

**LIMITS OF RATIONAL PLANNING AND SYSTEMATIC MANAGEMENT  
OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BUSIA DISTRICT:  
A CASE STUDY OF BUSINYWA CHILD  
DEVELOPMENT CENTRE.**

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A Thesis

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Project Planning and Management

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August, 2010

## DECLARATION A

"This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a Degree or any other academic award in any University or Institution of Learning".

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## DECLARATION B

"I/We confirm that the work reported in this was carried out by the candidate under my/our supervision".

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# APPROVAL SHEET

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## DEDICATION

*To my dear parents with lots of love.*

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## **ABSTRACT**

This research was directed to "*limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects: A case study of Businywa Child Development Centre*".

The objectives of the study were to find out the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, identify the effects thereof, and establish the possible solutions.

The methodology used in the study was a descriptive survey design where data was collected and analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively, the data was presented by use of graphs, pie charts, tables, and narration. Data was collected by using research instruments such as; questionnaires, documentation, and observation.

Study findings show that if the future of limits of rational planning and systematic management persists, this is most likely to create a lot of problems hence slowing down on the achievement of the intended goals and objectives of development project, of which might continue to lag behind the economic and social welfare of the targeted communities.

In conclusion, finding new ways of establishing conditions that allow development planners and managers to recognize and cope effectively with the inevitable complexity and uncertainty of development problems will be the strongest achievement to developing countries and international assistance agencies in the remaining of this century.

The study recommended that: systems of development projects in developing countries should respond creatively and quickly to changes, improvise new ways of doing things, be sensitive and responsive to the needs of people they serve.

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# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **THE PROBLEM AND ITS SCOPE**

### **Background**

A review of the experience in developing countries over the past decade confirms that despite the complex formal requirements prescribed for project preparation, analysis, and management—projects continue to deviate widely from preconceived plans. But delays, cost overruns, changes in objectives, and other deviations are usually attributed to inadequate design, analysis, and administrative control. In a performance, audit of seventy projects World Bank (2008) Officials found for instance, that it was a “fairly common experience for projects to change in the course of implementation”. In most cases the officials reported, the original design has been proven to be technically faulty or the preparation studies insufficiently detailed to foresee difficulties subsequently encountered.

But it is rarely noted that many of the problems encountered are unpredictable, no matter how comprehensively the projects were planned or how much technological analysis was done. Nor is it generally observed that detailed, rigid, and complex design, analysis, and management procedures may themselves have created many of the problems. Attempts to impose rational and systematic standards have, for instance, generated conflicts and tensions among funding agency staff, central government planners, project managers and technicians

and the various groups and projects affected. Problems also arise from the inflexibility of planning and design procedures – especially when funding agencies attempt to force managers to follow preconceived designs in the face of unanticipated social, economic, and political changes, or when new information about existing conditions threatens the success of a project as it was originally conceived. These problems with rational planning and systematic management are not only confined to projects in developing countries, but similar difficulties arise when governments in industrial societies attempt to plan public policies and programs in the great detailed (Lindblom, 2006). Attempts at rational planning in the United States have often had the effect of making policies less rather than more effective (Wildavsky, 2004). By focusing too heavily on objectives and procedures, planners may overestimate the resources available to carry out programs and underestimate the costs of doing detailed and sufficient analysis. Rational planning has often displaced dynamic processes of political interaction through which different views and perspectives could have evolved.

One needs only a cursory review of evaluations conducted by national governments and international agencies themselves in order to discover that attempts at rational planning and systematic management generated unintended side effects that detract from the efficacy of international development projects.

Attempts at rational planning and systematic management may result in costly but ineffective analysis, and also in greater uncertainty and inconsistency. The delegation of important development activities to foreign experts not familiar

with local conditions, inappropriate interventions by central government planners, inflexibility, and unnecessary constraints on managers. Failure to include intended beneficiaries in the design and implementation of projects and reluctance to engage in the detection and correction of errors are also consequences frequently encountered.

### **Statement of the Problem.**

Rational planning and systematic management plays a very important role in the project life cycle. It is therefore imperative for every project to take note of the same as it's a pre-requisite to efficient and effective performance. If the reverse is the case, development is adversely affected.

According to the Busia District Community Development Officer's Annual Report 2008/2009, it was reported that most of the development projects in Busia have performed poorly for the last five years and among the projects noted was Businywa Child Development Centre. This was clearly attributed to the limits of rational planning and systematic management.

This could lead to delay or failure in the achievement of the intended goals and objectives of the development projects which can impact negatively on the development of the District. This therefore, has necessitated the need for the researcher to find out and evaluate the causes, effects thereof and possible solutions to alleviate the situation.

## **Purpose of the Study**

The study is intended to identify the limits of rational planning and systematic management of the development projects in Busia district, a case study of Businywa Child Development Centre.

## **Research Objectives**

1. To find out the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.
2. To identify how the limits affect rational planning and systematic management of development projects.
3. To establish possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.

## **Research Questions**

1. What are the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects?
2. How do the limits affect rational planning and systematic management of development projects?
3. What are the possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects?

## **Scope**

The study was carried out on limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects in Busia District, taking a case study of Businywa Child Development Centre. The project is located in Busia District, 9 kilometers from the Major Town, a long Busia – Jinja Highway. The study looked at the limits of rational planning and systematic management of Businywa Child Development Centre in the-range of five years in the development process from the year 2005 – 2009.

## **Significance of the Study**

The study findings are of great importance in the notification of the people in Authority more so in the Development Sector about the limits; effects thereof, and what ought to be done to cease the persistent increase of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.

Outcomes and recommendations from the study are of help to the concerned persons in Authority to know their strength and weaknesses thus motivating them to strive positively in the attainment of their intended goals.

Lastly, the relevant information from the field research study will be of much benefit to the further researchers in the related fields for literature review.



## **Operational Definitions of Key Terms**

APHA:	American Public Health Association
BCDC:	Businywa Child Development Centre
CIO:	Compassion International Organization
DR:	Doctor
PROF:	Professor
SOW:	Statement of Work
UN:	United Nations
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
WBS:	Work Breakdown Structure

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, the researcher reviews the related literature of the study. The literature review is divided into sections that include; meaning of rational planning, systematic management, their relationship, the limits, effects thereof, and possible solutions.

### **Concepts, Ideas, Opinions from Authors/Experts**

#### **Rational Planning**

Harold (2000), Refers to being able to think clearly and make decisions or ideas based on the reason rather than emotions. Most successful development projects, whether it is in response to in-house project or a customer request, must utilize rational techniques. The qualitative and quantitative tools for project planning must be identified. From a rational point of view, planning must make effective utilization of resources. This effective utilization over several different types of projects requires a rational plan in which the entire project is considered as one large network subdivided into smaller ones.

If the project is large and complex, then careful rational planning and analysis must be accomplished of both the direct and indirect-labor-charging organizational units. The project organizational structure must be established so

that maximum allocation of resources can be made; resource costing and accounting systems must be developed; and a management information and report system must be established.

Effective rational planning can not be accomplished; all of the necessary information becomes available at project initiation. These information requirements are: the Statement of Work (SOW), Project Specifications, Milestone Schedule, and the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).

### **Systematic Management**

Morris (2004), It is the doing things according to a system or plan in a thorough, efficient or determined way. Here management decides and implements the means to effectively and efficiently utilize human resources to reach predetermined objectives. In this, project managers perform the same functions as other managers, that is, they plan, schedule, motivate, and control. Various types of managers exist because they fill special needs, for example, the marketing manager specializes in distributing a product or service; the production manager specializes in the conversion of resource inputs to outputs; the financial manager ensures adequate funds are available to keep the project viable.

