

**THE INFLUENCE OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY-RELATED BUDGETS ON
CONFLICTS AND FORMATION OF MILITIAS
IN JONGLEI STATE, SOUTH SUDAN.**

(2005-2011)

A Thesis

Presented to the College of Higher Degrees and Research

Kampala International University

Kampala, Uganda

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

By:

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October, 2012

DECLARATION A

This Thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree or any other academic award to any other university or institution of learning whatsoever



Name and Signature of Candidate

24/01/2013

Date

DECLARATION B

I confirm that the work reported in this Thesis was carried out by the candidate under my supervision.

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6/02/2017

Date

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The researcher thanks God for His mercies and the grace to complete the course. The researcher thanks and acknowledges the contribution of the College for Higher Degrees and Research to making this course an enriching experience and the VIVA Panel for their constructive criticisms that has made this research work better in all ramifications.

The researcher appreciates and thanks his Supervisor, Dr. Nwaniki Rosean who spent many hours poring over this work and for patiently listening to the researcher's long arguments about South Sudan, defence expenditures and conflicts in Jonglei state. Her frank opinions and advice shaped this work.

The researcher appreciates all his classmates and acknowledges the fact that with over one hundred years experience in various fields; he was privileged to participate with the crème de la crème from all over East and West Africa and in a truly international class.

The researcher thanks his family members, most especially his wife, Olatundun Tinuade Omideyi who has been a 'victim' of the long absences from home in the pursuit of happiness for the whole family.

The researcher's colleagues in South Sudan are appreciated for their understanding and for providing him the opportunity to attend the lectures. The researcher thanks Mr. Samuel Nampak Abashe of the IMTC for his unalloyed support and prays that God continue to bless him. The researcher also appreciates the support of Dr. Mustapha Tejan-Kella, his senior colleague in South Sudan for his support and mentoring at all times.

For everyone who contributed in other ways to the success and happiness of the researcher while studying at KIU, you are all appreciated.

Olaide Omideyi

October 2012

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

SPLA: Sudan people's Liberation Army

SPLM: Sudan People's Liberation Movement

RMG: Rebel Militia Groups

GoSS: Government of Southern Sudan/Government of South Sudan

SSAF: South Sudan Armed Forces

GDP: Gross Domestic Product.

MRS: Medical Receiving Stations.

HSBA: Humanitarian Baseline Survey Assessment.

SAF: Sudan Armed Forces

MP: Member of Parliament

UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan

OCHA: Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Assistance.

tukul: round mud huts with grass roof commonly used in South Sudan.

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ABSTRACT

The study examined the influence of defence expenditure and security-related budgets on conflicts and formation of militias in Jonglei state of South Sudan and it was based on four specific objectives: (a) to determine the characteristics of the defence and security-related budgets in South Sudan; (b) To ascertain the level of access to defence and security related budgets by various groups and how this influences conflicts and formation of militias; (c) Analyze the recruitment, appointments, promotions and retirement procedures; d) Evaluate the level of service delivery to SPLA officers and family members and the factors responsible for the high level of desertions. The study employed a descriptive research design. SAQ were used to collect primary data from 200 people, using simple random sampling. Data analysis was done using SPSS's frequencies and percentages.

The findings of this research showed that the government of South Sudan is justified in spending part of its resources on defence and security related expenditures as part of its duties to its citizens is to protect them and create an enabling environment for productive economic activities to take place but that this function is being performed without making use of scientific methods to determine the defence and security needs of the country. The study also found out that the relatively high allocations to security related expenditures and lack of accountability and structures to monitor compliance with disbursement guidelines is like a magnet drawing everyone to the defence budget.

The conclusion of the research showed that there was need for the government to spend part of its budget on defence and security related issues as part of its basic responsibilities to the citizen of South Sudan and improve accountability. Further the study recommends the implementation of the security sector reforms policy document by paying particular attention to the reduction of the number of personnel in the armed and security forces and improvement of welfare.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM AND ITS SCOPE

Background of the Study

Defence budgets/expenditures have always been controversial the world over economy cannot be over-emphasized. The resources going to the sector also generates interest as resources that goes to defence are resources denied to other sectors of the economy which affects economic development on a more general level. Defence expenditures and its disbursement also attract interest from everyone as it is a veritable source of conflict in any country, be it developing or developed.

Opinions differ on defence expenditure relative to other sectors of the economy. The perceived importance or non-importance of defence expenditures depends on personal, professional and economic views. Most commentators on defence expenditures agree that there is a need for a defence sector and consequently, defence expenditure, the character of the expenditure itself has remained a subject of controversy the world over. Adam Smith viewed soldiers as 'unproductive'¹ while Hirst in Kennedy² (1975) averred that 'public expenditure on professional soldiers should be kept at a minimum but 'sufficient' level to maintain a country and protect her against other civilized societies'.

Most armed forces in the third world with very few exceptions and as presently constituted are poorly trained, unwieldy, poorly paid, undependable, unproductive, mostly illiterate or at best semi-literate, corrupt, unfocused, unmotivated and largely unprofessional. The armed forces members in Third World countries also suffer from negative image problems and are widely reviled by their civilian populations (From Researchers' personal experiences and observations in different countries).

The Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) was formed in Bor, Jonglei State Sudan in 1983 when then Lt. Col. John Garang was sent down south to quell a mutiny by 500 Sudanese soldiers of southern origin based in Bor who were resisting orders to be rotated to the north of Sudan. Lt. Col. Garang arrived in Bor but instead of quelling the mutiny, decided to join the mutineers and also encouraged southern soldiers in other military garrisons to rebel against the government. The rest as they say, is now history as the SPLA became the main vehicle used to fight for the liberation and securing of independence for the southern part of Sudan on 11 July 2011.

The SPLA was theoretically transformed from a rebel force into a conventional army after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 through section 58 of the Interim constitution of Southern Sudan and now codified as a national army via part 10, chapter 1 of the South Sudan Interim constitution and was the only armed group recognized under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that brought the Sudanese civil war to an end in 2005.

The disbursement of defence expenditures by the Government of Southern Sudan after the signing of the CPA deserves attention based on the amount of resources going to defence and defence-related issues, the manner of disbursement and concerns about transparency in the disbursement of defence budgets and the potentials that defence budgets have to encourage more conflicts and formation of Rebel militia groups in the new republic of South Sudan is cause for concern.

Statement of the Problem

The government of South Sudan has been trying to repay the international community for its unflinching support towards the attainment of nationhood by

adhering to most of recommendations or implied stands of the donors on issues of national importance. The integration into the SPLA of renegade elements from various RMGs is one of the best examples of this. The belief of the international community is that integration of the RMGs into the SPLA will quell the allegations of the SPLA as a 'Dinka' Army and open up the political space to persons with opposing views.

With the obvious setbacks to the professionalization of the SPLA and erosion of morale and discipline, the government is going ahead to integrate the RMG leadership and their followers with inflated military ranks thus encouraging more persons to join the RMGs and providing opportunists the chance to form RMGs to gain political and economic relevance. Integration have financial consequences for the defence budget as supplementary provisions are made to cover the costs of providing for the needs of the integrated members.

