

**CHALLENGES FACED BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  
IN DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN SERVICES IN SOMALIA**

**BY**

**HASSAN ABDI MOHAMED**

**MPP/10001/81/DF**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE  
STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF  
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE  
DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN PROJECT  
PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF  
KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL  
UNIVERSITY**

**APRIL, 2009**



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## DECLARATION

I, HASSAN ABDI MOHAMED, declare that this is my effort and original work and that it has never been submitted in any other academic purpose, to any higher institution or university for the award of an academic reward.

Signed  .....

Date... 18/05/2010...

HASSAN ABDI MOHAMED



## APPROVAL

This thesis entitled **Challenges faced by Non-governmental Organizations Delivering Humanitarian Services in Somalia** was done under the supervision of Prof. Sunday Nicholes Olwor it is submitted to the School of Post Graduate Studies at Kampala International University.

Signed:  .....

Date:  .....

Prof. Sunday Nicholes Olwor (PhD)



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Declaration-----	i
Approval-----	ii
Dedication-----	iii
Acknowledgements-----	iv
List of tables-----	v
List of figures-----	iv
List of acronyms -----	vii
Abstract-----	iv
<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	
Introduction-----	1
1.1 background of the study -----	1
1.2 statement of the problem-----	3
1.3 purpose of the study-----	3
1.4 specific objectives-----	3
1.5 scope of the study -----	3
1.7-significance-of-the-study-----	4
1.8 conceptual framework -----	5
<b>CHAPTER TWO</b>	
<b>REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE</b>	
2.0 Historical perspective-----	6
2.1 The humanitarian crisis-----	6
2.2 Issues and problems of internally displaced Somalis-----	13
2.3 Theoretical perspectives-----	15
2.4 Causes of IDPS the need of humanitarian assistance-----	18
2.5 Problems within the organsiation hampering an effective humanitarian services-----	26
2.6 obstacles of implementation -----	27



**CHAPTER THREE**

Methodology ----- 31

3.1 research design-----31

3.2 Research respondents -----31

3.3 sampling techniques -----32

3.4 Research instruments -----33

3.5 Reliability and validity of the instrument -----33

3.6 Data processing and analysis -----33

3.7 limitations of the study -----35

**CHAPTER FOUR**

Data presentation, interpretation and analysis -----36

4.0 Overview -----36

4.1 Demographic information of the respondents----- 36

**CHAPTER FIVE**

DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS -----43

5.0 Overview -----43

5.1 Discussions -----43

5.2 Conclusions -----48

5.3 Recommendations -----49

5.4 Suggestions For Further Research -----51

References -----52

**APPENDICES**

Appendix A : Questionnaires ----- 55



## LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Distribution profile of the respondents.....	37
Table 4.2 external obstacles hinder the NGOs efforts to provide good humanitarian services...38	
Table 4.3 Internal organizational problem.....	40
Table 4.4 Causes in delivery of humanitarian assistance.....	41



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework .....	6
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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
UN	United Nations
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
WFP	World Food Program
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
IMC	International Medical Corps
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
FSAU	Food Security Agency Unity
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
BBC	British Broadcasting Co-operations
HRW	Human Rights Watch
AI	Amnesty International
PTAs	Parent-Teacher Associations
CRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
FAO	Food Aid Organization
WHO	World Health Organization
SORA	Somali Refugee Agency



TFG Transitional Federal Government  
AMISOM African Mission in Somalia



## ABSTRACT

After the collapse of the central government in 1991 the government institutions were dismantled and clan based factions filled the gaps but failed to unit and fight for power struggle. The impact of the civil war brought a massive and waves of refugee's emigration, poverty and internal displacement people. This problem forced the international community to help and provide those who lost the foundation of their livelihoods. The non-governmental organizations are the first group who helped, those NGO's meet a lot of challenges, obstacles and barriers faced the services they provided to the internal displaced people. This study investigates challenges faced by Non-governmental Organizations delivering humanitarian services in Somalia.

The research was used cross-sectional survey research design and the sample technique used was purposive sampling and simple random sampling. The selected NGO's been six out of twenty two NGO's the total numbers of staffs was 150 staffs and choose 108.

The data collected in this research was analyzed by using SPSS. Finally, the results obtained showed that there are challenges barriers and obstacles faced the non-governmental organizations. Particular the study showed the obstacles are lack of effective government, ongoing wars, and closure of key airstrip, lack of qualified or trained staffs, limited facilities and poor implementation strategies. Also the study showed problems originated the recipients of humanitarian services. The study recommends the following areas to be studied: the effect of the poor training and management of the local NGOs to the implementation of the humanitarian services in Somalia, the effects of the NGO's that supports the humanitarian services to the community in Somalia.



## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background of the study

Somalia is among the most dangerous and difficult place in the world for humanitarian agencies to work (WFP, 27 March 2008). Fighting and attacks have regularly forced aid agencies to pull out staff and stop operations. During 2008 alone, over 15 national and international members of staff working in aid agencies had been kidnapped and 19 of them killed (IRIN, 15 July 2008). Convoys have been systematically targeted for looting and extortion. The insecurity has been greatest in the South-Central Region and in Puntland following the killing of three World Food Program (WFP) staff.

In January 2008, Médecins sans Frontières decided to close its project in the southern port city of Kismayo. An attempted kidnapping in Garowe also forced UNHCR to evacuate its international staff from most of Puntland (UNHCR, April 2008). On 22 June 2008, the Head of UNHCR in Mogadishu was abducted. In May, one of the insurgent leaders issued a direct threat to Americans working for humanitarian organizations in Somalia (AI, 13 May 2008).

The extent of roadblocks set up by government and non-state forces such as the rebels is also a significant problem. Eric Laroche, the Humanitarian Coordinator of Somalia until December 2007, reported counting 238 blockades on one journey into south and central Somalia. Trucks were forced to pay from \$30 to \$400 to pass through each roadblock. Without full protection



from militias those vehicles were thus unable to deliver humanitarian goods to the populations in need (UN News, Oct 2007).

According to the Independent Expert from the United Nations on the situation of Human Rights in Somalia, this difficulty of humanitarian access has forced thousands of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) to go with-out any form of assistance for weeks, living in the open and often even forced to pay a “shade tax” to shelter from the sun and rains (UN SC, 14 March 2008). Fluctuating levels of insecurity have hampered the humanitarian agencies, systematic collection of information about (IDPs) and to plan and deliver humanitarian assistance. Particularly in central and southern Somalia, humanitarian access has constantly been obstructed by unpredictable political dynamics and violence.

Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) are basically volunteer organizations formed to perform defined or stipulated roles to the benefit of the society or a target part of the society without any profits or financial gain out of the activities. International NGOs in Somalia have extensively promoted and protected the rights of people who have been forced to flee their home areas. International NGOs especially Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, MSF Sweden, MSF Holland, African Muslim Agency and African Education Trust have provided humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, removal of landmines, and have also support the return and repatriation of victims’ into their homes. They also undertake basic activities like provision of shelter kits, construction of latrines and water tanks, rehabilitation of schools, vocational training, and livelihood support and assistance to returning refugees.



## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The impact of the civil war, the waves of IDPs, emigration, poverty and the absence of a central government in Somalia have forced the international NGOs to step in and look after the IDPs and who are emigrants from the violence in Somalia.

However the international NGOs and indigenous NGOs seem to face many challenges including insecurity, lack of physical access and so on. Thus the researcher is motivated to examine the challenges that face NGOs supporting the humanitarian activities in Somalia which need to be studied and to recommend those problems.

## **1.3 Purpose of the study**

The purpose of the study is to identify the challenges that NGOs face in supporting internally displaced people within Somalia, it also investigate how NGOs mitigate those challenges to ensure a continual support of displaced people is successful.

## **1.4 Specific objectives**

1. The obstacles caused by external forces that are experienced by the NGOs, and how these obstacles hinder the NGOs efforts to provide good humanitarian services.
2. The problems within the organizations hampering an effective humanitarian service.
3. How these problems affects the recipients of the humanitarian assistance.

## **1.6 Scope of the study**

The study established and determines the challenges faced by the NGOs that deliver the humanitarian services in Somalia. The research is to be carried out in Somalia focusing on the challenges faced by the NGOs delivering humanitarian services to the displaced people in



Somalia. The research also identifies the obstacles and barriers within the country that face when implementing the humanitarian services, the problems within the humanitarian Organizations and the problems originating from the recipients of the humanitarian aid in Somalia.

