AFRICAN UNION MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN MOGADISHU SOMALIA

A Thesis Report
Presented to the College of
Higher degrees and Research
Kampala International University
Kampala, Uganda

JZ5334.5.A35
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2018

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of International Relations and Diplomacy

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DECLARATION

I Ashwaq Abdi Hashi, declare that this work entitled **"AFRICAN UNION MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN SOMALIA"** is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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APPROVAL

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University Supervisor for the project paper.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this report to my Dear Parents, brothers and sisters.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to the Almighty Allah for enabling and guiding me through my academic life.

I express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Ongodia Ekomolot for accepting to spend his valuable time to supervise my work, in instances where he could have used it to do other things. I thank him for the valuable guidance rendered to me in the production of this thesis report.

I wish to take a big stance in recognizing my mother Mrs. Aisha Mohamed who struggled for me to provide a firm foundation of education that I based on to capture this level.
I acknowledge the efforts of my financial supporters for their words of wisdom and the financial support they extended to me unreservedly during the study time.

I acknowledge the authors whose works have been cited in this study.

I also thank the respondents of Mogadishu, Somalia for accepting to give me the vital information that helped me compile this thesis report. Their contribution to the formation of this thesis report cannot be underrated.

I wish to extend my gratitude to my friends for their constant encouragement, contributions and advice at various stages of writing this thesis report.

I also pay special tribute to all those who have been close to me during the sleepless nights when producing this thesis report.

May the Almighty Allah bless them all.

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ABBREVATIONS

AU	:	African Union
AMISOM	:	African Union Mission in Somalia
TFG	:	Transitional Federal Government
ICU	:	Islamic Courts Union
FGS	:	Federal Government of Somalia
FRS	:	Federal Republic of Somalia
SPF	:	Somali Police Force
SNF	:	Somali National Forces
FPU	:	Formed Police Unit
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
UNOSOM	:	United Nations Operations in Somalia
IGAD	:	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IGASOM	:	Intergovernmental Authority on Development Support Mission in Somalia
PE	:	Peace Enforcement
PSO	:	Peace Support Operations
TCC	:	Troop Contributing Countries
PSC	:	Peace and Security Council
US	:	United States
UN	:	United Nations

ABSTRACT

The study "African Union Military Intervention and Peace Building in Somalia" set out to examine the extent to which the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has contributed to stability and peace building in Somalia. The objectives amongst others includes assessing the role of AMISOM in resolving instability and conflict in Somalia, examining the challenges faced by AMISOM in managing the conflict and building peace in Somalia, as well as the methods used by the African Union military intervention forces in peace building in Somalia. Conceptualized on the premise of the 'Just War theory'; the study adopted the exploratory descriptive research design using *Survey* as the research method, employing both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. Findings reveal that the continental peace architecture of African Union through AMISOM provides an institutional framework for implementing the concept of a comprehensive peace that encompasses conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. At the pinnacle of this architecture is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004 with ten members elected for two-year terms and five for three-year terms in order to provide some stability and continuity to the Council's leadership. Further findings reveal that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a large extent have succeeded in restoring peace and order, and ensuring a central government in Somalia. Based on the findings, the study concludes that though African Union Military Intervention in Somalia suffers from poor institutional competence, lack of resources, funds and troop contributions, and remains highly dependent on assistance from outside organizations which tend to undermine its effectiveness to main peace and stability, it has been a stabilizing element in Somalia. The study therefore, recommends increased funding for AMISOM; inclusion of young people as stakeholders in the peace building and security process; adoption of awareness and sensitization as part of the AMISOM intervention; as well as establishment of community information control channels.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

The intention of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Somalia in 2007 was a landmark act by which peace was restored in Somalia. Nevertheless that there were high expectation on AMISOM, though there was also skepticism or its ability to deliver results in form of peace in Somalia. This study explores the AMISOM efforts to contribute to peace in Somalia. This opening chapter is structured to include the background of the study, objective of the study, research objectives and questions, scope of the study and significance of the study.

1.1Background to the Study

This section encompasses four perspectives namely historical, theoretical, conceptual and contextual perspectives.

1.1.1 Historical perspective

Somalia's history of conflict reveals an intriguing paradox namely, many of the factors that drive armed conflict have also played a role in managing, ending, or preventing war. For instance, clannish and clan cleavages are a source of conflict used to divide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, used to mobilize militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very difficult to achieve. Most of Somalia's armed clashes since 1991 have been fought in the name of clan, often as a result of political leaders manipulating clannish for their own purposes. Yet traditional clan elders are a primary source of conflict mediation, clan-based customary law serves as the basis for negotiated settlements, and clan-based blood-payment groups serve as a deterrent to armed violence. Likewise, the central state is conventionally viewed as a potential source of rule of law and peaceful allocation of resources, but, at times in Somalia's past, it was a source of violence and predation. Economic interests, too, have had an ambiguous relationship with conflict in Somalia. In some places, war economies have emerged that perpetuate violence and lawlessness, while in other instances business interests have been a driving force for peace, stability, and rule of law. Understanding under what circumstances these and other variables serve as escalators or deescalators of violence or both is the subtle challenge conflict analysis faces in the Somali context. A brief review of conflict trends in Somalia underscores the point. (Kindiki, 2003).

Somalia descended into the state of anarchy after the fall of Siad Barre. Since then there have been more than fifteen attempts through which the people of Somalia and the international community have tried to establish a government in Somalia from the rabble the country has witnessed. Yet in all these attempts, no new government has survived a good deal of time to establish a durable structure of governance for a unified country. Instead, more and new militia factions have been sprouting and engaging each other in a civil war in controlling their tuffs and possibly the whole country. (Moller, 2014).

With the proliferation of militia and militarization of the country many innocent civilians have been caught between the cross-fires that have caused unprecedented deaths, displaced peoples, and caused untold sufferings. Some have been uprooted and fled their homes to seek refuge in other places within the country, while others have gone to neighboring countries. The fall of Barre's rule led to an intensified and increased free-flow of guns and other unauthorized weapons in to the hands of many Somalis. It was unimaginable that two years after Barre was deposed that the number of unsolicited weapons in circulation in Somalia were unprecedented. As Godwin Murunga has noted by this time "there were more arms than food in Somalia"[i]. It must be noted that Siad Barre used millions of dollars in building the military and buying of armor of all kinds. Scholars are still assessing the intentions of such massive military build-up, but some have noted that regional strategy and irredentism were possibly the major ones. At this time of the cold war, Barre did not have problems of getting military assistance because what he only needed to do was to play the tune of one superpower and its allies or to the other. Somalia's geostrategic in the region enabled Barre to easily lure the support of either the United States of America or the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic and their allies. (Brooks, 2013).

Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy describe the changing nature of the Somali crisis over the past 20 years: from Cold War to civil war (1988-91); state collapse, clan war and famine (1991-92); and international humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. They outline how some Somali communities have drawn on traditional institutions to promote reconciliation and develop local systems of governance. The article reviews international and regional reconciliation efforts in Somalia, and the impact of these on peace, conflict and governance. An important feature of the past two decades has been the emergence of a variety of Islamist movements seeking to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. These range from traditionalist sufi orders, to progressive Islamist movements, inspired groups like Al Itihad Al Islamiya pursuing a regional or global agenda.

Various armed factions began competing for influence in the power vacuum and turmoil that followed, particularly in the south. Among the effects of the 1990-92 fighting was the temporary collapse of customary law. This precipitated the arrival of UNITAF and UNOSOM peacekeeping forces in December 1992. Factional fighting persisted in the south. With the absence of a central government, Somalia also began to be characterized as a "failed state". The UN withdrew in 1995, having incurred significant casualties, but no central authority had yet been reestablished. After the collapse of the central government, there was some return to customary and religious law in most regions. In 1991 and 1998, two autonomous regional governments were also established in the northern part of the country. This led to a relative decrease in the intensity of the fighting, with SIPRI removing Somalia from its list of major armed conflicts for the years 1997 and 1998. (Brooks, 2013).

1.1.2 Theoretical perspective

The military feasibility of and justification for intervening in Somalia can be examined utilizing the historically rich "just-war" theory. With historical roots going as far back as the classical Greek and Roman philosophers, as well as prominent Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, "just-war" theory has an extremely rich theoretical background. Furthermore, contemporary thought has not neglected this theory on the whole. Michael Walzer, perhaps the foremost modern contributor to "just-war" theory, has provided much revision to the broader notions. (Bruton, 2014).

Of "just-war" theory. The theory, broadly speaking, aims to provide a set list of criteria for what one could use to evaluate whether or not a war, campaign or occupation was "just". It is important to note that "just-war" theory is almost exclusively a philosophy stemming from Western and, later, Christian theological schools of thought. As such, "just-war" theory bears credibility purely in the modern westernised sense. Given the rise of anti-western conflict in the world, it is important to recognize this distinction from the outset as "just-war" theory does not reflect the morality of any army or military waging war. (Marchal, 2011)

Thus "just-war" theory still has a significant influence on the justifications states and international military organizations use in their own campaigns. Although the tactics and nature of warfare have changed considerably on the ground, justifications for the war in the first place still remains necessary in modern world politics. (Kindiki, 2003).

"Just-war" theory possesses three core categories for the moral evaluation of a war: Jus ad bellum, the justice of going to war in the first instance; Jus in Bello, the justice in the combat and conduct of the war, and lastly Jus post bellum, the justice of post-conflict proceedings. Each of these categories possesses a clear list of criteria for what makes the cause, conduct and post-conflict management of a war just. (John Stupart, 2011).

1.1.3 Conceptual perspective

Military intervention: Military intervention is a phenomenon where an outside party gets involved militarily in another country with the purpose of righting or preventing some perceived injustice. (Kindiki, 2003).

Peace building: is designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict by creating a sustainable peace. Peace building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically. (Elmi, Afyare and Abdullahi Barise 2012).

United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was the first response to the turmoil situation in Somalia in 1992. Its function was to monitor a ceasefire between warring factions and to provide humanitarian aid throughout Somalia. In the same year in 1992, after the situation in Somalia had further escalated, the Security Council passed a resolution794 authorizing member countries to form a United Task force (UNITAF) in collaboration with UNOSOM I to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid which became a difficult task to UNISOM I. In 1993, UNOSOM II was established to fulfill the remaining tasks through reconciliation and disarmament of clan militias. However, the operation was unsuccessful and ultimately led to the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in 1995. After several conferences held outside Somalia in October 2004, the so-called Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in Kenya under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). (Brooks, 2013)

1.1.4 Contextual perspective

The people of Somalia are prone to wars that is brought about by the complains put forward concerning clan clashes, an equal economic balance and poor management among the Somalis themselves. The AMISOM in Somalia has done its level of bringing peace and stability in the country by educating the Somalis the negative out comes of wars and the negative consequences

that result from fighting all the time. The AMISOM has also played a big role in training soldiers in Somalia in different times so that the people in Somalia can be well equipped to defend the country and explore more about peace and security. The role of AMISOM in Somalia is also highlighted where its main strategy is based on two major approaches: a security-oriented approach depending on the security system and the continuing defeat of insurgents and politically-oriented approach based on good governance. The study also stipulated the challenges that African Union military intervention faced in Somalia by reflecting AMISOM's five main challenges as the legacy of Black Hawk Down, the shadow of Ethiopia's military campaign, the AU's capacity problems, the conflict environment in Mogadishu, and finding an appropriate exit strategy. However, the gap the study addressed included the task and programmes of African Union military intervention in Somalia as well as the achievements of African Union military intervention and its challenges in maintaining peace in Somalia.

The Somali Civil War is an ongoing civil war. Somalia has had no effective government since 1991. A transitional government backed by Ethiopian troops threw out Islamists from the capital, Mogadishu, in December 2006, but since then Islamist insurgents have carried out almost daily attacks. About 20,000 people flee fighting in Mogadishu each month. More than two million Somalis rely on food aid to survive. The young Islamist fighters launching attacks around Mogadishu are known as Al-Shabab. Recently placed on the United State's list of "foreign terrorist organizations", Al-Shabab began as the militia wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The largest in Mogadishu, In February 2012, Al-Shabab released a joint video with Al-Qaeda, announcing that the two groups had merged. (Freear, 2013).

On December 2006, the Security Council gave a mandate to IGAD Peace support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) to deploy troops to Somalia. In reference to the UN Security Council resolution 1725, it excludes bordering states to be part of the Mission. Later on, states bordering Somalia joined the Mission because of the financial burden falling on the other Non-bordering states. IGASOM Peace Support Mission was not deployed to Somalia due to the lack of international support. On December 2006, Ethiopia officially entered Somalia invited by Somali Transitional federal Government (TFG). On 21 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy peacekeeping force to Somalia under the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). (Demeke, 2014).

AMISOM refers to African Mission in Somalia which especially operates in Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia since 2007. AMISOM comprises of six African countries namely, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sierra Leone. Its mandate is to support the Somali federal government and to create dialogue among Somalis. It is also a regional arrangement under the authorization of UN Security Council. This study therefore seeks to examine the role of African Union Military Intervention and peace building in conflict resolution in Mogadishu Somalia. (Buer, 2001).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Since Somalia plunged into civil war in 1988, it has been submerged in decades of violent conflict. About fourteen peace conferences backed by the international society could not terminate the crisis and revamp the institutions. Efforts to enhance security, mainly through African Unin Military Intervention and Peace building mission could not successfully stabilize the country. Over the past two decade this conflict has caused several political headache and security challenges in the Horn of Africa (HOA) and above (Bruton and William, 2014). The presence of AMISOM since 2007 has not conquered Al-Shabaab nor weaken its capacity to launch attack, this has resulted to continued killing and displacement of civilians both in Somalia and beyond. Furthermore, states that have intervened in Somalia conflict have pursued their own national interests, agendas and priorities, thus undermining the peace process in the country (ibid).

To date, Somalia is still in chaos as Al-shabaab has continued to launch deadly attacks on Somalia and has posed a serious threat to security of East African states.

The Al-ShabaabGarissa University attack on Kenya Soil on April 2nd 2015 that killed 147 persons clearly displayed the extent of anarchy and violence in the Horn of Africa. In this research i conducted a bid to examine the choice of states for engaging with AMISOM and national interest has jeopardized the potential for long term stability of Somalia. This research study is intended to examine the African Union Military Intervention and peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia.

1.3 Main Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between African Union military intervention and peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia.

