

EFFORTS OF SOMALI CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN FIGHTING AGAINST CORRUPTION IN MOGADISHU, SOMALIA

A Thesis

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In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree
Master of Public Administration and Management

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DECLARATION A

"This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a Degree or any other academic award in any University or Institution of Learning".

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
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DECLARATION B

"I confirm that the work reported in this thesis was carried out by the candidate under my/our supervision".


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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my mother **Kadija Hashi Osman** and my sister **Sahra Jama Warsame.**

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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this study was to investigate efforts of Somali Central Government in Fighting against corruption in Mogadishu, Somalia. Specifically to determine the extent of corruption in Somali central government, to determine the main causes of corruption in Somali central government and to indentify efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia.

The sample size of this study was eighty (80) respondents including government officials and civil society organization staff. In this study the sample was reached through the Slovin's formula. The study was conducted through descriptive research design and used questionnaires as the main tools for collecting data. The questionnaire was consisting of structured and self administered with closed questions. Data was analyzed by assessing the frequency of respondents per question. Questions addressed particular theme and followed the sequence which was analyzed. Tabulated frequencies and necessary analysis was made using Excel and SPSS computing program to present the quantitative data analyses.

The study found that the level of corruption has been increásing in central government agencies and corruption does not only exist in political sphere but also in the Administration level in Somali central government agencies. The main causes of corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu are: lack of transparency and accountability, nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal employment opportunities and poorly paid salary structure in the public sector. The study found that there are efforts, challenges and suggested solutions in order to fight corruption: The newly appointed cabinet started with better revenue collection and controlling systems to deter corruption, it's difficult to eradicate corruption in country with strong tribal system, creating National anti-corruption bodies and policies and Strong penalty to corruption practitioners.

The study recommends that: the government should establish National anti-corruption policy, better Public Fund Management and accountability, strong penalty to corrupt individuals and to create independent detective personnel.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a
CDG	Center for Democracy and Governance
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ICVS	International Crime Victim Surveys
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Peoples' Movement
TFC	Transitional Federal Charter
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	Transitional Federal Institutions
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
TI	Transparency International

TNG	Transitional National Parliament
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Security Group
USA	United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SCOPE

Background of the study

Corruption appears to have been dominant for the last 5,000 years of human history, and continue to exist in most countries of the world today, between 1776 and 1850, the national government wrote two constitutions, and the original 13 states wrote their first constitutions and an additional 16 new constitutions for the importance of opening entry as a deterrent to corruption in the 1840s state constitution (Wallis, 2005).

Corruption deals in Africa are getting bigger. The crooks are getting smarter and doing ever greater damage to Africa's economies - sucking out resources meant for health, education and clean water. (Patrick Smith, 2002)

According to a new report released by the Germany-based anti-corruption group Transparency International (TI, 2010) , Somalia ranks as the most corrupt country in the world. Corruption cuts across all facets of the society public and private and exists in the political, economic, social, religious, and cultural spheres. All forms of corruption are prevalent in Africa, ranging from small-scale bribes required for normal bureaucratic procedures to large-scale payment of considerable sums of money in return for preferential treatment or access. The illicit acquisition of personal wealth by public officials and their cronies have had damaging effects on society, ethical values, justice, the rule of law, and sustainable developments in Africa. (Brinkerhoff & Kulibaba 1999).

Political corruption is the use of legislated powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain. Political corruption has done the greatest harm to

economic, political and social developments, undermining the legitimacy of public institutions. Political can be defined as: the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives and to sustain the costs of those actions over time' (Brinkerhoff & Kulibaba 1999).

Bureaucratic corruption provides civil servants with the opportunity to raise their compensation above what the law prescribes. Through the practice of corruption, private entrepreneurs are able to capture and maintain monopoly positions in the economy. Politicians, who serve as wealth brokers, obtain the resources they need to purchase security and continue to monopolize the supply of legislation. The biggest loser from corruption is society as a whole. Corruption allows inefficient producers to remain in business, encourages governments to pursue perverse economic policies, and provides opportunities to bureaucrats and politicians to enrich themselves through extorting bribes from those seeking government favors. Thus, corruption distorts economic incentives, discourages entrepreneurship, and slows economic growth (Mbaku 1989, Gould 1980).

World Bank (1999) has said that political will is measurable by first, identifying key decision makers, their constituencies, and the potential political and financial costs to them of a particular policy, in this case, reducing corruption, and second, focusing on event that might signal a commitment to fighting corruption (Brinkerhoff & Kulibaba 1999).

Corruption is defined as wrongdoing by those in a special position of trust. The term is commonly applied to self-benefiting conduct by public officials and others dedicated to public service. Bribery, in law, the illegal influencing of any person in the exercise of a public duty through the payment of money or anything of value, or Something, such as money or a favor, offered or given to induce or influence a person to act dishonestly. Corruption or level of corruption is widely used in public discourse and usually hold a twofold common-sense meaning. On

one hand it stands for those illegal practices, in which citizens or organizations bribe officials in charge for awarding permissions, contracts, or to escape punishment or fines for offenses they committed. Simpler: to obtain privileges against law or against the rules of some bureaucracy. Corruption is the misuse of office for unofficial ends (Klitgaard, 1981).

A common definition of public corruption is the misuse of public office for private gain. Misuse, of course, typically involves applying a legal standard. Corruption defined this way would capture, for example, the sale of government property by government officials, kickbacks in public procurement, bribery and embezzlement of government funds. Corruption is an outcome a reflection of a country's legal, economic, cultural and political institutions. Corruption can be a response to either beneficial or harmful rules. For example, corruption appears in response to benevolent rules when individuals pay bribes to avoid penalties for harmful conduct or when monitoring of rules is incomplete as in the case of theft. Conversely, corruption can also arise because bad policies or inefficient institutions are put in place to collect bribes from individuals seeking to get around them. (Klitgaard, 1981).

Measuring corruption statistically is difficult if not impossible due to the illicit nature of the transaction and imprecise definitions of corruption. While "corruption" indices first appeared in 1995 with the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), all of these metrics address different proxies for corruption, such as public perceptions of the extent of the problem. (Transparency International, 1995)

Transparency International, an anti-corruption NGO, pioneered this field with the Corruption Perceptions Index, first released in 1995. This work is often credited with breaking a taboo and forcing the issue of corruption into high level development policy discourse. Transparency International currently publishes three measures, updated annually: a Corruption Perceptions Index (based on

aggregating third-party polling of public perceptions of how corrupt different countries are); a Global Corruption Barometer (based on a survey of general public attitudes toward and experience of corruption); and a Bribe Payers Index, looking at the willingness of foreign firms to pay bribes. The Corruption Perceptions Index is the best known of these metrics (Transparency International, 2003).

The International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), since 2003 under the responsibility of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), focus on individuals rather than firms. The surveys are designed to produce comparable data on crime and victimization across countries, using a combination of computer-assisted telephone interviewing techniques in developed countries and face-to-face surveys in developing countries. In most developing countries, the survey data refer to the experience of urban households, since the surveys are only implemented in the capital (or largest) cities. With respect to corruption, respondents were asked if government officials asked, or expected the respondent, to pay bribes for their service during the last year (United Nations, 2003).

The World Bank (2005) collects a range of data on corruption, including survey responses from over 100,000 firms worldwide and a set of indicators of governance and institutional quality. Moreover, one of the six dimensions of governance measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators is Control of Corruption, which is defined as "the extent, to which power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests." While the definition itself is fairly precise, the data aggregated into the Worldwide Governance Indicators is based on any available polling: questions range from "is corruption a serious problem?" to measures of public access to information, and not consistent across countries.

Despite these weaknesses, the global coverage of these datasets has led to their widespread adoption, most notably by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (World Bank, 2005).