The issue of defence expenditure in South Sudan is also a problem as a result of the amount of resources going into defence and defence-related sectors is cause for concern. Out of the total budget 2006 amounting to 3,581,548,512 Sudanese Pounds, a total of 1,197, 493,770 SDP went to Security representing approximately 33.5 percent of the total budget. This excluded money budgeted for War Disabled, Widows and Orphans (455,393), Internal Affairs (311,220,857 SDP for Police, Prisons, Wildlife personnel) and later, War Veterans Commission. In 2008, the total budget was 5,712,662,066 while security gulped 1,873,621,146 representing 32.79 percent of the total budget. This also excluded estimates for defence-and security related areas such as War Disabled, Widows and Orphans (2,899,779 SDP), Internal Affairs (462,816,694 SDP) and War Veterans Commission (2,854,305 SDP). If the huge sums going to defence and security related needs are critically examined, we can deduce that resources are being starved critical sectors such as education, roads, employment generation, healthcare and infrastructure to pander to the needs of defence and security among many other competing needs of government.

Purpose of the Study

The research had the following purposes;

- i. To determine the characteristics of defence and security-related budgets in South Sudan
- ii. Ascertain the level of access to defence and security-related budgets and how this influences conflicts and formation of rebel militia groups.
- iii. Analyze the recruitment, appointments, promotions and retirement procedures and how these reinforce conflicts and encourage insecurity.
- iv. Create the basis for evaluating armed forces welfare in south Sudan based on efficiency or otherwise of defence allocations.
- v. Evaluate service delivery to SPLA officers and family members and how it reinforces the sharp divisions between officers and enlisted men.
- vi. Predict possible future scenarios for the SPLA based on present occurrences and security dynamics of the new nation of South Sudan.

General Objective

Establishment of the links between conflicts and formation of rebel militia groups in Jonglei state of South Sudan and weaknesses in defence and security-related budgets.

Research Questions

1. What are the demographic characteristics of the respondents?
2. What is the level of access to defence and security related budgets?
3. Are the recruitment, appointments, promotions and retirement procedures fairly done?
4. What roles do military ranks play in service delivery to SPLA officers and family members? How this does reinforces the dualistic nature of the SPLA as a military force?
5. How true is the assertion that the apparent lack of accountability in defence and security-related budgets encourages the struggle for its control in South Sudan? What are the connections between struggle for

access to defence and security-related budgets play in formation of rebel militia groups?

6. What are the influences of the international community on South Sudan's current policy in dealing with rebel militia groups?

Hypothesis

The size, benefits, contributions and economic and social costs of South Sudan's defence expenditures to the personnel of the SPLA, other sectors of the economy and the general public does not meet the ends.

Scope

Geographical Scope

This study looked at the defence expenditures of the new Republic of South Sudan and influence on conflicts and formation of rebel militia groups. The study limited the examination and analysis of conflicts and formation of rebel militia groups to Jonglei state of South Sudan. Observations and comments on SPLA personnel welfare was incorporated into the study to emphasize the assertion that the security related expenditures are not being used to improve personnel welfare in spite of the huge allocations. Using military units in Jonglei state of South Sudan as examples was necessary as these units approximates the general situation better than in Juba with the nice houses, well-laid out barracks for officers and working equipment including helicopters and relatively new vehicles compared to the grass huts, dilapidated vehicles and the generally dirty environment that characterizes most of the military barracks in Jonglei state.

Theoretical Scope

The issues covered by the study include:

- I. Analysis of the budgets of the government of South Sudan from the year 2006 to 2011 and the level of access by various groups and how this influences conflicts and formation of militias.
- II. Evaluation of the levels of service delivery to the different cadres within the SPLA and influence on desertions.
- III. Insights into how the defence and security-related budgets in South Sudan has been indirectly fuelling insecurity witnessed in Jonglei state as everyone jostled for advantages or recognition as a 'player' since this is the only way to access economic opportunities at present in the country.
- IV. The influence of donor countries and international communities on defence and security policies and how this fuels insecurity and inconsistent policies by the government of South Sudan.

Content Scope

This study looked at the following issues:

- I. Budgeting challenges in the Republic of South Sudan in terms of the factors that affects or determines allocations to different sectors. Defence and security related expenditure is consuming huge portions of the national budget apparently based on the myriad security challenges facing the new government but on deeper reflection, this could be justified by the military backgrounds of those involved in allocating resources to different sectors.
- II. Lack of capacity in the Presidency and Ministry of Defence of South Sudan to clearly define the defence needs and objectives of South Sudan and design modalities for its realization at minimum costs. Emphasis on quantity over quality has its drawbacks and some of those drawbacks are already being felt with bloated personnel, rickety equipment and a far from satisfied majority of citizen who expect a better performance from their armed forces.

III. In the best of climes where modalities are in place to monitor defence budgets including by civil society groups, opportunities still abound for shenanigans to take place. In a country like South Sudan where modalities are not in place to monitor defence and security related expenditures and there are no vibrant civil society groups, it becomes a challenge to effectively call the government and its agencies to account on disbursement of budgets on defence or for any sector for that matter. The study examined the lack of transparency and checks and balances in defence and security related budgeting in South Sudan.

IV. Defence budgets normally should 'trickle down' to the beneficiaries who are SPLA troops in terms of improved welfare, serviceable equipment and providing the best environment for the troops to perform. In the case of South Sudan generally and particularly in Jonglei State, this is not observed to be so during the study. If defence budgets are not making life better for majority of SPLA troops, who are the beneficiaries?

Time Scope

The study examined the defence and security related budgets and their influence on conflicts and formation of rebel militia groups in Jonglei state between 2006 and 2011. The Sudanese civil war ended in 2005 with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army. The CPA gave some measure of autonomy to the southern part of Sudan on most issues including defence and security-related budgeting pending the determination of the status of Southern Sudan in the referendum held in December 2010. The referendum ended in secession of the southern part of Sudan and the formation of the new Republic of South Sudan with the declaration of independence on July 09 2011. The defence and security-related budgets have been the responsibility

of the government of South Sudan since 2006 when it was part of Sudan to the present.

Significance of the Study

The study is significant because it set the records straight on defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan and provides a new insight into the relationships that exist between defence and security related expenditures, armed forces personnel welfare and conflicts. Opinions differ on what constitute the 'right' amount of government budgets that should be dedicated to defence and security all over the world and same goes for South Sudan. Certain impressions about the SPLA/SSAF have been created by writers and commentators on defence budgets in South Sudan. Some of these assertions claimed an undue emphasis on defence spending at the expense of other sectors of the economy. The study examined the assertions of over-spending on defence and security using factual evidence based on the budget estimates of the government of South Sudan from 2006 to 2011.

This study is also significant in that it will provide the basis for evaluation of impacts of defence and security-related expenditures on the welfare of armed forces personnel in South Sudan and also provide the basis for generalization of armed forces personnel welfare in the East African Region.