1.4 Specific Objectives of the Study

1. To examine the causes of instability and conflicts in Mogadishu, Somalia.
2. To assess the role of AMISOM in resolving instability and conflict in Mogadishu, Somalia.
3. To examine the challenges that African Union Military Intervention face in maintaining peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia.
4. To find out the methods used by the African Union military intervention in peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia.

1.5 Research questions

1. What are the causes of instability and conflicts in Mogadishu, Somalia?
2. What has AMISOM done to resolve instability and conflict in Mogadishu, Somalia?
3. What are the challenges that African Union Military Intervention is facing in maintaining peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia?
4. What are the methods used by the African Union military intervention in peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia?

1.6 Hypothesis:

There is no significant relationship between African military intervention and peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia.

1.7 Scope of the Study

This section discussed the geographical scope of the study, content scope, time scope and theoretical scope

1.7.1 Geographical Scope

The study was carried out in Mogadishu, Somalia which is located in the horn of Africa. More so the study was carried out in AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu, Somalia. This is because AMISOM as a mission to combat the conflict and reinstate peace building has a lot of information about the research study in subject.

1.7.2 Content Scope

The study was to investigate the role of African Union military intervention in the peace building process of Somalia. The study was also to investigate the role of AMISOM in conflict resolution in Somalia, the causes of conflict and instability in Somalia and the mechanisms used by AMISOM in resolving conflicts and ensuring stability in Somalia.

1.7.3 Time scope

The study was carried out for a period of two years from 2015 to 2017. This period enabled the researcher to accomplish the data from the field and compiling the information.

1.7.4 Theoretical Scope:

The study was guided by Just War theory, which indicated that the theory application of jus ad bellum can be framed in the more contemporary notion of "responsibility to protect" (R2P), particularly when one considers how much the two doctrines overlap in purpose

1.8 Significance of the Study

The study will be useful to the government of Somalia to know the exact role of the military intervention and in peace building.

The study will help policy makers on issues concerning conflict resolution and stability in Somalia in order to know how to deal with such problem.

The study will help the humanitarian agencies to know the level of human rights and how human rights can be maintained with reference to the findings of the study.

The study will help academicians in the field of international relations, conflict studies and resolution, civil wars and stability in order to learn the causes of conflicts and civil wars.

The study will help the researcher gain skills and knowledge regarding conflict and instability issues in order to use the same while applying for a job in concerned organizations.

1.8 Operational definition of key terms

Military intervention: is the interference by one state in the affairs of another state by military. (Walraven, 1999).

Peace building: is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, and political as well as economic transformation. It is defined in An Agenda for Peace as actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (Imobighe, 2006).

Peace keeping: Operations aimed at preserving peace between two consenting belligerent parties as defined in chapter (CAP) 6 of the UN charter. (Imobighe, 2006)

Peace Making: It is a diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to negotiate a settlement of their dispute through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Peacemaking is central to all peace processes and in general conducted by the diplomatic community. (Dare, 2010).

Peace Enforcement: the use of armed force to maintain peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. It is provided in Chapter VII of the Charter, and may be needed when all other efforts fail.

Peace Support Operations: It is the term frequently used for operations that are primarily military. It refers to those activities requiring the functions related to potential use of force and thus includes preventive actions, peacekeeping, disarmament, sanctions and embargoes, and peace enforcement. (Kuwali, 2014).

Conflict: This refers to the underlying issues that result into tension, crisis and violence among parties, states or communities. (Ryan, 1999).

Armed Conflict: This denotes conflicts whereby parties on both sides resort to the use of force. It includes situations ranging from a military over flight, an attack on a civilian by a single soldier, or an all-out war with massive casualties. (Ryan, 1999).

Contemporary Conflict: This refers to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflicts in the post-cold war world. (Ryan, 1999).

Conflict Management: It is used to refer to the limitation, mitigation and containment of conflict, rather than the durable elimination of the causes of conflict. (Ryan, 1999).

Clanism: Is defined as a bidding bond between members of the bigger family through patrilineal kinship. This influences the being of the people in the society whether political or social allegiances, which are determined by descent in the male line and can change depending on one's prevailing interest in the community. (Muthuma, 2007).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This Chapter reviewed existing literature on the subject matter. Theoretical perspective, conceptual framework. The concepts of conflicts, instability and Conflict Resolution were discussed. This chapter reviewed previous works on peacekeeping as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism. The subthemes include: role of Africa military intervention in Somalia, the causes of conflicts in Somalia, Impact of conflict in Somalia and Tasks and challenges AMISOM in Somalia.

2.2 Review of Existing Literature

According to Kioko (2003), AMISOM experience during their first thirty months of its operation provides significant understanding about some wider issues that involve the challenges of peacekeeping without any peace to keep. (Moller, 2014, p. 5) argues that the Somalia's war creates a situation that is feasible to examine many external actors, thus Somalia's neighbors, regional, international organizations, super powers and other forms of non-state actors. In point of fact, the Somalia's protracted conflict has led to many studies in order to evaluate the capability of AU in managing and containing intrastate violence. However, ever since AMISOM was established, there have been several varying studies, perspectives, and conclusions not only in relations to its effectiveness, but also in regards to the challenges that have undermined the achievement of its mandates.

Some researchers have limited their studies on the basis of considering if AMISOM has had a positive impact or not, without considering the root causes of the violence. The study conducted by (Barise, 2006) fail to consider the causes of Somalia's conflict, but instead focus only on the challenges facing AMISON operations. Further, Kathrine and Victoria argue that AMISOM has a lot of gaps and challenges that will be very difficult to redress. Similarly, (Kioko , 2003) did not identify the causes of the Somalia's conflict, but focus only on the challenges and constraints of the local and international political forces influencing AMISOM operation. Paul demonstrates that AMISOM is ill-conceived operation which cannot be said to have concluded to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, (Cilliers et al., 2010, pp. 4-5) recount that AMISOM

has failed to effect considerably on humanitarian and security challenges and being threatened with failures cannot be able achieve peace in Somalia. Stefan and (Christalla, 2013, 168,) state that notwithstanding AMISOM's intervention, Somalia's conflict is still unresolved. On the contrary, (Neus, 2013, p.3), appraises the successes and the constraints that emanated in the AU's mission in Somalia. Neus argues that AMISOM has made some progress in the political dimension and Somalia is undergoing political transformation. (Freear et al., 2013, p. 4) also contend that there has been a partial success on AMISOM operations and has made a considerable success against Al-Shabaab, in the past 18 months. However, these studies do not mention the causes of Somalia's conflict and that questions the premises of their recommendations. Identifying the causes of conflict is very relevant to peacekeeping, because it helps to handle all the factors included in a conflict and devise a solution to resolve those factors.

Some scholars have examined the effectiveness of AMISOM through the analysis of particular factors. However, these findings are inadequate since some factors are being considered while others are avoided. For instance, (Baker, 2007), explains that AMISOM's effectiveness has been undermined by inability to dispatch troops to the location they are needed and get them well equipped. (Neus, 2013) demonstrates a different view that shortage of troops was the major factor weakening the AU's operations in Somalia. (Coning, 2007, pp. 1-12) his study posits that shortage of troops was not a challenge to AMISOM, since Africa has significantly contributed up to 28% of uniformed UNs peacekeepers. In his point of view, lack of funds, poor planning and management are the major factors undermining the effective of AU's peace operation in Somalia. (Gjelsvik, 2013, p. 4) identifies low level of female's involvement in AU's peace operation in Somalia as a major challenge. She points out that increase in the involvement of Women is necessary for AMISOM to actualize its mandate.

Some studies have been conducted to examine the contribution of international and regional organization on the AMISOM's effectiveness. (Moller, 2009, p. 23) argues United Nations intervention in Somalia had in the beginning of Somalia's crisis had a negative effects, and its support together with EU on AMISOM is minimal. Moller states that the core actors are other subsidiaries like World Health Organizations (WHO), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) etc. (Assanvo et al., 2007, 22) examined the contribution of EU to African Union' peace operations mainly in Somalia and demonstrate that the support offered for establishing and financing the African Peace Facility (APF) demonstrated on of the most significant projects of EU in the

course of it approach to Africa. These scholars assert that AMISOM's cannot be effective without the support of the EU. (Derblom et al., 2008, p. 7) in agreement with Williams et al, contend that UN and EU are very effective in peacekeeping missions in Africa and that AMISOM cannot be effective without the assistance of UN and EU. In contrast, (Wolff et al., 2013, 164) argued that African Union's peace mission effectiveness will still remain insignificant until AU reduces its dependence on external actors.

Notwithstanding, the availability of studies on AMISOM describe significant features and factors about Somalia's conflict, this literature still has some gaps which can be completed by this research. First, this debate over the merits and the effectiveness of AU multidimensional category of peacekeeping operations is handicapped by lack of critical examination of the roles and motives of AU contributing states. Second, we lack an adequate information on the challenges undermining effectiveness of AMISOM on the premise of its mandate. Third, local root of Somalia's conflicts have been neglected by the available studies on AMISOM. Finally, we know little about the theoretical understanding of AU's mission in Somalia. This study is aimed at rectifying these shortfalls. The study will draw from the perspectives of realist theory in international relations to explain the motive of states engagement in Somalia conflict and participation in AMISOM.

2.3 Theoretical perspective

2.3.1 Just-war theory

A "just-war" theory application of jus ad bellum can be framed in the more contemporary notion of "responsibility to protect" (R2P), particularly when one considers how much the two doctrines overlap in purpose. At the 5858th meeting of the UN Security Council, the notion of the responsibility for the international community to intervene was discussed, as the advisor to the Secretary-General urged for the intervention in both political and security tracks, in the hopes of fulfilling the obligations set forth behind the spirit of R2P. Somalia has historically failed to protect its own people from self-destruction since the early 1990s; thus the burden or responsibility of intervention lies squarely on the shoulders of the international community since it is in accordance with a morally-acceptable justification for military force.

Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun justified military intervention in the modern framework of R2P through analysis of what the just-cause threshold shall be before the UN or in extraordinary cases a coalition of sovereign states intervenes. In the tradition of Grotius' philosophy, just causes for war can effectively be reduced to three overarching grounds: when acting in self-defence, when defending others from attack and when protecting citizens from oppressive, violent regimes. In the twenty-first century, this can include the just cause of situations of "state collapse and the resultant exposure of the population to mass starvation or civil war, as in Somalia. The TFG may be defined as the legitimate authority, at least politically, but the underlying truth remains that Somalia is without legitimate state control. Because of Somalia's anarchic nature the citizens are not being threatened and oppressed by a single violent regime, but by several smaller clans and armed militias. This, if anything has proven to be more detrimental than a single, despotic government or leader. Indeed, if anything, the cause for R2P in Somalia is only strengthened by its anarchy (Chesterman, 2001).

The spirit of R2P has become obscured by the series of failures seen in Somalia. With the recent AMISOM intervention, the limitations of such a restricted and ill-equipped force is indicative of just why Somalia's hope for an end to conflict cannot emerge quickly or effectively. But this need not be the case. Should the US or UN Security Council's respective administrations ever garner the political will necessary to intervene in Somalia again, it is crucial to bear in mind that the precedents set by the decisive military failures to enforce peace in 1993 are by no measure an indication of certain doom for any future force. As argued above, military intervention is not only justified by criteria laid out not only in international law, but in the roots of "just-war" philosophy. Furthermore, if military intervention can be carried out on a large enough scale as to match the strategic requirements, and with a broad enough mandate to secure the region, reinforcing existing channels for humanitarian aid becomes a logical second step. Essentially, one of the largest objections used by state leaders to absolve responsibility to get involved in Somalia is that of military unfeasibility, citing the 1992/3 UNOSOM operations as a prime example of how even the United States can fail militarily. But on closer examination, we see that not only is this pretence false, it is ignorant of the broader failings of the Security Council in creating a sound strategy before boots even touched the ground in Mogadishu.

Military intervention in Somalia can be achieved, and moreover it is completely within the bounds of moral justification for the deployment of forces. More importantly, securing Somalia would enable the kind of humanitarian assistance so crucial for securing the failed state and

providing a framework for eventual elections processes, it would de-escalate tensions with neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Eritrea, and would ironically solve one of the international community's biggest maritime headaches: piracy in the Gulf of Aden. It would be naive to assume that such an intervention would be cheap or without cost. But much like the proportionality of jus ad bellum, understanding that the net utility of securing Somalia would outweigh the perceivable cost is the first step in eroding the lack of political will at the Security Council (Coleman, 2007).

2.4. Conceptual Framework



According to the conceptual framework above, the role of African Military intervention is to maintain peace in Somalia, however, these conflicts have led to political chaos and instability, human rights abuses and violations, the lack of provision public services, and regional security threats such as Islamic extremism and terrorism as a result, the government of Somalia has resorted to regional integration to seek support from the neighboring countries, to modify the internal policies and involve the UN Security Council in their matters. These have brought at least a peace Somali land up to date.

2.5 Concept of Conflict

According to Adis James (2002), conflict is a very fluid and ambiguous concept. "Conflict is a multi-dimensional social process which is a common and essential feature of human existence". When expressed and handled constructively, conflict can act as a catalyst for personal, social and political change and transformation. When it is expressed destructively, conflict fosters violence and damage that is familiar in wars and violent conflicts Armed conflict is described as war. Conflicts in Mogadishu, Somalia are predominantly inter-clan based in terms of root causes of the conflict since 1991. The danger however lies in the spillover effect resulting in cross border actions and refugee situations.

According to Henrikson (2000), AMISOM's African Peace Support Mission was launched by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 19 January 2007 as a result of a failure to implement the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). IGASOM was intended to replace the Ethiopian forces that were defending Mogadishu's government from the rebel Islamic movement, Al Shabaab. Transferring the mandate from IGAD resulted in the AU needing greater African involvement in the operation and reluctance by Western states to dispatch their troops to Somalia. On 20 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized AMISOM (UNSC Resolution 1744), thereby endorsing the previous AU decision. As the criteria of a Peace Support Operation led by the AU establishment, the AU's intent was indeed that the UN would assume responsibility for the mission within six months, which did never happen. However, even if the UN has since played a secondary role, its support has been crucial for African military intervention.