### **1.7 Significances of the study**

The findings of this study may greatly contribute to the understanding of the role of NGOs in Somalia. It will also help increase a broad understanding of the obstacles, problems within the organizations, and the cause for need of humanitarian aid.

It will also help Somali community, the Humanitarian NGOs, and the government to know the existing challenges in humanitarian services delivering so that the problems can be deal with.



## 1.8- Conceptual Framework

### Independent Variable

#### Service Delivering:

1. Realize basic needs the displaced people.
2. Improving the income of the refugees.
3. Increasing the skills of the refugees.
4. Poverty reduction.
5. Improve infrastructure.

### Dependent Variable

#### Role of NGOs:

1. Operate programmes of education,
2. Health,
3. Social welfare and economic improvement,
4. Human rights,
5. Gender equity and humanitarian activities

### Extraneous variables

1. Attitudes.
2. Government policies.
3. Laws and Regulations.
- 4 Wars



## CHAPTER TWO:

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

#### 2.0 Historical Perspectives

##### 2.1. The humanitarian crisis

The Somali Democratic Republic was formed, in 1960, by merging the former British and Italian Somaliland's. Its economy is largely based on agriculture. In the central and northern parts of the country, nomadism dominates. To the south the climate becomes more humid, nomadism shades into transhumance and permanent rain-fed agriculture becomes more common. In the fertile Juba and Shebelle valleys irrigated agriculture is also practised. The country is largely populated by the ethnic group *Samaale* subdivided into genealogical groups, *Hawiye*, *Dir*, *Daarood* and *Digil-Mirifle* which in turn are divided into clan families, clans and sub-clans, (Danida, 2003).

The social and political structure is largely shaped by, conflicts and alliances between those clans and tribes. Alignments are constantly shifting, leading to a weak social organization requiring continuous negotiation between the various social units involved.

In 1969 general Siad Barre seized power. The dictatorial Barre regime faced increasing opposition in the 1980s, particularly from the Somali National Movement in the north, but also from different clans and political factions in other parts of the country. Heavy fighting led to the fall of the Barre regime in January 1991 followed by widespread civil war which ruined the country and resulted in a massive internal displacement of people and refugee flows in the



country and to the neighboring countries. The international community reacted by providing large-scale humanitarian assistance.

Following a unsuccessful UN peace-keeping operation (UNOSOM, 1992), a US-led multinational task force (UNITAF) gradually covered the central and southern parts of the country in order to curb the fighting and secure humanitarian access. In 1993 UNOSOM II was set up by the Security Council to replace the UNITAF forces. UNOSOM II, also a US-led operation, ended in fiasco and withdrew in 1995, (Danida, 2003).

Former inter-clan allies in the fight against Barre turned into enemies in an ongoing struggle for power in the country that remains stateless until today. In the period following the early 1990s, the ongoing inter-clan hostilities led to a disastrous situation. The country has lacked a functioning government, resulting in the breakdown of social, political and economic order. In turn, these unstable conditions, combined with periodic drought and flooding resulted in a situation of widespread and chronic humanitarian suffering.

In 2001 Somalia ranked 161 out of 163 countries on the human development index (UNDP Human Development Report, 2001). The Human Development Report for 2003 does not contain any information on Somalia as a result of lack of statistics and problems of data collection. Statistics on access to health facilities, safe water supplies, sanitation facilities as well as enrolment rates for primary education are scattered. Surveys conducted in the central and southern parts of the country reveal high rates of malnutrition, morbidity, mortality and very low rates of primary school enrolments.



As a result many long-term IDPs have returned to Somaliland and a large number of IDPs from other parts of Somalia have resettled there. However, the influx of large numbers of destitute people threatens the nascent positive social and political developments and has an impact on Somaliland's fragile economy (Danida, 2003)

Similar to Somaliland, Puntland has known relative peace and security since 1991. In June 2001 however, when the three year term of Puntland's government expired, a fierce internal power struggle led to a constitutional crisis, which threatened the region's security and stability. Conflict erupted in Puntland by power struggle in May 2002, resulting in the temporary evacuation of international UN and NGO staff. Puntland is the home to pastoralists and currently counts large numbers of IDPs, minorities and urban destitute, whose vulnerability has been compounded by the recent instability which has led to intermittent humanitarian access.

Contrary to these two northern regions of Somalia, the central and southern parts of Somalia have constantly witnessed violent struggles since the collapse of the Barre regime. Warlords continued fighting to establish hegemony over the fertile lands between the Juba and the Shebelle rivers, and major ports like Mogadishu and Kismayo.

The central and southern regions of Somalia are home to the largest populations of vulnerable and food insecure groups. Intermittent factional as well as inter- and intra-clan armed conflicts, sometimes indelibly fuelled by external humanitarian support, compounded by the effects of natural hazards such as periodic drought and flooding perpetuate their vulnerability. As a result, considerable internal and cross-border displacement continues to take place, (Danida, 2003).



### 2.1.1 Humanitarian situation

The clashes and social insecurity across most of southern and central Somalia since early 2007 has caused massive displacement, particularly from Mogadishu and its environments. At the end of December 2007, there were an estimated 600,000 newly internally displaced people (IDPs) in Somalia, in addition to the estimated 400,000 people in situations of protracted displacement since 1991 (UNHCR, 20 November 2007; AI, May 2008).

Humanitarian agencies in March 2008 reported that up to 20,000 people had been fleeing Mogadishu every month since January (UNHCR Protection Cluster up-date, 18 July 2008; BBC, 26 March 2008). As of June 2008, estimates put the number of IDPs in Somalia at 1.1 million (OCHA, 16 July 2008; CIA, July 2008; USAID, 16 July 2008).

Fighting and tensions in towns in the south-central such as Baidoa (IRIN, 8 July 2008), Beledweyne (IRIN, 14 July 2008), and Galgadud (IRIN, 30 June 2008) between June and July 2008 have displaced thousands of families. According to UNHCR, at least 28,000 people fled their homes in Beledweyne out of fear of conflict between insurgents and Ethiopian troops (Protection Cluster up-date, 18 July 2008). An estimated 30,000 people were also displaced from JuriEil town in Galgadud region towards the end of June as a result of conflict (IRIN, 30 June 2008).

In 2007, in the north of the country, a separate border conflict between Somali-land and Puntland displaced an estimated 45,000 people (OCHA, October 2007). There have been no reports of new displacement during 2008. By December 2007, 60 per cent of the population of the capital Mogadishu had fled the poorest among them to destitution in surrounding areas. About 300,000



IDPs are camping out in makeshift settlements along the fifteen-kilometer stretch of road between Mogadishu and Afgooye (IMC, February 2008; FSAU, February 2008; UNSC, March 2008).

The vast majority of IDPs lack access to water and sanitation facilities, and basic services such as health centres and schools. 80 per cent of the displaced lack access to clean water and latrines (FSAU, February 2008; MSF, 26 June 2008).

Families sleep up to ten people in huts made from sticks, plastic sheets, and bits of fabric that provide little protection from the sun and the dust. More than 40 people share a single latrine, in some places even more.

In March 2008, 40 humanitarian agencies working in Somalia warned of an impending humanitarian crisis. The agencies claimed that two million Somalis needed daily help to survive the crisis caused by the fighting (BBC, 26 March 2008).

The World Food Programme (WFP) at the same time warned that Somalia was “sinking deeper into an abyss” with a lack of security hampering humanitarian access in some areas and with over a million people displaced (WFP, March 2008). A massive number of these IDPs were living on less than one meal a day (IRIN, 11 March 2008). A 2007 survey by the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) in regions that were hosting the highest number of IDPs showed that about 70 per cent had no employment and that their access to food was limited as a result; a problem compounded by rising food prices (FSAU, February 2008). Even though some humanitarian assistance from international and local NGOs was getting to the displaced, the demand was said to be overwhelming.



Child malnutrition has been at critical levels for some months. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator reported in October 2007 that only 20 per cent of the children in south and central Somalia were receiving the food and medicines necessary for their survival, and that young children were suffering from the highest levels of malnutrition ever recorded in the area (UN News, Oct 2007).

Camp life was causing increasing numbers of young children to suffer from malnutrition and diarrhea (IMC, Jan 2008; MSF, 26 June 2008). A statement by UNICEF in February 2008 reported that some 90,000 children could die in the next few months due to inadequate funding for nutrition, water and sanitation programmes (UNICEF, 12 February 2008). Lack of hygiene and clean water has led to made diarrhoea cases among young children to increase dramatically, with one out of every 35 children dying of diarrhoea before the age of five (IMC, March 2008).