Systematic management is unique because it manages temporary, non repetitive activities and frequently acts depending on the formal plan, for example, managers here are expected to marshal resources to complete a fixed-life project

on time, budget, and within specifications. Managers in this instance are the direct link to the customer and must manage the interface between customer expectations and what is feasible and reasonable. They provide direction, coordination, and integration to the project team, which is often made up of part-time participants loyal to their functional departments.

Systematic management is responsible for performance and it must ensure that appropriate trade-offs are made between time, cost, and performance requirements of the project. At the same time, unlike its functional counterparts, this type of management generally possesses only rudimentary technical knowledge to make such decisions and it must orchestrate the completion of the project by inducing the right people, at the right time, to address the right issues and make the decisions. Clearly, this system of management is unique and challenging and since there are a variety of environmental forces interacting in today's development projects world wide, that contribute to increased demand for good management across all projects. This way of management appears to be ideally suited for development environment requiring accountability, flexibility, innovation, speed, and continuous improvement.

### **Relationship between Rational Planning and Systematic Management**

Cleland (2007), there are many development projects in which management can not identify a project's priority and link it with the strategic plan. Every systematic management should contribute value to the project's rational plan,

which is designed to meet the future needs of its clients. Ensuring a strong relationship between the rational planning and systematic management is a difficult task that demands constant attention from top and middle management.

The larger and diverse the project, the more difficult it is to create and maintain the strong link. Ample evidence suggests that many development projects have not developed a process that clearly aligns management to the formal plan. The result is poor utilization of the project's resources – people, money, equipment, and core competencies. Conversely, projects that have coherent link of systematic management to rational planning have more cooperation across the development and perform better globally.

Development projects can ensure this relationship by the integration of projects with the formal plans. Integrations assume the existence of a strategic plan and a process for prioritizing projects by their contribution to the plan. A crucial factor to ensure the success of integrating the plan with the management lies in the creation of a process that is open and published for all participants to review.

### **The limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects**

Kilby (2007), The insistence of funding organizations whether they be international aid agencies or central government ministries on precise and detailed statements of objectives at the outset in order to facilitate systematic

planning, management and control often leads to game playing, phony precision and inaccurate reporting that create severe management problems later on.

In his evaluation of eleven United Nations technical assistant projects for developing small scale industry and handicraft cooperatives, he found that many of the initial proposals did lack specific goals and targets. But he also noted that the planners and managers who designed the proposals often unrealistically enlarged the goals and targets that they could identify. Unable to predict precisely what the project could achieve, but faced with demands of quantitative indicators, administrators overestimated the number of people who would find jobs through project activities by more than five times the actual number who were eventually employed. In this study, efforts were made to find out the difficulties in defining goals and objectives precisely.

Ahmed (2005), Managers faced either with conforming to requirements for rational planning and precise identification of objectives and goals (regardless of their capacity to do so) or with losing the funding for a project, often provide seemingly precise statements that are inaccurate, unverifiable or mere window dressing. The objectives are often the ones that planners think the funding organizations want rather than those that managers can achieve. Moreover, projects are often designed by central government officials, international agency staff or foreign consultants who will not ultimately be responsible for managing them, and who may be more concerned with formulating a 'fundable' proposal than with planning a project that is administratively feasible. The study looked at

the role played by government, international agency or foreign consultants intervention in planning and management of development projects.

Thimm (2000), States that the tendency to design projects without adequate knowledge of local conditions and needs is not confined to those involving foreign consultants. Managers in central government ministries often know as little as some external consultants about minority ethnic, regional or religious groups within their own countries. Or they may fail to incorporate what is known into project designs because the information can not be quantified.

An evaluation of eight settlement and livestock projects in the Uganda, for instance, concluded that all of them had had problems obtaining the acceptance and cooperation of local residents. Those that had been designed to settle Karamajongo groups ran into special difficulties. "Social acceptance became a particular problem in irrigation projects where karamajongos were expected to be available for scheduled work in their fields at time periods which apparently clashed with their livestock herding interests". He also reports, the Karamajongos simply opposed the managers of the projects, even though the pasture conditions in the area were technically suitable to make the program a success. In nearly all cases, the projects had been designed by the central government planners who knew little about local conditions and who made few attempts to discover or understand the cultural practices that would be essential to successful implementation. It's upon this concept that the study found out about the delegation to experts and inappropriate intervention in development projects.

Hutchinson, Montre, Hawes & Mann (2004), the more sophisticated the analytical requirements, the more likely essential nonquantifiable information will be overlooked. Many development projects were identified from linear programming models but many of the resulting proposals failed to include information that was vital to the success of the project. It had simply never been collected and quantified. The analysis of development projects in developing countries for example, did not account for cost or profit conditions of the beneficiaries for whom the project were intended; intended beneficiaries had this information, but it was never solicited from them.

The project designers simply assumed that increased productivity would generate large profits, an assumption that turned out to be highly questionable. The project thus did little to improve production or incomes of peasants. That's why the study sought to find out the level to which the beneficiaries are involved in the development project activities.

Gordenker (2006), Limits can also arise from the politics of development project formulation and negotiation. Although international assistance agencies insist that projects be appraised and selected on the basis of objective financial and technical criteria, political leaders often intervene to shape a project's scope, components and organizational arrangements.

That is especially true in the case of large, high – priority development projects, or those in which a government thinks its sovereignty is being impinged upon by



international agencies. Thus – despite the elaborative search, identification and selection procedures employed by most international assistance agencies – one evaluation of United Nations assistance projects in Africa pointed out that “in practice projects selection tends to be heavily influenced by considerations which are extraneous to the rational screening process”. The two major factors that often sway decisions are “the immediate socio – political events which lead up to the project request and the personal background of the United Nations advisers assisting in project identification and formulation. It was vital therefore, to explore the dynamics of political interaction and intervention in development projects.

### **Effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects**

Ostrander (2003), In his study of the Compassion International sponsored projects in Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia, notes that government officials in each country intervened directly in negotiations on development projects, some times they deliberately generated conflicts with international agency personnel in order to obtain concessions or greater control over design and implementation. The design and funding of the development projects in such developing countries involved a long, tortuous process of political bargaining; for more than a year, government officials played an important role in negotiating with the World Bank and a group of private investors to reach a mutual compromise. The final proposal was less a reflection of formal principles of “good

management” than a bundle of political compromises minimally acceptable to all parties. The study thus identified the effects of government intervention in the planning and management process of development projects.

Tendler (2001), the ability of technical experts and project managers to follow a detailed project design once they are on the job may also be extremely limited. In his evaluation of development projects points out that “effective operation of the experts was hampered by under – provision of counterparts, language problems, lack of logistical support from the Ministry and shifting government Policy.” In some cases, the government altered its requests or demanded changes in the scope or content of a project after it had gotten underway because scarce technical and managerial personnel had to be reassigned to other projects or activities. Moreover, long delays in receiving essential equipment or supplies often slowed down the projects or changed their fundamental nature, requiring unanticipated alterations in activities and outputs. It was the interest of this study therefore, to note the effects of technical experts intervention in development projects.