According to Ayoob (2008), bearing in mind that African military intervention is playing a supportive role, leaving the ownership of the process to the government, African military

intervention multidimensional peace-making strategy is based on two major approaches: a security-oriented approach, which is dependent on the enhancement of the security system and the continuing defeat of insurgents; and a politically-oriented approach, which is based on the promotion of good governance. With the purpose of targeting those goals, the African military intervention Mission initially structured its deployment in terms of the Military, the Police and the Civilian components. The AMISOM military component is mandated to defeat the areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, secure liberated areas and provide support to institutionalize Somalia's National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP). This includes integrating, harmonizing and sustaining security institutions, ensuring coordination among administrative entities, and implementing de-militarization programs as DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants). The mandate is broad in relation to the human and financial resources that are needed or available. Since early 2012, AMISOM's expansion in areas of operation has been enormous. Even after the development of AMISOM's strategic concept, the troops deployed are reportedly inadequate to guarantee the stabilization of its areas of operations. For instance, it is unclear how 2500 Ugandan and Burundian troops could be expected to stabilize the Baidoa sector or how Djiboutian soldiers will stabilize the Belet Weyne sector. Other challenges relate to sourcing and deploying personnel and capabilities to the Mission. Some of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) has pledged to deploy troops, but a lack of clarity about logistical, institutional or financial aspects has complicated the implementation. For instance, the expected troop deployment by Sierra Leone was delayed as a result of logistical supply problems involving the acquisition of ammunition. (Bradbury, 2010).

Finnemore (2003), argues that disagreement between President Guellah of Djibouti and some of his senior military officers about the deployment of Djibouti's battalion is also symptomatic of the problems confronting AMISOM and the TCCs. It is extremely important that AMISOM promotes its peace building support strategy in parallel with Somalia's strategy, allowing the government to have the necessary space to maneuver in order to be the leading institution in the process. The trend in the "liberated areas" and partially in Mogadishu is that the willingness and capacity of AMISOM to enhance relations with the government is low and its strategy is largely divorced from the state-building strategies of the government. Also, the AMISOM troops are still being perceived by the local population as "occupying" troops.

Knife (2002), indicates that the Somali government lacks the capacity to govern effectively. Therefore, and with the purpose of filling the power gap, AMISOM is actually creating a culture of dependence that prevents the government from taking over power and the AU PSO from planning a strategy to pull out their troops in the operating areas. Another important element to mention is that the international-led approaches to peace building have so far neglected local Somali traditions and experiences of controlling and managing security, which have demonstrated a time tested capacity to be effective in the absence of the state.

According to Ryan (2003), AMISOM has in several cases failed to understand local dynamics and governing methods, provoking confusion and producing limited or non-existent outcomes in their interventions. It is important that AMISOM understands the local initiatives in dealing with security in order to support the building of a legitimate and effective security strategy.

According to Imobighe (2004), the AMISOM Police have the mandate to engage in the capacity building of the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible body that can provide security for the population. As AMISOM soldiers have moved from Mogadishu to other "liberated areas", the first Formed Police Unit (FPU) arrived from Uganda in August to support Somali Police Force (SPF) in providing security in the capital. On 16 September 2012 AMISOM received its second Formed Police Unit (FPU) from Nigeria. So far, AMISOM has assisted the SPF in vetting 600 former Somali police officers with the purpose of increasing the number of operational police officers in the country. With the need to combat public disorder, the FPU's actions have been based on rapid-reaction movements with a limited efficacy. Hence, more FPU members and equipment are required to effectively guarantee the rule of law in the city.

2.6 The Causes of instability and Conflict in Somalia

Politics and Government is a factor that had a great influence on Somalia's civil war. The president Mohamed Siad Barre was known as the general who lead the coup d'etat and came into power by force after the assassination of President Sharmarke. He was viewed as a dictator by some and he had a negative impact in Somalia's history by playing the role as one of the causes of the civil war. President Barre who ruled the country since 1969 was over thrown by clan-based militias. He once said, "When I came to Mogadishu...[t]here was one road built by the

Italians. If you try to force me to stand down, I will leave the city as I found it. I came to power with a gun; only the gun can make me go. That's exactly what happened. He ruled with an iron fist and anything he says goes. President Barre proclaimed a socialist state and believed in nationalism. He established the Somali language to be the official language and was anti-tribalism. He also advocated for Greater Somalia which included the Ogaden region also known as Western Somalia (who is still under the occupation of Ethiopia even after the Ogaden war that was led by Barre), Djibouti, and the North Eastern province of Kenya, NFD. Barre was accused of human rights abuses. George James from the New York Times reported that "In June 1990, a hundred prominent citizens signed a declaration called the Mogadishu Manifesto, calling for his resignation and the appointment of a transitional government pending free elections. He called the manifesto "destructive," and jailed 45 of those who had signed it, but about a month later he ordered their release. He agreed to multi-party parliamentary elections to be scheduled in February but later canceled them and the civil war took its course." (Alasow, 2010).

Somalia was colonized by Italy and Britain. Italian Somalia and British Somalia later united and formed the Somali Republic in 1960, which will be later known as Somalia's Independence Day, on July 1st. Because of this history of colonialism, Somalia still to this day has regional problems. There regions, districts, and states divided within the country. North Somalia, or Somalia has cut ties with the South and does not intent to reunite. Somalia is unrecognized, self-declared state and Puntland along with the other regions has acknowledged themselves as autonomous states. Competition for power and resources has continued to divide these regions.

Tribalism is one of the major causes of the Somali civil war. Even to this day, the first thing a Somali wants to know about another Somali is what clan does he or she belongs to. In order for a Somali to recognize a government or a political party, they need to have a clan representative who will think about their people. "Clans form the bedrock of Somali society and identity, but political exploitation of their rivalries has blocked every attempt at peace since Somalia collapsed into war in 1991." (Reuters, 2011)

The economy also played a big role. "The scarcity of Somalia's resources is one of the driving forces of the conflict, as different groups compete for these limited resources" (Afyare, 2012). Somalia has always been a poor country and is still undeveloped today. The Somali people have

relied on foreign aid for many years and when that was taken away, it had troubled a lot of people.

Political, Economic, and Social problems are some of the root causes of the Somali civil war. Somalia is a county who has known war after war and famine after famine. If you ask most Somalis today, they will tell you that they want peace. It's time to put down the gun and pick up the pen. The international community has held countless peace conferences, provided millions of aid, but still has failed to bring peace. The only people who can bring peace to themselves are the Somali people. Maybe they can finally learn lessons from the past and start thinking about the future. The Somalis in the diaspora is using education to fight back right now. This young generation today can maybe store hope one day.

2.7 The Impact of peace building on the People of Somalia

Somalia is a prime example of the complexity of peace building. By the late 1990s, south-central Somalia had deteriorated into lawlessness, conflict and chaos. International actors engaged in intensive diplomacy, with close to 10 back-to-back peace conferences between 1991 and 2004. All of them failed. Conversely, the north stayed relatively peaceful, with internal reconciliation processes led by Somalis in Somaliland and Puntland. In Somaliland, traditional leaders, politicians, business people and women's organizations put together a series of inter-clan reconciliation conferences in the early 1990s with limited external support (there was some funding and logistical assistance from international non-governmental organizations). While contextual factors and timing may have contributed to this success, the Somalia case re-emphasizes the critical importance of supporting local reconciliation and peace building before rushing to central state-building. This is an important lesson to inform current efforts in Somalia. Despite the signing of the New Deal Somali Compact in 2013, where the international community pledged €1.8 billion to support the state, international backers have so far been unable to address pre-existing structural violence, widespread poverty and the clan politics that has fractured Somali society.

The impact of peace building in Somalia has been that people or natives of the war affected Somalia can be able to sleep in their houses, do some business while being protected by the external machineries. The introduction of African Union Military intervention and peace

building in Somalia brought some space of breathing to the people of Somalia. Before the intervention of African union military intervention, the people of Somalia used to sleeping in bushes and many others killed innocently with no any crime committed.

According to Albert (2000), whatever the underlying factors or the precipitating contexts of conflicts in Somalia, there are many problems or consequences which are usually negative and retrogressive to the people of Somalia survival.

One of the prominent outcomes of peace building struggle on conflicts in Somalia has been civil war or violence. Somalia has been dragged into the theatre of wars since time immemorial.

According to Ikeazor (2006), to his conclusion, he said that the underlying theme in most of the conflicts in Somalia is ethnic division or ethnicity. Within the context of civil wars which is the most pronounced outcome of conflicts, other factors or contexts have specifically been linked to conflicts. These include economic, political and social predicaments.

Economically, civil wars resulting from ethnic tensions and conflicts usually plunge nations and countries into economic mess. Ordinarily during civil wars and violence, property which is highly valued is destroyed. Houses are burnt, and some economic resources vandalized. Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and other countries that witnessed civil strife will attest to this fact. Various economic operations usually get to a halt, for instance, during the Liberia civil war, their economic production stopped. Ethnic violence in Nigeria currently in the Niger Delta area has partially paralyzed economic exploration of crude oil in that zone. The ethnic tension between the ljaws, the Itshekiris, and the Urhobos has seriously affected the business of oil companies located in that area. In the process, economic setbacks are usually experienced. The intra ethnic strife in Ogoni land resulted in the loss of life of a notable contributor in African literature Ken SaroWiwa. The Liberian conflict led to far reaching death consequences on the people. West Africa (1993) showed bones and remains of killed civilian plantation workers in Liberia. The conflict also had other consequences on soldiers, children and civilians. Other social consequences of ethnic conflict include lack of trust and prejudice among citizenry. These are few among the various consequences of ethnic conflict situations in Africa. Fortna and Howard (2008).

2.8 Tasks and Challenges faced by African Union military intervention in Somalia.

According to Paul D. Williams (2007), the African Union launched its fourth peacekeeping operation, the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Now approximately two and a half years old, AMISOM's short life has not been a happy one. It was deployed to Mogadishu essentially in support of the Ethiopian government's preferred faction in Somalia's ongoing civil war. Not surprisingly, and like the three UN-authorized peace operations deployed to Somalia during the early 1990s, AMISOM faced serious challenges which severely restricted its ability to operate. In January 2009 the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the election of Somalia's new transitional government led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and the arrival of Barrack Obama's administration in the United States renewed the debate over how AMISOM should relate to the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and how the mission might be brought to an end.

Williams (2002) reflects upon African Union military Intervention has five main challenges: the legacy of the "Black Hawk Down" episode of October 1993; the shadow of Ethiopia's military campaign; the African Union's capacity problems; the conflict environment in Mogadishu; and finding an appropriate exit strategy. It concludes that AMISOM was an ill-conceived mission which attracted few serious political champions. The predictable results were a dangerously under-resourced operation that placed several thousand peacekeepers in harm's way for morally and politically dubious reasons.

Hanson (2008), argues that the legacy of Black Hawk Down has become contemporary discussions of peacekeeping in Somalia are colored by the events of October 3-4, 1993, and the images of a violent country awash with arms that they left behind. The deaths of American soldiers not only sparked the Clinton administration's retreat from UN peacekeeping (codified in Presidential Decision Directive 25) but also acted as a major warning against putting boots on the ground in African war zones. Second, the subsequent U.S. disengagement from Somalia left Ethiopia as the central plank in Washington's regional policy in the Horn. Third, when U.S. troops did return to the Horn, it was primarily to conduct counter-terrorism operations initially after the 1998 embassy bombings and then in the aftermath of 9/11. U.S. policy thus looked at Somali and regional politics through the narrow and distorting prism of counterterrorism.

According to Ori (2014), the shadow of Ethiopia's intervention established during Ethiopia's attempt to forcibly install the TFG in Mogadishu, AMISOM was born into a war zone.

Ethiopia's 2006 campaign was the latest in a long series of military incursions aimed at degrading Islamist bases in Somalia, initially focused on al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, and more recently elements within the coalition of local Shari'a courts known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The main sticking point was that the regime Ethiopia was trying to install was deeply unpopular with many Somalis and once installed, made little effort to build its political legitimacy or reach out to its opponents. AMISOM was thus mandated to support a weak, divided, and (in the view of many Somalis) illegitimate government which was widely seen as being one faction in the country's ongoing civil war. It didn't help that the TFG was unable to control many of its security forces and demonstrated virtually no capacity to govern effectively.

There was also considerable skepticism within the African Union about the legitimacy and effectiveness of Ethiopia's actions and the wisdom of deploying into a violent, chaotic vacuum with no apparent peace strategy. As a direct consequence, few African countries contributed troops to AMISOM. It was also widely noted that Ethiopia's representative in the Peace and Security Council's (PSC) had ignored the internal procedures when AMISOM was established – specifically Article 8.9 of the PSC Protocol (2002) states that a PSC Member 'which is party to a conflict under consideration ... shall not participate either in the discussion or the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation.'

African Union military intervention was seen in Somalia as being a tool of Western interests because of Washington's support for Ethiopia's campaign and because of a strong diplomatic push by the Bush administration to get African states to contribute troops to the mission. Many Somalis were outraged that the United States had openly dismissed the UIC's achievements during 2006 and acted as if the courts were dominated by terrorists, did not condemn abuses committed by Ethiopian troops against Somali civilians, provided intelligence support to Ethiopia during its operations, and engaged in airstrikes on Somali soil.

According to Kuwali (2014), the African Union's lack of capabilities, the AU's short record of peacekeeping provided little evidence to suggest that it would be able to find, deploy, manage or pay the 8,000 troops authorized to form AMISOM. Sure enough, the AU struggled to secure promises of just over 60 percent of the authorized troops. In practice, approximately 1,600 Ugandan troops were the sum total of AMISOM until December 2007 when a company of 100 Burundian soldiers arrived. By April 2009 AMISOM had around 4,300 troops from Uganda and Burundi nor could the AU pay for its own peacekeeping mission. Instead, it relied on funds from

the U.S., UN, the European Union and several other states. Deploying them also proved impossible without Western assistance and when they were deployed they lacked crucial pieces of equipment and materiel (after mid-2008 these needs were partly fulfilled by scavenging assets from the defunct UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea, (UNMEE). These predictable shortfalls confirm the findings of a joint UN-AU panel on peacekeeping (the so-called "Prodi Report"), which concluded that, "It is simply undesirable to expect peacekeeping missions to deploy into uncertain situations without the necessary means. It is a recipe for failure. We are deluding ourselves if we believe that having something on the ground is better than doing nothing. In the absence of the necessary capabilities, such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising expectations of the people that cannot be fulfilled. Worse still, it undermines the credibility of peacekeeping and weakens the organization that is responsible." (para.16). these are sensible warnings and there is little evidence to suggest that these concerns will disappear any time soon.