### **2.1.2 Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia**

An estimated 80% of the Somali population led a nomadic or semi-nomadic existence, moving with their herds to and from grazing lands and water sources. Due to ongoing localized hostilities, these traditional population movements have been compounded by displacement of people which also included unsettled refugees returning from neighboring countries. As a result, accurate estimates of IDPs in Somalia are hard to establish, (Danida, 2003).

In 2003 the UN estimated that 350,000 persons out of the some 7 million Somali population were displaced. Tracking displaced populations in Somalia is particularly difficult as virtually all Somalis have been displaced by violence at least once in their life. Wars and severe droughts have complicated and hampered the seasonal migrations of the nomadic Somalis, and the 1990s



families have increasingly moved to main towns in search of seasonal work and humanitarian assistance. Some estimated 40,000 IDPs live in Somaliland of which 15,000 live on the outskirts of the towns of Hargeisa and Burao, in planned and unplanned settlements.

Some 90% of the 30,000 IDPs in Puntland live in and around the town of Bosasso. Excluding Mogadishu, where between 100,000 and 250,000 people live in about 200 squatter settlements and camps. There are about 88,000 IDPs in south and central Somalia with about 60,000 IDPs living in and around the town of Kismayo, (Danida, 2003).

### **Physical security of IDPs**

Civil society organizations in Somalia have reported fighting near IDP camps; fighting that led to further displacements (IRIN, 10 Jan 2008). Human Rights Watch, in its 2007 report *Shell Shocked: Civilians under siege in Mogadishu* stated that thousands of displaced people from Mogadishu suffered further attacks from armed criminal groups and individuals as they fled the city in March and April. The attackers appear to have been motivated by the opportunity to steal cash, goods, and other assets from un-armed civilians. In addition, in some areas there was a pattern of rape and sexual violence against women and girls (HRW, 2007).

Amnesty International also reported incidents of attacks, rape, assault, and extortion directed at displaced people by parties to the conflict (AI, May 2008). The Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia (appointed by the UN Secretary-General) also reported that internally displaced people were subjected to threats, intimidation, looting, assault and sexual and gender based violence (UN SC, 14 March 2008).



## **2.2 Issues and Problems of Internally Displaced Somalis**

IDPs in Somalia face many different problems. According to the UN, they constitute nearly half of the estimated 750,000 Somalis who live in a state of constant humanitarian need. Particularly vulnerable are women and children, who constitute 75% of the IDPs in Somalia (Danida, 2003).

### **2.2.1 Physical security - lack of protection**

IDPs in Somalia remain some of the most vulnerable in the world; because of no working government to provide them with socio-economic rights protection. Most IDPs come from minority groups with low social status in Somalia's clan system and have suffered a long history of bias, and forced displacement (AI, May 2008). While protection, access to resources and political participation are generally granted through clan affiliation, displaced and politically less organised minorities have been particularly exposed to serious human rights abuses. International protection instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles for Internally Displaced Persons prove difficult to implement and enforce in the prevailing context of state collapse (Danida, 2003).

### **2.2.2 Subsistence needs - access to health, nutrition and shelter**

Lack of sufficient health care is one of the biggest problems facing the Somali population today. They are totally dependent on the international community for the delivery of health services. The medical infrastructure which was ravaged by the conflict has not been rebuilt. At the few operational clinics and other health facilities, the settled population is given priority over the IDPs. IDPs are more at risk of malnutrition than resident populations because they lack access to adequate quantity and quality of food, are largely deprived of clan assistance, and lack access to income generating activities.



Other contributing factors are lack of access to proper housing, and to drinking water and sanitation. Attempts of the international community to provide access to water and sanitation to the IDPs are frequently undermined by the settled population claiming these services for them and using the argument that IDPs are not involved in maintaining water sources (wells).

Finally, the ongoing insecurity limits humanitarian access in a general sense and contributes to the poor health and nutritional status of IDPs, (Danida, 2003).

### **2.2.3 Lack of self-reliance**

Somalia ranks among the five least developed countries. Lack of reliable data makes it difficult to establish the real economic status of Somalia. It is estimated that current annual Growth Domestic Product (GDP) per capita ranges between US\$ 180 to US\$ 200. Major sources of income are remittances from the Somali Diaspora and the export of livestock to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The volume of remittances still suffer from the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001, because of relating Al-Qaeda in which most of the companies facilitating the transfer of remittances were either closed or had reduced their capacity to manage transfers. During the past three years income from livestock trade has been reduced because of a ban in the Gulf States on import of Somali livestock due to suspected livestock diseases (Danida, 2003).

In these circumstances, the economic situation of IDPs in or urban is particularly difficult. Many IDPs with a traditional agro-pastoralist or agricultural background lack skills to generate income in urban settings. Since resources are already stretched in the urban settings, the IDPs find themselves excluded by the settled urban population from the informal economy. IDPs who wish to settle in rural areas face different problems. For instance, as a result of the collapse of the



state, IDPs are obliged to rent public land controlled by private individuals at exorbitant prices. Moreover, they are vulnerable to spontaneous and forced relocations. (Danida, 2003)

### **2.3 Theoretical Perspectives**

In its broadest sense, the term “NGO” refers to the organization that is first not based in government; and second not created to earn profit. While this broad definition of an NGO is correct semantically, it refers more to what an organization is not, rather than to what it is, and can be applied to many organizations (Brodhead and O’Malley 1998).

Alan Rogers defines NGOs as an organization established and governed by a group of individuals by state purpose, (Alan, 1995). Another definition by (Bageya, 1998) NGOs as basically volunteer organization formed to perform, defined or stipulate roles of the benefit of the society or a target part of the society without any profits or financial gain out of the activities. NGOs refer to the legal constitute of non-profit making organizations in areas of relief, education, health and humanitarian assistance. NGOs are principally value driven and oriented towards meeting the needs of the poor in order to improve on their welfare or wellbeing.

NGOs originated from the need to provide relief especially after the World War II when economists unanimously recommended that the government of the newly independent states should not get involved with income and asset distribution. The industrial revolution was also a factor that led to the rise of NGOs. The emergency and industries in Europe came up with assistant of exploitation of the poor by the rich. NGOs are relief, education; health care, and welfare agencies mainly for people affected by disasters and civil wars. An NGO is private not



for profit institution dedicated to influence the structures of government and ensure the great welfare of its citizens.

NGOs play important roles in society. Motivated by a desire for a caring and development society they establish and operate programmes of education, health, social welfare and economic improvement, especially among disadvantages sectors.

In doing this, they directly and indirectly encourage and extend democratic practices. NGOs have also long been involved in pioneering new approaches to meeting needs and solving problems in society. In recent years, they have also been at the centre of renewed searches for sustainable processes of social, environment and economic development and action on issues such as peace, democracy, human rights, gender equity and humanitarian activities (Raper, 2003).

### **2.3.1 How NGOs work in Somali Community**

NGOs work in Somali Community can be grouped under the following headings:

- Providing resources
- Fostering community participation
- Capacity building

### **Resources**

Most international NGOs in Somalia began working in communities to supply resources, sometimes in the form of disaster relief. Among the NGOs involved in education activities in the country studied, all bring resources with them to the communities within which they work.



The resources are most apparent in the case of community schools, where NGOs might supply concrete things such as tin roofs and teacher salaries. Local NGOs and their proximity to a community serve as a conduit through which resources from donors/international NGO supported programmes can flow to the community. In all cases, NGOs bring their skills and experience into Somali community, shaping experiences of changes in ways that can provide models for future community activities (Raper, 2003).

### **Community Participation**

For governments, community participation in education most often means supplying resources, both funding and labour, to support local schooling. The World Bank programme in Somalia shows how NGOs have mobilized communities to provide counterpart funds for school construction grants. Initially most mobilization or sensitization campaigns in education focus on encouraging parents to provide resources to create and support educational needs and to send their children to school. The methodologies for working in Somali community have also begun to change, moving increasingly away from telling the members of the community what they should do, to involving them in decision-making activities. More participatory approaches, which include facilitating community discussions and negotiations to decide what are their problems are, how they might be solved, and how to implement those solutions, are being used by NGOs, in part because they better support the double goal of most NGOs-improving education and strengthening civil society in Somalia (World Bank, 2003).