UNDP (2009), Project designed and prepared by headquarters staff of international agencies and by central ministries of developing countries often requires high levels of Coordination among government agencies and between the public and private sectors in the developing states yet the ability of central planning agencies and government ministries to coordinate and control their resources is extremely weak in most cases. His evaluation of development

projects pointed out that "coordination between government departments in concepts and actions is enormously complicated by sectoral factionalism" a problem aggravated by sectoral specializations within the United Nations systems. The compartmentalization between technical line ministries and their relationships to the ministries of planning and finance finds a virtual mirror image in the United Nations system of Specialized Agencies and their relationship to the United Nations Development Projects Representative in the field". It was on this view that the study highlighted the effects of the International Agencies in the planning and management process of development projects.

### **Possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects**

Korten & Alfonso (2002), Argues that rational planning and systematic management must be based more on social learning than on scientific management. It must depend less on finding subjective rational and optimal or "correct" solutions than discovering useful actions that can ameliorate adverse conditions of individuals and groups who are affected by them and in ways that are acceptable to them.

He further argues that the key to social learning is not analytical method, but organizational process; and the central methodology concern is not with the isolation of variables or control of bureaucratic deviations from centrally designed blueprints, but with effectively engaging the necessary participation of system

members in contributing to the collective knowledge of system. He contends that "the more complex the problem, the greater the need for localized solutions and for value innovations – both of which call for broadly based participation in decision process of system ," and he points to a number of the development projects which have used these process more successfully than those that were planned and managed by conventional methods. In this study, efforts were made to establish how planning and management of development projects can be simplified.

Caiden & Wildavsky (2004), Says that in developing countries choices among development project arrangements must consider the trade – off between the cost of apparent redundancy and duplication and the increased probabilities of succeeding in attaining development goals. These analysts argue that the creation of redundancy, far from being inefficient and wasteful, is essential for increasing the reliability of service delivery.

They do point out that the ability of rich countries to obtain the resources needed for production and service delivery owes less to management efficiently than to complex redundancy. When a large number of development projects with resources and skills are performing the same or similar functions, the failure of one project is not critical. Others fill the gap, thereby greatly increasing reliability and reducing uncertainty. "Arrangements in poor countries," they "lack the benefits of redundancy – the surplus, the reserve, the overlapping networks of skills and data – to cushion the reverberating effects of uncertainty." The study

sought to establish how incentives can be created for innovative management of development projects.

Rondinelli (2002), Asserts that an enduring problem of promoting rational and systematic planning and management respectively of development projects is what He has called the "paradox of power." A paradox inherent in planning and management reforms is that although strong central commitments are necessary to initiate them, they cannot be effectively implemented and sustained without diffused political support and wide spread participation. But those whose political commitment is necessary to initiate the reforms often consider such a diffusion of participation and power as a serious threat.

Development projects that reallocate economic resources, increase income and expand participation in the economy also create new and potentially more powerful interest groups that can make claims on and challenge central authority. Indeed, the creation of countervailing power is often a precondition for sustaining project reform. It's on this ground, that the study revealed how adjusting planning and management procedures to the environment of public policy-making is a great solution.

Montgomery (2005), States that although many development projects need central guidance and support, their implementation must be localized to meet unique or special needs, especially in rural areas where resources and institutional capacity are lacking or weak. In his review of development projects


programs in twenty-five developing countries Uganda inclusive, concluded that devolution of management functions to local, non – career officials “produced significantly better results for peasant welfare than arrangements using professional management system.” Basing on this idea, the study noticed the usefulness of building local organizational capacity and an effective institutional network for service delivery.

### **Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework**


The conceptual framework (figure 2.1) points out the Independent variable (Rational Planning) which presumes the cause of an effect, Dependent variable (Systematic Management) this provides the result from the cause, and Extraneous variable, these are external factors that are beyond the management’s control but do affect directly the project.

Here it shows that the success of systematic management depends upon the role played by the rational planning of development projects.

### Independent Variables



### Dependent Variables



### Extraneous Variable

**Source :**( Author, 2010)

### Independent variable (rational planning)

This is the most important stage in the project life cycle, where the level of efforts increases and plans developed to determine the resources to be used, when it will be scheduled, how the staffing will be, what the budget will be, and the risks expected.

UN (2005), evaluation of ten projects in developing countries found out that more than two years were required to develop and approve project proposals; it took nearly another three months to negotiate them with the government. And more than three years of intensive planning, it was changed to an experiment to test alternative approaches to rural development. The project could have been initiated three years earlier and designed incrementally. This evaluation is related to the findings in the present study, its states that rational planning and systematic management is a time consuming, costly, and involves activities that frequently entails long delays in translating policies into actions and does not always ensure effective results.

Strachan (2006), the insistence of international agencies on using complex feasibility analysis, for example, often leads consultants and governments to propose large-scales, high-technology, and capital construction projects because they are considered to be more worthy than smaller, labor-intensive, social and human resource development programs of the time, effort, manpower, and funds that must be invested in elaborate and detailed analysis. Frequently the delegation of the planning and design to international constants results in projects that meet approved technical and financial analysis requirements, but that are either ineffective in solving local problems or produce adverse consequences. This matches with the findings in the present study, which shows that the complexity of the procedures used to plan and analyze project proposals, together with the scarcity of highly trained technicians in most



developing countries, usually results in greater dependence on foreign experts to do the required analyses and manage the projects. But the delegation of functions to technical experts does not guarantee that the projects will be more effectively designed or more appropriate to the problems and needs of developing countries.

UNDP (2004), the transfer of inappropriate technology is another indication of lack of knowledge or sufficient concern about local conditions and needs. Evaluators of UNDP-sponsored rural development projects found that "a major constraint affecting achievement of project objectives is the transfer to technologies without local adaptations." The complex technology that administrators often recommend may have little or no advantage over less complex indigenous methods or equipment. The finding and argument above are in line with the present study, which argues that rational planning and systematic management are conferred to an aura of scientific precision that encourage administrators to search for quantitative solutions to problems and rely on technical standards rather than to seek knowledge and insights from those who are supposed to benefit from the social or economic development programs.

UN (2005), the conditions under which the development projects must be implemented are often so constraining that field managers cannot adhere to the preconceived designs; nor can they quickly change these conditions to make them compatible with the plans. The people, to whom they must deliver new knowledge and technology as the analysts discovered, live in harsh environments

endemic to crippling and even killing diseases, having little or no one of outside communication. Achieving significant program objectives quickly is extremely difficult when these environmental problems are coupled with such other projects difficulties; as the implementation Sahel governments' inability to adequately support project goals, slow arrival of equipment, suppliers and technical expertise and ineffective use of the AID project evaluation system. This is consistent with the present study, which elaborates that attempt at rational planning and systematic management often lead planners to over design development projects; they are made too complex for the institutions assigned to implement them. Also, the methods of analysis used by national planners or staffs of international agencies are often imposed on indigenous organizations.

World Bank (2006), many International Organizations as well as governments of developing countries have elaborate project evaluation procedures and prescribe monitoring and review of ongoing projects, evaluation is less rigorous and accurate than headquarters producers imply because of this absence of baseline data and the inherent difficulties of out that it is usually "in the interest of all parties to conclude that, save for the most visible failures, every project in the most favorable light, and the unwillingness of international organizations to embarrass recipient governments, also inhibit accurate evaluation. This finding collaborates with the present study; it asserts that the reluctance of administrators to engage in error detection and correction makes it difficult for anyone to know when projects are deviating from their planned paths. It reduces

the ability of managers to learn from past mistakes and limits their capacity to redesign projects when they meet obstacle or difficulties.