Somali central government collapsed in 1991 after the regime of Barre overthrow. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is the current internationally recognized government of the Republic of Somalia. It was established as one of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of government as defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The government is backed by the United Nations and the African Union, as well as the United States. The Transitional Federal Government officially comprises the executive branch of government, with the Transitional Federal Parliament serving as the legislative branch. The government is headed by the President of Somalia, to whom the cabinet reports through the Prime Minister (Afyare, 2009).

Fighting against corruption is a global movement in all sectors of societies. Somalia is one of the most African countries who suffer the great impact of corruption which lastly caused the loss of the entire Somali State and the public services provided by the government institutions. Although most countries differ in their anti-corruption action approaches, their effort depends on the level of corruption that exists in their countries and how political leaders view it. Even though the fight against corruption is extensive around the world, it is still a growing problem which is a burden to economic growth and dangerous to the lives of many communities trying to make a good living in their countries (Sowda, 2009)

Statement of the Problem

Since the collapse of Somali central government in 1991, major scandals involving high level public officials have shaken the Somali public service in recent years, with politicians and public servants regularly caught accepting bribes or mismanaging public resources. This suggests corruption has become a pervasive aspect of Somali politics and bureaucracy. a highly corruption effected all government institutions especially central government agencies, However, corruption hares been constantly reported to be high in Somali government as Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2010) reported that Somalia is one of the most corrupted country in this world. The corruption in Somali central government agencies affected collection of taxes, recruitment, government decisions, while corruption is indeed one of the most formidable challenges to good governance, development and poverty reduction in Somalia.

The study concentrated on the extent of corruption, main causes of corruption and also identified efforts, challenges and possible solution of how to mitigate the corruption in the central government of Somalia.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to understand the way forward of fighting against corruption and its effect on Somali government institutions.

Objectives of the study

General objective

- The main objective of the study is to investigate efforts of Somali central government in fighting against corruption in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Specific Objectives

1. To determine the extent of corruption in Somali central government.
2. To determine the main causes of corruption in Somali central government.
3. To identify efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Research Questions

1. What is the extent of corruption in Somali central government?
2. What are the main causes of corruption in Somali central government?
3. What are the efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia?

Scope of the Study

Geographically, the study was conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia covered the period between January 2009 and December 2010. Mogadishu's population is estimated 2.5 million people with 20 KM square of area. This study concentrated on efforts of Somali central government in fighting against corruption. The data was collected through questionnaire by researcher in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Significances of Study

The study was an important contribution for Somali central government, as it was helping to determine the corruption and its effect on government institutions in Somalia and how to establish the public trust.

The study was greatly helping the task of the Donors in helping Somalia to its recovery. The findings of this study may vary, and may slightly or greatly contribute the establishment of public trust; it was overall help the growth of studies about the issue and contributed to building the necessary steps to prove the need of fighting against corruption in Somali central government. It also identifies the illustration and the root causes of corruption while suggesting a set of tools intended to win anti-corruption fight.

Operation definition of variables

Central government

A central government also known as a national government, union government and in federal states, the federal government is the government at the level of the nation-state. The structure of central governments varies from institution to institution. Many countries have created autonomous regions by delegating powers from the central government to governments at a sub-national level, such as a regional, local, or state level. Based on a broad definition of a basic political system, there are two or more levels of government that exist within an established territory and govern through common institutions with overlapping or shared powers as prescribed by a constitution or other law.

Usual responsibilities of this level of government which are not granted to lower levels are maintaining national security and exercising international

diplomacy, including the right to sign binding treaties. Basically, the central government has the power to make laws for the whole country, in contrast with local governments.


Corruption

Corruption is a lack of integrity or honesty (especially susceptibility to bribery); use of a position of trust for dishonest gain. Corruption means the abuse of a public office for personal gain or other illegal or immoral benefit. In general, corruption is defined as the abuse of authority for improper gain. Public corruption refers to the misuse of governmental authority while private corruption indicates a misuse of purely nongovernmental power. Many analysts focus on public corruption. A very standard definition of public corruption, used by the World Bank, is the abuse of public power for private benefit. Several types, forms and manifestations of corruption can be mentioned, such as political versus bureaucratic corruption, bribery, extortion, favoritism, and embezzlement.

Fighting corruption means, ensuring voting rights, and improving working conditions were central priorities of the Progressive age.

Conceptual Framework

Figure 1.1(Conceptual Framework)



Source: Researcher

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter offers a logical review of the literature on the topic with the aim of investigate past and present research on the topic. In so doing, the researcher hopes to see where this study would fit in the scholarship on the issue under study.

Concepts, Opinions, Ideas from Authors/Experts.

1991 was a time of great change for Somalia. President Barre was ousted by combined northern and southern clan-based forces, all of whom were backed and armed by Ethiopia. And following a meeting of the Somali National Movement and northern clans' elders, the northern former British portion of the country declared its independence as Somaliland in May 1991; although de facto independent and relatively stable compared to the tumultuous south, it has not been recognized by any foreign government (Mohamed, 2009).

In January 1991, President Ali Mahdi Muhammad was selected by the manifesto group as an interim state president until a conference between all stakeholders to be held in Djibouti the following month to select a national leader. However, United Somali Congress military leader General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the Somali National Movement leader Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur and the Somali Patriotic Movement leader Col Jess refused to recognize Mahdi as president (Mohamed, 2009).

This caused a split between the Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC) and Somali People's Movement (SPM) and the armed groups Manifesto, Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and Somali National Alliance (SNA) on the one hand and within the USC forces. Barre's armed supporters remained in the south of the country until mid 1992, causing further escalation in violence, especially in the Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba regions. The armed conflict within the USC devastated the Mogadishu area (Mohamed, 2009).

The civil war disrupted agriculture and food distribution in southern Somalia. The basis of most of the conflicts was clan allegiances and competition for resources between the warring clans (Mohamed, 2009).

In reaction to the continued violence and the humanitarian disaster, the United States organized a military coalition with the purpose of creating a secure environment in southern Somalia for the conduct of humanitarian operations. This coalition, (Unified Task Force or UNITAF) entered Somalia in December 1992 on Operation Restore Hope and was successful in restoring order and alleviating the famine. In May 1993, most of the United States troops withdrew and UNITAF was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) (Mohamed, 2009).

However, Mohamed Farrah Aidid saw UNOSOM II as a threat to his power and in June 1993 his militia attacked Pakistan Army troops, attached to UNOSOM II, in Mogadishu inflicting over 80 casualties. Fighting escalated until 19 American troops and more than 1,000 civilians and militia were killed in a raid in Mogadishu during October 1993. The UN withdrew Operation United Shield in 3 March 1995, having suffered significant casualties, and with the rule of government still not restored. In August 1996, Aidid was killed in Mogadishu.

Following the outbreak of the civil war, many of Somalia's residents left the country in search of asylum. In 2000, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected to lead the Transitional National Government (TNG) (Mohamed, 2009).

This was followed in 2004 by the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia, the most recent attempt to restore national institutions to the nation after the 1991 collapse of the Barre regime and the ensuing civil war. On October 10, 2004, Somali parliament members elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the former President of Puntland, to be the next president and head of the TFG. The other institutions adopted at this time were the Transitional Federal Charter and the selection of a 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament (Mohamed, 2009).

Following the collapse of centralized government, much of the legal system and most of the educational institutions and social services fell under the control of religious institutions, which often received significant funding and support from international charities. In 2005, some of these clerical organizations united to form the Islamic Courts Union, after the secular warlords began to challenge the sharia-based judicial institutions. Wary of Islamist paramilitaries in the age of the War on Terror, the CIA funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to secular warlords inside Somalia in 2006, intending thereby to neutralize the threat of suspected members of Al Qaeda they believed to be sheltered by the Islamic Courts Union ICU. This was cited by experts as a factor in the resurgence of Islamic militias in the country, prompting the latter to engage in pre-emptive strikes which routed the warlords and led to the seizure of Mogadishu by the ICU. The ICU gained control of Mogadishu and its surrounding districts in June 2006, after the Second Battle of Mogadishu. The ICU was later overthrown by the Ethiopian military with the support of the United Nations, African Union (AU), and the United States government. After the ICU forces were chased from Mogadishu, the leaders of the

Transitional Federal Parliament entered Somalia declaring themselves the rightful governors of Somalia. As of October 2007, there was still widespread opposition within Somalia to the TFG, and the TFG's leaders and their allies were still attempting to suppress a strong insurgency (Mohamed, 2009).

Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to withdraw from the country, leaving behind an under-equipped African Union (AU) peacekeeping force (Mohamed, 2009).

In January 2009, a new President was elected from amongst the more moderate Islamists, and the Transitional Federal Government, with the help of a small team of African Union troops, began a counteroffensive in February 2009 to retake control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its control of southern Somalia, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union and other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two main Islamist groups in opposition, began to fight amongst themselves in mid 2009 (Mohamed, 2009).

The concept of corruption is very wide, endemic and broad. It has been defined differently by different scholars and from different sources. "Corruption" comes from the Latin verb "corruptus" (to break); it literally means broken object. Corruption is a wrongdoing by those entrusted with positions of power, especially government officials and private service personnel who misuse funds and other resources for their personal use thus causing economic decline. This will always have a negative impact on the administration and proper economic development of any given country be it a poor Somalia or a great economic power like the

United States of America (USA). What the whole world has witnessed in the past year as the USA economy plummeted to very low levels pulling the rest of the world with it clearly came down to corrupt practices at top levels. Were it not for its transparent democracy, the world would never have known what swept the US giant companies to the ground as if hit by a destructive hurricane or tsunami. Transparency International (2003) defines corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private or personal gain. Corruption involves behavior on the part of the officials in the public or private sector, whether civil servants or politicians, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, all those close to them, or induce them to do so by misusing the positions in which they are placed. In other words corruption is giving something to somebody with power so that he will abuse his power and acting favor. It can as well be defined as the act of soliciting or accepting an inducement or reward, which may influence the action of the receiver.

According to World Bank (2005), the term corruption is regarded as "The abuse of public office for private gain". This definition considers the cause of corruption in public authority and its abuse (Transparency International, 2003).

In most developing countries today, corruption is widespread and part of everyday life. Society has learned to live with it, even considering it, fatalistically, as an integral part of their culture. Not only are public or official decisions for instance, on the award of government contracts or the amount of tax due bought and sold, but very often access to a public service or the exercise of a right, such as obtaining civil documents, also has to be paid for (Transparency International, 2003).

Several mechanisms help to spread corruption and make it normal practice in these countries. Civil servants who refuse to toe the line are removed from office; similarly, businessmen who oppose it are penalized vis-à-vis their competitors.

Furthermore, an image of the state has grown up over the years according to which the civil service, far from being a body that exists to implement the rights of citizens – rights that mirror their duties – is first and foremost perceived as the least risky way of getting rich quickly. All of which helps to make corruption seem normal (Transparency International, 2003).

Central government

Central government is the government at the level of the nation-state. Usual responsibilities of this level of government are maintaining national security and exercising international diplomacy, including the right to sign binding treaties. Basically, the central government has the power to make laws for the whole country, unlike the situation with local governments. Central government-within this structure are the government ministries and departments and agencies to which the ministers of government are assigned. Central government also works alongside agencies to help with tax collection. The area of government that is concerned with national issues such as taxation, defense, international relations, and trade (Jocelyn, 2008).

Media and true corruption cases

Local media in southern Somalia do not have access to the information that could potentially incriminate government officials who are involved in corruption and graft. What information there is comes in the form of political accusations by rival politicians against each other. It is not necessarily followed by formal investigations. A culture of secrecy surrounds everything the government does.

Any news that does come from the government is often spin, or consists of general allegations of corruption against a government official who has fallen out of favor with the Somali top officials. (UN Monitoring Group, 2010)

Lawmakers in Somalia's national parliament are bribed to vote for a particular issue. Reports abound of huge sums of money changing hands in the Somali parliament when an important motion is being debated or is about to be voted on. No corruption scandal has ever been exposed by the local media, which are vibrant but handicapped by the threat of persecution, arbitrary arrests and the nonexistence of a legal right to access information in Somalia's legal system. And no one has been formally charged with, or arrested for, corruption in Somalia since the current transitional government was formed in 2004. (UN Monitoring Group, 2010)

The ability of local media to expose wrongdoing by officials from top to bottom is severely curtailed with arbitrary arrests being a part of everyday life for journalists, particularly those in the south and central parts of the country. A number of journalists have been killed, tortured and arrested for unexplained reasons. Since January 2007, nearly 10 have been killed and nearly 50 others arrested, though most of them were later released. Despite the approval of a media law that generally grants freedom of speech by the national parliament, the media's freedom to report on even the simple workings of government, let alone corruption, has been severely curtailed. (UN Monitoring Group, 2010)

Corruption is country's worst-kept secret

It is not just that the country's integrity level is not up to international standards which make life in Somalia so difficult. It is well-known that there has been corruption in even the highest levels of the Somali government since it was formed in 2004 in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi where the U.N. and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) sponsored protracted peace talks. But it has often seemed that there was only a gentlemen's agreement among Somali government officials that no one would be held responsible for corruption beyond generalized verbal accusations of wrongdoing. No one would ever have to face justice. Lawmakers in Somalia's national parliament are bribed to vote for a particular issue. Reports abound of huge sums of money changing hands in the Somali parliament when an important motion is being debated or is about to be voted on. (UN Monitoring Group, 2010).

Security

Somalia has undergone significant political change in 2009/10, but the security situation has remained largely stagnant. The conflict remains a grim example of "hybrid warfare": a combination of conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, as well as indiscriminate violence, coercion, and criminal disorder - compounded in the Somali case by the interference of regional powers. Somalia's frail Transitional Federal Government has struggled ineffectually to contain a complex insurgency that conflates religious extremism, political and financial opportunism, and clan interests. Beneath a superficial ideological overlay, armed opposition groups have essentially degenerated into clan militias, manifesting the same kind of fluid alliances and fissile tendencies. As a result, southern Somalia remains a patchwork of fiefdoms controlled by rival armed groups, a political and

security vacuum in which no side is strong enough to impose its will on the others. Meanwhile, the relatively stable northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland have suffered increasing spillover from the conflict to the south in the form of targeted killings and bombings. (UN Security Council, 2010)

The military stalemate is less a reflection of opposition strength than of the weakness of the Transitional Federal Government. Despite infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt — a composite of independent militias loyal to senior government officials and military officers who profit from the business of war and resist their integration under a single command. During the course of the mandate, government forces mounted only one notable offensive and immediately fell back from all the positions they managed to seize. The government owes its survival to the small African Union peace support operation, African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), rather than to its own troops.

Clan militias operating under the banner of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a in Galguduud region proved far more effective than the Transitional Federal Government on the battlefield, inflicting serious reverses on Al-Shabaab forces. (UN Security Council, 2010).

Opposition forces, though generally better disciplined, organized and motivated than their government adversaries, lack popular support and are equally susceptible to internal divisions. Hizbul Islam — a coalition of four clan-based militia groups under the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys — was founded in February 2009 and had all but disintegrated by the end of the same year. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (better known as Al-Shabaab) is a sprawling coalition of jihadists, business interests and clan militias, which has suffered serious internal frictions over such issues as the role of foreign fighters, the use of suicide bombers and desirability of political dialogue. (UN Security Council, 2010).

Persistent, low-intensity warfare between these various groups demands a steady flow of arms, ammunition and military or dual-use equipment. These items continue to enter Somalia in violation of the general and complete arms embargo imposed in 1992, at a fairly steady rate. Primary sources of supply remain Yemen and Ethiopia, although contributions to the Transitional Federal Government from the United States, Uganda and other parties have also entered Somali arms markets. (UN Security Council, 2010). Eritrea once a major sponsor of armed opposition groups — appears to have scaled down its military assistance while continuing to provide political, diplomatic and possibly financial support. There has been little overall change in the types of arms and ammunition entering Somalia, but the Monitoring Group has observed that small numbers of heavy mortars and wire-guided anti-tank weapons are now employed by armed opposition groups. (UN Security Council, 2010).