Anon (1963), focuses on the conflict environment where instead of bringing peace and stability to Somalia, the installation of the TFG in Mogadishu brought about a significant deterioration in the security situation and a renewed phase of warfare. In this context, arguably AMISOM's most fundamental challenge was how to act as a peacekeeping operation when there was no peace to keep. Although the UIC's forces were initially routed from Mogadishu in late December 2006, elements soon reorganized and attacked Ethiopian and TFG soldiers as well as AMISOM peacekeepers. The most deadly element was the youth militia Al-Shabaab, which by late November 2008 was estimated by the AU to be around 2,000-strong and to operate in cells and units of about 300-400 militias.

On 22 February 2009, Al-Shabaab coordinated the most deadly single attack on AMISOM, which killed 11 Burundian peacekeepers and injured another 28. On April 16, 2009, the UN Secretary-General noted that insurgent attacks against AMISOM were "becoming more sophisticated, coordinated and lethal." The ongoing conflict produced an escalating spiral of violence, not least because Ethiopian, TFG, and later AMISOM forces were often heavy handed in responding to these attacks. The resulting collateral damage among the civilian population produced a huge wave of displacement (in 2007, 400,000 of Mogadishu's population of approximately 1.3 million fled the city) and generated intense levels of anti-Ethiopian and also anti-American feeling.

According to Muthum (2007), finding an Exit is a challenge. AMISOM's final challenge is figuring out how to leave. This became particularly important in early 2009 after the Ethiopian withdrawal and the election of the new transitional President, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Within Somalia opinion has been divided: some see AMISOM playing a necessary role in supporting the new TFG and Sheikh Sharif's outreach efforts, others, including the new Prime Minister, recommended that AMISOM should depart within 120 days. Within the AU, the weight of opinion was clearly to hand over the mission to the UN; the sooner the better. But in the UN Security Council there were good reasons to be cautious.

In November 2007, for instance, Ban Ki-moon had said that deploying UN peacekeepers to Somalia was 'neither realistic nor viable'. A year later, however, the Bush administration pushed for a UN peacekeeping operation for Somalia. It soon discovered that there was no appetite for such a force among European and African powers. The furthest it got was resolution 1863 (16 January 2009) which expressed the Security Council's "intent" to establish a UN peacekeeping operation "as a follow-on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the Security Council by June 1, 2009" (para.4). With Barrack Obama's arrival in the White House, however, the U.S. government began to adopt a more cautious stance.

According to Gettleman (2000), in his April 16, 2009, report on the modalities of such a transition, Ban Ki-Moon set out four options intended to help achieve the UN's strategic objective in Somalia. The "high-risk" Option A, envisaged replacing AMISOM with a 22,500 strong UN peacekeeping operation with a Chapter VII mandate. The "pragmatic" Option B was for the UN to devise a support package for AMISOM until the Somali National Security Force could secure Mogadishu on its own. The "prudent" Option C was Option B plus a UN Political Office for Somalia and a UN Support Office for AMISOM within Mogadishu. Option D, "Engagement with no international security presence," was intended to serve as a contingency plan in case of an AMISOM withdrawal (either intentional or forced). The Secretary-General has advocated an "incremental" approach, divided into three phases: Phase 1 would entail adopting Option B; during Phase 2, Option C would be practiced; and during Phase 3, it would be appropriate to enact Option A. Option D would remain the contingency plan in case of AMISOM withdrawal. It remains to be seen whether this plan will be adopted and, if so, whether it will work.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter includes research design, research population, and sample size, sampling procedure, research instruments, validity and reliability of research instruments, data gathering procedure, data analysis, ethical consideration and limitation of the study.

3.2 Research Design

The study employed descriptive research design. It was descriptive in that it described the characteristics of respondents. The descriptive design was used to determine how African Union military intervention stabilized the political situation in Mogadishu, Somalia. It was cross-sectional in that data was collected from all respondents at the same time. The study used both the quantitative and qualitative research approaches; the quantitative approach consisted of descriptive designs such as descriptive co-relational design to establish African Union Intervention and peace building in Mogadishu Somalia.

3.3 Research Population

The total population of Mogadishu is approximately three (3) million people, (ministry of planning and development 2014 to 2015) the target population for this research was 3,000,000 people and these included 320,000 traditional leaders, 790,000 politicians, 990,000 Youth organizations and 900000 AU representatives in Somalia. The reason of selecting these categories of respondents is due to the fact that the researcher expects them to have a good understanding of the affairs of African Union Intervention and Peace Building in Mogadishu Somalia.

3.3.1 Sample Size

The sample size of the researcher for the research study was 400 respondents. The researcher used the Slovene's Formula to generate the sample size from the research population of 3,000,000 people.

Formula is: $n = \frac{N}{1+N(e^2)}$

Where; n = Sample Size

N = Population Size (3,000,000)

e = Level of significance = e = 0.05 = e^2 = $(0.05)^2$ = **0.0025**

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e^2)}$$

$$n = \frac{3,000,000}{1+3,000,000\ (0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{3,000,000}{1+3,000,000\ (0.0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{3,000,000}{1+7500}$$

$$n = \frac{3,000,000}{7501}$$

n=399.94

n=400 Respondents

Table 3.3.1: Population and Sample Size Summary

Respondents type	**Population**	**Sample size**
Traditional elders	320000	89
Politicians	790000	92
AU representatives	900000	99
Youth organizations	990000	120
Total	**3,000,000**	**400**

3.3.3 Sampling Procedure

To select the sample of 400 respondents out of 3,000,000 target population, simple random sampling technique was used. In this technique the list of the respondents was attained from the AMISOM and then used simple rotary method to select the sample until the required sample of 400 respondents was reached. The researcher used simple random sampling because it was easy

to get a list of all the respondents from the required respondents and then select the respondents easily. Simple Random Sampling technique is a technique that ensures each member of the target population has an equal and independent chance of being included in the sample. Furthermore, it produces a random sample. The researcher was convinced that the target population was uniform and had similar characteristics.

3.3.4 Purposive Sampling

This study used a purposive sampling to get relevant information.

A purposive sample is a non-probability sample that is selected based on characteristics of a population and the objective of the study. Purposive sampling is also known as judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling. A purposive sample is where a researcher selects a sample based on their knowledge about the study and population. The advantage of purposive sampling is that the researcher targets only the respondents who have the information that the researcher wants. Another advantage is that the purposive sampling saves time because the researcher only goes to the responsible respondents.

3.4 Data Collection Methods and Tools

This study employed both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. A number of techniques were used in order to get relevant information from various categories of respondents.

3.5 Research Instruments

The research instruments designed by this study was questionnaire and interview.

3.5.1 Interviews

The study used interview guide to collect data from the selected key informants. Various interviews were conducted on 10 respondents these were carried out for both qualitative and quantitative sides of the study. Due to the need of the facts and experience, key informant interviews were conducted. Structured interviews were conducted for quantitative research.

This involved a face to face interview. The study preferred to use face to face interviews because people tend to share a lot of information when someone is asking the questions in person; because it is much easier to ask a follow-up question and get examples to support what people

are saying, and because it gives people an opportunity to participate in a more direct way, and they have a greater buy-in to the results of the assessment process.

3.5.2 Questionnaires

The questionnaires were administered to 400 respondents where ideas and knowledge were given to the researcher by the respondents. These questionnaires were given to all respondents who were required to give information about the study.

3.6 Validity and reliability of the instrument

Validity

Validity is the degree to which a measuring instrument measures what it is designed to measure. Validity is the ability of an instrument to measure what it is supposed to measure. To ensure validity the method used its expert's judgment. The researcher computed the content validity using content validity index (CVI).

$$CVI = \frac{\text{Number of questions declared valid}}{\text{Total number of questions}}$$

Number of questions declared valid=16

Total number of questions =18

Therefore,

$$CVI = \frac{16}{18}$$

CVI= 0.88

Reliability:

Analysis will be done to determine the reliability of the questionnaire. Internal consistency of the items will be measured by using Cronbach's alpha coefficient. The items of the questionnaire will be considered to represent a measure of high internal consistency if the total alpha value is more than 0.7 (Downing, 2004).

Reliability is a measure of the degree to which research instruments yield consistent results or data after repeated trials. The test-retest technique was used to assess the reliability (accuracy) of the instruments. The researcher devised the instruments to thirty qualified respondents, fifteen from AMISOM security department and fifteen from local leaders. These respondents were not included in the actual study. In this test- retest technique, the questionnaires were administered twice to the same subjects after the appropriate groups of the subjects were selected, then the initial conditions were kept constant, the scores were then correlated from both testing periods to get the coefficient of reliability or stability. The tests and the trait measured if they were stable, indicated consistent and essentially the same results in both times (Treece and Treece, 1973).

This was done in the following ways: the appropriate group of subject selected (30 qualified respondents); then the test was administered to the subject; all initial conditions were kept constant; a time lag of one week was waited and then the same test were administered to the same subject; the scores were correlated from both testing periods. If the scores are the same or nearly the same, the conclusion was the instrument is valid.

3.7 Data Gathering Procedures

Data gathering procedures was divided into three phases, these included; before, during and after. The researcher followed these phases to reach to the conclusion of the data gathering procedures.

Before, before the research, the researcher was required to get an introductory letter from the college of higher degrees and research. After this letter, the researcher presented this letter to the field officials before carrying out the data gathering.

During; in the process of collecting data, the researcher educated the respondents about the research and also informed them about the future use, benefits and outcomes of the research report.

After; The data gathered was edited, encoded into the tables to represent the information got from the field..

3.8 Data Analysis

This part addresses processing and analysis. Therefore, data was collected from the study area, edited, collated and tabulated. Data was manually entered in an SPSS spread sheet and tabulated using the programmed and it will be analyzed on it. Then, the data was entered and tables were produced frequently. The data was analyzed and the report was made soon after.

Various statistical methods were used to analyze the data collected from the study. The profile of the respondents was analyzed by use of frequency and percentage distribution tables.

Qualitative data from the interviews was analyzed by use of content and context analysis. Content analysis involved coding and classifying data, also referred to as categorizing and indexing and the aim of context analysis is to make sense of the data collected and to highlight the important messages, features or findings.

Objective one and two: The mean, standard deviation, t-statistic and ranks was used to determine African union military intervention and peace building. An item analysis illustrated the strengths and weaknesses based on the indicators in terms of means and ranks. The following mean scale was used to interpret the means scored by the various variables to be analyzed.

Table 3.2: Mean Interpretation Table

Mean Range	Response Mode	Interpretation
3.26-4.00	Strongly Agree	Very High
2.51-3.25	Agree	High
1.76-2.50	Disagree	Low
1.00-1.75	Strongly Disagree	Very Low

3.9 Ethical considerations

The entire research process was conducted with due respect to ethical considerations in research. The researcher obtained the consent of the respondents to participate in the study. The researcher also minded about treating the respondents' views with utmost confidentiality. In general, a high degree of openness regarding the purpose and the nature of the research was observed by the researcher.

3.10 Limitations of the study

The research study faced the following problems:

1. Most of the respondents in Mogadishu Somalia were too busy, so less time was posed to the researcher. The researcher requested humbly for help from the respondents to offer him some time to answer the questions.

2. Confidentiality, in that, there is some information which was not supposed to move out of security to local people then to the researcher, this limited the research study. The researcher emphasized on keeping the security information secret and confidential.
3. Translating the Somali language to English was a limitation. It was not easy for the researcher to translate the Somali language to English since most of the Somalis don't understand well English language. But what I did I tried by all means to persevere and translated for the respondents to understand what I wanted from them.

4. Time was also another limitation. The time meant for the questionnaires to be filled became little because some respondents could not fill the questionnaires in the time scheduled since most of them looked to be busy. To solve this limitation, the researcher had to adjust on the time to allow the respondents fill the questionnaires as required.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of the data gathered and interpretation thereof. It gives the demographic characteristics of respondents and variables used. Findings are presented basing on the objectives of the study.

1. To examine the causes of instability and conflicts in Mogadishu Somalia.

2. To assess role of AMISOM in resolving the conflict in Mogadishu Somalia.

3. To examine the challenges that African Union Military Intervention face in maintaining peace and stability in Mogadishu Somalia.

4. To find out the methods used by the African Union Military Intervention in Peace building in Mogadishu Somalia.

4.2 Background Characteristics of Respondents

The respondents were asked to give their sex. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 1: Sex of Respondents

Sex	**Frequency**	**Percentage (%)**
Male	302	75.5
Female	98	24.5
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 1 above indicates that the majority 302 (75.5%) of the respondents were male; while a minority 98 (24.5%) of the respondents were female. The results reveal that more Officials who were African Union Military Intervention members compared to Locals who are accessible to, are willing and are courageous enough to participate in activities such as those that involve them

being required to give some information on certain Somali conflict-related issues. Information from officials is that the conflicts are majorly geared by male since they contribute to instability and insecurity in Somalia when it comes to taking part in extremism led by Al-Shabaab recruiters who radicalized many youth in the country, as well as in clan related conflicts. Therefore responses from the respondents comply with the officials' information indicating that males are greatly involved in the disputes compared to females.

Table 2: Distribution of Respondents by Age

Age	Frequency	Percentage (%)
20-39	20	05
40-59	300	75
60+	80	20
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 2 above shows that the majority of respondents were in the age bracket of 40-59 years (75%), 05% was in the age group of 20 - 39 years ,20% was in the group of 60 years plus. This distribution shows that conflicts between the two areas is dominated by people who are in the age bracket of 40-59, this is because they are involved in decision making processes and have seen regimes come and go.

The respondents were asked to mention their marital status. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 3: Distribution of Respondents by Marital Status

Marital Status	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Single	49	12
Married	298	74.5
Separated	23	06
Divorce	30	7.5
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 3 above indicates that the 298 (74.5%) of the respondents who were asked to mention their marital status and answered the question mentioned that they were married. while a 30 (7.5%) of the respondents who were asked to mention their marital status and answered the question mentioned that they were divorced. 23 (06%) of the respondents mentioned that they were separated and 49 (12%) of the respondents mentioned that they were single. Furthermore, the respondents confirmed that the Somalis are suffering from instabilities, insecurities, and protracted conflicts so there is clear need to help those people in danger because they lack water and food securities, whereby they experience constant threats including extremism, piracy, as well as clan division and differences since the collapse of Somali central government in 1991.

Table 4: A Table showing the distribution of respondents by level of education

Education Level	Frequency	Percentage (%)
None	30	08
Primary	45	11
Secondary	245	61
Post-secondary	80	20
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 4 above indicates that the majority 245 (61%) of the respondents have obtained up to secondary level; while a minority 30(08%) of the respondents have not obtained any level. 45(11%) of the respondents have obtained up to primary level, and 80(20%) of the respondents obtained post secondary level. The results revealed that most of the Somalis dwelling in their villages have obtained formal education.