The study looked at how defence and security related expenditures and access to the resources going to defence and security is contributing to conflicts in Jonglei state of South Sudan as the struggle for access to state resources take a new dimension through the formation of RMGs to force the government to negotiate with leaders of the RMGs and give them access to privileges associated with top government functionaries and military Generals.

The study examined defence expenditures within the context of the members of the SPLA/SSAF who are supposed to be the main beneficiaries of resources going to defence and provide an opinion on whether defence budgets are trickling

down to the majority SPLA/SSAF personnel or trickling up to the few Generals and Presidency officials or trickling out to foreign contractors alone.

Analysis of defence and security-related expenditures in developed economies is still carried out mostly as 'specialist' projects. The study of impacts of defence expenditures on armed forces personnel welfare is still in its infancy and studies on this are also very scanty with the field generating little or no interest in Africa. Analyzing the relationships between defence and security-related budgets, armed forces personnel welfare and conflict is a new phenomenon and carrying out such focused study on South Sudan is a pioneering effort. This study therefore served as one of the building blocks for future researchers into armed forces personnel welfare and conflict studies in South Sudan and East Africa generally.

The study and analysis of defence expenditures and impacts on armed forces personnel welfare and relationship with conflicts in South Sudan is a new dimension and this study will benefit researchers in conflicts, defence budgeting in African countries and post-conflict stabilization including those related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts. Others that will benefit from the study are researchers into Security Sector Reforms in South Sudan and African countries and community security and small arms control practitioners.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Defence expenditures in every country have always been controversial. Opinions range from those who feel defence and security receives too much resources to the detriment of other sectors to those who feel that too little resources are devoted to the defence and security sector.

The secrecy associated with defence and security budgets' implementation does not help matters too. The military as a tradition everywhere has a mania for secrecy in calculation of defence needs and spending of resources allocated to it since they feel it gives them an aura of power and freedom to determine the defence direction of the country. The need for secrecy in military and security issues was highlighted by Aderinto (1992)¹⁶ where he said 'secrecy is an important ingredient to military strategy and diplomacy'. Defence expenditures in countries such as the United States of America can be easily appraised using their contributions to the GDP in monetary terms. R. L. Miller (1973)¹⁷ has this to say about the Pentagon 'Almost 10 percent of all assets belong to the Pentagon. It owns for example, around 40 million acres of land, and it controls, directly or indirectly, over 4 million workers. Its budget is only 25 percent less than the entire Gross National Product (GNP) of Great Britain. The department of defence is richer than just any small nation in the world'.

Misconceptions by the public about the SPLA/SSAF are not new. Olaide Omidoyi (1997)¹⁸ had this to say about the Nigerian army and the assumed privileges they are supposed to be enjoying 'Members of the Nigerian armed forces are always being portrayed as people who enjoy privileges in terms of "fat" salaries, bonuses and other sundry welfare packages. They are also portrayed as 'idle people who drink pepper soup and beer from morning till night in their messes'. This is also true about the SPLA where the flashy lifestyles of a few Generals and Presidency officials is used to generalize for the whole of the SPLA/SSAF as

force where privileges are the rule and not the exception. Olaide Omideyi (1997) went further to assert that 'Most Nigerians except those who are directly affected, believes that the armed forces personnel are the sole beneficiaries of Nigeria's defence expenditure, real or imagined, to the detriment of civilians. A visit to most military barracks (Nigeria has 77 at 1996) will disprove these assertions. Dilapidated houses with the paint peeling off, blown off or leaking roofs, squalor, misery, dirty environment reeking of poverty and hopelessness which could be felt, haggard looking and malnourished children in swarms, kid prostitutes, empty Medical Receiving Stations (MRS), empty taps, pools of stagnant water in which millions of mosquitoes breed. The visitor will also see empty offices, unserviceable equipments and empty schools devoid of furniture and students'.

Opinions on the roles and importance of the members of the armed forces vary. Though most commentators agree that the need exists for a defence sector and consequently, defence expenditures, the character of the defence expenditures remains a subject of intense controversy the world over. F. W. Hirst in Kennedy 1975²⁰ averred that 'public expenditure on professional soldiers should be kept at a minimum but "sufficient" level to maintain a country and protect her against other civilized societies'. Going further, Hirst in (Kennedy, 1975) was also of the opinion that 'all expenditures on armies, navies and weapons of destruction are wasteful' and that defence planning must be viewed in terms of the dynamics of competing scarce resource allocation in the public sector.

On the African scene we have those who believe that too much resource are dedicated to defence by governments while depriving other more productive sectors of same resources that could fuel development. This group believes that resources being allocated to defence are resources which could be more productively utilized in the civilian sector of the economy and this is therefore negatively contributing to economic growth. The leading exponent of this group

is Bayo Adekson who substituted 'military extractive ration' for the more conventional use of defence burden. Based on this, Adekson (1992)²¹ described 'military extractive ratio as 'the proportion of national wealth more or less forcibly appropriated by the military members of the society at any time'. Adekson was of the opinion that the contribution of the Nigerian military to the economy is negative because the contributions cannot be measured in monetary terms.

The negative analysis of Adekson is however counter-balanced by another school of thought that believe that defence, as a matter of national priority, deserves more resources as security forms the basis (necessary and sufficient conditions) for development. This group argues that security should be accorded the highest value among other national values. This group also argued that defence expenditures, if properly harnessed, could serve as an engine of growth to launch any country into the orbit of economic growth. This group found a leader in former military President of Nigeria, General I. B. Babangida. Reiterating his view of defence as of high national value, I. B. Babangida²² (1985) said 'Defence commands a substantial part of most national expenditures because it is a sine qua non for any form of development. Each state has a territorial base which must be protected and preserved as a condition for progress and survival'.

The third group which pitches its tent in between the two extremist views of Adekson and Babangida recognizes the need for security but at the same time recognizes that resources devoted to defence have alternative uses which are very highly valued by individuals particularly in a peacetime situation (Domkat Bali 1987)²³. The leading exponent of this middle course is A.C. Pigou, (1988)²⁴, the Cambridge Economist, who said 'expenditure should be distributed between battle ship and poor relieve in such wise that the last shilling devoted to each of them yields the same return of satisfaction'. In allocating resources to defence to promote national growth, there are varied opinions on this as against Babangida's stand on defence spending. R.B. Miller (1998)²⁵ in his argument

against high defence spending opined thus; 'if in fact, it is true that military spending will lead to increased employment, the government still has the option spending those same dollars for other things such as more education, dams, housing and other civilian goods. There is no truth to the argument that a large defence sector is necessary to provide for full employment in our economy. The government has numerous ways to spend its money; defence being one of them'.

Defence and what goes to it might attract different opinions but the desirability of defence spending cannot be removed if a nation is to instill confidence in its population of its readiness to protect its citizens. Thus, defence is a public good and spending on defence related expenditures is a public spending.