Efforts to restore peace and security to Somalia are critically undermined by a corrosive war economy that corrupts and enfeebles State institutions. The limited ability of the Transitional Federal Government to pay its officials and security forces is handicapped by entrenched corruption at all levels: commanders and troops alike sell their arms and ammunition — sometimes even to their enemies. Revenues from Mogadishu port and airport are siphoned off. Some government ministers and members of parliament abuse their official privileges to engage in large-scale visa fraud, smuggling illegal migrants to Europe and other destinations, in exchange for hefty payments. (UN Security Council, 2010).

The most obvious symptom of the war economy is piracy: attacks on shipping off Somalia increased in 2009, despite the presence of international naval forces offshore. The increase has been driven in part by the remarkable success rate of Somali piracy in 2008 (38 per cent of all ships attacked were hijacked), its high profitability and relatively low risks. Several notorious pirate leaders remain at

liberty in Puntland, and senior officials have at times intervened to secure the liberty of kinsmen detained during the course of counter-piracy operations. Meanwhile, international counter-piracy operations have driven some pirate activity back to ungoverned central Somalia. (UN Security Council, 2010).

In general terms, the Somali conflict in 2009/10 is perhaps best described in terms of “hybrid warfare”, which is generally defined as a combination of conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, and terrorist acts as well as indiscriminate violence, coercion, and criminal disorder. Northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) remained relatively stable, but suffered increasing spillover from the conflict in the south, notably in the form of attacks with improvised explosive devices. In southern Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government struggled ineffectually to contain a complex insurgency involving extremists, political opportunists and clan-based militias. Foreign forces played a role on both sides of the conflict: the Transitional Federal Government owed its survival mainly to the support and protection of Ugandan and Burundian troops operating under the umbrella of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), while the opposition benefited from the military contributions of non-Somali fighters, trainers and advisers. (UN Security Council, 2010).

In southern Somalia, conflict between the Transitional Federal Government and a loose coalition of insurgents was at a stalemate for most of 2009. An offensive in Mogadishu by opposition forces in May and June failed to dislodge the government, largely thanks to AMISOM protection and external military and financial support to government forces. A government counteroffensive in July demonstrated the weakness of opposition forces in the capital, but failed to sustain its early achievements. In October 2009, Al-Shabaab successfully resisted an attempt by local forces to dislodge them from the port town of Kismayo, and

have since exercised full control over this major logistical hub and source of revenue. (UN Security Council, 2010)

Late in 2009, however, the military balance in south-central Somalia appeared to be shifting against the opposition as Hizbul Islam had ceased to function as an integrated force, and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) forces, bolstered by their alliance with the Transitional Federal Government, inflicted a series of defeats on Al-Shabaab in the Galguduud and Hiraan regions. Opposition forces responded to the stalemate and growing military pressure inside Somalia by invigorating their support networks outside the country and, in the case of Al-Shabaab, threatening acts of terrorism against countries they perceived to be aligned with the Transitional Federal Government. (UN Security Council, 2010)

Clan dynamics

The Transitional Federal Government is supported by a variety of militia groups, some of which operate nominally under the authority of the forces. An international assessment of the UN security sector late in 2009 estimated that some 5,000 to 10,000 Government-aligned militias operate in Mogadishu. (UN Monitoring Group, 2010).

In practice, the majority of government forces are irregular, clan-based, and characterized by highly personalized command arrangements. Military and police functions often overlap. The security sector as a whole lacks structure, organization and a functional chain of command — a problem that an international assessment of the security sector attributes to "lack of political commitment by leaders within the Transitional Federal Government or because of poor common command and control procedures", as well as lack of resources. The report observes that "the culture, mentality and behavior of 'militias' remains extant in

the Army". Although government officials claim that a national security plan is being formulated to address these challenges, the Transitional Federal Government has never managed to deploy regimental or brigade-sized units on the battlefield.(UN Monitoring Group, 2010)

Nepotism and Favoritism

This includes any kind of intervention on the part of a public employee or authority to the advantage of an individual or a group of people that goes against the regulations. Nepotism gets clearer in appointing someone to a position for reasons based on kinship or tribal affiliation and despite incompetence, disqualification, or lack of eligibility. These also apply to an official who gives away certain material benefits on family or tribal bases, with disregard to the ineligibility that exists. For example, when a small technician or engineer becomes a secretary of a Public People's Committee of a multi-million-dollar budget institution by nepotism, such a secretary is often ready to practice all types of financial, bureaucratic, and moral pillage and corruption.

Favoritism extends to include favors to the advantage of some individual or some authority to which one belongs, like the family, tribe, authority, region, etc, without being eligible for it. The best example for this is probably what happens in People's Committees when government tenders are announced. Tenders usually are illegally given to specific companies or partnerships with some connections with officials, their family members, or tribes, via illegal deals between the parties concerned and in absolute absence of integrity and transparency. Sometimes tenders are given to specific companies against the legal procedures required. Under this category also there the kind of favoritism by which some particular authority gets illegally favored to attain certain services.(CDG, 1999).

Diaspora support networks

The distinction between Somali residents and diaspora communities is exceptionally blurred. Many Somalis living abroad retain such strong links to their homeland that they are essentially “binational”, travelling regularly and remaining active in social or political issues in Somalia. Many Somali Cabinet ministers and members of parliament hold foreign passports. Several key Shabaab and Hizbul Islam leaders, as well as a growing number of their foot soldiers, have lived abroad and retain active linkages to their host countries. Support within the Somali diaspora for armed opposition groups reached its peak under Ethiopian occupation and has declined considerably since Sheikh Sharif was elected president. But residual networks, including die-hard extremists with transnational links, continue to fuel the insurgency. These networks of sympathizers and activists mobilize political and financial support, serve as forums for recruitment, and provide advice to prospective recruits and fighters. The importance of these networks has received unprecedented international attention in the past 18 months, owing to a small number of high-profile terrorism cases, but they are much broader, better established and serve more purposes than this handful of cases would suggest. (UN Monitoring Group, 2010)

Low Levels of Public Wages and Services

The low payments of public servants, who represent the majority of the working force in Somalia, in addition to the ever-increasing standards of living, has created a proper environment for corruption to thrive in both state and society. Thus, every citizen's priority has become how to secure additional financial resources by any means, including bribery (Abdinoor, 2007).

Meanwhile, the low-level (or complete absence) of public utilities and services that naturally secure citizens' interests, by virtue of the rights of citizenship, has forced citizens to seek illegal means of competition to get their rights and interest. This environment has encouraged the development of bribery, nepotism, and favoritism in public sector institutions. For example, one of the means a public servant may use to obtain more income is to keep at home the stamps and seals of his employer government institution so that they may illegally use them in return for cash commissions from those who may need them. Customers, company agents, or store owners thus wind up with two options: either pays large amounts of money in taxes, or bribe public servants for getting the government authority's seal on official documents. Some houses even turned into dens for forged documents, including tax forms, contracts, deeds, official receipts, and many other forms of illegal transactions. (Abdinoor, 2007).

Challenges facing collective action to fight corruption

In this section we will discuss the challenges faced in reversing the corruption trend while at the same time trying to embrace the remedial actions highlighted in the next section.

Culture of the people: it is quite difficult to eradicate corruption in country with strong tribal system and poor economic situations. Nepotism is practiced by politicians, enticement and bribing, usually, tend to obstruct any endeavors against corruption. Somalia is a typical example suffering the prevalence of a very strong tribal system, poor economy (scarce resources) and absence of employment opportunities keeps the country with a chronic and widespread corruption. Clans fight for handling meager public funds and politicians corrupt the

system for their personal gains. There is strong competition among individuals from different tribes for public positions, and to get a public position one has to pay kickback and his/her clan members have to support him/her to find that position for corruption means, (Abdirizak, 2011).