## **Capacity Building**

International NGOs in Somalia also assist in creating or training school committees and/or parent-teacher associations (PTAs), organizations through which communities can gain control of their own schools.

## **2.4 Causes of IDPs the need of humanitarian assistance**

### **2.4.1 Poverty**

Somalia is considered one of the least developed countries in the world. Economic decline and civil war in the 1980s followed by a protracted armed conflict in the 1990s resulted in deepening levels of poverty, deprivation and vulnerability. 43% of Somalis live in extreme poverty, with an income of US\$ 1 a day or less. Average life expectancy at birth is 47 years; the adult literacy rate is 19% and 47% of the active population is unemployed.

The economy in Somalia is heavily dependent on livestock and agriculture. Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal and bananas are Somalia's principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, goat and manufactured goods are the principal imports. In the south, massive imports of food aid and the disruption of traditional rural-urban commercial networks have largely distorted markets in Mogadishu and in other parts of the country. In the last few years, agricultural production has been unstable as drought continues to affect most of the country.

From a broader perspective, prolonged food insecurity and vulnerability resulting from limited employment opportunities, inflation, volatile markets for cereals and a ban on livestock exports, combined with successive years of crop failure, flooding, conflict and demographic changes have



created a protracted emergency situation to the Somali community to need and ask humanitarian assistance to the international NGOs (UNCU, 30 July 2002).

#### **2.4.2 The ban on Somali livestock's**

A combination of other factors also threatens Somalis' traditional livelihoods. The prolonged and continued ban (since September 2000) on the export of Somali livestock by the Gulf States in response to the outbreak of the Rift Valley fever in Saudi Arabia and Yemen has badly hurt nomadic pastoralists in Somalia these comprise roughly 44% or 2.7 million of the population and depend on the livestock trade as a vital source of income. While livestock continue to be exported today to alternative markets, terms of trade for livestock have continued to drop against the value of dry food rations, placing greater stress on poorer pastoral households.

The number of animals has increased within Somalia since the ban and this overpopulation has left some rangelands in the north and central portions of the country overgrazed and fragile, adding still more pressure on pastoralist livelihoods.

In the early 1980s Saudi Arabia had become Somalia's international market for cattle from the lower Jubba river area. Saudi Arabia imposed a ban on Somalia beef in 1983 due to suspicion of rinderpest contamination. These fears proved to be unfounded, but the ban remained in effect and it reduced annual cattle exports from 157,000 in 1982 to less than 8,000 in 1984. Saudi Arabia's ban on Somalia beef severely hurt cattle merchants and it drove the trade to markets in Kenya. This was less efficient than trading with Saudi Arabia before the ban, because there were already well-established cattle markets in Kenya. At that moment the ban on Somali livestock caused a less economy, unemployment and a feed back of need of humanitarian assistance because 2.7



million Somali's was depend the economy of livestock trade this brought that these 2.7 million need the assistances of the international NGOs (Ozden, & Schiff 2007).

### **2.4.3 The Absence of Public Services**

In Benadir Hospital, South Mogadishu once one of the busiest and most sophisticated hospitals in the city a handful of voluntary nurses attend to cholera patients lying on the floors in the entrance and the abandoned wards. Intravenous drips hang from window bars. In the nurses' room small, bare office oral rehydration's salts are being emptied unceremoniously into a large container of water. Halima Hassan Abdi says "she has been a nurse for more than 32 years in Benadir Hospital, and still turns up most days on a voluntary basis." "I work part of the day here, then spend the rest of the day in the market to make some money," she says. Staff on duty say they have received about 50 suspected cholera cases a day since mid-March, with the numbers now declining. The death rate recorded at Benadir was described as relatively low, with one or two mostly children dying each day (UNDP 2001).

For the most severe cases, the staffs say they rely on the hospital director, Dr Abdulrazak, buying antibiotics from local pharmacies. A limited amount of emergency surgery is still carried out by Dr Abdulrazak on a private basis at the hospital, mainly for road traffic accidents, hernias and caesarean births. Patients or their relatives have to be able to purchase intravenous drips, antibiotics, drugs etc as well as pay a doctor's fee. Thus the absence of the public services in Somalia caused even the hospitals to wait the help of the international NGOs like MSF because of shortage of resource such as medicine, equipment and sometimes the salary of the staff.



Some 30 percent of patients in hospitals in southern Somalia and Mogadishu suffer from gunshot, knife and stick wounds. Most other cases needing surgery relate to maternal problems, reflecting on the near absence of clinics and basic maternal health care. Birth complications are also linked to female genital mutilation and the poor socio-economic standing of women.

So professional doctors are limited because of war and lack of government this caused the NGOs to sent professional Doctors around the world to help the Somalia community.

#### **2.4.4 The Migrating Poor**

Makeshift camps of displaced Somalis and refugees (primarily originating from Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s) have mushroomed in the city since the fall of Siad Barre's government in 1991. Most of the dome-shaped huts are made from paper, sticks, sacks and cloth scavenged from the growing mountains of rubbish, with barriers of scrap metal delineating different sections of the camps. Some camps receive rudimentary help from humanitarian agencies or Islamic organisations (NGOs), but the vast majority of internally displaced people must rely on their own survival skills. At four different camps visited in south Mogadishu, people reported new arrivals from southern Somalia because of drought and insecurity.

Many families in the camps have been repeatedly displaced, and for some, it is their second or third time in the capital. Some arrive seeking relatives, but others come because it remains a traditional migration route even with Mogadishu's precipitous decline, the displaced still expect the capital to provide opportunities. The majority IDPs interviewed said they survived by begging, by receiving food scraps, and by earning a little cash by providing carrying services to



people in the market earning about 2,000 - 3,000 Somali shillings a day (Ozden, & Schiff, 2007).

Camp managers and volunteers say some of the main problems in the camps are TB, pneumonia, skin diseases, malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, cholera and malnutrition. In Tribune Camp, volunteer manager Jawahira Mohamed complained of security problems with thieves and outbreaks of fighting inside the different sections of the camp.

She said one resident had killed another in a knife attack early April, and had been taken to an Islamic court. The two clans were called, and the aggrieved party given the option of killing one man or demanding payment. Eventually payment of 100,000 Somali shillings was agreed, although there are problems in raising the money.

Islamic organisations provide some assistance to the displaced, but mainly during Muslim festivals. Some 20 or 30 head of sheep are delivered to each camp for the Eid festival. Otherwise, Islamic organisations are concentrating on orphanages, funding Koranic schools, or injecting money into business ventures. The main Islamic organisations operating in Mogadishu are the International Islamic Relief Organisation; Al Haramayn; Al-Islah Charity; Monazamat Al-da'wa; African Muslim Agency and Muslim Aid UK. Western humanitarian organisations maintaining a rudimentary presence in Mogadishu are ICRC, MSF Spain, Action Internationale Contre la Faim, Peace and Life (Sweden), and Daily Bread from Germany. United Nations offices include representatives from UNDP, FAO, UNHCR, WFP and WHO. These humanitarian agencies presently have no permanent expatriate presence and depend on a skeleton structure of local staff.



Some local Somali humanitarian organisations have made efforts to work in the camps, but lack funding. For example, the Somali Refugee Agency SORA, founded in December 1998, has mapped out the camps and compiled lists of families, adults and children, as well as the main health and sanitation problems. It has recorded 138 camps in Mogadishu, North and South. SORA estimates that refugees make up about 30% of the camps. But the NGO ACF estimates 234,000 displaced Somalis alone live in 201 camps in Mogadishu (Erica, 2005).

#### **2.4.5 Unemployment**

More than 60% of the urban population aged 15 to 64 is unemployed. Unemployment among the youth up to 30 years of age, who have grown up in a time of complete state collapse, is a particularly disturbing problem. This generation has little to no formal education, few marketable skills, and in many cases has been drawn into militia activities and/or criminality.

As such, they pose a serious challenge to peace and security as well as the economic and social development of Somalia. The most common forms of ensuring survival are small scale trade, casual employment, market activities and sale of livestock. Only 5% of the displaced people are able to afford three meals per day, with 64% living on one meal per day or less. The main sources of food, besides purchasing, are begging and food aid (Erica, 2005).

#### **2.4.6 Inflation**

Inflation is the major problems of bringing Somalia people depend on humanitarian services delivered from the foreign countries because the value of the Somalia currency become very low according to the U.S dollar the what the Somalia business import and export and also a base about the change of the Somalia currency (UNDP 2001).