Assumptions of the existence of 'markets' (perfect or imperfect), in which resources are efficiently allocated through the price system cannot be applied to the field of defence budgeting and analysis since the price system has little or nothing to do with it but determined by national priorities, personal idiosyncrasies of leaders, arm-twisting, horse-trading and even blackmail according to Hitch and McKean (1961)²⁶. Aderinto (1992) also pointed out that 'Defence expenditure ensures that the 'right' amount is spent on various objectives of government in the light of the pattern of national priorities. In formulating its budget, government is concerned primarily with achieving an optimal balance among the various categories of collective wants it has undertaken to provide'.

The value or priorities ascribed to defence over other expenditures of governments are sometimes distorted by the propaganda of giant defence and security firms who always manage to convince poor African countries that they need to spend more money on weapons. Weapons trade fairs, Air shows etc are held at great expense to showcase the latest in civil aviation and space industries

but these shows are also used to attract sales of military hardware from countries with enough resources to place orders for newer weapons that are sometimes jazzed-up versions of what the countries purchased last year.

A BBC News item (written by Jorn Madslien on 02 June 2011)²⁷ had this to say about how propaganda influences defence spendingA 'on the face of it, the Paris air show- to be held later this month is all about the civil aviation and space industries. But the biennial exhibit is at least as much about billions of dollars of military spending. A broad range of companies, ranging from small component makers to giant defence and security firms such as Lockheed Martin, BAE systems, Finmeccanica and Northrop Grumman, will fill the 130,000 square metres (1.4 m Sq ft) of exhibition space in the chalets and halls on the edge of Le Bourget airports' run way'.

The BBC article went further to say that ' with more than 200 official delegations from 88 countries, many in the arms industry are expecting their order books to be dramatically boosted this year, industry officials and military officers have told BBC News. Military conflicts obviously bolster arms sales, because it uses up weapons and ammunition, and there has been plenty of it in recent months'. In particular, several countries that are normally not actively involved in armed conflicts are now in a position where they will need to restock bombs, ammunition and weapons following months of action in Libya and conflict elsewhere in the region, an executive at an international arms company told BBC News'. Arms trading is not only big business, it is accepted as part of everyday practice and does not suffer from any negative image problems given the scope of the shows where 200 official delegations from at least 88 countries will participate on average.

The benefits of economic growth are often channeled towards purchase of more weapons as the BBC News article pointed out. 'wealth in the region, resulting from strong economic growth on the back of soaring global oil prices, has bolstered arms sales to the Middle East in recent years. In 2010, the region spent \$111bn (68bn British Pounds Sterling) on military expenditure, a 2.5% rise on 2009, with the bulk of the purchases made by Saudi Arabia'. Looking at the amount spent by the Middle Eastern countries on military purchases in 2010 according to the article, it is difficult not to do a comparative analysis of what this money could do in terms of provision of safe drinking water, kilometers of new roads, new health centres and upgrading of existing ones, schools and creation of more employment opportunities. Lending credence to the power of propaganda to drive weapons sales through promotion of non-existing 'enmity' and 'security threats', the BBC News article had this to say 'But although much of the focus will be on the Middle East this year, the industry's biggest growth markets are actually in relatively peaceful parts of the world. In 2010 "the region with the largest increase in military spending was South America" according to SIPRI. "This continuing increase in South America is surprising given the lack of real military threats to most states and the existence of more pressing social needs", observes Carina Solmirano, a SIPRI Latin America expert. In Asia, arms race rather than outright war is driving weapons sales, with rivalries and border tension between Pakistan, India and China. India was the world's largest arms importer in 2010". The rivalry between India and Pakistan over the Kashmiri region is well-documented and is being used by the well-oiled propaganda machines of the arms manufacturers to boost sales to both countries.

Olaide Omideyi (October 1997)²⁸ described the dilemma of the Nigerian armed forces personnel who are underpaid and suffers from the effects of the poor welfare in the army but lack credibility with friends and family thus; 'First, the impression that the civilian population normally have about soldiers and officers is false and quite misleading. The soldier or the officer is believed to be

financially buoyant at every point in time when all indicators point to the contrary. The officer or soldier might try to explain himself till kingdom come to friends and relations as to the true conditions of service but the fact still remain that such explanations or protestations are never believed’.

Olaide went further to give concrete first-hand experiences of what the soldiers and officers go through in terms of coping with generalizations of public opinion about military personnel; ‘The second impression is that the soldiers and their officers are lazy human beings, overpaid from public coffers for doing nothing. No soldier can complain of being cash-strapped and be believed, even sometimes by their wives and children. This impression of constant financial buoyancy of officers and soldiers has been influenced by some officers and soldiers with visibly opulent lifestyles for various reasons. These reasons might include one or more of the following, coming from a privileged background and therefore having access to extra means of finance other the army salary, holding of choice (and juicy) appointments which enables the person have access to extra funds, patronage from senior officers (we still remember the IBB boys). Other reasons include foreign operations in Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia, corrupt practices like taking bribe and embezzling troop funds and extortion. The extra funds might also come from private businesses. Some soldiers are also petty traders in their spare time while some are professionals like medical doctors who offer their services to private individuals at a price’.

Poor welfare for soldiers also have historical antecedent. Joseph Hume in Sweetman J (1988)²⁹ was quoted as having said that ‘The state of the barracks generally would be found to be very objectionable, both as to drainage, ventilation and cleanliness’. Hume was also said to have complained bitterly after visiting a military barracks in 19th century England that ‘The soldiers, in fact, were a great deal more comfortable than the working classes’ as if the soldiers were not part of the ‘working classes’ he mentioned.

In Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida was said 'to have been moved close to tears' (Tell Magazine Nov 18, 1996)³⁰ and was 'appalled at the slum-like conditions of the sprawling Ojo Military cantonment. Soldiers were living in houses without windows, using roofing sheets blown off from other buildings as windows'. This sad event occurred during an unscheduled visit to the barracks at the instance of Major Sambo Dasuki, ADC to General Babangida and a Major in the Nigerian army then. This shocking discovery that money meant for soldiers welfare does not get to them led to the bringing the Nigerian defence ministry under the Presidency as a department for more effective monitoring of defence expenditure.

The impression of the civilian populations about their armed forces varied according to the period and the country being examined. In 19th century Britain, the civilian population was clearly hostile to the army. J. Sweetman (1988) captured the mood more accurately that 'more significantly, perhaps, growing expression of anti-military sentiments were associated with radical critics in the wake of the Great Reforms Act and subsequent willingness to introduce political and social legislation. Scorn was poured upon the army as a brutalizing and immoral institution by influential personalities like W.E. Gladstone, Richard Cobden, John Bright and the more extreme David Urquhart'.

In contrast to this, 'The Economist (P. 47, No 41, April 1996)³¹ captured the positive impressions of Americans about their army thus: 'In a Gallup last April, 30% of respondents had a lot of confidence in the armed forces, more than in such otherwise sturdy contenders as organized religion (22%) and the Supreme court (20%). The respected magazine went further to say that 'Civilians are impressed, first of all by the armed forces competence. Two other military virtues, a spirit of public service and a way of judging people strictly by their performance appeal equally to both left and right'.