Serious fight against corrupt: generally, depend on the level of education of the society at large. The more illiterate is the bulk of the people, the higher the level of corruption in any given country. Generally, the great illiterate majority tend to suppress the small number of literates fighting against corruption. This is a common problem of Africa and the third world in general, (Abdirizak, 2011).

Infrastructure: the existence of limited sources is another challenge why corruption cannot be eliminated in country, no anti-corruption institutes extending anti-corruption strategies. Furthermore, there is no tough law and order; hence the feeble law supports corruption to take place and strengthen in places where corruption is visible, (Abdirizak, 2011).

Economy of the country: meager economy exists in most part of the country, people are busy for obtaining their basic life, state revenue are controlled and are under the hands of specific ruling individuals, the economic scarcity push individuals to accept bribes for their economic stability, also people have to pay bribes for attaining opportunities, and averting job cuts, (Abdirizak, 2011).

Types of Corruption

Petty Corruption: this occurs when a public official demands, or expects a bribe for doing an act, which is he or she is required to do free of charge. It can also be when a bribe is paid to obtain services, which is official is prohibited from

providing. This form of corruption is mainly informed of “speed money” or “grease payment” to help in speeding up the doing of act or service. It’s commonly referred to as a catalyst or lubricant to smooth the process but in actual sense its extortion. Most people when they talk about corruption they refer to this corruption because it’s more visible and many people have participated in it while almost everyone has been a victim of this kind of corruption (Center for Democracy and Governance, 1999).

Grand Corruption: grand or huge corruption occurs when a person is a high position who formulates government policy or is to able to influence government decision making, seeks, payment or reward, usually for big wealth accumulation for exercising the extensive arbitrary powers vested in him or her. This type of corruption though not known to ordinary people is more severe and dangerous to the country as colossal sums of money are lost to the corrupt officials who continuously swing in money and luxury while poor become poor and more constrained. More anticorruption effort should be directed towards this type of corruption unfortunately is not known by many as it’s always done in closed doors/ camera (Center for Democracy and Governance, 1999).

Forms of Corruption

Bribery: Bribery involves the promise, offering or giving of a benefit that improperly affects the actions or decisions of a public servant. This benefit may accrue to the public servant, another person or an entity. A variation of this manifestation occurs where a political party or government is offered, promised or given a benefit that improperly affects the actions or decisions of the political party or government. Example: A traffic officer accepts a cash payment in order not to issue a speed fine (Samatar, 2002).

Embezzlement: This involves theft of resources by persons entrusted with the authority and control of such resources. Example: Hospital staff that steals medicines and in turn sells these to private pharmacists (Samatar, 2002).

Fraud: This involves actions or behaviors by a public servant, other person or entity that fool others into providing a benefit that would not normally accrue to the public servant, other persons or entity. Example: A public servant that registers a fictitious employee in order to collect the salary of that fictitious employee (Samatar, 2002).

Extortion: This involves coercing a person or entity to provide a benefit to a public servant, another person or an entity in exchange for acting (or failing to act) in a particular manner. Example: A public health official threatens to close a restaurant on the basis of fabricated health transgression unless the owner provides the public health official with regular meals (Samatar, 2002).

Abuse of power: This involves a public servant using his/her vested authority to improperly benefit another public servant, person or entity (or using the vested authority to improperly discriminate against another public servant, person or entity). Example: During a tender process but before actual selection of a successful contractor, the head of department expresses his/her wish to see the contract awarded to a specific person (Samatar, 2002).

Favoritism: This involves the provision of services or resources according to personal affiliations (for example ethnic, religious, party political affiliations, etc.) of a public servant. Example: A regional manager in a particular Province ensures that only persons from the same tribe are successful in tenders for the supply of foods in to the manager's geographic area of responsibility (Samatar, 2002).

Nepotism: This involves a public servant ensuring that family members are appointed to public service positions or that family members receive contracts

from State resources. This manifestation is similar to conflict of interests and favoritism. Example: A head of department appoints his/her sister's child to a position even when more suitable candidates have applied for the position (Samatar, 2002).

Causes of Corruption

The following have been major causes of corruption, Abuse of power by the public office holders, poorly paid salary structure in the public sector, Lack of transparency, Absence of adequate internal or external controls to prevent bribery, Weaknesses in the judicial system, Poor legislative accountability is consistently a problem and runs the risk of hindering prospects for enacting long-term anti-corruption reforms, Lack of serious program of combating corruption in the country, Illiterate and ignorant populace with inadequate public discernment of political choices, Political leader's incompetence. (Myint, 2000)

Effects of Corruption

According to Mahesh, (2006) an effect of corruption includes the following:

Lack of Fiscal policy: these mainly include lost revenues from tax, customs tariffs and licensing fees. Most revenue from developing countries is lost through unofficial and personal purposes. For example, most revenue of income comes from import tax and export of livestock (Mahesh, 2006).

Reduction in production investment and growth: the costs of corruption are high in countries like Somalia, Bolivia and Sri Lanka. The country's infrastructure has remained poor, and hence such countries do not have the ability to attract foreign investors. This creates an atmosphere of corrupt investors to sneak in and do their evil acts (Mahesh, 2006).

Costs to both the public and the private: provision of services based on bribes has extensive impact both on the public and the private sector. Although the level of impact differs between poor and rich, the diversion of resources from its intended purpose distorts the formulation of public policy which largely influences private business (Mahesh, 2006).

Loss of confidence in public institutions: once public services can be bought and public leaders break the trust or confidence that community has on them, institutions lose credibility. This in turn weakens law and order, security and the legitimacy of the state. Similarly, the international environment is heavily affected by corruption leading to such acts as: piracy, money laundering, banking fraud across borders, smuggling and both drug as well as human are trafficking (Mahesh, 2006).

Misallocation of resources: resources that otherwise would be directly towards production of goods and services are often diverted to corruption. This includes direct resources involved in cash transfers and indirect ones, such as maintaining contacts with government officials or providing an operation or production license to less efficient firm. Corruption also misallocates resources that could otherwise be used for provision of public service. Funds for licenses or tax incomes instead of contributing to the budget may simply end up in pockets of the corrupt government employees. Also resources are not used most efficiently, as it is not

the most efficient but, rather, the best connected firm that gets a government contract (Mahesh, 2006).

Misguided and unresponsive policies and regulations: In the systems that are corrupt, lawmakers will often generate policies and regulations that are not intended to improve overall economic or political environment. Rather, they benefit a few who are close to the decision makers or those who are bribing government officials to pass a favorable regulation (Mahesh, 2006).

Reduces competition and efficiency: Government officials demanding bribes for providing or denying services like licenses or permits limit the number of firms able to enter the market, thereby creating "rent-seeking" environment that forces companies that are unwilling or are unable to pay bribes into the informal economy. Competent individuals incapable or unwilling to pay bribes are also blocked in firms or public service jobs which sometimes remit efficiency (Mahesh, 2006).

Reduces public revenue for essential goods and services: Tax evasion, one of the biggest threats of government revenue flow, is widespread in corrupt countries because firms that are informal do not report their profits and subsequently do not pay taxes. Also businesses or firms that operate in the formal economy will pay bribes instead of taxes when tax administration is corrupt or opportunities for abuse of the tax code widespread. Moreover, corrupt government agents take for themselves fees and payments they collect from firms for the state budget, thus depriving government of funds needed to provide essential goods and services (Mahesh, 2006).

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter was to present the kind of research methodology that was undertaken for this thesis. It also presented the methodological process of the study. It outlined research design, research population, sample size, sample design, research procedure, research instrument, questionnaire used in the data collection, Validity and reliability of the instrument, data gathering procedures, ethical considerations, Data analysis and research limitations in the research process.