After the collapse of the central government of Somalia that is when the central bank of Somalia and financial institutions was totally collapsed. Somalia imports roughly 60% of its food requirements, mostly rice and wheat flour. Although cereal prices follow similar increased trends, increases in Somalia not only exceed global cereal price increases, but the relative price differential has significantly increased over the last six months. Mogadishu rice retail prices, the average price differential was 26kg/\$ during the period January 2000, but this increased to an average price differential of 61kg/\$ is caused by the worst inflation that happened Somalia specially Mogadishu which is the base of the country. The cost of one kilo of rice more than tripled, from 14,200 SoSh to 43,000 SoSh that is never happened in the country since Somalia took independence early 1960. The global rise in the price of staple foods has triggered protests across Africa, including in Egypt, Cameroon, Senegal, and South Africa. In Somalia, things are made worse by nearly two decades of civil strife.

Somalia's recent inflation begins with the rapid rise in the price of oil. Transport costs have skyrocketed, with a knock-on effect in all spheres of life. Widespread piracy along the Somali coast - the longest in Africa - is also a factor. Both commercial and humanitarian cargoes have been hijacked for ransom as the ships approached the Somali territorial waters. According to the International Maritime Organization, 25 ships were hijacked in Somali coastal waters last year.

Ten have already been hijacked or attacked so far this year, the latest being three ships now being held off Somali coast by pirates. The risk of attack by pirates has made chartering ships for delivery of food and other goods to Somalia twice as expensive, according to local Somali importers.



The printing of counterfeit bank notes of the local currency, the Somali shilling, has worsened already runaway inflation in the country and further devalued the shilling against the US dollar. Last year, one US dollar was worth approximately 20,000 Somali shillings, but this rate jumped to nearly 33,000 to dollar in May this year, following the revelation that billions of shillings' worth of fake banknotes was being printed on sophisticated printing machines in the semi-autonomous north-eastern region of Puntland (Ozden & Schiff, 2007).

#### **2.4.7 Civil wars**

The problem is caused by insecurity and conflict and the overall crisis facing the growing IDP population has been compounded by the effects of drought, deepening insecurity, hyperinflation (especially of food) and currency devaluation. The IDPs showed that about 70 per cent had no employment and that their access to food was limited as a result; a problem compounded by rising food prices. Today, urban migration is seen as an inextricable consequence of the conflict, and its consequences become apparent in the form of a dramatic rise in property prices, increased conflict over scarce resources like water, and high unemployment.

While by the end of 2005 sufficient rains for two consecutive seasons have somewhat stabilized the water and food situation in the north, enabling those pastoralists who had not yet moved to urban centres to begin re-stocking their herds and re-engaging in livestock trade, the south is considered at high risk of experiencing serious food shortages due to years of below-normal rainfall and intermittent fighting. In addition to significant crop losses, the number of livestock has decreased significantly. Some drought-related displacement towards urban centres was already reported at the end of 2005 (Newman, & Selm, 2003).



The vast majority of IDPs in Mogadishu fled drought and inter-clan fighting in rural areas of Lower and Middle Juba, Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle, Hiran and Middle Shabelle. The river areas are suffering from unusual crop losses of between 60-80 per cent in some parts. As a result, food prices reached record highs and with purchases being the main source of food for 99 per cent of IDPs, their nutritional intake seriously shrank.

Insecurity in Mogadishu and surrounding areas displacing people, IDP families surviving on less than a meal a day, Shortages of food and water, Host communities severely stressed, and IDPs and host communities faced with record high food and non-food prices.

## **2.5 Problems within the Organizations Hampering an Effective Humanitarian Service**

### **2.5.1 Unqualified Workers**

Another factor that bring problem to the organizations is lack of unqualified workers who are recruited to delivery humanitarian services or poor trained staff and technical expertise specially when gathering information and monitoring and evaluation.

### **2.5.2 Lack of Facilities and Self interest**

Limited facilities and poor implementation strategy is also another factor that brought problem in the organization when distributing humanitarian services to the internal displaced people. Self interest and interest based on clans that is delivering humanitarian services a place where the displaced people got help from other organizations instead of internal displaced people who don't have basic needs of life (Peace Corps ICE, 2002).



## **2.6 Obstacles of Implementation**

### **2.6.1 Lack of effective government**

The lack of effective government institutions, particularly in south-central Somalia, hampers the implementation of humanitarian activities. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacks the capacity to coordinate humanitarian aid and sometimes hinders the provision of humanitarian aid in Somalia. For example, in March and April 2007, the TFG imposed restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The TFG restricted UN agencies and international NGOs to the use of TFG institutions as their sole implementing partner, restricted the use of airports for the delivery of aid, stated that research and data collection efforts without TFG approval were invalid, and halted distribution of food aid for unspecified inspections and approval by the TFG. Following international pressure, including engagement by the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, the TFG removed these restrictions in late April 2007 and designated an Inter-Ministerial Committee, chaired by the Minister of Health, as the focal point on the coordination of humanitarian aid, (Payne, et al 2008).

### **2.6.2 Lack of security**

Ongoing insecurity has been the most significant obstacle to the provision and oversight of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Insecurity affects all aspects of the delivery of assistance to the country and prevents most international NGO staff and donors from maintaining a permanent presence there, hindering assistance efforts and reducing monitoring capacity. The international community manages its assistance to Somalia by “remote control” from Nairobi through numerous working groups (Feingold, et al 2008).



The coordination meetings on Somalia that occur in Nairobi consist mainly of information sharing and are burdensome and time-consuming. There is a need for more coordination to occur in Somalia rather than in Nairobi. UN agencies' and international NGOs' programs for Somalia are mainly implemented by Somali national staff, often without the on-site technical (Feingold, et al 2008).

The insecure operating environment in Somalia has led to breaks and delays in the delivery of humanitarian aid, thereby affecting human survival. For example, insecurity has limited the international community's ability to provide humanitarian assistance to 230,000 IDPs living in desperate conditions along a road between Mogadishu and Afgooye and lacking access to urgently needed food, clean water, sanitation, and health care. Delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations has not been possible or has been interrupted when the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers could not be ensured. Humanitarian aid workers in Somalia have experienced harassment, arbitrary detention at key checkpoints, kidnapping, arrest, and attacks and have at times been completely prevented from conducting aid operations. In October 2007, for example, the WFP temporarily suspended its food distributions when TFG soldiers violated the UN premises in Mogadishu and arrested the program's Head of Office. The official was released 5 days later, and food aid and all other UN planned activities subsequently resumed (Payne, et al 2008).

Insecurity in Somalia has also limited the international community's efforts to monitor and evaluate the provision of humanitarian aid. Because of security concerns, international NGO officials have been unable to travel to Somalia to monitor and evaluate the humanitarian activities (Payne, et al 2008).



Following the killing of three staff members of MSF Holland on January 28, the medical humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has decided to close its project in the southern city of Kismayo, Somalia. Although activities in Kismayo ended, MSF remains committed to providing medical care to the Somali people, therefore projects in other locations in Somalia will continue to operate the rest of the country except Kismayo. "This has been an extremely difficult decision to make," said Arjan Hehenkamp, MSF's Director of Operations for Somalia. "There is a significant need for independent humanitarian assistance in Kismayo, but we cannot continue working in a place where our staffs have been deliberately targeted and brutally murdered." MSF condemns attacks against humanitarian aid workers and their consequences on the delivery of assistance to vulnerable populations in Somalia.

### **2.6.3 Lack of Access**

The international community also faces logistical challenges in transporting humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations. NGOs said that their lack of physical access to Somalia by sea, overland, and by air has created major delays and increased the cost of transporting supplies to the country, because of ongoing insecurity in Somalia (Feingold, et al 2008).

According to the UN, nearly 80 percent of food aid to Somalia by WFP is shipped by sea, but the availability of shippers willing to carry food to the country has been reduced by half because of concerns about piracy. At least 15 hijackings of ships off the coast of Somalia took place in 2007, with 3 of the attacks involving WFP-chartered ships. In August 2007, the UN Security Council passed a resolution encouraging member states to take appropriate action consistent with international law to protect merchant shipping, particularly the transport of humanitarian aid. Subsequently, in November 2007, French Navy vessels escorted two WFP ships. When the



Kenyan government closed its border with Somalia in January 2007, NGOs had difficulty transporting humanitarian supplies into Somalia and reloading trucks from Somalia with supplies in Kenya. Relief convoys eventually received permission to cross the border into Somalia, but inconsistent authorization and delays hindered travel through July 2007.