On opportunities in the US armed forces, C. Moskos (1996)³² had this to say 'A military career has long been an avenue of advancement for minorities, especially blacks who now make up some 30% of the army. In fact, the armed forces are the only place in America society where whites are regularly bossed by blacks'. This is possible because of the non-racial nature of the US army.

On the need for the army to be professional and stay out of politics, General Usman Katsina (Newswatch 1996)³³ was quoted as saying ' We already had a good army, we could really come out as a professional army, no interference with the politics of the day except our professionalism and the training of soldiers and our officers like the British or the Indian army'.

Aderinto (1992) provided some clarifications on why military budgets and defence planning are not widespread areas of interest to scholars. He mentioned the fact that 'Neglect in the application of economic analysis to defence, until recently, was a worldwide phenomenon. Even in the developed economies, the application of economic analysis to defence did not develop into a separate and distinct area of study within the subject matter of economics until recently. The delay resulted partly from the feeling among Economists that the existing methodology of economic analysis was inappropriate for defence analysis.

A methodology grounded on the allocation of resources by competitive market forces was considered inappropriate to deal with allocation of public funds. Such an allocation was considered a political matter outside the main concern of economists'. Aderinto (1992) gave further insight into why it is difficult to accurately analyze military expenditures thus 'The delay was also partly explained by the general paucity and inaccuracy of data. Secrecy was an important ingredient to military strategy and diplomacy. Unfortunately, researchers found secrecy surrounding defence spending very frustrating in their search for hard facts to prove their theories'.

The concern about transparency in dealings of the military in Africa should be addressed from a relative perspective since it is difficult even in advanced countries with monitoring guidelines to play a fast one with defence budgets. Adams Yamolinsky (1971)³⁴ described the issue of abuse of defence budgets in the United States of America thus 'The Senate Foreign Relations committee discovered that military assistance to foreign nations totaled almost \$7 billion. However, in the President's budget message to congress the listing under military assistance to foreign nations was only \$625 Million. Additionally, it was discovered that almost \$700 Million had been transferred to foreign nations for the purchase of arms under the 'food for Peace' program. This happened as part of covert military operations meant to extend American influence'. If it could happen in America with all the checks and balances, it should not be a surprise to anyone if it happens in a third world country.

It is not only important that the military maintains discipline in military matters but it is even more important that they should be above board in their personal lives. Unfortunately, this is not the case in most African countries as influential military Generals are considered above the law and live clearly above their means. Ummuna (The Week Magazine June 1997)³⁵ summed it up this way "But whereas civilian governors have in the past been tried, convicted and jailed (sometimes on spurious charges, their military counterparts have usually enjoyed a stunning degree of immunity. Even those of them, following public outcries are investigated and found guilty of gross financial offences are often quietly retired from service and sent home to blissfully enjoy their loot". This confirmed the 'above the law' assertion made above about the military strongmen.

Ummuna (June 1997) added 'In some cases where such fraudulent officers are subjected to a more "severe" punishment like the stripping off of their ranks, the verdict is later overturned, the ranks restored and such dismissed officers rehabilitated. This was exactly what happened during the days of the permissive

Ibrahim Babangida administration when some convicted officers, weeded out about two decades earlier for their misdeeds during the Yakubu Gowon era were pardoned and rehabilitated. In the circumstance, Nigerians have had no option than to believe that military personnel entrusted with governance are a breed of sacred cows'.

In analyzing defence expenditures in South Sudan, this study will adopt Aderinto's (1992) definition of what constitutes defence budget as 'the expected expenditure for one year for the goods and services needed to provide a range of military capabilities'. Aderinto further stated that 'It is the sum allotted to furnish the country with the wherewithal to use or threaten the use of military force in the interest of national security'. It is an acknowledged fact that most African countries misuse their defence expenditures in pursuit of aims not in consonance with the defence of national interests. Erskine (1991)³⁶ had this to say about the issue of misappropriation of defence expenditures 'Statistics indicated that a disproportionate part of the GNP of most African countries is spent on military material to the disadvantage of other vital areas of national development. Most of the military material being purchased is not destined for the defence of the nation, but rather for the exclusive security of the incumbent government and the prosecution of never-ending senseless civil wars'. Erskine went further to define what the duties of armed forces personnel in any country should be this way 'Most African defence forces are small, organized, equipped and manpowered, not for offensive objectives but principally to be able to deter and or contain external aggression. The primary role of most African armed forces is to defend the country's sovereignty, its territorial borders, waters and airspace and equally importantly, in times of emergencies, to assist other security agencies, in particular the Police force to maintain law and order'. The SPLA's duties were clearly spelt out in the Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan³⁰ but most times, the SPLA has ventured into duties and functions not mandated to by the said constitution such as collection of tolls at check-points,

enforcement of Presidential decrees and harassment of political opponents of the SPLM-led government in South Sudan (HSBA April 2011)³⁷

The SPLA got its recognition as a conventional army from part 10, chapter 1 sub-sections 151 (1) to (8) of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (2011)³⁸ which stated that '(1) the Sudan's People's Liberation Army shall constitute the national armed forces of the Republic of South Sudan. (2) the Sudan People's Liberation Army shall be transformed in to the South Sudan Armed Forces, and shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as established under this constitution and the law'. Section 151 (6) of the same constitution mentioned that 'the national armed forces shall respect and abide by the rule of law and respect the will of the people, the civilian authority, democracy, basic human rights and fundamental freedoms'.

The SPLA now constitute the national armed forces of the Republic of South Sudan and has been transformed into the South Sudan Armed forces as prescribed by the constitution but based on empirical evidence, the SPLA/SSAF has not remained 'non-partisan, national in character, patriotic, regular, professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority' as the constitution prescribed. This assertion will be supported with evidence from various sources. The professionalism of SPLA personnel has always been called into question during times of crisis as most of them are not able to stay neutral as members of a national army. During the clashes between the Lou Nuer and Murle tribes in Jonglei state of South Sudan during much of 2009 the HSBA (May 2009)³³ reported that 'Murle survivors described the Nuer as being heavily armed with AK-47s, PKM, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and hand grenades. There were reports that weapons were redistributed to Lou Nuer (the white army, which was the target of the 2005-06 disarmament) from SPLA stores in the period before the attacks. Southern Sudan Police Service and SPLA

uniforms were found on some of the dead bodies. This suggests that ethnic Lou Nuer within the SPLA were deserting to join their kin in the violence, pointing to problems of disaffection and command and control with the army. Furthermore, the SPLA- which had battalions in both Gumuruk and Pibor Counties and a smaller contingent about 1 km from Lekwangole town- did nothing to stop the attacks. Neither did the state government. There were similar accusations that the Murle, frequently allies of the SAF during the war, with a history of difficult relations with the SPLA, were receiving ammunition from the SAF'. The weapons that were reportedly 'redistributed' to the Lou Nuer were in SPLA custody and the SPLA Commanders were aware of the use that the weapons would be put when they redistributed them to the Lou Nuer youths.