Research Design

The study was conducted through descriptive survey design. The researcher used quantitative approach to quantify incidences in order to describe current conditions and to investigate the efforts of Somali central government in fighting against corruption in Mogadishu Somalia. Using information gained from the questionnaire.

Research Population

The population of this study was consisting of government official and part of civil society organization's staff in Somalia that was one hundred (100). The target population of this study was one hundred (100), fifty (50) of them were from government of ministries staff and fifty (50) of them from civil society organizations staff.

Table 3.1 Study Sample Structure

No	Organization Names	Target population	Sample Size
1	Ministry of finance	25	20
2	Ministry of interior	25	20
3	SIMAD University	25	20
4	SORDA (Local NGO)	25	20
Total		100	80

Sample Size

The sample size of this study was eighty (80) respondent including government officials and civil society organization staff. The data was collected from the selected sample of 80 respondents out of the one hundred that comprised both government officials and civil society organizations staff. In this study the sample was reached the Slovin's formula which is $n = N / (1 + (N \cdot e^2))$, where: n = samples size, N = total population, and e = margin of error, 5% = 0.05 (Mugenda, 2003).

This paragraph shows how to calculate the sample size. $n = N / (1 + (N \cdot e^2))$, $n = 100 / (1 + (100 \cdot 5\%^2))$,

$n = 100 / (1 + (100 \cdot 0.0025))$, $n = 100 / (1 + (0.25))$, $n = 100 / (1.25)$, $n = 80$

Sampling Design

The method of selecting the sample size was purposive sampling and stratified random sampling for the government ministries and civil society organizations.

Sampling Procedure

The study was conducted in Somalia especially describing the input-features in Somalia. The research has primary and secondary sources of data. Primary sources: was described as the data that was observed and recorded by the researcher for the first time to his knowledge and data that was collected by using questionnaire method. Secondary resource: this provides data by reading related documents from the central government in Somalia, fighting corruption and other related agencies and sources, like visiting public libraries, published materials, journals and the internet.

Research Instrument

The study was used questionnaires as the main tool for collecting data.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire used for this study was consisting of a structured and self administered with closed questions for the collection of required data. The selection of this tool was guided by the nature of data to be collected, the time available as well as by the objectives of the study.

Validity and reliability of the instrument

The reliability of the research instrument was concerned with the extent to which the research instrument yields the same results. Questionnaire was pre-tested to three participants and self administered questionnaire was used throughout the research to ensure that respondents fill the same questionnaire and the instrument provides the required information. Validity is the quality of the test doing what is designed to do where reliability consists of both true score and error score. (John Adams, 2007).

Data Gathering Procedure

After the research proposal gets approval, the researcher was requested from academic authorities to get introduction letter which states the permission to collect the research questionnaire within selected government ministers and civil society organizations. The researcher was distributed the questionnaire with attached letter of introduction from the university to selected respondents. After the distribution of the questionnaire, the researcher was collected the data, analyzed and then draw conclusions from the research was prepared the final report to submit to the concerned authorities.

Ethical Consideration

The study was conducted with permission and the full knowledge of the selected officials. No respondents name was mentioned in this research report. There was need for researcher to use professional and ethical standards to plan, collect and process data. The researcher was making sure that he used the objective methods in data collection. The researcher was making sure that any

element of individual bias was subdued in favor of well systematic and objective measure.

The methodology chosen for the research was selected on the basis on the research objectives and not for other reasons. The researcher was recognized the boundaries of this competence in selection of methodology and the researcher also was making sure that he used only those techniques for which he was qualified by his education training and experienced. Finally the researcher was making sure that he collected data according to accepted research standards.

Data Analysis

The collected data was edited and cross/checked during the field research to ensure their accuracy and legibility. Data was analyzed by assessing the frequency of respondents per question. Questions addressed particular theme and followed the sequence which was analyzed. Tabulated frequencies and necessary analysis was made using Excel and SPSS computing program to present the quantitative data analyses.

Limitations of the study

Firstly, most government officials in researcher's country don't like to make open their internal information and that was obstacle to the researcher, secondly there is insecurity all the county, thirdly the researcher faced language barriers and some of the respondents did not know English language so the researcher tried to translate them in their local language. All these obstacles were solved through hard work and convincing the target population that this research is pure academic and their information will be kept confidentially.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the presentation of data, analysis, and interpretation. The data analysis and interpretation was based on the research questions as well as research objectives, the presentation is divided in to two parts. The first part presents the respondents profile information, while the second part deals with presentation, interpretation, and analysis of the research questions and objectives. Below are the data presentations and analysis of research findings.

DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENTS

This part presents the background information of the respondents who participated in the study. The purpose of this background information was to find out the characteristics of the respondents and show the distribution of the population of the study.

In addition to that, the profile of respondents as to, Gender, Age, Marital status, level of education and experience to view what category the majority of the respondents are belonging to.

Section One

Table 4.1 the profile of respondents

Categories	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Male	52	65
Female	28	35
Total	80	100
Age		
20-30	22	27.5
31-40	28	35
41-50	18	22.5
51 and above	12	15
Total	80	100
Marital status		
Single	27	33.75
Married	49	61.25
Divorced	3	3.75
Widowed	1	1.25
Total	80	100
Educational level		
Secondary level	21	26.25
Diploma	11	13.75
Bachelor	28	35
Master	12	15
PhD and above	8	10
Total	80	100
Experience		
6 Months	8	10
1 year	14	17.5
2 years	11	13.75
3 years	20	25
4 years	27	33.75
Total	80	100

Gender

In the table 4.1, 65% of the total respondents were Male and 35% were Female. This shows that most of the respondents which were from the government ministries and civil society organizations staff were male while the females were the minorities.

Age

According to the table 4.1, the majority of the respondents that constitute 35% of the respondents are within the age bracket (31-40 years), 27.5% of the respondents are within the age bracket (20-30), 22.5% of the respondents are within the age bracket (41-50), 15% are of the respondent are 50 and above. This shows that the age of the majority of the respondents lays between 31 and 40 which means that most of them are in senior age.

Marital status

In the table 4.1, indicates that the majority of the respondents are married that makes up 61.25% of the respondents. Second group of the respondents are single which represents 33.75%, 5% of the respondents are others (divorced and widowed).

Education level

In the table 4.1, indicates that the majority of the respondents are bachelor degree holders that makes up 35% of the respondents, second group of the respondents are secondary certificate holders which represents 26.25% of the respondents, third group of the respondents are Master degree holders which constitutes 15% of the respondents, fourth group of the respondents are diploma

holders and that one constitutes 13.75% of the respondents. While the last group would be PHD and above holders which constitutes 10% of the respondents.

Experience

According to the table 4.1, the majority of the respondents that constitute 33.75% of the respondents experience are within the range (4 years and above), 25% of the respondents are within the range (3 years), 17.5% of the respondents are within the range of (one year), 13.75% of the respondents are within the range (2 years), 10% of the respondents are within the range (6 months),. This shows that the experience of the majority of the respondents lay between three to four years and above.

Section Two Question one

Extent of corruption in Somali central government

What is the extent of corruption in Somali central government?

The first objective of the study which was what is the extent of corruption in Somali central government? In order to achieve this objective, the researcher asked a number of questions to the respondents to provide answers to research question one. The results are presented in the following table.

Table 4.2: What is the extent of corruption in Somali central government?