CIO (2009), reported that in many of the technical assistance projects undertaken in developing countries objectives were started so vaguely or imprecisely that funding agency staff, government officials, project managers, consultants and participants were in continual conflict over the most efficient ways of managing them. This is in strong agreement with the present study; it found general confusion "regarding the long-term and immediate objectives, outputs, and work plans. Similarly, immediate objectives (project effects) were commonly confused with measurable outputs, and sometimes with elements of work plan which was often in nature of a reporting schedule."

Evaluators for the APHA (2009), few understandings sponsored by international assistance agencies include provisions for collecting simple baseline data prior to the start of the project and for collecting information to measure progress during its execution. The mission to Pakistan, for example, reported that "the identification of depressed economic groups is beset by problems of serious data scarcity" (USAID, 2007). Staff in Sri Lanka noted that the "socio-economic data base- while at first glance ample-contains serious deficiencies - with the paucity of data, the international donors have also been loath to undertake this arduous task" (USAID, 2008). These arguments do realm with the present study, it notes that rational planning and systematic management procedure often require information and data that are simply not available in most developing countries.

That such demand may force administrators to use whatever data at hand, regardless of their appropriateness or accuracy.

Cohen (2002), experience with development projects shows that the more complex they become the more difficult it is to obtain cooperation from and maintain coordination among the many organizations and groups that are needed to provide services and inputs. This goes hand in hand with the present study finding, which states that the tendency of management scientists to insist on sophisticated and complicated methods of analysis, planning and programming often creates more problems than it solves.

Esman and Montgomery (2003), found out that the field staffs who work with the poor and those populations living in remote areas are usually the worst trained, the least supervised and weakest motivated, and that they are rarely supported by efficient supply systems. This finding relates to the present study, which reveals that administrative systems and procedures are needed that encourage, support and reward those managers who take responsibility for development activities especially in rural areas where uncertainty and risk of failure are greater and where the knowledge required to plan and implement projects comprehensively and systematically is least likely to be available.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **Research Design**

The study adopted a descriptive survey design which was featured through surveys that utilized questionnaires, documentations and observation among the management, stakeholders, employees and beneficiaries of Businywa Child Development Centre. This was because the descriptive survey design enabled the researcher to gather information, summarize, present and interpret it for the purpose of clarification. It included facts, current conditions concerning the nature or class of events and involved procedures of induction, analysis, classification, enumeration and measurements. Such a study design helped to ensure evidence on existing situation and conditions and to identify standards and norms with which to compare present and hence plan for the future.

#### **Research Population**

The population under study constituted both male and female who had stayed at Businywa Child Development Centre for more than two years at the time of the study. The population had subgroups in which the researcher was interested. The population was thus divided into subgroups to represent the subgroups before the sample was drawn. Important to note was that the percentage of the subgroups in the sample was the same as that in the population.

## **Sample Size**

From a total population of 2000, the sample size was calculated using the Slovin's formula:

$$n = N / (1 + Ne^2) \text{ (Slovin, 2010)}$$

N = Total population

e = error tolerance

For this study:

$$n = 2000 / (1 + 2000 * 0.1 * 0.1) = 95$$

## **Sampling Procedure**

The sampling procedure used in the selection of respondents from the population was by stratified random sampling. The sample size of 95 was divided into four different categories such as; the management, stakeholders, employees, and beneficiaries, because the researcher felt that respondents from these groups provided the required information. The selection of the respondents to be interviewed was done at random from each stratum and the number was based on the proportion allocation on each stratum implying that small sample from small stratum and large sample from large stratum.

## **Research Instrument**

Structured questionnaires were used to collect data from the respondents. Self administered questionnaires were ideal, because all the respondents were within

the proximity of the researcher. It was also flexible and time saving, since it was executed within a short time of 21 days.

The questionnaires comprised of closed- ended and open-ended questions. In the closed-ended questionnaires, the researcher used pre-determined multiple answers, with the corresponding Likert rating scale, as below.

- A. Agree
- B. Strongly Agree
- C. Not Certain
- D. Disagree
- E. Strong Disagree

The respondents were required to tick the most appropriate option. In the open-ended questionnaire, respondents expressed their feelings about the research questions

### **Validity and Reliability of Instruments**

To establish the reliability of the questionnaire, the method of expert judgment was used which is recommended by Gay (1992) as the best. To affect this, after constructing the questionnaire, the researcher contacted the supervisor and three other experts to ensure the necessary adjustments were made and to make sure that the questionnaire was made to the advice of the experts. That is, it was made more clearly, relevant, specific and logically arranged.

In addition, a pre-test was conducted in order to test and improve on the reliability of the questionnaire. To improve the validity on the data collection instruments, (mainly the questionnaire), the number of relevant questions, and the outcome was above optimal. The following scale was adopted from Chandy (2007).

$$V=RQ/TQ$$

$$V=6/6=1$$

Where by,

V = Validity

RQ= Relevant Questions

TQ = Total number of Questions.

The above expression, indicates that the number of relevant questions from the total number of questions on the questionnaire, were above the required 0.5 scales. Thus the instrument used was valid.

### **Data Gathering Procedure**

During the data gathering, the study relied on both primary and secondary sources. This was because, the later was not sufficient enough for the study; hence it was not used alone. The management, stakeholders, employees, and beneficiaries were the primary source of data, through responding to the questionnaires. The project library and files provided the secondary data.



However this source (secondary) was minimally used since most of the information was provided primarily. Thus the primary source was the most important one to use.

The selection exercise was conducted; and there after the researcher ensured that, the completed questionnaires were collected as soon as they were filled, to avoid loss or misplacement.

### **Data Analysis**

The research objectives together with the questions were used to guide the process of analysis through out the study. The same guided the process of editing, coding and tabulation.

Qualitative data analysis was basically applied on the respondent's views about the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, effects thereof, and possible solutions. During analysis, it is these very ideas generated from the research field that were ultimately grouped into sub-themes reflecting the grand theme of the study.

Quantitative data analysis was expressed in terms of descriptive statistics which was demonstrated by using pie charts, bar graphs and tables of frequencies and percentages so as to show the distribution of the responses as was deemed necessary.

## **Ethical Considerations**

Before going to the field for data gathering, the researcher first sought approval of the proposal by the supervisor. Thereafter, the researcher secured a letter of introduction -from the office of the Administrator of the postgraduate studies and research, Kampala International University; it was presented to the Project Director of Businywa Child Development Centre seeking permission to carry out research from his project. All this was done for the purposes of acceptance, confidentiality, and security during the field study/ research.

After all the required data was gathered, the draft report was written and handed to the supervisor for corrections which was then incorporated in the second draft. After the supervisor's approval, the final report was forwarded to the school of postgraduate studies and research for VIVA Exams.

## **Limitations of the Study**

The immediate challenge of this study was that because not much has been written on the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects in Busia District, the researcher therefore had to rely on scanty, raw literature available. Moreover, the scanty literature was so incomplete and often hand written of which it was difficult to use this information or its sources.

The researcher could not access genuine information from some respondents as they responded with a lot of suspicion. This was very true with the respondents in key positions with fear that they would be quoted.

Financial problems, it is true that this research needed a lot of funding from its implementation to the termination stage and the fact that the researcher had no stable financial status, it was such a big challenge to make the research possible.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA**

#### **Overview**

This chapter encompasses the presentation, analysis and interpretation of data collected from the field. Findings on the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, effects thereof and possible solutions have been presented, analyzed, and interpreted in accordance to the research objectives and questions of the study. As earlier noted in chapter three of this work the information for this study was provided by management, stakeholders, employees and beneficiaries respectively.