Another HSBA report (April 2011)³⁹ mentioned the roles the SPLA played in the suppression of opposition SPLM-DC candidates in Malakal Upper Nile State after the declaration of the election results in April 2010. HSBA reported that 'Since the April 2010 elections, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army has been engaged in conflict with elements in the Shilluk kingdom of Upper Nile state that it fears threaten SPLM hegemony with the government of South Sudan (GoSS). The conflict began with the SPLA suppression of four victorious parliamentary candidates from Lam Akol's opposition SPLM-Democratic Change (DC) party following elections in April 2010'.

The report went further to highlight the attempts to muzzle opposition parties and candidates opposed to the SPLM using the SPLA. HSBA provided further insights 'From its inception, the SPLM-DC has met with open hostility from the SPLM/A, which fears Lam's ongoing connection with the North, his public complains about southern corruption and lack of democracy, and the threat he could pose to the party's control of the Southern government. Lams' support for unity with the North also undermined the SPLM's increasing public calls for separation. In the months following the SPLM-DC's establishment, the SPLA

disrupted its events, detained and reportedly beat its representatives, denounced the party as an illegitimate organ of the National congress Party (NCP), and tried to ban it from taking part in the elections (Sudan's constitutional court rejected the ban)'.

It seems that the SPLA Commanders are not reading the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan or merely deciding to overlook its provisions based on instructions received from SPLM apparatchiks in power. Section 152 of the Interim constitution of South Sudan (July 2011)⁴⁰ constitution states that:

"There shall be a code of conduct for the national armed forces that shall:

- a. be informed by their military doctrine;
- b. make a clear distinction between the military and partisan political functions;
- c. underline the principle that the national armed forces shall not be used as an instrument of physical intimidation of the civilian population;
- d. make a clear distinction between the military and policing mandates; and
- e. make clear that all members of armed forces shall not be involved in illicit activities that may affect the environment and natural resources".

Political differences with the centre in Juba determined the response of the SPLA to the happenings (activities of RMGs and banditry) in Shilluk areas of Upper Nile state as the opportunity was used to carry out violations reported by various groups and media including the HSBA. Part of the HSBA report (April 2011)⁴¹ went thus 'But the SPLA appears not to have discriminated between the SPLM-DC supporters and others when deliberately retaliating against the Shilluk as a group. Human rights observers reported the army engaging in summary executions, rape, destruction of property and looting – all accusations the SPLA rejects. For its part, the SPLA says that Shilluk youths led them to Robert's hideout, where the army acknowledges killing 11 armed supporters. The sharp contrast between these differing accounts calls for more investigation'. To buttress the above, the Sudantribune.com (02 January 2012)⁴³ reported that:

'South Sudan said Monday it is investigating an allegation of assault against a senior official in the national government by forces believed to have been from the new nation's military. An armed group, allegedly members Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), beat up Jok Madut Jok, undersecretary in the country's Ministry of culture, at Wau airport on 31 December-2011, Sudan Tribune has been told. The attack on the senior official occurred when he arrived at Wau airport from Juba, on the same day that President Salva Kiir was passing through on the way back from his Christmas holiday in his home state of Warrap'.

A defence sector, as defined by Olaide Omideyi (2005)⁴⁴ as 'A distinct sector, contributing to national development by its operations through the employment of specialized workers and resources to effect production of a diversified range of defence related products and competitively marketing such products within and outside the country' does not exist in South Sudan at present.

SPLA soldiers have been implicated in other abuses such as indiscriminate killings and abduction of women for forced marriages. In the AFP reports of 28 December 2011⁴⁵ mentioned the unfortunate incident that occurred in Pigi, Khor-fullus County of Jonglei state where;

"South Sudanese soldiers accidentally shot dead four Christmas Eve worshippers and wounded 15, the young nation's military spokesman said on Tuesday."This is terrible," Philip Aguer told AFP. "SPLA has never done such a thing before in our history." The tragedy occurred on December 24 in Pigi County, Jonglei State.

Soldiers of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) opened fire when they found one of their colleagues with nine bullets in his body after an earlier shooting near the church, Aguer said. "Unfortunately they started shooting randomly," and hit worshippers fleeing the church at the sound of the gunfire, he added".

Unfortunately, the version given by the Pigi community to a team comprising of the UNMISS, UN Agencies and the state government including the MP for the area contradicted what the SPLA Spokesperson said that the shooting was 'accidental'. Apparently, the SPLA troops were out on patrol and met another SPLA patrol in the dark and each patrol mistook another as an enemy and opened fire. In the aftermath, the SPLA soldiers returned to the nearby church where the community members were holding a Christmas service and opened fire on them killing four persons instantly and injuring another fifteen villagers and displacing 8203 persons who ran away after the attack (Khorfullus Report January 03 2012)⁴⁶ The same mission was also briefed about other unwholesome activities of the SPLA which included abducting women and young girls from the community as 'wives'. 28 of such incidents (SPLA soldiers forcibly taking females from the community as 'wives') had already been recorded as at the time the team visited Pigi.

The SPLA might be blamed for not being professional enough but the government through its policies is also not helping it achieve a professional status through the policy of 'integration' of the RMG members into the SPLA after the signing of peace accords. The Small Arms Survey (November 2011)⁴⁷ described the attraction of RMGs to young persons in South Sudan thus; 'Given the lack of opportunities, economic and otherwise, for unemployed, idle young men in many communities in Greater Upper Nile, these self-styled rebel commanders succeeded in mobilizing local support relatively quickly. Aside from the prospect of minor material gains in forms of weapons, food, and the freedom to loot, the rebellions arguably provided a sense of purpose for young, disenfranchised Southerners living outside the reach of the government authority where they have not benefited from any 'peace dividends' promised in the CPA'. What the Small Arms survey did not add was that since employment opportunities were very limited, joining an RMG provided a sure entry into the SPLA for members once their leadership signed the usual 'Ceasefire agreement'

with the SPLM government in Juba and members can then be integrated into the SPLA most times at inflated ranks and be assured of regular employment and salaries for the foreseeable future.

The RMGs, their leadership and guiding philosophy are aptly analyzed by Small Arms Survey (November 2011)⁴⁸ thus: 'With some important exceptions, the insurgencies have similar roots and dynamics. In most cases they are led by opportunistic individuals set on exploiting local resentments towards the South's government institutions and security sector, which are perceived as exclusionary by many citizens. Despite their rhetoric, the primary aim of the rebel leaders has been to increase their own power base within these institutions, however, rather than to improve them for the betterment of their communities' To confirm the above assertion about RMG leaders launching their rebellions for personal gains, the Small Arms Survey gave a comparative description of the conditions of David Yau Yau a former RMG Commander in Pibor, Jonglei State and an integrated 'Major General' in the SPLA who had also defected back to Khartoum to possibly 're-defect' later back to Juba, and his former fighters thus 'In mid-June, UNMIS transported Yau Yau to Juba, where he told reporters that he had already signed a ceasefire agreement and was prepared to finalize details of the integration process of his troops into the SPLA. Since then he has remained in Juba while his forces continue to await an SPLA-led integration process to be held in Owinykibol, a small village in Eastern Equatoria state, where they were transferred after he travelled to Juba. While he enjoys comfortable accommodations in the southern capital, his armed men are waiting in the bush for their integration process to begin'. This is not surprising as most of the rebel leaders launched their rebellions for personal recognition and for the opportunity to improve their personal fortunes as noted earlier.