Once in Somalia, humanitarian relief items are frequently subject to arbitrary taxation and customs fees at TFG checkpoints and at ad hoc roadblocks manned by armed militias. In 2007, the international NGOs received reports of TFG-manned checkpoints demanding that passing traffic including humanitarian convoys pay fees ranging from \$20 to \$133, and later up to \$520, per truck.

The closure of key airstrips in south-central Somalia during the first half of 2007 often prevented aid staff from reaching the country and access has been further complicated by poor road, sea, and air infrastructure and flooding. The limited implementing capacity of local NGOs in Somalia also constrains the delivery of humanitarian aid. International NGOs work through local Somali NGOs to implement their programs, but many of these local NGOs lack operational capacity, qualified staff, and technical expertise, and international NGO officials said there is a need to build their capacity to provide aid. In addition, NGO managers said that the Somali staffs they have trained often leave to work for the UN, further weakening the capacity of the NGOs (Feingold, et al 2008).



## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Research design

The study employed a cross-sectional survey design to identify the challenges faced by Non-governmental Organizations delivering humanitarian services in Somalia. Cross sectional survey design examines several groups of people at one time (Salkind, 2000).

#### 3.2 Research Respondents

This study was conducted among Non-governmental organizations. The target respondents were field workers and general managers of the humanitarian organizations. Field workers and general managers were selected because they have the information and meet the challenges, obstacles and barriers delivering, humanitarian services to help internally displaced people in Somalia. Non-governmental organizations in Somalia were divided into separate groups such as relief organizations, health organizations, educational organizations and others. Two NGOs were selected from each group. This was done to find out the challenges faced by each group and the influence it had their activity. Each category or section has equal proportion to the sampling chosen and it was 18 respondents.

The target was twenty two NGOs and selected six NGOs according to the sections the researcher mention above, the staffs and managers of the selected NGOs were 150 Staffs, and 108 has been chosen as a sample of the study. The reason the researcher chosen the staffs and the managers was, he believes they have the information and the data he was gathering.



### 3.3 Sampling Technique

The study used purposive sampling and simple random sampling. Simple random sampling is a sample obtained from the population in such a way that samples of the same size have equal chances of being selected (Amin, 2005). Thus simple random sampling used to select to the NGOs and purposive sampling was used to select the respondents using the following criteria:

For the fieldworker:

1. Field workers.
2. Experience to the problem.
3. Working with NGOs for 6 months.

For the managers:

1. Overseeing the field workers.
2. Experience to the problem.
3. Working with NGOs for at least 1 year and above.

Data gathering of the research started when the proposal, approved. The researcher was given an introduction letter from the office of the director of school of postgraduate studies and research. The researcher distributed 108 questionnaires to the select and target respondents 5 of the distributed questionnaires were spoiled and were not analyzed. After the data collection was carefully done, data organizations done by Statically Package for Social Science (SPSS).



### **3.4 Research Instrument**

Research questionnaires' consisting of structured and self administered with a combination of both open and closed questions for the collection of the required data in this study was used to determine the challenges faced by the Non-governmental Organizations delivering humanitarian services in Somalia.

Interviews were used because there was information that could not be directly observed or were difficult to put down in writing. The technique allowed control to be gained from the line of questioning and historical information.

### **3.5 Reliability and Validity of the Instrument**

The reliability of the research instruments concerned with the degree to which the research instrument give way the same result. Reliability of the respondent's instruments questionnaire was established through a test-retested method. The researcher conducted a pre-test for the instruments questionnaire in Mogadishu and the test was conducted after one week in the same city and the same respondents and it gave the researcher the same result. This shows the constancy and the reliability of the instruments. Validity is the quality of the test doing what is designed to do (Salkind, 2000).

### **3.6 Data Processing and Analysis**

Qualitative data analysis was used to analyze the data in the study. The five steps of analytical process were followed: categorization; 'unitizing' data; recognizing relationships and developing categories; and developing and testing hypothesis to reach conclusion.



In categorization of data, similar data from each case and from the information collected from the NGO staffs and IDPs were categorized. Categories included the following: lack of security for NGO staff, the impact of poor infrastructure to the humanitarian activities and lack of knowledge and experiences of NGO staff about the humanitarian activities. Other sub-categories were also added during the research process.

Quantitative analysis was also used and this was statistical methods in the measurement of central tendencies such as the mean, median, and mode. Qualitative analysis was prominent because respondents had more than what is demanded from them. Therefore, these views have to be provided somewhere to stay through this design to reflect the information on the ground. The analysis of data was used tables, and expressed of frequency and percentages in appropriate way.

In order to show the distribution of the respondents, presentation and analysis of the collected data is computed in percentages. The percentage was obtained as:

$$\text{Percentage (\%)} = \frac{n}{N} \times 100$$

Where n= number of sample

N= total population



### **3.7 Limitation of the Study**

The researcher faced number of problems including some of the respondents not knowing the English language so translating local language into English language is difficult. Also, the researcher faced some of the respondents who didn't answer the questionnaire properly or correctly because of to be targeted and killed or kidnapped by those who did the problem whether they are the TFG or the rebels.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS**

#### **4.0 Overview**

In this chapter, the results of the study are presented, analyzed, and interpreted precisely. The study used a cross-sectional survey as a research design and employed questionnaires to obtain data from the field.

The presentation is divided into two parts. The first part presents the respondent demographic information, while the second part deals with presentation, interpretation, and analysis of the research questions and objectives.

#### **4.1 Demographic information of the respondents**

As mentioned above, this part presents the background information of the respondents who participated in the study. The purpose of this background information is to present the characteristics of the respondents and show the distribution of the population in the study. Their distribution is established in table 4.1 below.



Table 4.1 distributions of the respondents

Categories	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	53	51%
Female	50	49%
Total	103	100%
<b>Age</b>		
21-30	50	46%
31-40	25	24%
41-50	25	24%
50 above	3	3%
Total	103	100%
<b>Qualifications</b>		
Secondary	10	10%
Diploma	33	32%
Bachelor	60	58%
Total	103	100%
<b>Experience in the organization</b>		
Less than 6 months	10	10%
6 months-1 year	23	22%
1 year-2 year	20	19%
2 years and above	50	46%
Total	103	100%

Findings from table 4.1 indicate that different categories were involved in the study, that is both male and female respondents were included. However, there were more than males compared females. The percentage was 53% males and 50% females. Majority of the respondents, that is 46 % were in the age bracket of 20-30 years. Among the sample respondents, 58% were bachelor



degree holders, 32% diploma holders and the remaining 10% were holders of secondary certificates. 10% of the respondents had some work experience of less than 6 months, 22% had work experience of 6 months-1year, 19% had work experience of 1year-2years and the remaining that is 46% had work experience of more than 2 years.

Table 4.2. External obstacles hinder the NGOs efforts to provide good humanitarian services

AREAS RATED	SD	D	A	SA
1. Lack of effective government	10	23	50	20
	10%	22%	49%	19%
2. On-going wars	20	10	50	23
	19%	10%	49%	22%
3. Logistical challenges	10	20	23	50
	10%	19%	22%	49%
4. Lack of physical access.	5	28	50	20
	5%	27%	49%	19%
5. Safety and security of the humanitarian aid workers and insecurity of operating environment.	10	20	23	50
	10%	19%	22%	49%
6. Access of humanitarian relief.	20	10	50	23
	19%	10%	49%	22%
7. Closure of key airstrip.	15	15	45	28
	15%	15%	44%	20%

Table 4.2 presented the obstacles encountered in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Clearly the table showed that lack effective government, on-going wars, logistical challenges, lack of physical access, safety and security of the humanitarian aid workers and access of humanitarian



elief were the main obstacles caused by external forces that care experienced by the NGOs. These obstacles hinder the NGOs efforts to provide good humanitarian services.

Majority 50 (49%) of the respondents agreed that lack of effective government is the major problem and also an obstacle that stops the implementation of delivering humanitarian services to the recipients.

Majority 50 (49%) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that the safety and security of the humanitarian aid workers and the insecurity of the operating environment affects all aspects of the delivering of humanitarian assistance like road blocks, killing and kidnapping the staffs of the humanitarian agencies. On-going wars are also the obstacles of the implementation of the humanitarian assistance so insecurity is problem and an obstacle because no one can work in an insecure environment.