No.	Questions	Mean	Interpretation
1	There is heavy corruption existing in the central government agencies	3.57	Very high
2	In the last few years, the level of corruption has been increasing in central government agencies	2.91	High
3	There is an equal employment opportunity in the central government agencies	2.34	Moderate
4	Corruption effects decision making process in the central government agencies	3.23	High
5	Corruption is not only exist in political sphere but also in the Administration level	2.82	High
6	Corruption contributed to larger fiscal deficits in the central government of Somalia	2.98	High
7	Somali Central government corruption caused lack of public trust	3.40	Very high
8	Lack of foreign direct investment because of corruption	2.31	Moderate
Overall mean		2.95	High

In the Table 4.2 all respondents (from both government ministries and civil society organizations staff) in those selected institutions strongly agreed that the In the last few years, the level of corruption has been increasing in central government agencies was very high with the mean of 3.57 and also strongly agreed that Somali Central government corruption caused lack of public trust with the mean of 3.40 the respondents disagreed that There is an equal employment opportunity in the central government agencies with the mean of 2.34 they was also high (agree) with over all mean 2.95, which means the statements mentioned above shows that the extent of corruption in central government is high.

Section Three Question Two

Main causes of corruption in Somali central government

What are the main causes of corruption in Somali central government?

The second objective of the study was what are the main causes of corruption in Somali central government? In order to achieve this objective, the researcher asked a number of questions to the respondents to provide answers to research question two. The results are presented in the following table.

Table 4.3 what are the main causes of corruption in Somali central government?

No.	Question	Mean	Interpretation
1	Nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal employment opportunities	3.51	Very high
2	Lack of security	3.13	High
3	Lack of transparency and accountability	3.65	Very high
4	Absence of Free Media and access to Public Information and Records.	2.99	High
5	Poorly paid salary structure in the public sector	3.12	High
6	Continuous civil war	2.94	High
7	Absence of adequate internal or external controls to prevent bribery	2.98	High
8	Weaknesses in the judicial system	2.87	High
9	Lack of serious program of combating corruption in the country	2.60	Moderate
10	Lack of real propensity on the part of the political leadership to combat corruption	2.89	High
11	Businessmen involvement in the government agencies	3.32	Very high
Overall mean		3.09	High

In the Table 4.3 all respondents (from both government ministries and civil society organizations staff) in those selected institutions strongly agreed that the Lack of transparency and accountability in the Somali central government was very high with the mean of 3.65 and also strongly agreed that Nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal opportunities with the mean of 3.51 the respondents disagreed that There is Lack of serious program of combating corruption in the country with the mean of 2.60 they was also high (agree) with over all mean 3.09, which means the statements mentioned above are the main causes of corruption in central government of Somalia.

Section Four Question Three

Efforts, challenges and finding possible of solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government

What are the efforts, challenges and possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government?

The third objective of the study were what are the efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how mitigate corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia? In order to achieve this objective, the researcher asked a number of questions to the respondents to provide answers to research question three. The results are presented in the following table.

Table 4.4 what are the efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somali?

No.	Questions	Mean	Interpretation
1	The newly appointed cabinet started better revenue collection and controlling systems to deter corruption.	3.07	High
2	Creating Government officials' asset recording program.	3.05	High
3	Reducing the role of government in economic activities (to limit authority).	3.24	High
4	Professionalization of recruitment and management.	3.15	High
5	It's difficult to eradicate corruption in country with strong tribal system.	3.45	Very high
6	Meager of economy exists in most parts of the country and especially in the central government	3.38	Very high

	agencies.		
7	The great illiterate majority tend to suppress the small number of literates fighting against corruption.	3.06	High
8	Lack of country's political stability.	3.04	High
9	Creating National anti-corruption bodies and policies	2.80	Moderate
10	Independent audit system	3.14	High
11	Strong penalty to corruption practitioners	3.57	Very high
12	Hiring of well trained staff and offering the perspective of ongoing trainings	3.30	High
13	Increasing transparency through accessible, relevant, and accurate information	3.09	High
14	Creating measures or policies that encourage civil society and nongovernmental organizations to report corrupt activities on the part of public officials	2.80	High
15	Maintaining awareness through local media	3.25	High
16	Cooperation with local universities to collect data on institutional demands and structures	3.28	Very high
Over all mean		3.16	High

Source: Primary data 2010

In the Table 4.4 all respondents (from both government ministries and civil society organizations staff) in those selected institutions strongly agreed that the Strong penalty to corruption practitioners in the Somali central government was very high with the mean of 3.57, and also strongly agreed that It's difficult to eradicate corruption in country with strong tribal system with the mean of 3.45, the respondents disagreed that Creating National anti-corruption bodies and policies with the mean of 2.80, they were also agreed (high) with over all mean 3.16, which means that the statements mentioned above are the efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in central government of Somalia.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter discusses the findings, conclusion and recommendation of this study. Firstly, it discusses the major findings of the study as stated in the research objectives. Secondly, the conclusion will be draw form the findings of the study. Lastly, the researcher will bring recommendation for further research for this study.

Discussions of the Research Findings

The study focused on efforts of Somali central government in fighting against corruption in Mogadishu, Somalia. The study was to determine the profile of the respondents in terms of: gender, age, education, marital status, and experience. The objectives of the study were: to determine the extent of corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia, to determine the main causes of corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia, to identify the efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Research question one:

The first objective of this study was to identify the extent of corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia. Based on analysis of chapter four, most of the respondents strongly agreed that the in the last few years, the level of corruption has been increasing in central government agencies, and they

also agreed that the Somali Central government corruption caused lack of public trust.

The researcher found that the corruption effects decision making process in the central government agencies and also corruption contributed to larger fiscal deficits in the central government of Somalia. In addition to that findings that the corruption is not only exist in political sphere but also in the Administration level in Somali central government agencies.

Research Question two:

The second objective of the study was to determine the main causes of corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia. Based on analysis of chapter four, most of the respondents strongly agreed that there is lack of transparency and accountability in the central government agencies and also strongly agreed that there is nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal employment opportunities in the Somali central government. The findings of the study showed that there is poorly paid salary structure in the public sector and also lack of real propensity on the part of the political leadership to combat corruption in the central government.

Research Question three:

The third objective of the study was to identify the efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government agencies in Mogadishu, Somalia. Based on analysis of chapter four, most of the respondents agreed that the efforts of Somali central government in fighting against corruption are: newly appointed cabinet started better revenue

collection and controlling systems to deter corruption, creating Government officials' asset recording program, reducing the role of government in economic activities (to limit authority) and professionalization of recruitment and management. And also agreed that there are some challenges which are facing the central government in order to fight corruption such as: it's difficult to eradicate corruption in country with strong tribal system, meager of economy exists in most parts of the country and especially in the Somali central government agencies, the great illiterate majority tend to suppress the small number of literates fighting against corruption and also country's lack of political stability.

The respondents also suggested some possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government which are: there is need of creating national anti-corruption bodies and policies and also putting strong penalty to corruption practitioners in the Somali central government.

The above findings show that the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. This implies that as long as there are efforts of Somali central government to fight against corruption, the corruption practices will decrease.

CONCLUSIONS

The study investigated efforts of Somali central government in fighting against corruption in Mogadishu, Somalia. The conclusions were made objectively as follows:

The first objective of this study was to determine the extent of corruption in Somali central government. Based on findings all respondents (from both government ministries and civil society organizations staff) in those selected institutions strongly agreed that there is heavy corruption existing in the central government agencies and also agreed that the Somali central government corruption caused lack of public trust.

The second objective of the study was to determine the main causes of corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia. Based on findings all respondents (from both government ministries and civil society organizations staff) in those selected institutions strongly agreed that there is lack of transparency and accountability in Somali central government they also strongly agreed that there is nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal employment opportunities in the Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia.

The third objective of the study was to identify the efforts, challenges and finding possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government in Mogadishu, Somalia. Based on findings all respondents (from both government ministries and civil society organizations staff) in those selected institutions agreed that the newly appointed cabinet started better revenue collection and controlling systems to deter corruption in the Somali central

government and also strongly agreed that it's difficult to eradicate corruption in country with strong tribal system and also to put strong penalty to corruption practitioners in the central government agencies in Mogadishu, Somalia.