The adoption of the policy of integration and awarding of inflated ranks to the former RMG commanders is polarizing the ranks of the SPLA, affecting morale of loyal officers, lowering discipline and causing disaffection with the government

manifested in the challenges of integrating those the SPLA considered 'former enemies'.

Theoretical Perspectives

This study has no theories to draw upon as it is a pioneering study. There are few research studies carried out in the field of defence analysis in the third world to draw inferences from. Studies on the relationship between defence expenditures and armed forces personnel welfare are very rare while the study of the relationships between defence budgets, armed forces personnel welfare and conflicts in the SPLA does not exist for now.

The theoretical perspectives for this research came from the researcher's personal experiences in various post-conflict countries including Sudan and South Sudan, working in post-conflict stabilization teams and close cooperation and provision of technical support to activities related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, community security and small arms control activities and security sector reforms.

What this study did was to lay the groundwork for further studies in the future into the field of research in defence budgeting and conflicts in South Sudan. As the SPLA becomes more professionalized and open to sharing information, most of the constraints faced by this study will be gradually eliminated the biggest being the reticence of the SPLA Commanders to share information on key issues such as tribal composition of the SPLA, salary structure, number of troops, average educational qualifications of officers and other ranks and training opportunities to mention just a few. Basic issues are treated as 'Top Secret'. Most of the figures and facts used were obtained through discreet observations and deductions spanning many years of living in South Sudan before and after independence which was an added bonus that gave the impetus to the concept of developing further the analysis of defence expenditures and welfare of armed forces personnel and how access to resources allocated to defence expenditures influences conflict in Jonglei state of South Sudan.

Related Studies

The past empirical investigations related to this study include the following;

a. Analysis of Nigeria's Defence Expenditures (1985-1995)⁵³ and Its Impact on Economic Welfare of Armed Forces Personnel: A case Study of Biu Military Cantonment, Biu, Borno State Omideyi (1997). The study looked at the relationship between the economic welfare/well-being of armed forces personnel at the Biu Military Cantonment in Borno State, Nigeria and the amounts budgeted between 1985 and 1995 for defence related expenditures. The study was conducted in Nigeria while the geographical study area was Biu Military Cantonment in Borno State. Some of the findings of the study included the following;

- a. The defence sector is part and parcel of the Nigerian economy and that the expenditures in the sector forms part the society's total expenditure on goods and services.
- b. The defence sector is adequately funded but that there is no evidence to suggest that it is being over-funded compared to other sectors such as agriculture, education and health.
- c. That there are Nigerian firms who can satisfy some of Nigeria's defence requirements most especially, the requirements that does not require elaborate technologies to meet like clothing. These Nigerian firms are not getting these contracts and are therefore not benefitting from Nigeria's defence expenditures.
- d. That the major beneficiaries of Nigeria's defence expenditures are the foreign defence contracting firms and a few privileged Nigerians to the detriment of the Nigerian firms and the Nigerian economy.
- e. That Nigeria's defence expenditures are not being used as an engine of growth and development as obtained in other like the United States of America, Britain, Belgium, France and Sweden.

f. That there is widespread dualism in dispensing defence expenditures' largesse in the armed forces. The main divisions being between the officers and soldiers on one hand and their respective families on the other hand.

f. That there exists unequal access to education, health services, housing, sanitation and other infrastructures between soldiers and officer, the officers being at advantage. We can therefore safely say that officers in the Nigerian armed forces have more access to and actually consume more than a 'proportionate' portion of the defence expenditure that soldiers in form of salaries, allowances and other grants.

The second related study is titled 'Armed forces restructuring in the third World: A New Approach to the Reduction and prevention of Humanitarian Disasters by Olaide Omideyi in August 2005.

Some findings were made at the conclusion of the study. The findings tallies perfectly with the 1997 study mentioned in (a) above. Though the focal point of the 1997 study by Olaide was the welfare situation in the Nigerian military, all issues raised then had to be raised again since the study generalized for selected third world armed forces.

The findings of the study are summarized below:

a. Most crises in the third world always directly or indirectly involve members of the armed forces. Most wars, when not started by armed forces personnel are sustained indirectly by the military through other seemingly unrelated factors. The UNDP report on Sierra Leone described some of these unrelated factors thus; "The economic gains derived from the war have provided a strong incentive for sustaining it. The military top brass, leaving the soldiers at the war front deprived of salaries and logistics, largely squandered higher defence expenditures for the "war effort". Demoralized and disenchanted with the government, many soldiers engaged in banditry, fraternized with the rebels or simply joined them. Combatants on both sides soon became deeply involved in mining of gold and diamonds, trading in agricultural produce and wide-spread looting of civilian and public property".

The involvement of military personnel in conflicts can also be traced to the desire to better their lot economically. The UNDP report further stated that:

"The extravagant lifestyle of soldiers associated with the NPRC regime, whose coup in 1992 started as a protest against poor conditions at the war front, induced a feeling of betrayal among the fighting men, leading to further banditry and defection to the rebels. This extravagant life style had a strong "demonstration effect" on other soldiers. It is widely believed that this was one of the factors that induced them to participate or support the military coup of 1997, with the hope of enjoying a similar lifestyle"

b. The levels of education in the third world armed forces is low compared to what is obtained in armed forces in other parts of the world. While the completion of at least senior high school is the rule in other armed forces, it is the exception in third world armed forces. The enlistment of stark illiterates into the armed forces under the guises of ethnic balancing, quota system, federal character and national unity are still commonplace occurrences. Most of the soldiers (at least 70%) enlisted this way will still leave the army as illiterates

c. A sizable percentage (An average of 40% for the whole third world) of military personnel are either under-employed, unproductive or plain idle. This should not be surprising since scientific principles (matching needs with available resources) are never used in the determination of their national defence needs. We have soldiers who float around the barracks doing nothing apart from serving as domestic help to officers, naval personnel who have never sailed even in a canoe and Air-force personnel who have not logged a minute flying time within the last ten years. Sounds funny but it is the absolute truth.

d. The state of the equipments in the third world armed forces is deplorable. Essential tools for efficient functioning of the armed forces are either not available or unserviceable due to the poor maintenance culture. Emphasis is on replacement of equipment and tools. Those trained to maintain such tools often leave the armed forces for greener pastures.

In the 1997 study, it was discovered that the team trained to use and maintain the water purification plant at Biu military cantonment, Nigeria, were discharged from the Nigerian army without training other soldiers to take over from them. The water purification plant had to be closed down and the water pumped without being purified, which sharply increased outbreaks of cholera and dysentery with deadly consequences.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This research effort made use of historical and evaluation research methods which may change as the research progresses. The nature of the research indicates that obtaining figures for purpose of analysis from the sample population (members of the SPLA serving in various formations in Jonglei State of South Sudan is not feasible as the data obtained will not be objective).