Majority 50 (49%) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that lack of physical access by sea, overland, and by air have created major delays and increased the cost of transporting humanitarian aid supplies to the displaced people in the country. Logistical challenges also brought delay in the delivery of the humanitarian aid in the right time and in a place where the humanitarian aid is most needed.



Table 4.3 organizational problems.

AREAS RATED	SD	D	A	SA
1. Lack of unqualified and untrained staff	5 5%	25 24%	23 22%	50 49%
2. Limited experience	20 19%	10 10%	28 27%	45 44%
3. Limited facilities and poor implementation strategies.	20 19%	10 10%	50 49%	23 22%
4. Self interest and interest based clan.	20 19%	10 10%	45 44%	28 27%

Table 4.3 presented the profile of the problems within the organizations hampering an effective humanitarian service. Clearly the table showed that lack of unqualified and untrained staff, limited facilities were the main problems identified within the organizations hindering the majority (50%) of humanitarian relief services.

Majority 50 (49%) of the respondents claimed that staff of international NGOs and Local NGOs are unqualified and there is no training for technical issues which brings the information gathered totally wrong and also monitoring and evaluation of the work can't be covered because of the lack of knowledge. Therefore, the result showed that the strategy used by the international and local NGOs in implementing the humanitarian assistance is very poor and facilities are not enough mainly because there is no government that helps the NGOs to deliver the humanitarian aid to the internally displaced people in Somalia.



Table 4.4 Causes in humanitarian assistance.

AREAS RATED	SD	D	A	SA
1. Delay of raining season and droughts that continue.	15 14%	10 10%	50 49%	28 27%
2. Looting animals and properties about the minority.	20 19%	15 15%	45 44%	23 22%
3. Floods	5 5%	25 24%	23 22%	50 49%
4. Unemployment among the youth.	20 19%	10 10%	23 22%	50 49%
5. Inflation and devaluation of currency.	20 19%	10 10%	23 22%	50 49%

Table 4.4 presented the profile of the causes to the humanitarian assistance. Clearly the table showed that flood, unemployment among the youth and the inflation and devaluation of the currency were the main causes identified with 50% impact.

Majority 50 (49%) of the respondents strongly agreed that floods are the main causes destroying the farmers and houses of the people who live in the urban areas which lead to the need of humanitarian aid.



Majority 50 (49%) of the respondents strongly agreed that unemployment among the youth up to 30 years of age and who have grown up in a time of complete collapsed state. Youth ended up is in particular this becoming part of militia to get income.

Majority 50 (49%) of the respondents strongly agree that inflation and devaluation of the currency originates the needs of humanitarian assistance because people do not have the power or ability to purchase basic needs such as intravenous drips, antibiotics, drugs and etc.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### *5.0 Overview*

Chapter four presented, analyzed and interpreted data obtained from the field. Based on findings on the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the discussion of the results of the study. The conclusions and recommendations is drawn and given respectively.

#### **5.1 Discussions**

##### **Discussions of the findings on the obstacles of delivering humanitarian services**

The main objective of the study was to investigate the challenges faced by Non-governmental Organizations delivering humanitarian services in Somalia. The findings showed that the obstacles and barriers of delivering humanitarian aid are the challenges faced by the NGOs that delivering humanitarian assistance to the displaced people. Here below, the researcher has discussed the findings from chapter four one by one.

When asked to give their response that lack of effective government is the base of the obstacles to deliver humanitarian aid to displaced people. However many of the respondents were complaining that lack of effective government caused insecurity of staff causing obstacles and barriers of delivering humanitarian aid to displaced people.

Ongoing insecurity is caused by lack of effective government and is the most significant obstacle to the provision and oversight of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The insecure operating environment in Somalia has led to breaks and delays in the delivery of humanitarian aid, thereby



ffecting human survival and it has not been possible for the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers.

Humanitarian aid workers in Somalia have experienced harassment, arbitrary detention at key checkpoints, kidnapping, arrest, and attacks and have at times been completely prevented from conducting aid operations. Lack of security targeted aid workers; killings of humanitarian workers affect delivery services and humanitarian convoys were at risk of extortion and physical attack.

When the respondents were asked to give their comments about physical and logistical challenges that caused barriers to deliver humanitarian aid to the displaced people. Their findings revealed that the availability of shippers willing to carry food to the country has been reduced by half because of concerns of piracy. The subjected arbitrary taxation and customs fees at TFG checkpoints and at ad hoc roadblocks manned by armed militias causing transporting of supplies too cost much. This caused major delays to the humanitarian aid to internal displaced people. Some of the NGOs stopped assisting the recipients. This caused the most harmful impact when the greatest portion of humanitarian aid was postponed until a certain reliable and saving agreement or environment are put a head.

The respondents were asked to give their response or views on whether the closures of airstrips in the country and access have further been complicated by poor roads, sea, and air infrastructure and flooding. The majority pointed out that the closure of key airstrips limited the reach of places where humanitarian problems occurred because some of the NGOs deliveries were by air and the infrastructure of local airports is poor.



Some of the humanitarian aid and assistance was shipped by sea but the availability of shippers willing to carry food to the country has been reduced by half because of concerns of piracy and this has brought the cost of transport to increase.

### **Discussion the problems within the organization**

When asked to give their response about the staff of Non-governmental organizations being unqualified due to implementing capacity of local NGOs in Somalia and the constraints of delivery of humanitarian aid. The international NGOs work through local Somali NGOs to implement their programs, but many of these local NGOs lack operational capacity, qualified staff, and technical expertise. There is a need to build their capacity to provide aid. In addition, NGO managers said that the Somali staff they have trained often leave to work for the UN. Further weakening the capacity of the NGOs. Furthermore, the complex working environment in south-central Somalia prohibits the rapid start-up of new NGOs in districts or regions without exhaustive negotiations with community leaders and local authorities.

Further, respondents were asked to give their views whether the problems in the organizations are based on limited experienced and poor implementation strategy when distributing humanitarian services to the internal displaced people. The majority agreed that the staffs of the humanitarian NGOs' must build their capacity by developing technical, administrative and management skills. They also expressed concern that local NGOs lack the capacity to spend additional funds effectively to get experienced staffs that can do the humanitarian aid properly. This raises issues of overall capacity of the local partners, both in terms of effective delivery of assistance and in terms of the skills needed for proper monitoring, accountability and transparency.



There is no strengthening of local capacity building to facilitate and oversee immediate services delivery including humanitarian assistance and basic services of livelihood support. No strategies are in place to support immediate enhancement of transparency and accountability, project management, financial management and accounting and monitoring and reporting. There are strategies of preparedness for future crises. Some aims have to be achieved immediately. Poor existing strategies of humanitarian assistance coordination and management that function in cluster have to get support to help internal displaced people.

Finally the respondents were subjected to the question as whether there is self interest or interest based on clans that deliver humanitarian services or assistance to place where people get help of basic needs of life. Respondents mentioned that a small portion of people in humanitarian services is related militia or major forces who take humanitarian aid supposed to be given to people by force.

### **Discussions of the findings originating from problems of the humanitarian services recipients**

When respondents were asked to give their response on problems originating from recipients humanitarian services about rain, dry rivers that can't give enough water to farmers. The majority agreed that the statement is true this revealed the findings that droughts continue for long time and there are no rivers and dams and farmers wait only for rains.

In the last few years, agricultural production has been unstable as drought continues to affect most of the country. From a broader perspective, prolonged food insecurity and vulnerability resulting from limited successive years of crop failure, flooding, conflict and demographic changes have created a protracted emergency situation.



The respondents were further asked to give their views on whether unemployment among the youth who have grown up in time of complete state collapse was a disturbing problem, if inflation and devaluation of the currency and humanitarian services were a problem. The majority of the respondents agreed that this statement is true.

These findings agreed that after the collapse of the government the economy in Somalia is heavily dependent on livestock and agriculture. Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal and bananas are Somalia's principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, goat and manufactured goods are the principal imports. The importing of livestock was banned and stopped because of disease. This caused unemployment in the country and it reduced the economy and the young generation has little formal education, few marketable skills, and in many cases has been drawn into militia activities and/or criminality.