#### **Profile of the respondents**

The researcher prepared the questionnaire appropriate to this study. A structured questionnaire was used to collect data from the respondents. Self administered questionnaire was ideal, because all the respondents were within the proximity of the researcher. It was also flexible and time saving, since it was executed within a short time of twenty one days. The researcher distributed a total of ninety five questionnaires (95), that is; to management (10), stakeholders (20), employees (20), and beneficiaries (45) of BCDC and all questionnaires were completed representing a response rate of 100%, this was

considered very ample for the objectives of the study. The response rate was so because the researcher had four assistants and all are workers at BCDC. These persons encouraged and motivated the respondents to fill in the questionnaire. University introduction letter and personal introduction letter to the respondents are also the cause of the stated response rate.

### Gender of respondent

**Figure 4.2 Gender of respondents**




Source: primary data, 2010

In the bar graph above, on the issue of gender of respondents; fifty six (59%) were male and thirty nine (41) female, representing a total frequency of 95 and percentage of 100. Implying that the number of male response was greater than that of the female.

### Age group of respondents

**Figure 4.3 Age group of respondents**




Source: primary data, 2010

Referring to the above graph, twenty five (26%) were in the age interval of 18-25, fifteen (16%) were in the range of 26-35, twenty three (24%) were between 36-45, twenty (21%) were in the interval 46-55 and twelve (13%) were above 56 years of age.

### Marital status of respondents

**Figure 4.4 Marital status of respondents**




Source: primary data, 2010

The results in this pie chart, reveals that forty nine (52%) of the respondents were single, thirty six (38%) were married, three (3%) were widows/widowed and seven (7%) were separated/divorced. In this case, the majority of the respondents were singles, followed by the married, separated/divorced, and the widow/widowed respectively.

### Education background of respondents

**Figure 4.5 Education backgrounds of respondents**




Source: primary data, 2010

The results summarized in the graph above, reveals that 23 (24%) of respondents were of secondary level, 72 (76%) were of college/university level. This is evident that all the respondents were knowledgeable and understanding enough to read, interpret and give relevant answers to the research questions.



## Position held at project by the respondents

**Figure 4.6** Position held at project by the respondents.



Source: primary data, 2010.

As stated from the figure 4.6, management was ten (11%), stakeholders were twenty- (21%), employees were twenty (21%), and beneficiaries were forty five (47%). This was so because the frequencies and percentages of the subgroups in the sample was the same as that in the population.

## The limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects

**Table 4.1** Management's view on the limits


Options	Frequency	Percentage
A. Agree	06	60
B. Strongly Agree	04	40
C. Not Certain	00	00
D. Disagree	00	00
E. Strongly Disagree	00	00
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: primary data, 2010



In table 4.1, it is indicated that the management's response on the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects; six (60%) agreed on the issue and four (40%) strongly agreed on the same.


**Figure 4.7 Stakeholders view on the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

It is evident from this bar graph, that only two (10%) were not certain about the issue but eleven (55%) agreed and seven (35%) did strongly agree.


**Figure 4.8 Employees view on the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

From the above figure, it is evident that the employees response on the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, thirteen (65%) did agree and seven (35%) strongly agreed about the issue.

**Figure 4.9 Beneficiaries view on the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

In figure 4.9, on the question of the limits of rational Planning and systematic management of development projects, twenty five (56%) beneficiaries agreed and thirteen (29%) strongly agreed, apart from five (11%) who were not certain and the two (04%) who disagreed.

### **Limits found out from the study**

Majority of the respondents (management, stakeholders, employees and beneficiaries) as witnessed in the above table and figures agreed/strongly agreed that there are limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects and below were the most often mentioned limits as presented, analyzed and interpreted as follows.

### **Costly and ineffective analysis**

First and far most, the respondents emphasized that rational planning and systematic management is a time consuming, costly, and involves activities that frequently entails long delays in translating policies into actions and does not always ensure effective results. That the lengthy review processes produce advocacy documents which are often too theoretical to be operationally useful.

This is in line with USAID (2006), present design process for development projects is complex, requiring between two to four years for each project proposal to start. Frequently the delegation of the planning and design to international consultants results in projects that meet approved technical and financial analysis requirements, but are either ineffective in solving local problems or produce adverse consequences.

### **Inconsistency and uncertainty**

Besides, it was revealed by the respondents that rational planning and systematic management of development projects do not necessarily reduce uncertainty, nor does it make the actions of project managers more consistent with policies and objectives. And that those long delays that result from attempts at rational planning can generate even more uncertainty and inconsistency the very problems that systematic management is supposed to avoid.

The above statement collaborates with UN (2008), rapid turnover of personnel in international funding institutions and agencies, and among technical consultants

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hired to assist with analysis and design often leads to increase inconsistency and confusion as the design process drags on.

### **Delegation to experts and inappropriate intervention**

It was also found out from the study that the complexity of the procedures used to plan and analyze project proposals, together with the scarcity of highly trained technicians in most developing countries, usually results in greater dependence on foreign experts to do the required analyses and manage the projects. But the delegation of functions to technical experts does not guarantee that the projects will be more effectively designed or more appropriate to the problems and needs of developing countries.

This finding matches with Noranitpadunkan (2007), in other cases inappropriate methods have been applied by technical experts who are not familiar with the culture of the country in which they are working and who design projects that are not suited to its needs.

### **Failure to involve intended beneficiaries in planning and management**

The respondents further, stated that many of the planning and management procedures adopted by international agencies and governments of developing countries originate with multinational corporations and engineering organizations that develop them to analyze and to manage development projects. And that they are conferred to an aura of scientific precision that encourage administrators to search for quantitative solutions to problems and rely on

technical standards rather than to seek knowledge and insights from those who are supposed to benefit from the social or economic development programs.

This point is similar to the researcher's observation, few of rural development projects funded by the International Agencies, for instance, elicited the participation of the people for whom they were intended.

### **Inflexibility and unnecessary constraints on managers**

It was argued by the respondents, that what leads to success is the ability of managers to design and manage simultaneously, and to test new ideas and methods continuously no matter the circumstances in which they find themselves. That the managerial flexibility, however, is often squashed by officials in headquarters of inter-national agencies or national ministries who insist on conformance to detailed plans and rigid management systems.

On the contrary UNDP (2005), the most valuable managerial skills is not necessarily the ability to conform to preconceived project plans or project schedules, but the ability to innovate, experiment, modify, improvise, and lead talents that are often discouraged or suppressed by rigid design and centrally controlled management procedures.

### **Reluctance to engage in evaluation and error detection**

To sum up on the limits, it was confirmed by the respondents, that administrators in developing countries and international assistance agencies have

a limited capacity to discover when and how projects go astray from their designed paths implementation. That the emphasis on meeting schedules and achieving detailed objectives make them reluctant to uncover and correct mistakes.

It's consistent with APHA (2007), often, sponsoring agencies or funding institutions fail to plan for monitoring and evaluation; thus, they do not know when they deviate from the plans or what the ultimate effects are on beneficiaries.

### **Effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.**

**Table 4.2     Managements view on the effects of the limits**


<b>Options</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>A. Agree</b>	8	80
<b>B. Strongly Agree</b>	2	20
<b>C. Not Certain</b>	00	00
<b>D. Disagree</b>	00	00
<b>E. Strongly Disagree</b>	00	00
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: primary data, 2010

In the table, as regards the management's response on the effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects: eight (80%) agreed on the issue and two (20%) strongly agreed too.