4.3 Cause of instability and Conflict in Somalia

The respondents were asked whether the following are some of the causes of the conflicts. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 5: Distribution of respondents' views on whether the following are some of the causes of the instability and **conflicts**

Responded	**Frequency**	**Percentage %**
ethnic differences	350	87.5
Political chaos	50	12.5
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 5 above indicate that the majority of 350(87.5%) agreed that ethnic difference between the Somali population is one of the major causes of the conflicts. On the other hand the minority 50(12.5%) disagreed that there are other causes of the conflict rather than clan difference. This is because the different clans have different beliefs in terms of power struggle in a sense that it is the determinant of the ability of a clan to dominate the system of governance. This has forced mostly the youth to be radicalized by Al-Shabaab insurgents and extremists, and get involved in armed struggles since the Somali civil war in 1991 hence the conflict.

Basically the major causes of the conflict and instability in Somalia is political chaos, leadership failure, ineffective governance and clan-based competitions therefore these explain why this age group fight each other in order to survive the turmoil, fight injustice as claimed by some and increase their loyalty to their clans by the expense of other clans. However, one of the officials from the department of an public affairs of African union (AU) mentions "Piracy and the growth of Islamic extremism are not the natural state of being. They are but symptoms of an underlying malaise – the absence of effective government and hope." Indeed, the malaise is alarming. Continuous fighting, drought, food insecurity and lack of healthcare have severely led to the perpetuation of the Somali conflict.

Furthermore there has been prolonged political chaos in Somalia since 1991 which contributed to the insecurities and lack of stability in Somalia especially in southern part of the country where AMISOM is battling with Al-Shabaab insurgents since 2007. As highlighted by the above.

As one of the respondents noted that:

> The most complex source of conflict in Somalia is political chaos since 1991 and leadership failure where Somali Clans get involved in such conflicts by the struggle and desire to control the state and dominate other competing clans (officer from Djibouti of AMISOM in Hiiraan state).

4.3.1 Loss of Lives as a Result of instability and Conflicts

The respondents were asked whether there are people who have lost their live as the result of conflicts. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 6: Distribution of respondents' views on there is people who have lost their lives as the result of conflicts

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	370	92.5
No	30	7.5
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 6 above indicates that lives of people have been lost in the Somali conflict between the Somalis. 370 (92.5%) of the respondents agreed that lives of people were lost since the 1991 Somali civil war. There was no certainty on the number of people who have died as a result of the dispute. Though the respondents were estimating in hundreds of thousands of people who have lost lives since the civil war broke in 1991.

Officials confirmed the loss of lives but they also had no exact figures of the people who die roughly every year but their estimates were in hundreds.

One of the respondents had this to say:

> Apart from the common known negative effects of the conflict between the Somalis, other negative effects like enmity between the Somalis, slow development also arose from the conflict (AMISOM Leader from AU Official).

Some of the respondents indicated that they have tried to convince people in their clans not to continue engaging in the dispute.

4.3.2 Social Outcomes of instability Conflicts in Somalia

The respondents were asked whether conflicts have social outcomes in the country. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 7: Distribution of respondents' views on whether instability and conflicts have social outcomes in Somalia

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	379	95
No	21	05
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 7 above indicates that the study revealed that 379 (95%) respondent said that the prevailing conflicts in the communities have brought social outcomes in the country. Some of the outcomes pointed out by the respondents included Islamic extremism, piracy, displacement of people from their original places of settlement leading to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Refugees in neighboring states, poor standards of living, loss of lives by some of the weak members of the conflicting clans. The 21(05% respondents) which is the minority said that the disputes have no social impact on the clans involved in the conflicts.

One of the key informants stated:

> Over a million people are internally displaced and hundreds of thousands have sought refuge elsewhere, often living under deplorable conditions because of the

conflict in Somalia where the unfolding humanitarian crisis is one of the worst in present times (AMISOM's Senior Political Officer).

In other words, the outcomes are confirmed by the officials as they also highlighted some of the social effects of the conflict.

4.3.3 Economic Effects of instability and Conflicts in Somalia

The respondents were asked whether conflicts have affected Somalia economically. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 8: Distribution of respondents' views on whether instability and conflict have affected Somalia economically

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	387	97
No	13	3
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 8 above indicates that, the majority of 387(97%) question was targeting how the conflicts have affected the Somalis in terms of economic life. Therefore from the study the findings indicated that the largest percentage agreed that the conflicts have generally affected the economic life of the Somali population negatively creating conditions of high unemployment rates, lower levels of income and the general collapse of the Somali economy such as export of banana and livestock in the international system. The remaining 13(3%) respondents also contributed in answering the question but they said that there is no much economic effect as the result of the disputes.

More to that people's income has reduced due to the fear of insecurity undermining trade activities in the country as well trading with people from other neighboring states leading the Somali state to be economically isolated as a result of those conflicts.

One of the respondents had this to say:

> Economically, most of the effects of the Somali conflict are negative by bringing inflation, low levels of production, under-development in terms of infrastructure and economic development levels.

4.4 The Role of AMISOM in Resolving instability and Conflicts in Somalia

4.4.1 Measures put in Place by Government of Somalia to settle the Conflict.

The respondents were asked whether the government of Somalia with the support of AMISOM has put in place measures to settle the conflict in Somalia. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 9: Distribution of respondents' views on whether the government of Somalia with AMISOM's support has put in place measures to settle conflicts

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	382	95.5
No	18	4.5
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 9 above indicates that from the findings, 382 respondents (95.5%) said that the government of Somalia (GS) with the support of AMISOM has put has certain measure in place to bring down the conflict. But relatively 18(4.5%) respondents are not aware of any opinion from the government to curb the disputes.

One key informant revealed that:

> State-building in Somalia seems to be successful where the Somali government with the support of regional and international partners such AMISOM troops contributing countries is putting more efforts in implementing a comprehensive approach based on a strong security and development policy. The Somali government looks to take full ownership of building the institutional capacity of

the state, albeit with considerable attention to local interests and the clan structure. Full commitment of the international community has also contributed to the provision of humanitarian aid, development and security support throughout this process (AMISOM Officer).

4.5 Tasks and Challenges of AMISOM in Maintaining Peace building and Stability in Somalia.

4.5.1 AMISOM's Programmes in Somalia

The respondents were asked whether the following are some of AMISOM's programmes in Somalia. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 10: Distribution of respondents' views on whether the following are some of AMISOM's Programmes in Somalia

Responded	Frequency	Percentage %
Peace enforcement	365	91
Peace keeping	35	09
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data 2018

Table 10 above indicate that the majority of 365(84%) agreed that AMISOM's main operation in Somalia involves peace enforcement. On the other hand the minority 35 (09%) argued that AMISOM is tasked with keeping peace in Somalia.

As one AMISOM official stated:

> Currently the mandate of AMISOM is extended beyond a peacekeeping mission to a peace enforcement focus since 2010 by engaging the liberation of Al-Shabaab held areas in Somalia with the help of the Somali national army through carrying out military operations against the Islamists as well as stepping up efforts to train and equip Somali national forces in a bid to stamp out the Al-Shabaab insurgency and limit its influence (AMISOM Official).

4.5.2 African Union Military Intervention as a key player in instabilities and Conflicts Resolution Somalia

The respondents were asked whether AMISOM is a key player in conflict resolution in Somalia. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 11: Distribution of respondents' views on whether African Union Military Intervention is a key player in instabilities and conflict resolution in Somalia.

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	309	77
No	91	23
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 11 indicates that the majority 309 (77%) of the respondents said that AMISOM has played a big role in conflict resolution in Somalia while the minority 91 (23%) respondents have undermined the works of AMISON as saying they came to economically take advantage of the unexploited resources in Somalia and as a result, their counties have played a major role in perpetuating the conflict in Somalia.

According to one of the respondents:

> The AMISOM mission which is endorsed by the UN Security Council is firmly established to provide security support to the Federal Government of Somalia as well as to contribute to the creation of favorable conditions for dialogue, reconciliation and the provision of humanitarian assistance in the country (UPDF Officer, AMISOM).

4.5.3 Challenges African Union Military Intervention faces in maintaining Peace in Somalia

The respondents were asked whether AMISOM is facing challenges in maintaining peace in Somalia. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 12: Distribution of respondents' views on whether AMISOM is facing challenges in maintaining peace in Somalia.

Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Yes	384	96
No	16	04
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 12 above indicates that the majority 384 (96%) agreed that the AMISOM is facing quite a number of challenges in maintaining peace in Somalia such as language barrier, lack of enough logistics and equipment's, poor feeding whereas the minority 16(04%) indicated that they are not facing any challenge as it is of their own making to come to Somalia.

Another respondent said that:

> Until today the mission remains unable to fulfill its broad mandate. In addition to the extremely difficult conditions it has to operate in, AMISOM suffers from poor institutional competence, lack of resources, funds and troop contributions, and remains highly dependent on assistance from outside organizations (former Ugandan member of AMISOM troops).

In conclusion, the study indicated that the main causes of conflict in Somalia are political chaos since 1991, leadership failure, and ethnic difference in terms of clans getting involved by the desire and struggle to control the state and dominate other competing clans where the conflict had impacts on the people by creating refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Thus AMISOM plays a pivotal role in resolving the conflict in Somalia by providing security support to the Somali government and contributing to good governance. Although AMISOM faces certain challenges including poor institutional competence, lack of resources, funds and troop contributions and highly depending on outside assistance.

4.4.2 The methods used by the African Union Military Intervention in peace building in Somalia

The respondents were asked whether there are some methods employed to end the disputes. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 13: Distribution of respondents' views on whether there are some methods employed to end the instability and conflict in Somalia

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	390	98
No	10	02
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 10 above indicates that the majority 390 (98%) of the respondents said that there have been some measures put down to resolve the conflict in Somalia. 10 respondents (02%) who constituted the minority totally disagreed that there are no methods put down to end the conflict.

One of the key respondents said:

> Among those conflict resolution methods employed, the following are inclusive, peaceful negotiation, government intervention and mitigation, restoration of peace, mediation and arbitration to mention but a few. Furthermore, the officials had this to say; "The methods put down to end the conflicts like peaceful negotiations, major organizations involvement, and government intervention (AMISOM'S Anonymous Officer).

These methods have been enforced by both citizens and other outside people like those working in united nation, and African union (UN, AU).

4.4.3 Negotiation as a method to curb Disputes

The respondents were asked whether the negotiation method will be successful in curbing down the disputes. Their responses were captured and tabulated as indicated in the table below:

Table 14: Distribution of respondents' views on whether the negotiation method will be successful in curbing down the dispute

Response	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	388	97
No	12	03
Total	**400**	**100**

Source: Primary Data

Table 11 above indicates that the majority of the 388 (97%) respondents of the respondents agreed that the method will be successful in an attempt to curb the conflicts between the Somalis in Somalia. The remaining 12(03%) responded total disagreed that the negotiation method can be of any help regarding conflict resolution among clans because it has been tried for a long time and they tested its failure.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The study aimed at establishing the impact of conflict resolution by regional actors on conflicts in Somalia. This chapter presents summary of the findings, conclusion and recommendations.

5.2 Summary

The study found out that African Union Military Intervention is putting more efforts on helping the government of Somalia by working on the clock to keep peace in Somalia and bring the conflict to an end. This is aimed to be done through liberating towns and other areas from Alshabaab control, creating favorable conditions for security and development in liberated lands, disarming the citizens and organizing peaceful negotiations among the conflicting clans of Somalia. Furthermore the government of Somalia with the help of regional actors mainly by AMISOM troops contributing states is trying with its level best to distributing resources equally, developing favorable policies that are aiming at ending the conflicts.

5.2.1 Causes of instability and conflicts in Somalia

Features of Somali Culture

Clan enmity, collective punishment and adverse antagonistic features of Somali culture reward violence. At times, a disparaging conflict between clans starts over a mere expression of hostility. One may kill a member of another clan merely because the victim's clansmen have killed an individual from the perpetrator's clan. There are several examples in history of conflicts originating from the clan differences and competition. The recent and most prominent is the conflict between the Dir and the Mareehaan clans. A member of the Mareehaan clan had killed an entrepreneur from the Dir clan about thirteen years before. To avenge this there was a bloody retaliation. The situation that could have been easily and peacefully dealt with was the basis of a major conflict that saw deaths and displacement of hundreds of civilians. In addition to such expressions of hostility, most Somalis witness people using aggression and benefiting from it. Young men have been known to attack other clans and steal their camels. In townships it is evident that thousands of armed men benefit from using violence to force people to pay them illegally, and they feel that their actions are justified by the fact that Somali clans have been

fighting and robbing each other since time immemorial. Over time majority of Somalia's ancient and even current writings have been seen to support the use of violence witnessed amongst different clans, or at least attempting to legitimise stealing their property.

Politicized Clan Identity

In Somalia one clan is of major importance in the society, one has to identify and be accepted by his clan. There has been since history evidence of clan animosity. Divisions are defined by clan and sub clan lines. The Somalia society is made up of main clan families like Darod, Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Rahanweyn, and minority clans. Clan divisions has been a source of conflict used to divide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, mobilize militia, and make broad based reconciliation very difficult to achieve. Most of the Somalis conflicts have been fought in the name of clans often as a result of political leaders manipulate clanism for their own benefits. President Mohamed Siad Baare and his policies played a significant role in propagating clanism. Current realities validate this assertion that competition for power and/or resources was the leading cause of conflict among clans and militia groups.

The war between the Somali forces and the Somali National movement (SNM) for control of North West Somali. The members of isaaq clan formed a front, their grievances were against Baare's administration placement of the Northwest under the military control and used the military administration to attack Isaaq and dispose them of their business. The civil war mounted by SNM began in the May of 1988. Government forces committed killings against civilians. 50000-60000 Somalis died mostly members of the Isaaq clan. Over a million Somalis were rendered homeless. These atrocities fuelled Isaaq demands for secession in what became self-declared state of Somaliland .