The other thing is the devaluation of the currency and the inflation when the central bank of Somalia and financial institutions totally collapsed. Somalia imports roughly 60% of its food requirements, mostly rice and wheat flour. Although cereal prices follow similar increased trends, increases in Somalia not only exceed global cereal price increases, but the relative price differential has significantly increased over the last six months.

The printing of counterfeit bank notes of local currency, the Somali shilling, has worsened already runaway inflation in the country and further devalued the shilling against the US dollar. The devaluation of the shilling against the dollar immediately translates into serious pains in a family's budget.

Ultimately the respondents were asked whether the absence of public services caused poor sanitation contaminated water and lack of near clinics and maternal health care and surgery.



Patients of their relatives have to purchase drips, antibiotics, drugs and as well pay doctors fees. There are no enough bed wards. Intravenous drips hang from window bars sanitation is poor and water supply is inadequate and often contaminated. Few services now depend on volunteers and private support.

## 5.2 Conclusions

The researcher made the following conclusions depending on from the findings of the study.

The research questions were made so as to derive the obstacles of delivering humanitarian services to the displaced people. The findings showed or revealed that there are obstacles and barriers to humanitarian work. The results confirmed that if the security of the operating environment, the safety and security of the humanitarian aid workers is ensured, if the militia and the clans stopped roadblocks, killing and kidnapping the staff of the humanitarian agencies, if the government institutions work effectively, if the government reduced or stopped the subjected arbitrary taxation and custom fees the better humanitarian services will reach immediately the right place and to the right people.

The research questions were also made as to explore the problems within the organizations. In regard to the research questions, the findings obtained confirmed that there are problems in the humanitarian organizations. The results show that the higher a qualified or trained staff and technical expertise, the higher the problem will be solved. From the findings the researcher therefore came to conclude that if the organizations get enough facilities and set a good strategy for implementation if they stopped self interest and interest based on clanism, the more problems in the humanitarian organizations will be solved and help to the displaced people would be boosted. Hence the problems in the organizations have to be solved.



Finally the research questions were made to address the problems originating from the recipients of humanitarian services. NGO's should build services for people to get good sanitation and water reduced unemployment will cause people to purchase basic needs and create jobs. Farmers should get enough water in droughts and dams built.

### 5.3 Recommendations

1. Firstly, by directly approaching representatives of the leaders as well as civil society, business and religious leadership in the field to Coordinator and representatives of the Country Team plan response to the needs and rights of vulnerable communities, including internally displaced persons, most of who are living in and around urban areas.
2. Policy guidelines should clarify minimum standards and charges for air operations throughout the country involving humanitarian Non-governmental organizations inside Somalia. The NGO's have to pay landing fees for the use of airstrips and air operations throughout the country to built the air strips.
3. Restoration of Markets and Economy – Since humanitarian interventions seem to take place in the country where agriculture is the largest market, The humanitarian NGOs must encourage and plan funds or budgets for the regeneration of pastures and potentially improved crop production in some areas, in particular in the southern and central regions for the upcoming planting season in the breadbasket regions of southern Somalia, to increase crop yields and incomes. Restoration of Basic Medical Facilities – There is a requirement to have basic medical care that can provide minimum coverage of a society. Even in societies where there is an absence of government, there is very basic care.



The humanitarian assistance, the basic level of care helps is that to have access to clean water, thus reducing risk of epidemics for the rest of the population.

4. There must be capacity building, training and strengthen the skills and capacities of the humanitarian staffs to cope with different aspects of the crisis. Individual staff of local NGOs and local staff of International NGOs and Agencies, and individual members of affected communities, must strengthens their capacity for effective service delivery, accountability, disaster mitigation and management, as well as security related capacity building.
5. To make good relationship to members of traditional leadership and governance structures, such as elders, religious groups and others, who play a significant role in facilitating access and delivery of humanitarian assistance,. Government actors in selected cases, only if directly needed to strengthen immediate service delivery to affected/vulnerable communities (for example in health, education, water and sanitation). Coordination and management systems; cluster and inter-cluster coordination; management mechanisms of common funds; advocacy and communication mechanisms.



#### **5.4 Suggestions for further research**

The following are among others, pertinent suggestions for further research:

1. To determine the effects of the Non-governmental Organizations that supports the humanitarian services to the community in Somalia.
2. To examine the effect of the poor training and management of the local NGOs to the implementation of the humanitarian services in Somalia.



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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE

Date:

Dear Respondent,

I am a student at Kampala International University studying a Master of Arts in Project Planning and Management, this questionnaire has been prepared for data collection concerning “Challenges faced by the Non-governmental Organizations Delivering Humanitarian Services in Somalia”. The purpose of the questionnaire is only for academic reasons and the information you provide treated with utmost will be confidentially. I kindly request you to answer the questions fully and honestly.

Your assistance will be highly appreciated

Direction: Please tick in the blanks provided as your response.

#### A. Profile of the respondent

1. Age:

----- 20-30

\_\_\_ 30-40

\_\_\_ 40-50

\_\_\_ 50 and above



## 2. Gender:

☐ Male☐ Female

## 3. Educational Qualification:

☐ Primary Level☐ Secondary Level☐ University level

## 4. Number of years experience:

☐ Less than 6 months☐ 6 months—1 year☐ 1 year—2 years☐ 2 years and above

## 5. Type of humanitarian service offered by your NGO

.....

**D. Direction:**

Please write your answer to the statements below. Kindly use the rating guided as follows for A, B, C, and D

4- Strongly agree

3- Agree

2-Disagree

1-Strongly disagree



### **C. Obstacles of delivering humanitarian services:**

- ..... 1. Lack of effective government institutions that hampers the implementation of humanitarian services.
- ..... 2. Ongoing of wars that cause in security in Somalia.
- ..... 3. Logistical challenges in transporting humanitarian aid to the displaced people in the country.
- ..... 4. Lack of physical access to Somalia by sea, overland, and by air has created major delays and increased the cost of transporting supplies to the displaced people in the country.
- ..... 5. Insecurity affects all aspects of the delivery of humanitarian assistance like road blocks, killing and kidnapping the staffs of the humanitarian agencies.
- ..... 6. The insecurity operating environment in Somalia has led to breaks and delays in the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- ..... 7. Delivery of humanitarian aid to the displaced people has not been possible or has been interrupted when the safety and security of humanitarian aid workers could not be ensured.
- ..... 8. Humanitarian relief items are regularly subject to arbitrary taxation and customs fees at TFG checkpoints and at ad hoc roadblocks manned by armed militias that cause delay and break of delivering assistance to the displaced people.
- ..... 9. The closure of key airstrips in the country and access has been further complicated by poor road, sea, and air infrastructure and flooding.



#### **D. Problems within the Organizations**

..... 1. International NGOs work through local Somali NGOs to implement their programs, but many of these local NGOs lack operational capacity, and international NGO officials said there is a need to build their capacity to provide aid.

..... 2. International NGOs pass the humanitarian services through local NGOs, but some of those patterns didn't deliver to the right place and to the right people.

..... 3. Lack of qualified or poorly trained staffs, and technical expertise in the fieldwork specially gathering information and monitoring and evaluation.

..... 4. Limit experienced capacity of the fieldworkers to deliver humanitarian services to the internal displaced people.

..... 5. Limited facilities and poor implementation strategy when distributing humanitarian services to the internal displaced people.

..... 6. Self interest and interest based on clans that is delivering humanitarian services a place where the displaced people got help from other organizations instead of internal displaced people who don't have basic needs of life.

#### **E. Problems originating recipients of the humanitarian services**

..... 1. Poor sanitation and water that is inadequate or contaminated and also the absence of public services.

..... 2. People have not able to purchase intravenous drips, antibiotics; drugs etc as well as pay a doctor's fee.



..... 3. Lack of the near absence of clinics and basic maternal health care for the people like cases needing surgery relate to maternal problems, and also birth complications are also linked to female genital mutilation.

..... 4. Delay about the time of raining seasons and the river that reach dry level or cannot give enough water to the farmers.

..... 5. Looting animals and property, about the minority people did by militia control by a warlord or militia clans.

..... 6. Floods that caused by destroying the farmers and also houses of the people who live in the urban areas.

..... 7. Unemployment among the youth up to 30 years of age, who have grown up in a time of complete state collapse, is a particularly disturbing problem.

..... 8. Inflation and devaluation of currency in the late of last decade in Somalia.

..... 9. Droughts that continue long time where there is no rivers and dams where the farmers wait only for rain.

..... 10. Diseases and insects that attack and destroy the farmers before the ripping time.