**Figure 4.10 Stakeholders view on the effects of the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

Above, indicates that the stakeholders response on the effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, only two (10%) were not certain, but eleven (55%) agreed on the matter and seven (35%) strongly agreed to that.

**Figure 4.11 Employees view on the effects of the limits**




Source: primary data, 2010

The figure above, as regards the employees response on the effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, only two (10%) were not certain on the issue but the rest that is; twelve (60%)

agreed and six (30%) strongly agreed that there are effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.

**Figure 4.12 Beneficiaries view on the effects of the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

As indicated in the present graph, as per the beneficiaries response on the effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, twenty two (49%) agreed and sixteen (36%) strongly agreed, apart from the thirteen (13%) who were not certain and one (02%) who disagreed on the matter.

### Effects identified from the study

Most of the respondents did react positively by agreeing and strongly agreeing that there are effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic



management of development projects and the most frequently emphasized on were as follows.

### **Difficulties of defining objectives and goals precisely**

To start with, respondents mentioned that one of the most frequently cited effect is imprecision of the goals and objectives. Project officials admitted the difficulty of tracing out exactly who is affected by an activity and what the long-range consequences are, that these make them express their frustration over their inability to quantify the needs of the poorest groups in developing countries. Therefore, that it is nearly impossible to specify goals and objectives for projects aimed at increasing the living standards of the poor when essential factors of poverty, like dietary habits, housing standards, price differentials and ecological diversity are yet to be explored in any great details.

This finding gives more validity to CIO (2005), specific goals often cannot be identified until activities are well under way and the conditions under which will be implemented are better known. The best that can be done at outset of a project is to state objectives generally and to aim at broad targets.

### **Lack of appropriate or adequate data**

Second, respondents noted that rational planning and systematic management procedure often require information and data that are simply not available in most developing countries. That such demand may force administrators to use whatever data at hand, regardless of their appropriateness or accuracy.

In agreement Burns & Stalker (2003), the requirements that International development projects be targeted on the poorest groups in developing countries has led some missions to complain during this century. The precise information needed to get projects approved and to ensure desired results simply does not exist or is not easy to acquire.

### **Inadequate understanding of social and cultural conditions**

In addition, the respondents revealed that another serious effect is the difficulty of comprehending at the outset of a project all of the social and cultural nuances that are important for effective administration. That the demand for systematic analysis and management often leads planners and managers to use information and data that can be easily gathered or manipulated by statistical methods. And that misplaced priority on quantification often makes the planning and management procedures of international assistance agencies or national ministries end in themselves.

The study finding affirms the researcher's observation, where by in detailed feasibility studies required by the international agencies, analysts often manipulate vast amounts of unreliable data with complex statistical formulas in order to reach a conclusion on the desirability or undesirability of a project.

### **Dynamics of political interaction and intervention**

As per the study, respondents asserted that among the most severe constraints on planning and managing development projects in rational and systematic ways

is the inevitable political intervention and conflict that arises in the process. And that serious difference later erupts as conflicts that can affect the course of implementation or there may be a turnover of key personnel within the executing agency or funding institution after a proposal is formulated, submitted and approved that brings in new staff who do not understand, or who disagree with, the original design.

This study finding resonates with USAID (2005), attempt to alter, modify or circumvent the provisions of the agreement and sometimes after proposals have been submitted and approved by funding agencies and recipient governments, one side or the other become disillusioned when the details or management implications emerge.

### **Low level of administrative capacity.**

In a nutshell, it was indicated by the respondents that attempts at rational planning and systematic management often lead planners to over design development projects; they are made too complex for the institutions assigned to implement them. That the methods of analysis used by national planners or the staffs of international agencies are often imposed on indigenous organizations. And that most of the development projects in developing countries funded by International Agencies, designers required development projects to use complicated auditing and bookkeeping methods, which they could not perform adequately; nor were they willing to pay for such services. Hence that their

ability to take advantage of programs sponsored by the International Organizations was therefore severely limited.

On that note, it was similar to UN (2009), the inability to provide contributions at agreed-upon levels left the projects and the overall development plan for the developing countries unable to recruit managers for many of the projects until two or three years after they had been approved; inordinate delays occurred in providing routine administrative authority to project directors once they had no national counterparts until late in their assignments and were thus not able to train them before their departure.

### **Possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development project**


**Table 4.3 Managements view on the possible solutions to the limits**

<b>Options</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<b>A.</b> Agree	5	50
<b>B.</b> Strongly Agree	5	50
<b>C.</b> Not Certain	00	00
<b>D.</b> Disagree	00	00
<b>E.</b> Strongly Disagree	00	00
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: primary data, 2010

In the above table, the management’s response was very positive in that; five (50%) agreed and five (50%) strongly agreed that there are possible solution to the limits.


**Figure 4.13 Stakeholders’ view on the possible solutions to the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

From the figure above, only two (10%) of the stakeholders were not certain but ten (50%) agreed and eight (40%) did strongly agree.


**Figure 4.14 Employees view on the possible solution to the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

It is evident from the graph above, that the employees response on the possible solutions to the limits, only two (10%) were not certain about the question but the rest that is; thirteen (65%) agreed and five (25%) strongly agree to it.

**Figure 4.15 Beneficiaries view on the solutions to the limits**



Source: primary data, 2010

In the present bar graph, it is indicated that the beneficiaries response on the possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, twenty (44%) agreed and fourteen (31%) strongly agreed, apart from the seven (16%) who were not certain and four (09 %) who disagreed on the issue.

### **Possible solutions established from the study**

During the study, majority of the respondents did agree and strongly agreed that there are possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic

management of development projects and below were the repeatedly stated points.

**Adjusting planning and management procedures to the environment of public policy-making.**

In the first instance, the respondents proposed that to be more effective, development planners and managers must explicitly recognize and use a wide variety of methods of influence, including information dissemination, public education, specialized training programs, persuasion and consultation techniques.

This is reflected in Rondinelli (2006); much more attention must be given to processes of formal and informal bargaining and negotiation, mediation and coalition building in the process of decision-making if development planners and managers are to become more effective in coping with the complexity and uncertainty of development problems.

**Building local organizational capacity and an effective institutional network for service delivery.**

Study findings from respondents suggested, that adaptive institutions must be designed in conjunction with beneficiaries and open to local participation and leadership. That efficient and effective service delivery to rural poor can be attained through standardized locational criteria or by mechanisms designed by professional technicians and administrators. And that it depends on an intimate

understanding of rural life, behavior and motivation, which is unlikely to be brought to bear on the planning and implementation of integrated rural development programs without participation of intended beneficiaries.

This gives more prevalence to UNDP (2009), the failure to include beneficiaries in the design and formulation of projects often leads to severe management problems later. Projects are always assigned to wrong organizations for implementation, or to one with insufficient administrative and technical capacity to carry it out, or to one so tightly controlled by vested interested groups that it can not serve the intended beneficiaries.

### **Simplifying planning and management procedures**

Further more, respondents disclosed, that the tendency of management scientists to insist on sophisticated and complicated methods of analysis, planning and programming often creates more problems than it solves. That it is clear from past experience that administrative procedures and arrangements for development must be relatively simple and uncomplicated. Besides, that less complicated techniques of planning and analysis can provide greater opportunities for experienced planners and administrators to bring their experience to bear on the selection of appropriate projects.