RECOMMENDATIONS

After the research finding, the following are the recommendations:

- The government should establish National anti-corruption policy and bodies to fight corruption in the country.
- Better Public Fund Management and accountability: The fight against corruption can be improved under an environment with good governance, transparency and well managed public funds. Lack of good management and accountability by the government officials are the motives that lessen a nation's development both psychological and material. Public fund mismanagement is done by the public servants, particularly those with access to the government's income sources like the ports, the police and tax departments.
- Strong penalty to corrupt individuals: corruption problem affects all societies, wealthy and poor; so in order to avoid and overcome this practice there must be easy access to law and order. This is necessary for the sustainability of resource management in a good manner. If the law is definitely meting big punishment against corruption practitioners and the power of accomplishment or taking the accurate step is available, then this is a touchable step towards the elimination of corruption and.
- Independent detective personnel: since corruption practitioners are those responsible for the management and implementation of state affairs as well as the running of natural resources of the country, it becomes difficult to monitor them. Security and judiciary agency in most countries are under

the hands of the government, and the authority of these agents remains in tandem with those taking care of state property.

Suggested area for further research

- Challenges and associated solutions in Collective Action to fight corruption.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

TRANSMITTAL LETTER



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P.O. Box 20000, Kampala, Uganda
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**OFFICE OF THE ASSOCIATE DEAN, SOCIAL SCIENCE
SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH (SPGSR)**

December 23, 2010

Dear Sir/Madam,

**RE: REQUEST FOR HASSAN-KAFI JAMA WARSAME. REG.NO.
MPA/42862/92/DF; TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN YOUR ORGANIZATION**

The above mentioned is a bonafide student of Kampala International University pursuing a Masters of Public Administration. He is currently conducting a field research of which the title is "**Efforts of Somali Central Government in Fighting against Corruption in Mogadishu Somalia,**" As part of his research work; he has to collect relevant information through questionnaires, interviews and other relevant reading materials.

Your organization has been identified as a valuable source of information pertaining to his research project. The purpose of this letter is to request you to avail him with the pertinent information he may need.

Any information shared with him will be used for academic purposes only and we promise to share our findings with your organization. Rest assured the data you provide shall be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Any assistance rendered to him will be highly appreciated.

Yours truly,

**Dr. ROSEAN MWANIKI
ASSOC.DEAN SOCIAL SCIENCES
SPGSR**



APPENDIX II

RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

Dear respondent,

I, Hassan-kafi Jama Warsame, student at Kampala International University (KIU) doing a Master of Arts in Public Administration and Management. I am investigating "Efforts of Somali central government in fighting against corruption in Mogadishu, Somalia".

This study has been prepared for academic purpose and you have been selected to provide reliable information according to your knowledge. I kindly request you to answer the following questions honestly. The results of this study will be useful for getting better solutions on fight against corruption in Somali central government and whole country.

Information you offer will be used for academic purpose and also kept confidential.

Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Hassan-kafi Jama Warsame

MPA/42862/92/DF

Section: A. PERSONAL PROFILE

Please tick the appropriate answer.

1. Age

20-30 ☐ 31-40 ☐ 41- 50 ☐ 51 and above ☐

2. Marital Status

Single ☐ Married ☐ Divorced ☐ Widowed ☐

3. Educational Level

Secondary level ☐ Diploma ☐ Bachelor ☐

Master ☐ PhD and above ☐

4. Experience

6 months ☐ 1year ☐ 2 years ☐ 3 years ☐

years and above ☐

5. What is the name of your organization?

Instruction: Please write your answer to the statements below. Kindly use the rating guided as follows for A, B, C and D

A= strongly agree

B= Agree

C= Disagree

D= strongly disagree

1. What is the extent of corruption in Somali central government?

No.	Questions	A	B	C	D
1	There is heavy corruption existing in the central government agencies				
2	In the last few years, the level of corruption has been increasing in central government agencies				
3	There is an equal opportunity employment in the central government agencies				
4	Corruption effects decision making process in the Somali central government agencies				
5	Corruption is not only exist in political sphere but also in the Administration level				
6	Corruption contributed to larger fiscal deficits in the central government of Somalia				

7	Central government Corruption caused lack of public trust				
8	There is lack of foreign direct investment in country because corruption				

2. What are the main causes of corruption in Somali central government?

No.	Questions	A	B	C	D
1	Nepotism and favoritism in employment with no regard to competence and equal employment opportunities				
2	Lack of security				
3	Lack of transparency and accountability				
4	Absence of free media and lack of access to public information and records.				
5	Poorly paid salary structure in the public sector				
6	Continuous civil war				
7	Absence of adequate internal or external controls to prevent bribery				
8	Weaknesses in the judicial system				
9	Lack of serious program of combating corruption in the country				
10	Lack of real propensity on the part of the political leadership to combat corruption				
11	Businessmen involvement in the government agencies				

3. What are the efforts, challenges and possible solutions of how to mitigate corruption in Somali central government?

No.	Questions	A	B	C	D
1	The newly appointed cabinet started better revenue collection and controlling systems to deter corruption.				
2	Creating Government officials' asset recording program				
3	Reducing the role of government in economic activities (to limit authority)				
4	Professionalization of recruitment and management.				
5	It's difficult to eradicate corruption in country with strong tribal system.				
6	Meager economy exists in most parts of the country and especially in the central government agencies.				
7	The great illiterate majority tend to suppress the small number of literates fighting against corruption.				
8	Lack of country's political stability				
9	Creating National anti-corruption bodies and policies				
10	Independent audit system				
11	Strong penalty to corruption practitioners				
12	Hiring of well trained staff and offering the perspective of ongoing training.				

13	Increasing transparency through accessible, relevant, and accurate information.				
14	Creating measures or policies that encourage civil society and nongovernmental organizations to report corrupt activities on the part of public officials.				
15	Maintaining awareness through local media				
16	Cooperation with local universities to collect data on institutional demands and structures.				

APPENDIX III

CALCULATION OF CONTENT OF VALIDITY INDEX

$$\text{CVI} = \frac{\text{Number of all relevant questions}}{\text{The total number of the items}}$$

Section: One

$$\text{CVI} = \frac{8}{6} = 0.75$$

Section: Two

$$\text{CVI} = \frac{11}{9} = 0.82$$

Section: Three

$$\text{CVI} = \frac{16}{15} = 0.94$$

Therefore, Average of content validity index is

$$\text{CVI} = \frac{2.51}{3} = 0.84$$

APPENDIX III

INTERPRETATION OF MEANS

Range	Description	Interpretation
3.26- 4.00	strongly agree	Very high
2.51- 3.25	Agree	High
1.76- 2.50	Disagree	Moderate
1.00- 1.75	strongly disagree	Low

RESEARCHER'S CURRICULUM VITAE

1. PERSONAL DATA:

Name: Hassan-kafi Jama Warsame.
Place of Birth: Mogadishu,
Date of Birth: 1985.
Marital status: Single.
Gender: Male.
Nationality: Somali.
E-mail address: hassankafi@hotmail.com
Mob: +254(0) 791 503 066.

2. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND:

Duration	Institution	Qualification
2010-2011	Kampala International University(KIU)	Master of Public Admin and Management (Candidate)
2005-2009	Somali Institute of management and Administration Development(SIMAD)	Bachelor of Information Technology (BIT)
2002-2005	Ahmed Gurei Secondary School	Secondary Certificate

2. SEMINARS / WORKSHOPS.

Duration	Institution	Course
2010	Africa Population Institute	Public Admin course
2010	UNPOS/KSMS	Public Financial Management
2009	NDI	Webmaster and ICT course
2006	UNAIDS	Country Response Information System(CRIS)
2006	Youth-Link	HIV and AIDs Prevention
2007	SIMAD	Business Communication certificate.

4. WORK EXPERIENCE.

Duration	Institution	Responsibility
April 2009-Jan.2010	Somali Presidency	Webmaster and ICT assistance
2005-2009	Soma-action International Fund (SAIF)	Admin assistant