The conflict before 1991 pitted government forces against a growing number of clan base liberation movements in 1989 and 1980. The strongest of these movements included the United Somali Congress (Hayiwe Clan), The Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogaden clan) and the Somali salvation Democratic (Movement Marjaten clan). This multi front war presaged the predatory looting and banditry that characterized that characterized the feud in 1991 -1992. When opposition Leaders wanted to mobilise forces, they emphasised the most inclusive identities: the SNM leaders emphasised the grievances of the Isaaq clan, whereas the USC leaders mobilised the Hawiye clan, in general; all people were being mobilised and organised along clan and sub

clan lines. General Mohamed Siad Baare depended heavily on his own Mareehan sub-clan of the Darod clans. As a result, the SSDF leaders gunnered their support from the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darod clans, while the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) depended on the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod clans. After 1992 there was a shift from emphasis on inclusive clan identities (for example Darod or Hawiye) to sub-clan identities such as Harti, Mareehaan, Habargidir or Mudullood. Overall the only important function of clan identity lay on their importance in mobilisation.

Availability of Weapon as a Cause of Conflict

The accessibility of weapons made the Somali conflict worse. The Somali people ammunition was censured by two major sources of weapons. Because of Somalia's tactical location, the two superpowers of the time (the former Soviet Union and the US) competed to arm the former dictator. Another important source of weapons to warring parties in Somalia is the Ethiopian regime, which was arming opposition groups. The easy access of weapons and the animosity in the society in general resulted in all-out civil war in 1988.

Somalia Irredentism

Somalia irredentism tendencies have been a source of challenges to state sovereignty in the horn of Africa and have constituted a major source of insecurity in the region. Somalia extends into parts of the terrain of the Kenyan North eastern frontier, Djibouti, Somali land and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The dream of United Somalia was resurrected by Mohamed Siad Baare. The claim by Somalia of the territories with Somali speaking people is symbolised by the five stars in the Somalia's Flag. Somalia's aim and objective is to later in the future bring these territories together as one great Somalia. Over time this aspiration has been a cause of strife between Somalia and its neighbours. British colonial legacy say to the interference of the boundaries through treaties with Italy for compensation. The British established a demarcation in the Kenyan northern frontier as a marker of where the Somalis were not allowed to travel beyond-this in turn strengthened the feeling by the Somalia's in this region as exceptional and exclusivity. In the Northern Frontier the rate of taxation of Somalis was high than other Africans. In the commencement of independent Somalis in the Northern Frontier demanded separation from Kenya. After independence and KANU took over the Somalis resulted to guerrilla warfare.

On the Ethiopian side Somali's irredentism was more problematic as it involves a larger population and the border is still in dispute. Kenya and Ethiopia have signed a pact to ensure security in case of Somali's irredentism. Somali irredentism has been abandoned as the neighbours and the world was against it.

Unemployment as a Conflict Cause in Somalia

Somalia's large number of jobless youth stimulated the conflict. Although no plausible census has been taken, Somalia now has an approximate population of about 9-10 million. Over time there was an increase in population which saw a young population with no employment opportunities (1980s). Social amnesties for the population like education, health and others were not availed to the Somalia people by the government. The vital sectors which could ensure employment were under-developed as well. In turn this state of affairs created widespread hopelessness among the youth. The youth idleness and lack of a tangible income generating agenda place then in a situation where they were vulnerable to the possibility of being manipulated and swayed to conflict by the elites who is out to ensure there interest by unlawful means. As viewed Somalia has continuously been termed as a failed sate due to the general lack of security in the region. There was a huge visible divide between the rich and the poor. As in any society of this sort the elites capitalised on this opportunity and organised the young men to use them to their benefits.

Ethiopian Factor As A Cause Of Conflict

Ethiopia meddling in the internal affairs of Somalia is a significant cause of the conflict in Somalia. This ensures shelter for all the instigators of the conflict. The meddling has undermined vital peace accords i.e. The Cairo Accord 1997 and the Arta Agreement of 2000 and has manipulated Somalia peace process in Kenya. More than a dozen Somali warlords and other important group leaders agreed on a power-sharing principle in Cairo, Egypt, in 1997. They also by consensus reached a decision to form a national government. The most contentious issue was the wide divide amongst the factions and the areas they drew their support. There were the Libyan supported factions on one side and the Ethiopian supported factions on the other. These two groups controlled most of Somalia, and both participated in the Cairo convention. In most cities in Somalia's the civilian's welcomed these agreements i.e. the Cairo Accord by widespread chants in its support. Ethiopia has also been involved in the training/ recruiting of some of the

warlords involved in causing animosity in Somalia. It encouraged Colonel Abdullah Yusuf and General Adan Abdullahi Nur to leave the meeting and reject its outcome. From Cairo their first stop was Addis Ababa. Ethiopia started to openly sustain these two faction leaders militarily and politically.

On numerous occasions Ethiopia has sent weapons to guarantee the conflict in Somalia. Ethiopia seeks to sustain its regional hegemony status by ensuring a weak and divided Somalia. This has led to two major wars in 1964 and 1977, and hundreds of skirmishes have taken place along the border between Ethiopia and Somalia. The main origin of one of the major conflicts was the Ogaden region, which is under the jurisdiction of Ethiopia. Somalia has sought to support an overthrow of Ethiopia's government, and on the other hand Ethiopia has supported opposition movements to the Somalia government. All of the opposition groups have started their wars in Ethiopia in order to fight against the military government of Siad Baare, and Ethiopia has been a major player in perpetuating Somalia civil war especially in the past 14 years.

Warlords/ Militias

Warlords who are benefiting from the status quo lead most of Somalia's factions. Some have committed atrocious crimes and therefore feel unsure about their futures. These use violence and intimidation after peace accords were signed which in turn is beneficial to them. The latest example of Mogadishu warlords' determination to demoralize Ali Gedi's government illustrates better how Somalia's spoilers are committed to keep the status quo. General Aideed, for example, challenged and effectively undermined the ill-fated UN efforts to restore peace in Somalia in 1993, regardless of wide support for the UN presence and activities. The two Somalia militia leaders best known to the world in 1992 represent specific ethno geographical interest areas. These influences the governance of Somalia, some key actors (factions) in Somalia are; Alshabab, Hisbul Islam, Al Suna wal jama'a, Somali, Punt land etc.

Absence of Major Power Interest

Over time the only interested parties in the Somalia conflict are the neighboring countries a as these suffer the spillover effect of the conflict. Kenya has been actively involved in the peace talks and is hosting millions of refugees from Somalia.

Winston Tubman, the UN Secretary-General's political representative to the Somali peace Conference in Kenya, was quoted as saying: "One of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council - China, Britain, France, the US and Russia -could make a difference in Somalia â€¦ The African Union can be interested, the European Union can help, but what you need is some driving force (by a big power) in my experience". Somalia's failed state dimension is more prevalent as no major power has a keen interest in the region. Before the rise of the piracy Somalia feature minimally in the International System relations. Now that it is posing a major threat to most powers there is a possibility that the increasing interest in the region by other actors will pressure it into a peace agreement.

Religion and Conflict

The surfacing of many religious leaders and groups associated with different schools of thought has seen religious participation in fighting within different religious groupings. Globally, religious leaders are often seen as linked to terrorism. This serves to tarnish their image nationally and internationally. The main resistance to the government consists of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) also known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Joint Islamic Courts, Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), or the Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC), a cluster based on fundamental Islamic law that is attempting to wrest formal administrative and governmental control from the TFG as well as impose a system of Shari' a law upon the country. They seek to bring order of some sense to the chaotic region, thus ending the long period of disorder since1991. A more radical faction of the SCIC has emerged throughout 2007 and early 2008 - al Shabab ('the lads' in Somali). These had been internationally attributed Al Qaeda. These groups continue to commit gross abuses / violations of human right in Somalia which in turn worsen the situation in Somalia and creates a conducive hub for other groups to mobiles and get involved in the conflict. "Fundamentalist Islamic clerics have more and more sought to set themselves up as an substitute to the clan-based fiefdoms and the intermediary federal government that is struggling to affirm its authority. The new alliance describes the clerics as terrorists and accuses them of killing temperate intellectuals, Muslim scholars and former military officials in a string of unexplained murders." Religion has for a long time been a significant cause of conflict in Somalia. They rally the use of the ever contended shariah law which has seen execution and cutting of limbs of civilians old and young, Islam has been responsible for a number of suicide bombs which are seen as a form of religious act.

Piracy

This is a cause of conflict in Somalia as it sees inflow of capital that sees the capability of purchasing weapons and the recruiting of youngsters who have no other source of income. Piracy has created a population that is viewed as outcasts of the Somali society; those associated to piracy are secluded and disowned by their clans because they are seen as immoral. They are accused of being involved in drug and prostitution which are unforgivable in the Somali society. As a result these hang around gangs and become extremely dangerous to the security of Somalia.

Tribalism is one of the major causes of the Somali civil war. Even to this day, the first thing a Somali wants to know about another Somali is what clan does he or she belongs to. In order for a Somali to recognize a government or a political party, they need to have a clan representative who will think about their people. "Clans form the bedrock of Somali society and identity, but political exploitation of their rivalries has blocked every attempt at peace since Somalia collapsed into war in 1991." (Reuters, 2011)

The economy also played a big role. "The scarcity of Somalia's resources is one of the driving forces of the conflict, as different groups compete for these limited resources" (Afyare, 2012). Somalia has always been a poor country and is still undeveloped today. The Somali people have relied on foreign aid for many years and when that was taken away, it had troubled a lot of people.

Political, Economic, and Social problems are some of the root causes of the Somali civil war. Somalia is a county who has known war after war and famine after famine. If you ask most Somalis today, they will tell you that they want peace. It's time to put down the gun and pick up the pen. The international community has held countless peace conferences, provided millions of aid, but still has failed to bring peace. The only people who can bring peace to themselves are the Somali people. Maybe they can finally learn lessons from the past and start thinking about the future. The Somalis in the diaspora is using education to fight back right now. This young generation today can maybe store hope one day.

5.2.2 The role of AMISOM in resolving instability and conflict in Somalia

To the AMISOM, the precarious security situation reinforced the call on AU and IGAD to deploy a force to Somalia in the late 2006. Nonetheless, the restrictions placed on the frontline states to intervene in Somalia as well as other administrative problems inherent in the arrangement of it become necessary to review the original plan of deploying an IGAD force that was expected to hand over to the AU within 6 months.

At once, the AU/IGAD sent a first Fact-Finding and Reconnaissance Mission on to determine the mandate, force size, structure and tasks of the Peace Support Mission. The proposed IGAD Forces for Somalia (IGASOM) Deployment Plan was presented by the Military Experts from the IGAD Member States, refined by the Chiefs of Defense and finally approved by the Ministers of Defense at the 14 March 2005 meeting in Entebbe, Uganda. The IGASO M Deployment Plan was subsequently adopted at the 24th IGAD Council of Ministers on 18 March 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya. Nevertheless, the IGASOM deployment did not take place in light of extant difficulties which were mainly due to the UN Security Council's inability to lift the arms embargo on Somalia. Hence a request was made for a Joint AU/IGAD Planning Team and the Somali National Security and Stabilization Plan for the deployment of forces to Somalia.

On 20 March 2006, the 11th IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Nairobi reiterated its decision to deploy IGASOM. Subsequently an Extra-Ordinary Council of Ministers Meeting on 13th June 2006 in Nairobi reaffirmed the need for deployment of IGASOM. On 5 July 2006 a second AU/IGAD mission to Somalia undertook political and technical consultations with the TFG, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Business Community, Civil Society and Traditional Leaders in order to finalize the modalities for deployment of forces to Somalia. Subsequently, on 1 August 2006, an Extra-Ordinary Council of Ministers' Meeting in Nairobi directed the Chiefs of Defense Staff of IGAD to prepare a revised Detailed Mission Plan based on the situation in Somalia and in accordance with the Somali National Security Stabilization Plan. It was finally by the PSC, at its Meeting held in Addis Ababa on 19th January 2007 the AU Commission was mandated to establish a Peace Support Mission in Somalia. The decision was therefore taken to deploy an AU Force that incorporated elements from IGAD to be called African Union Military Intervention in Somalia

Since the days the AMISOM became operational, in spite of providing security support to the Federal Government of Somalia as well as contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for dialogue, reconciliation and the provision of humanitarian assistance in the country AMISOM faces certain challenges in terms of the mission remaining unable to fulfill its broad mandate. In addition to the extremely difficult conditions it has to operate in, AMISOM suffers from poor institutional competence, lack of resources, funds and troop contributions, and remains highly dependent on assistance from outside organizations. African Union Military Intervention has been facing numerous attacks on its base in Mogadishu. For instance, on February 22, a double suicide bomb attack on an AU base in Mogadishu left 11 Burundian soldiers dead and another 15 wounded. On September 17, 17 soldiers were killed and 29 wounded in a suicide attack by Islamist rebels on the headquarters of the African Union force in Mogadishu. At least four civilians were also killed and more than 10 wounded. 12 of those killed were Burundian soldiers and five were Ugandan. Among the dead was the AMISOM deputy commander Maj. Gen. Juvenal Niyonguruza, from Burundi and one of the wounded was AMISOM commander Gen. Nathan Mugisha, from Uganda.

5.2.3 Challenges that African Union Military Intervention in maintaining peace building and stability in Somalia

There are many challenges faced during conflict resolution. The various challenges include the Somali society being diverse and often divided whereby clan structure dominates society and determine how Somalis relate to one another as well as to foreign entities as well as armed citizens, ignorance due to their low levels of education. Because of this it has been difficult to explain to the possible benefits of ending up the conflicts so as to achieve security and livelihood of the local population to improve, and it is likely that a decrease in control and influence of Islamist groups can be observed.

There are some measures put down to curb the conflicts between the Somalis. These methods include peacekeeping and enforcement which African Union Military Intervention is currently steering, peaceful negotiations, arbitration, mediation all these methods are aiming at restoring peace in the area. Although some methods are failing to succeed in the short run like peaceful negotiations, officials say that in the long run the method will be efficient. This is because the conflicting clans are armed and the use of force may end up into a rebellion.

When disputing parties fail to reach a settlement through mediation, according to Henri (1995, Arbitration or Court)they may carry it on through our arbitration process or the public judicial system. Arbitration is a private adjudicatory process similar to a court of law. The decisions are legally binding. The disputants give up the power to create their own solution and place control of their problem in the hands of a neutral third-party, called an arbitrator. Therefore, arbitration or court should be the last resort to settle a dispute. When seeking adjudication of the dispute, the parties must choose either arbitration or court; they cannot do both.

Conflict Transformation is a complicated process (Dalton, 2011), which uses mediation, but focuses on the attitudes and perceptions of the parties and looks to alter these perceptions. On small-scale or short-term projects, the time frame won't allow this level of resolution to make radical changes in personalities. Long-term, large-scale projects with significant impact on a wide-spread population may require loftier resolution techniques in which the parties are encouraged to look beyond the project to their feelings and attitudes.