The above finding goes hand in hand with Esman (2005), care must also be taken to keep the design of development projects, especially those intended for rural areas, from becoming too complex. The "more complex the development



project, the less likely donor agencies or national governments will encourage local participation in the design or implementation of the project, tending to confine participation to sharing in project benefits.”

### **Encouraging error detection and correction rather than suppression and punishment.**

Respondents further said, that the ability of managers and administrators to monitor and evaluate continuously so that mistakes are uncovered and corrected quickly must be strengthened in the bureaucracies of developing countries and international assistance organization. That incentives and rewards must be provided to encourage innovation, experimentation and creativity.

It's related to Chambers (2008), incentives and rewards can often be used more effectively to achieve desired behavior than punishments and threats, which are usually the basis of control-oriented methods of management. Only uncorrected error should be considered evidence of poor management.

### **Creating incentives for innovative management**

In a nutshell, respondents exclaimed that administrative systems and procedures are needed that encourage, support and reward those managers who take responsibility for development activities especially in rural areas where uncertainty and risk of failure are greater and where the knowledge required to plan and implement projects comprehensively and systematically is least likely to be available.

This finding strengthens the researcher's view, which states that an essential part of the incentive system must be adequate training, a strong system of field support and greater recognition of the special conditions under which field staff work. Moreover, after field administrators and project managers are trained; they must be given direction to manage without the rigid supervision that smothers flexibility and creativity.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter portrays a discussion of the results from the study. The discussion relates the objectives of the study to the findings earlier stated. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations are given.

#### **Findings**

In this aspect, the researcher presents the findings on the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects, effects thereof and possible solutions.

#### **Findings on limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.**

In this study, it was found that majority of the respondents (management, stakeholders, employees and beneficiaries) agreed/strongly agreed that there are limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.

Findings of this study proved, that the complex methods of feasibility analysis, appraisal, and selection may introduce a bias towards the choice of projects that are easy to analyze, but are of priority for development.

It was stated in the study, that evaluation of development projects in developing Countries requires a lot of time to develop and approve project proposals. After a series of site visits, however, the agency's review committee may decide that the proposal is not feasible and the project can be revised again.

Besides, the study showed that heavy reliance on foreign consultants who presumably understand and can meet the requirements of the international agency, often leads to projects that are unrealistic and inappropriate for local conditions. Such delegation during the past ten years for instance, led to projects based on incorrect assumptions concerning local capabilities and constraints which later contributed to serious problems of implementation.

Also, it was argued that a major constraint affecting achievement of development project objectives is the transfer of technologies without local adaptations. Even if there is an advantage, it is often nullified by lack of understanding or by resentment of a new idea 'parachuted' into an area without previous consultation with the users.

According to the study, the reluctance of planners and managers to engage in error detection and correction makes it difficult for anyone to know when projects are deviating from their planned paths; it reduces the ability of managers to learn from past mistakes and limits their capacity to redesign projects when they meet obstacles.

This study found out, that the success of many projects is measured by resources expended or inputs used during implementation, rather than by the quality and quantity of outputs, the impact of results on beneficiaries, or the nature of changes attributable to project's successful operation. Few understandings sponsored by international assistance agencies include provisions for collecting simple baseline data prior to the start of the project and for collecting information to measure progress during its execution

It was further noticed; that systematic management approach adopted by the projects of some developing countries reinforced the paternalistic attitudes of project officials towards the rural poor and in the minds of the administrators obviated the need to include beneficiaries in project planning and implementation. Only in about one-third of all the Compassion International's rural development projects were located involvement or resource contributions equal to those called for in the original proposals. And less than one-quarter of the projects had any effective participation by local residents, and almost none involved the beneficiaries in evaluation. Thus the failure to include beneficiaries in the design and formulation of projects often led to severe management problems later.

**Findings on effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.**

It was found out from the study, that most of the respondents did react positively by agreeing and strongly agreeing that there are effects of the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.

In this study, it was evidenced that in most cases it is difficult or impossible to define goals and objectives precisely at the outset, or to give more than general indications of what can be accomplished when a proposal is initially made especially for social and human resource development projects in rural area.

It was also observed, that the tendency to collect all conceivably useful data creates confusion about purposes, and inhibits managers from learning while they implement the projects. Many definitions and measures have been advanced but all have limitations in methodology and applicability to specific countries establishing social values. But collecting more data will not by itself overcome problems of project management nor will it necessarily make implementation more rational and systematic.

Also in this study, it was indicated that one of the most difficult changes to make in the bureaucracies of both international development agencies and developing countries are the managers' attitudes towards error. Under conditions of uncertainty, error and mistakes are not only likely, they are to be expected. Yet the bureaucratic systems in most developing countries, as well as in some international agencies, are designed to suppress mistakes and errors and to punish managers when mistakes are discovered. Such attitudes are not only

unrealistic but also dangerous. They cause administrators and managers to be fearful of making mistakes, encourage correction, redesign and redirection.

In this study, it was found out that complex methods rarely work at any level in rural areas of developing countries, and especially at the local level in rural areas. Rural people either ignore complex administrative procedures or are exploited by project officials who manipulate them. Moreover, skills and resources for management are in short supply in rural areas of most developing nations and administrative capacity will remain relatively weak.

**Findings on possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.**

According to the study, it was established that majority of the respondents did agree and strongly agreed that there are possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.

Besides, the study results revealed that the concept of development policy-making and social experimentation requires that projects be designed in such a way that errors and mistakes can be uncovered as a project proceeds. It can then be redesigned and revised incrementally.

From the study, it was discovered that the capacity of field official to work with beneficiary groups must be strengthened and their ability to mobilize human and financial resources in ways that foster mutual respect and cooperation between development project officials and local residents must be improved. The work of

the officials should be facilitating and supporting rather than control-oriented. They must be trained to recognize the capacity of local residents, regardless of their social status, level of education or income, to make important contributions of knowledge, skills or commitment to the success of development activities.

Further, study findings emphasized that development projects purposes must be clearly defined. It is clear from past experience that administrative procedures and arrangements for development must be relatively simple and uncomplicated. Less complicated techniques of planning and analysis can provide greater opportunities for experienced planners and administrators to bring their experience to bear on the selection of appropriate projects.

Lastly, the study noted that if incentives for innovative management are to be effective they must be given adequate resources to obtain the equipment, supplies, personnel and facilities needed to carry out the tasks. Upward mobility within the civil services system must be tied to field performance. That as long as field service posts are perceived of as inferior, unrewarded and dead end positions, ambitious and skilled managers will resist field assignment and continue to seek positions at headquarters in the national capital.

## **Conclusions**

Basing on the information in chapter four, the researcher came up with the following conclusions.



1. Courses of actions that lead to the attainment of goals and objectives of development projects will remain complex and uncertain. Solving societal problems will always depend on the ability of planners and management to use more effectively the mechanisms of authority, exchange of ideas and persuasion, which are argued to be the most fundamental means of promoting social change.
2. Development planners and managers must not only understand these mechanisms (rational and systematic) better but also learn how to combine them in new ways to cope with complexity and uncertainty. In either case, effective development is unlikely to emerge from conventional principles, which emphasize comprehensive, detailed and control-oriented planning and management. In an uncertain and complex world, planning and management must be adaptive.
3. Development projects do require planners and managers who can facilitate rather than control the interaction of those individuals and groups who have the bits of knowledge, resources and experience needed to change undesirable conditions and the judgment to help define what the undesirable conditions are.
4. All in all, rational planning and systematic management requires skilled people who can act as catalysts, mobilizing those whose support or commitment is needed to make development projects responsive, appropriate and successful.

