD resolutions of 7th November 2014. They should avert famine and meet humanitarian needs of all civilians in need. The risk that famine has realized might take hold in parts of South Sudan by March 2015 is high. According to the United Nations, South Sudan is already in a major malnutrition crisis. It projects that of 6.4 million people will be facing food insecurity between January and March 2015 and \$1.81 billion will be needed over the course of 2015. Given the scale of the need and the urgency, South Sudan, donor governments and humanitarian agencies must redouble their efforts to increase humanitarian assistance. They should fund specialized gender- based violence (GBV) and child protection programming.

All parties to the conflict must protect civilians and ensure full and unhindered humanitarian access. The International Community (IC) should support the UN peacekeeping missions in South Sudan (UNMISS) and Abbey (UNISFA) to reorient their focus, structure and staffing to fully prioritize the protection of civilians and human rights reporting. Bring greater transparency and accountability to management of oil and mineral resources and all government expenditure to help build the legitimacy of the state. The government, with the cooperation of the International Community should urgently improve transparency and accountability in the management of mineral resources and government expenditures. This should include the wide dissemination of data relating to the oil industry as well as fiscal and financial data. Authorities should be encouraged to enact the Petroleum Revenue Management Act.

#### **5.2.4. Develop and implement targeted recovery and development programmers**

Once peace is restored, South Sudan will need support to develop and implement targeted recovery and development programmes. All recovery and development programmes should be oriented to the needs and priorities of the people of South Sudan. They should result in more equitable distribution of public resources to reduce poverty and promote the emergence of a strong private sector, focus on investment social and physical infrastructure that will help rejuvenate live hoods lost during the war and promote economic growth; the gender sensitive; include effective security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs; and engage the youth in productive activities.

South Sudan conflict to build sustainable peace in the Equatorias the Transitional Government National Unity (TGoNU): Ensure full implementation of the permanent ceasefire in the Equatorias. Resolve eligibility criteria for cantonment, specifically in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal. Take steps to repair trust and badly damaged relationships with certain Western Equatorial politicians through building on ex-Governor Bakosoros address the escalation in pastoralist-farmer conflict. Implementing the presidential decree ordering cattle keepers to leave

parts of the Equatorias; providing impartial support for existing community-based structures to negotiate cattle migration and seeking to resolve conflicts in neighbouring states, such as Lakes and Jonglei, that drive cattle keepers from their homes in greater numbers.

According to the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism: Investigate reported violations in the Equatorias, including military resupply of forces, in a timely fashion, paying special attention to the precise relationship between different Equatorian forces and the SPLM/A-IO.

To the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and diplomatic community ought to prioritize the following to stop conflicts in the Equatorias, support for the TGoNU in resolving eligibility criteria for cantonment in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal; formation and funding of the National Architecture for the Permanent Ceasefire and Unification of Forces to ensure implementation of the permanent ceasefire and oversee forces in cantonment; and making clear to the warring parties that continuing conflicts in the Equatorias would be a serious ceasefire breach. Ensure that Equatorian perspectives are given due weight during constitution drafting, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and other political processes.

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## APPENDICE

### Appendix I: Interview Guide

Thank you for accepting to participate in the survey. I am **Nyathiec Elizabeth Autiak**, a student of Bachelor of International Relations at Kampala International University. The survey is absolutely for academic purposes only. The information you provide will help me understand issues concerning the relationship between War, Conflict, and its impact in the Greater Horn of Africa: A Case Study of South Sudan. The information you provide will not be used to identify you as an individual. Your honest responses are therefore much appreciated. Thank you once again.

#### Section One:

- A. Code.....
- B. Age.....
- C. Sex.....
- D. Location.....
- E. Occupation/Profession.....

#### Guiding Questions:

- I. How does an unfair power position allocation, oil and border issue contribute to conflict in South Sudan?
- II. How does an ethnic, religious and cultural difference contribute to conflict in South Sudan?
- III. What are the challenges towards peaceful conflict resolution mechanism in South Sudan?

Thank you