Thus, conflict transformation in Somalia is concerned primarily with changing the attitudes and perceptions of the Somali parties have about one another. In the long term, this can be very beneficial, as changed attitudes can result in less conflict moving forward. Conflict resolution and peace building initiatives in Somalia designed to teach Somali population how to peacefully resolve conflicts by understanding the importance of unity and peaceful co-existence is a critical step in achieving sustainable peace in Somalia.

To achieve such transformation, the Somali people and their government need the help of both regional and international actors in order to get to successfully bring the conflict in Somalia to an end. Compromise is a key factor in conflict resolution. Once again, as in any mediation, all parties need to be amenable. Somali Parties will need to sit down and negotiate a settlement that is satisfactory to all sides. In a situation that doesn't present a clear-cut decision, a compromise is often the result of mediation.

According to Lewton 2008, Compromise method is used in conflict resolution. When both sides have something tangible to bring to the table, compromise can be the fastest and easiest way to resolve difference. For example, if the conflict is over which person will do a specific task the tangible factor is the task, and it can be divided so that both parties will do various aspects of the

task. A simple dispute over where to hold a retirement party could end with a third choice that has some of the best aspects of the two previous choices.

If various elements are involved, each party can gain something important to them while conceding something that isn't. for instance, if one party feels unequal sharing of resources in federalism while another views the federal system as empowering the local people. The compromise could be clearly formulating the policy for equally sharing of national resources as well as separating the powers of the central government and those of regional states.

Even disputes between political structures and social apparatus can offer an opportunity to compromise, show good faith on both sides, and bring different views together. Sometimes scheduling is at the root of the dispute, and the schedule simply needs to be tweaked to meet the needs of both sides. When negotiating a compromise settlement, it is important to have a priority list from each side in advance to know which issues are more important and which can be sacrificed. Then it's a matter of trading off issues. Compromise, however, won't work if one party is just plain angry that it is feeling less appreciated than the other party or not being included in the decision-making process. Personal grudges and disenchantment lead to conflict of a less logical method that can't always be solved using tradable tangibles.

In 2004 the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established following a two-year peace process, hosted by the government of Kenya and brokered by the Eastern African 'Intergovernmental Authority on Development' (IGAD). More successful than its predecessors leading to the creation of the current internationally recognized Federal Government of Somalia, the TFG attempted to reinstate governmental and juridical institutions and gained short-lived popular support. Its tasks to restore order and bring peace to this troubled country have yet to be accomplished. The TFG also proved to be a fragile alliance, prone to internal strives and clan interests. Although it enjoyed international support from the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the IGAD and a number of (especially Western) nations, politically, the TFG struggled for national recognition and physical control over the whole Somali territories despite it achieved momentum in late 2012 when Somalia got its first recognized government since 1991 with breakout of the Somali civil and subsequent collapse of the central government led by president Siad Barre.

5.2.4 The methods used by African Union Military Intervention in peace building in Somalia

Introduction, the African Union Military Intervention approach to peace building is an outcome of African experience with peace missions and lessons from the global environment, especially the United Nations (UN). Murithi correctly indicates how discussions about peace efforts in Africa have focused on actions, successes and failures since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and sees them as part of the institutionalization of pan-African ideals of prosperity for all, peace, development, self-reliance, freedoms and liberation (Murithi 2008:17). This gives the AU approach a fundamental uniqueness: its birth in a particular historical experience, its particular experiences of the structures of power and life that make up modernity/coloniality, and its aspirations born on the periphery of the world system we live in today. A major part of this peace building agenda is contained in the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework (NEPAD, 2005). The incomplete transition of Africa from colonial to post-colonial, resulting in the persistence of neo-colonial conditions, must be born in mind when analysing efforts at peace building in Africa. This leads to what Ndlovu-Gatsheni terms 'neocolonised postcolonial' conditions where peace and development remain elusive for ordinary Africans (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:3).

By decolonial (Grosfoguel, 2009:10) peace we imply the pursuit of peace in a manner that also deals with the colonial continuities in the nature of the inherited state, with its underlying paradigm of war and violence, its coloniser model of the world and its colonial political economy. These continue to haunt post-colonial African societies. The concept is derived from the rich literature in decoloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015:28), a family of theories that places on the discussion table the critical importance of decommissioning the underpinnings of the colonial order of things, including neo-colonialism, and pursuing decoloniality as an imperative for the achievement of full liberation in the global South. Decolonial peace forms part of the number of conditions that describe what the literature calls the decolonial turn, namely: decolonial ethics of co-existence, political economy, power, being and love, among others (Mignolo, et al., 2010). So, this article seeks a departure from Eurocentric worldviews in the mainstream literature on peace building that discount the fundamental problem of coloniality and constrain the transition to lasting peace and prosperity in African conflict situations. The article does not dwell on explaining the underlying paradigm of violence that lies at the foundation of

the Westernised modern world since the late 15th century and how this has remained in place because of the incomplete process of decolonisation of power, knowledge and being. Though this is important, it is a subject that requires a full article on its own.

This article rather focuses on the contention that although the AU has innovated in useful ways in peace building, the failure to fundamentally transform the inherited neo-colonial African society (including the state) limits the achievement of decolonial peace. Africans' experiences with centuries of structural violence and its manifestation in intra- and inter-state conflict demonstrate the need for a focus on a more fundamental peace than is internationally the norm. It requires a shift towards a peace paradigm that promotes the continued decolonisation of the African state and society in order to give rise to what we call decolonial peace.

It moves from the premise that peace efforts undertaken both by the AU and regional economic communities have a fundamental weakness arising from the fact that they take as given the colonial/neo-colonial state and economy established through violent processes of conquest, colonisation and domination; they envisage peace without the decommissioning of the underlying logics of coloniality and its support for perpetual and repeated violence. As a result, these initiatives register progress in peace building that are reversible and fragile because the heritage of structural violence remains in place under neo-colonial arrangements first set in place at independence. Decolonial peace is similar to the act of detoxing a body while applying measures to heal diseases that nest in toxic conditions. This detoxing (decolonisation) is a long complex process that began as indigenous resistance to colonial conquest, and later developed into the rebellions against colonial rule, the achievement of independence and now the search for alternatives to Western ways of achieving noble purposes of peace, development and justice.

On this basis, the idea of African solutions to African problems becomes meaningless because African problems are neither originated nor sustained by African sources. Therefore solutions will require the decommissioning of the colonial structures that underpin African problems, structures that are actually global in their nature. For instance, Madagascar's incessant conflict is not purely about what Malagasy political actors do or do not do, but also its entanglement with imperial designs of France which have not ceased in spite of independence in the 1960s. The very idea of the AU and regional economic communities seeking to take control of their destinies implies a rebellion against the structures of coloniality that reproduce colonial conditions of

dependence, violence, divisions, illusions and other factors in the conflict. Perhaps it is utopian to believe that a completely transformed society will come to exist, but Africa can make great progress towards a decolonial peace wherein the colonial condition is fundamentally transformed.

Continental peace architecture: The basis of AU peace building

When the AU was born, conflict patterns were starting to change from inter-state towards greater incidence of intra-state conflict (Olympio, 2004:109–112). New key factors of conflict also emerged, such as: ethnicisation of political and power struggles, competition over scarce resources and access to state power, violence fuelled by proliferation of small arms, armed groups influenced by politico-religious ideologies, and secession-seeking groups who wished to leave their nation states (Bujra, 2002).

This revealed the underlying problem of the failure of the African state to protect and provide for its population. It became a state that was fragile and without full control over the whole of its territory. Rebel groups and militia could thrive outside protected capital cities and resourced towns.

It turned out that this state was elitist, factionalist, tribalist, militaristic and autocratic, implicated more in oppressing and brutalising its people than offering social and economic development or ensuring security or building peace.1 It is in this context that the AU refined and expanded the OAU experience with peace missions, to build its approach to peacebuilding, but this remains a work in progress.

The continental peace architecture provides an institutional framework for implementing the concept of a comprehensive peace that encompasses conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict recon-struction and peacebuilding. At the pinnacle of this architecture is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004 with ten members elected for two-year terms and five for three-year terms in order to provide some stability and continuity to the Council's leadership. The focus of the PSC is similar to that of the OAU Central Organ, i.e. to prevent and resolve conflicts by monitoring potential security threats throughout the continent (Baregu, 2011:14-25). It sends fact-finding missions and can authorise AU interventions in the form of peace envoys, observer missions, mediators, good offices, technical

support teams, and armed forces to keep peace after agreements. Article 7(e) of the Protocol Relating to Establishment of the Peace and Security Council operationalises the AU Constitutive Act's principle of non-indifference by empowering the Council to recommend military interventions for authorisation by the AU Assembly in cases of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes (African Union, 2002). This is a new dynamic in Africa's peace agenda – a continental decision-making platform for peacebuilding plus the principle of non-indifference towards violence within states. Its success will be related to whether and how the continent manages to undo the curse of Berlin which infects the states, the economies and society in general. Otherwise, this architecture will be remembered only for its great promise rather than its actual effect on the ground.

AU-Regional Economic Communities (RECs) interface

The African Standby Force consists of five regional brigades and enables the AU to intervene in a coordinated fashion in a conflict situation.

In this regard, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECASS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) have responsibilities to make, secure and build peace in the regions. In this way, the AU framework for peace building encourages regions to take responsibility for peace building in conflict situations; thus the AU implements the principle of subsidiarity in order to build the capability of RECs to ensure peace in the regions (Adibe, 2003:105–114). No other continent in the world uses regional structures for peace building in the same fashion. (Menkhaus, 2007, January 1).

The SADC role in successful peace processes in Madagascar, Lesotho and Zimbabwe is a case in point. It took the lead in facilitating mediation processes, in deploying security forces in the case of Lesotho to secure peace, and in peace building measures like training, confidence building and humanitarian assistance. Its leaders reported regularly to the AU PSC where they also sought endorsement of their peace building efforts and looked for refreshed mandates; and the AU relied heavily on the ability of the region to provide political, security and financial resources to these peace processes. As a result, the burden of supplying resources shifted to the regional organisation whereas in many other peace missions, the AU shoulders the bulk of the burden

with the help of outsiders. The analysis shows that this devolution of peace building responsibilities strengthened the capacity of the regional organisation to respond swiftly to prevent, manage and resolve conflict for purposes of building permanent peace (Zondi and Khaba 2014:1–17; Zondi 2013:49–79). The recent work of the EAC in bringing peace back to Burundi in 2015 (ICG 2016) and the IGAD role in facilitating South Sudan's peace negotiations after a devastating civil war in 20162 vindicate the AU approach of devolving responsibility for peace building to regional organisations closest to the situations. In all occasions, the impact is, among others, a stronger capacity to building peace at the regional levels. It is an approach that is designed to help strengthen regions and promote a regional integration that transcends the limitations of involved nation states with their logics of power as dominance rather than cooperation (Adejumobi, 1998:29–53).

But there is uneven performance and effect in the AU-RECs vertical coordination for peace building with some RECs, like SADC and EAC, showing signs of maturity in taking responsibility for peace in their respective regions, while others, like ECCAS and Communauté Économique et Monétaire des États de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), struggle in the absence of a willing and capable state or two to underwrite regional agency. Of course, the AMU remains moribund as a result of the broader geopolitical contestations over the Mediterranean and the Saharawi question. The pursuit of opportunities arising from the principle of subsidiarity in the AU Constitutive Act requires a willing and able set of leaders motivated by common good, but not all regions have this advantage. Secondly, the AU-RECs interface still suffers from poor coordination, the AU having failed to develop mechanisms to coordinate implementation of its decisions at regional levels and to assist regions to communicate their interests to the African Union Military Intervention's (Obouga, 2016). The envoys now exchanged between the regions and the AU have poorly defined roles, and very little of this is about ensuring cohesion between the two levels of governance. Thirdly, there is still limited horizontal coordination and harmonisation among RECs and as a result there is no notable case of REC-REC coordination of a peace initiative. Fourthly, the RECs require well-developed institutional mechanisms to deliver on the promise of regional responsibility for peace, which includes the full operationalising of standby forces, institutions for political coordination of peace efforts, capacities for mediation and peace-making, and structures for driving regional post-conflict rebuilding. For instance, while ECOWAS established the long-awaited Mediation Support Division in the ECOWAS Commission only in 2015, other elements of the peace architecture – as the Mali crisis of 2012

showed – including an early warning capability, a rapid military response force and post-conflict peacebuilding, remain work in progress (Odigie, 2016).

There is room for building the capacity of RECs to take on the responsibility for peace in regions and between regions, but this is not yet a major consideration in the upper echelons of the AU Peace and Security Architecture. Part of the reason for this is that Africa is battling to overcome the curse of Berlin that is manifest in what Ngugi wa Thiong'o called dis-memberment and what Mazrui called fragmentation of the African polity (Mazrui, 2010). Until these weaknesses are remedied, the AU will be forced to rely on UN peacekeeping forces or former colonial powers like France to respond effectively to urgent security crises as it happened recently in Mali. Under these conditions, there can be no decolonial peace. A lasting peace must accompany the building of national unity, regional cohesion and continental integration – a set of conditions opposite to those arising from the curse of Berlin.

The AU thinking and the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework

Many of the lessons learned from various experiments in peace building during the latter years of the African Union Military Intervention were integrated into the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework whose development began when in 2002 the implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) decided that Africa's peace building approach would be an all-embracing strategy including a) restoring security; b) managing political transition; c) anchoring socio-economic development; d) promoting human rights and justice; and e) resource mobilisation (NEPAD, 2005).

These five dimensions are designed to be mutually reinforcing and complementary. The AU believes that there is no need to place these in a sequence, because it does not accept the logic that you need one element to be fully in place before the next phase kicks in, as is often the case with the UN and Western approaches to peacebuilding. It is assumed in the mainstream literature that conflict prevention, conflict resolution, reconstruction, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding form a linear framework that must be followed in that order. Therefore, the actual implementation of this African Union Military Intervention policy differs from one conflict situation to another. The need to be context-specific and flexible in implementing this policy is an important feature of the AU approach to peacebuilding. Central to the policy is the need to pursue security, development and peace simultaneously at all times. Yet, in practice the AU

follows the Western and UN approaches that assume the sequencing of interventions from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction as both the 2003 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (Art. 20) and the policy framework referred to above suggest. Actually, the failure to deploy troops to quell terror attacks on Mali in 2013 (Aning, 2016:120–33) and the failure to send troops alongside mediators in the Central African Republic illustrate the pitfalls of the commitment to a linear process of sequencing interventions (AU Election Observation Mission, 2016). In this approach, the underlying sources of problems, including the inherited violent neo-colonial state, economy and organisation of society, are maintained, giving Africa only temporary respite from violence and/or a merely fragile peace. More than a decade ago, the literature already pointed to shallow peace processes that failed to transform the state and society so that they become pillars of peace and development (Baregu, et al., 2002:2). The following analyses of key African Union Military Intervention peacebuilding interventions will enable us to determine whether the African Union Military Intervention has evolved a unique approach to peace building and, if so, what this implies for the renaissance of a peaceful and prosperous Africa.