## **Recommendations**

Below are the recommendations drawn from the findings.

1. The planners and managers should respond creatively and quickly to changes. They should also be with the ability to plan and manage simultaneously and view themselves as leaders rather than as bureaucrats.
2. The systems of development projects in developing countries should train planners and managers to join action with learning, to experiment, to test new ways of doing things and to be sensitive and responsive to the needs of people they serve.
3. Most of all, the systems of development projects should let good/professional planners and managers to do the planning and management work, and should reward them of their efforts and results.

## **Areas for further research**

Further research can be made on the following topics:

1. The Principles of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.
2. The Opportunities of rational planning and systematic management of development projects.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I: Transmittal Letter



KAMPALA  
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

P.O.BOX 20000  
KAMPALA- UGANDA.  
TEL:-041-266813

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**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR  
SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH**

June 11, 2010

The Project Director,  
Businywa Child Project Development Centre  
Busia

Dear Sir/Madam,

**INTRODUCTION FOR NAFUNA ZAITUNA**

This is to inform you that the above named is our registered student (MPP/20011/82/DF) in the School of Post Graduate Studies pursuing a Master of Arts in Project Planning and Management.

She is interested in carrying out research in your organization on "The limits of Rational Planning and Systematic Management of Development Projects in Busia District: A case study of Businywa Child Development Centre".

Any assistance rendered to her regarding research, will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

  
Tunde Yara PhD  
**DEPUTY DIRECTOR-SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH**

## **Appendix II: Personal Introduction Letter to the Respondents**

**Nafuna Zaituna**

**School of Postgraduate and Research  
Kampala International University**

**P.O BOX, 20000**

**Kampala – Uganda**

**Dear Respondents,**

I am Nafuna Zaituna, a student at Kampala International University and am carrying out a research study on the "*Limits of Rational Planning and Systematic Management of development projects in Busia District: a case study of Businywa Child Development Centre*".

This study serves as a partial fulfillment of the requirements of the award of a Degree of Master of Arts in Project Planning and Management of the School of Postgraduate and Research of Kampala International University.

Feel free when answering the questions, the information given will only be used confidentially for academic purpose.

There is no "right" or "wrong" answer. It's your honest answer that matters.

Your cooperation will be much appreciated.

Signature .....

**NAFUNA ZAITUNA**

## Appendix III: Research Instruments

### SECTION A: PERSONAL INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS

Tick in the box in front of the option you believe fits best.

#### 1. Gender

Male

☐

Female

☐

#### 2. Age

18 – 25

☐

26 – 35

☐

36 – 45

☐

46 – 55

☐

56+

☐

#### 3. Marital Status

Single

☐

Married

☐

Widow/widowed

☐

Separated/Divorced

☐

#### 4. Education Level

None ☐

Primary ☐

Secondary ☐

College/University ☐

#### 5. Duration at the Project

2years+ ☐

6years+ ☐

10years+ ☐

15years+ ☐

#### 6. Position held at Project by respondents

Management ☐

Stakeholder ☐

Employee ☐

Beneficiary ☐

### SECTION B: QUESTIONNAIRE

1(a). Are there limits of rational planning and systematic management in development projects?

- |                      |                          |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| A. Agree             | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| B. Strongly Agree    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| C. Not Certain       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| D. Disagree          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| E. Strongly Disagree | <input type="checkbox"/> |

1(b). If your answer in 1(a) is either A or B. What are the limits of rational planning and systematic management in development projects?

2(a). Do the limits affect rational planning and systematic management in development project?

- |                      |                          |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| A. Agree             | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| B. Strongly Agree    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| C. Not Certain       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| D. Disagree          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| E. Strongly Disagree | <input type="checkbox"/> |

2(b). If your answer in 2(a) is either A or B. How do these limits affect rational planning and systematic management in development projects?

3(a). Are there possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management in development projects?

A. Agree ☐

B. Strongly Agree ☐


C. Not Certain ☐

D. Disagree ☐

E. Strongly Disagree ☐

3 (b). If your answer in 3(a) is either A or B. What are the possible solutions to the limits of rational planning and systematic management in development?

# APPENDIX IV: LOCATION OF BCDC IN BUSA DISTRICT



## **RESEARCHER'S CURRICULUM VITAE**

### **PERSONAL PROFILE**

I 'am an open minded person who would wish to develop my career in a Community Based Development Organization. I have a sound background in Social Work, Administration, HIV/AIDS and Psychosocial Counseling and Guidance. I enjoy team work, sharing of knowledge with others, meeting set targets and working under minimum supervision.

### **PERSONAL DATA:**

NAME : Nafuna Zaituna

SEX : Female

MARITAL STATUS : Single

NATIONALITY : Ugandan

CONTACT ADDRESS : Tel: +256-782 461977

E-mail: nafuna2@ yahoo.com

### **EDUCATION BACKGROUND:**

2002-2005 : Bachelor of Arts in Social Work and Social  
Administration (Kampala International  
University)



1999-2000 : Uganda Advanced Certificate of Education  
(Busia Secondary School)

1995-1998 : Uganda Certificate of Education  
(Kayoro Secondary School)

### **SHORT COURSES ATTENDED**

August-Sept 2008 : Certificate in Computer Application  
Skills. (Makerere University)

Feb- May 2008 : Certificate in Comprehensive Counseling  
(Vision Counseling Center)

January 2008 : Certificate in Child and Psychosocial Counseling  
(Vision Counseling Center)

December 2007 : HIV/AIDS Counseling and Guidance (Vision  
Counseling Center)

April-May 2007 : Certificate in administrative Law  
(Law Development Centre, Kampala)

## **WORK EXPERIENCE:**

January 2009-2010 : **Vision Counseling and Support Center**  
(Facilitator)

### **Duties:**

- Facilitate Training Sessions.
- Counseling and career guidance
- Supervision
- Monitoring, Evaluation and Record Keeping

Jan-Dec 2008 : **Kirudu Health Center, Salaama**  
**Munyonyo** (Counselor)

### **Duties:**

- Counseling and career guidance of HIV/AIDS patients
- Voluntary counseling and testing (VCT)
- Mother to child transmission and prevention of mother to child transmission
- Family planning and Immunization
- Supportive counseling and positive living

Jan-Dec 2007 : **Busia Global Village Foundation**  
**Organization** (Vice Chairperson)

Duties:

- Chairing executive board committee meetings
- Chairing district, sub county and parish co-coordinator's meetings
- Setting Agendas for meetings
- Participating in decision making

August 2005-Dec 2006 : **Businywa Child Development Centre-**  
**Compassion International** (Development  
Officer)

Duties:

- Offering counseling and career guidance
- Attending internal and external meetings, seminars, conferences and retreats
- Maintaining follow ups activities
- Participating in child care learning programmes which save children
- Safe guarding and promoting the welfare of the child and creating awareness to the public about child rights and parents responsibilities
- Also creating community systems and mechanisms for care and protection of a child for instance community based initiative

2002-2003 : **Busia District Probation and Social Welfare Office** (Assistant Probation Officer)

Duties:

- Handling domestic issues
- Carrying out inquiries as requested by the Magistrate Court especially about child offenders
- Submitting social enquiry reports
- Supervision and inspection of approved children and babies homes
- Supervision of younger people after release from children and babies homes
- Identifying and removing children whose lives are subject to significant harm

## REFEREES:

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3. Bishop. James Ntezimana

National Overseer and Senior Pastor,

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