5.3 Conclusion

5.3.1 The causes of instability and conflicts in Somalia

Despite the fact that the role of African Union Military Intervention in Somalia contributed to the provision of security support to the Federal Government of Somalia as well as contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for dialogue, reconciliation and the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, the mission still remains unable to fulfill its broad mandate in regard to the extremely difficult conditions it has to operate in, African Union Military Intervention also suffers from poor institutional competence, lack of resources, funds and troop contributions, and remains highly dependent on assistance from outside organizations which undermines its effectiveness to main peace and stability.

However, an important step for Somalia is the improvement of relations with its neighbors regionally, including African Union Military Intervention Troops contributing states and most notably Ethiopia. The two nations have been at war on several occasions, but basically share the same interests in regional stability and economic prosperity. Kenya, Djibouti, Eritrea and the Arabian Peninsula unlike Uganda are divided in their support of the movements in Somalia,

which has been demonstrated by numerous non-productive regional conferences and failed attempts to peaceful reconciliations. However, regional political and economic cooperation can only be achieved when the Somali Federal Government has affirmed its position to act as a regional political partner.

The study of the causes of the Somalia conflict has been a murky one has everybody has their own version of what is or has been the cause of the ensuing conflict in Somalia, the truth is there is no real simple answer on this question as there are complex and intertwined causes as the conflict moves from the early stages to the intermediate and so on. The issues are more than just merely religion and tribe. Somalia has been a victim of mismanagement, poor governance, lack of leadership and dictatorship since independence. Because of these factors, Somalis found it easy to get refuge within their clans, sub-clans and families where their honors and dignity are upheld and respected. Unnecessary regional interference from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya, and external interference by the US and Europe have played a major role in instability and insecurity seen today in Somalia. Therefore the consolidation and pacification of the Somalia state needs to be driven by Somalis themselves to enable the proper realization of peace based on Somali local remedies and mechanism. As international organizations have found out the civilians are the most affected in this ongoing conflict, a solution is bound to emanate from the involvement of the United Nations in the stipulation of the clarity of leadership. The involvement of the African Union in ensuring peace by sending its troops should be stepped up. For complete peace in Somalia the interference by Ethiopia and other outside parties in funding of militias or otherwise should be stopped.

5.3.2 The role of AMISOM resolving the conflicts in Somalia

Somalia could easily become a pariah state if it does not adequately address transnational security threats with the support of regional and international partners. This is, however, an impossible task for the weak Federal Government relying primarily with AMISOM for security, and as it is of equal importance to the international community, extensive involvement is required that goes beyond naval patrolling and counterterrorism operations. To date, international involvement has been limited and has often been counterproductive. Past and present peacekeeping missions have been ill-equipped and have not been able to render the necessary support.

Hence, whether AMISOM has a future in Mogadishu is thus primarily a question for the new government, the UN Security Council, and the AU to answer. Whether African Union Military Intervention should have been deployed at all is a question analysts should debate.

5.3.3 Challenges that African union military intervention face in maintaining peace and stability in Somalia

Despite the proliferation of such mechanisms, UN–AU collaboration continues to confront several significant challenges in Somalia. First, attempts to develop cooperative frameworks between multi-faceted institutions all face the generic problem that agreement on general principles does not automatically generate consensus on how to act in particular crises. Moreover, attempts to perfect and institutionalize collaborative mechanisms between the UN and the AU run the risk of creating inflexible structures, which can become redundant if powerful actors feel constrained and work around them to change the situation on the ground. While most members of the Security Council and PSC appear to support the idea that UN–AU cooperation would be enhanced by moving from context-specific to more predictable mechanisms, such initiatives run into the perennial problem of how to operationalize Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which was designed in a very different era of global–regional security collaboration and preceded the creation of most of today's regional organizations. This has raised two questions: (1) What should a strategic partnership between the UN Security Council and a regional arrangement entail in practice? and (2) To what extent can the UN Security Council forge a special relationship with the AU without setting a precedent for other regions of the world? While the answers remain unclear, a consensus has developed in both institutions that business-as-usual is not the correct response.

A second challenge is how to interpret the AU's position 'that its requests should, at a minimum, be duly considered by the UN Security Council'. At the Security Council, this has stimulated significant political differences between some African and non-African members. On the African side, some states argue the UN Security Council does not always respect the AU's views. For example, at the January 2012 UN Security Council debate on cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, Kenya's then foreign minister, Moses Wetangula, argued that 'The practice in the past two years seems to indicate an undesirable trend that appears to be selective on the part of the Security Council and that seems

to disregard full consideration of the position and/or recommendations of the AU or its organs. At the other end of the spectrum, US Ambassador Susan Rice, emphasized that

5.3.4 The methods used by the African Union Military Intervention in peace building in Somalia

Elusive peace: What fundamentally is the problem?

Given the ubiquity of imported approaches to the subject of peace in Africa, this article must begin with a short discussion on the value of Africa-centered thinking on the whole problem at hand. Ali Mazrui thinks of Africa today as haunted by the curse of Berlin, referring to the 1884–5 European partitioning of Africa into unviable states that embedded the paradigm of violence at the very foundation of African statehood, a paradigm Africa is struggling to disentangle itself from (Mazrui, 2010:23). This produced what Ngugi wa Thiong'o calls deep dismemberment that has defied efforts at unity, peace and development long after independence (Wa Thiong'o 2009). For him, this is partly because the African elite that took over were brought up in that same Euro-North American modernity which fashioned the current African condition. For this reason, efforts at peace, development and liberation without re-memberment of Africa at various levels have only helped provide for temporary respites rather than lasting solutions. It is in this analytical context that we consider the African Union Military Intervention's approach to peacebuilding and its efficacy in fulfilling the African dream of peace, where peace means removing the gangrene that set in centuries ago and keeps manifesting as resurgences of conflict, poverty and despair (Césaire, 1972). Peace is about a fundamental shift from the paradigm of violence at the root of the African states to a paradigm of peace that fosters the African renaissance (Du Bois 1953). Therefore, it is at the same time a process of decolonising the African colonial condition whose roots are a violent conquest and domination as well as the neo-colonial realities of post-colonial Africa. The article therefore makes a distinction between peace within coloniality, which amounts to mere silence of guns within a state founded in violence, and decolonial peace, which implies peace achieved by transforming the fundamentals on which the modern/neo-colonial state and society in Africa are founded. It is peace pursued alongside decolonisation of power, statehood, and state-citizen relations. This article will show that, while there are unique innovations by Africa in peace building, they come short of this transition to decolonial peace because the African political class has lacked the courage, imagination and

revolutionary consciousness to decommission the inherited modern state, its economy and ways of being in order to invent a new African political reality suitable for sustainable, fundamental and lasting peace (Nzongola, 1987:ix).

From the findings, there is a positive relationship between African Union Military Intervention and peace building in Somalia.

5.4 Recommendations

Basing on the findings of the study, the following recommendations can be made depending on each objective of the study.

5.4.1 The causes of instability and conflicts in Somalia

Guarantee formal and informal education for young people, channeling their power and energy into learning and development.

Acknowledge and include young people as stakeholders in the process of peace and security building, bearing in mind that they are both affected by conflict and the key to a progressive nation.

Eliminate the catalysts of conflict, including those related to economic challenges (youth unemployment) and the political exclusion of the youth.

Priority must be given to the political settlement, after which AU peacekeepers will have a vital, traditional monitoring role to play. The internal dynamics of the Somali socio-cultural fabric is crucial as to identify a lasting solution to the problem therein. There is no guarantee however that a political settlement is achievable but they are still the Somalis themselves that could save their country. The timing is vital. They should work hand-in-hand amongst themselves to resolve their problems in peaceful manner than resort to armed struggle which so far taught everyone that there are no gains at all. In this regard, Somalis in the Diaspora, the Somali civil society associations and most importantly, the leaders and elders of the different clan factions have a great stake to share.

5.4.2 The role of AMISOM in resolving the conflict in Somalia

Though Somalia is faced with insurgency, I as a researcher I recommend that AMISOM should always provide civic education to the people so that they should know the problems associated with wars so that they can stop killing one another.

I recommend that AMISOM should look for the root causes of the instabilities and conflicts so that they can treat the real problem than just going there to stay as they get their allowances on the expenses of the Somalis.

AMISOM should look for the way of getting Alshabab who is the key player in the conflict and instabilities in Somalia, so that the war should come to an end.

AMISOM should look for the terrorists who confuse their brothers and sisters by convincing them to join them to kill innocent people.

Somalis should be encouraged to practice intermarriage. This can help in getting different cultures with different behaviours. This is because the culture of Somalis may be that killing is not a problem, when a friend advices that killing is not good he or she may understand and take the advice so as to minimize the conflicts.

5.4.3 Challenges of that African union military intervention face in resolving the peace and stability in Somalia.

The UN, AU, and other regional states should have their own stake in helping Somali political forces come to peaceful reconciliations. The AU can work in connivance with the UN which must swiftly introduce a peacekeeping operation to support implementation of a serious political engagement, the first step toward a genuine political settlement to replace the AMISOM. In addition, those different actors mainly AMISOM Troops contributing states and other stakeholders, other than focusing on their respective interests (which is sometimes mutually exclusive), should commit themselves to ensure that a stable and peaceful Somalia would be created. This ultimately creates a fertile ground to reduce/'eliminate' extremism in all of its forms and resolve the present day plight of security and humanitarian crises particularly affecting the vast majority of the civilian Somalis and of course the Horn of Africa.

State-building in Somalia can only be successful by implementing a comprehensive approach based on a strong security and development policy. The Somali government needs to take full ownership of building the institutional capacity of the state, albeit with considerable attention to local interests and the clan structure. Full commitment of the regional and international community is required for the provision of humanitarian aid, development and security support throughout this process. This can be achieved through the restoration of both effective government and the training of national security forces required to secure peace and enforce laws and launching a large-scale civil affairs program to train young people and establish legitimate commercial livelihoods.

5.4.4 The methods used by African Union Military Intervention in peace building in Somalia

The African Union Military Intervention should use a method of sensitization in order to maintain peace building in Somalia. This is because sensitizing the community is an easy way of controlling the masses and it brings their attention to you as you pass peaceful information to them and get peace.

The African Union Military Intervention should be applying a method of educating Somalis formal education and in that education they should be encouraged to study courses that are related to peace building an or conflict resolution. This will help in a way that when someone has knowledge about peace building and or conflict resolution, that person cannot have a heart of killing or announcing war against other people.

African Union Military Intervention should use a method of looking for the real cause of the instability in Somalia and completely get rid of that problem so that the people of Somalia can completely get out of instability for once and all.

5.5 Contribution to Knowledge

This research report will contribute to understanding of the use of African Union Military intervention to provision of peace and building in countries affected with war and or any kind of instability or conflicts. This research report also will contribute knowledge to the security

officials in Somalia to always be aware of the threats by the war mongers and be ready react and prevent the consequences of the conflicts.

5.6 Areas of Further Research

1. The impact of conflicts on the standards of living of people in the region of Southern and Central Somalia
2. The role of education in conflict resolution in Somalia
3. The relationship between social factors an regional development

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

I am **Ashwaq,** a student of Kampala International Uganda carrying out a research study entitled "**African union military intervention and peace building in Somalia**" in partial fulfillment for award of Masters Degree of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy of Kampala International University. I kindly request you to respond to my questionnaire and all the information will be treated with utmost confidentiality and only used purely for academic purposes. Thank you very much for you cooperation.

Part A. Demographic characteristics of the respondents (Tick appropriately).

1. What is your sex?
   a) Male ☐ b) female ☐
2. What is your age bracket?
   a. 20-39 ☐
   b. 40-59 ☐
   c. 60+ ☐
3. What is your marital status?
   a. Single ☐
   b. Married ☐
   c. Widower ☐
   d. Widow ☐
4. What is your education level?
   a. None ☐
   b. Primary ☐
   c. Secondary ☐
   d. Post secondary ☐

Part B. The causes of instability and conflicts in Somalia

5. Is political chaos and leadership failure the main cause of conflict in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, why is this the main cause of conflict in Somalia?

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6. Does ethnic difference in Somalia escalated the conflict in the country?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, explain why ethnic difference contributed to the conflict in Somalia?

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7. Does the conflict in Somalia has economic impact on the Somali population?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, what kind of economic impact does the conflict have on the Somali people?

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8. Does the conflict in Somalia led to the loss of lives?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, approximately how many lives are lost since the Somali conflict started?

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9. Did the government of Somalia with the support of African Union Military Intervention come up with mechanisms to resolve the conflict in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, identify some of the mechanisms used?

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10. Can the negotiation method work in achieving sustainable solution for the conflict in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, briefly explain how it can achieve its goals?

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11. Does African Union Military Intervention contribute effectively to the conflict resolution efforts in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, explain briefly the ways African Union Military Intervention contribute in resolving the conflict in Somalia?

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Part C: The tasks and challenges of African Union Military Intervention in maintaining peace and stability in Somalia

12. Is peace enforcement the main duty of African Union Military Intervention operation in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, briefly elaborate why AMISOM's mandate is extended from its peace keeping focus?

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13. Does AMISOM play an important role in maintaining peace and stability in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, indicate how AMISOM contributes to the peace and stability in Somalia?

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14. Does AMISOM face challenges in maintaining peace and stability in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

If yes, give examples with brief explanation of AMISOM's main challenges in Somalia?

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Part D: The methods used by the African Union Military Intervention in peace building in Somalia

15. Which method do you use to combat instability and conflicts in Somalia?

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16. When applying the methods of bringing peace building to Somalia, who benefits and who loses?

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17. When and how do you apply a method of solving the conflicts and instability in Somalia?

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18. Among the methods of solving instability and conflicts in Somalia, do you use a gun to silence the war or you use peace talks?

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