This research effort is qualitative because it meets the description of Martin E. Amin (2005)⁵⁵ about the purpose of qualitative research as 'to promote greater understanding of not just the way things are, but also why they are the way they are. Through intensive and extensive observation, interviews and discussions, the qualitative researcher seeks to derive and describe findings that promote greater understanding of how and why people behave the way they do. It explains and gains insight and understanding of phenomena through intensive collection of narrative data'. The purpose of this research effort was to shed more light on the disbursement of defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan as it relates to welfare of SPLA personnel and how the struggles to control or access the budgets promote or contribute to the perennial conflicts in South Sudan given that government employment and the armed forces are the biggest sources of stable employment at present in South Sudan and that these are tightly controlled by a group that could be distinctly identified. If the characteristics of qualitative research as described by Amin (Page 45, 2005) were all right (research involves holistic inquiry carried out in natural setting, humans are the primary data-gathering

instruments, emphasis on multiple realities, purposive rather than random sampling, inductive data analysis, development of grounded theory, subject plays a role in interpreting outcome, utilization of intuitive insights and emphasis on social processes), this research effort qualifies to be referred to as a qualitative research since it fulfills all the characteristics mentioned by Amin.

The application of this research also fits in with the applications of qualitative research as described by Amin (2005) as 'theory development, defining important variables, hypotheses generation, organizational structures and studying new phenomenon' (summarized for emphasis). This research is going to develop new theories, define important variables and generate hypotheses in the study of defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan and welfare of SPLA personnel. The study will provide an insight into the emerging phenomenon of how disbursement and struggle for access and control of defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan is promoting and sustaining conflicts.

Target Population

The target populations for this research are the former personnel (officers and other ranks) of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) presently based in Pariak, Kolnyang Payam, Jonglei State of South Sudan. The target population is 3,000 former service personnel living in the locality of Pariak. The sample that was used to generalize for the SPLA in South Sudan was drawn from Jonglei state in South Sudan.

The research subjects (former SPLA officers and other ranks) share the same characteristics wherever they are found. Jonglei state is chosen for the selection of the target population because the ex-combatants in Jonglei state best approximates the characteristics of typical SPLA former combatants. Choosing Juba for example will give a distorted view of the characteristics as the living and operational environments in Juba, most especially for retired senior officers, are very agreeable and comfortable in relative terms.

Sample Size

Sample size of 200 former personnel of the SPLA was drawn from the 3000 target population in Pariak community, Kolnyang Payam in Jonglei state for the purpose of the research. Sample size was determined using military service, gender and age as yardsticks. The sample size was drawn from various ranks, gender and varying years of service to avoid receiving stock answers on the questionnaires.

Sampling Procedure

The SPLA as a military structure/organization, is homogenous in that personnel can expect to receive the same salary if they are at the same rank, issued the same tools and equipment to work with and wear the same uniforms. Accommodation, medical, education, training and feeding are standardized. SPLA barracks outside Juba are also homogenous in terms of the facilities they have or do not have. Therefore, any SPLA location is as good or as worse as the others. SPLA former combatants are also homogenous in terms of benefits they can expect to receive after disengagement from the army and the activities they engage in on return to their communities. The former combatants in Pariak share the same characteristics as the ex-combatants in any other part of the state or South Sudan generally. Therefore, samples drawn from Pariak community reflected characteristics of ex-combatants in other parts of South Sudan.

Research Instrument

The research made use of questionnaires and focus group discussions which the researcher has produced and attached as appendixes to this study. Researcher made Self-Administered Questionnaires were distributed to selected respondents in order to avoid subjectivity from researcher and this allowed respondents to feel free while responding. The researcher explained and clarified to respondents in areas where they needed more clarity. The questionnaire consisted mainly four sections.

Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

To ensure the validity and reliability of the instrument, the research employed the expert judgment method. After constructing the questionnaire, the researcher contacted experts in the study area to go through it to ensure that it measured what it was designed to measure and necessary adjustments were made after consultation and this ensured that the instrument was clear, relevant, specific and logically arranged. Secondly, a pre-test was conducted in order to test and improve on the reliability of the questionnaire. Alternatively, the reliability and validity of the instrument was established by corn-bachs Co-efficient alpha variable. Variables with corn-bachs. Co-efficient alpha test values for less than 0.5 were not used. The content validity index (CVI) was calculated using the formula; $CVI = n/N$. Where CVI= Content Validity Index, N= Total number of items in the questionnaire, n= number of relevant items in the questionnaire. Since the CVI of the research instrument (0.91) was greater than 0.7, then the instrument was declared Valid.

Data Gathering Procedure

Before data gathering

Upon accomplishment of defending and acceptance of the research proposal, the researcher obtained an introductory letter from the College of Higher Degrees and Research of Kampala International University, seeking for permission from the administration of Southern Sudan government access to the SPLA to participate in the study.

During data gathering

Due to the nature work and busy schedule of some prospected respondents, the researcher through the heads of departments and supervisors scheduled appointment for such respondents. The researcher was available to give necessary explanation on some question where need was. Then the researcher carried out a pilot study before the actual research to check feasibility of the research instrument, in order to make necessary improvement and

adjustments in the and to avoid wasting time. The researcher also made use of secondary data by reviewing available relevant text books, journal articles, periodicals, manuals dissertations, publications and visiting websites of the concerned organization.

After data gathering

After two weeks, primary data was collected through questionnaires which respondents returned back to the researcher which allowed the researcher to go ahead to analyze the data. Completed (SAQs) were coded, edited, categorized and entered into a computer for the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) for data processing and analysis.

Data Analysis

The data generated by this study was analyzed thematically based on the nature of the research. Data on completed (SAQs) was edited, categorized and entered into a computer for the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). Frequencies were used to analyze to analyze the data.

Ethical Considerations

To ensure that ethics was practiced in this study as well as utmost confidentiality for respondents and the data provided by them, the following was done: (a) coding of all questionnaires; (b) the respondent were requested to sign the informed consent; (c) authors mentioned in this study were acknowledged within the text; (d) findings were presented in a generalized manner.

Limitations of the Study

The anticipated threats to the validity in this study were as follows:

1. **Intervening or confounding variables extraneous variables:** Some respondents have got personal biases and honesty is a very big threat. To

minimize this threat, the researcher requested respondents to avoid being subjective while answering the questionnaires.

2. **Testing:** There was a likelihood of research assistants being inconsistent in terms of the day and time of questionnaire administration. There was thorough briefing and orienting the research assistants in order to address this threat
3. **Instrumentation:** The data collection instrument was not standardized and this problem was solved through testing it for validity and reliability.
4. **Attrition:** There was a likelihood of some respondents of not returning back the questionnaires and this was to affect the researcher in meeting the minimum sample size. To solve this threat, the researcher gave out more questionnaires exceeding the minimum sample size

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Introduction

This chapter is a presentation, interpretation and discussion of the field results. The frequency and percentage distributions were used to determine some of the necessary demographic characteristics of the respondents that have relevance for collection and analysis of the data. Mean and standard deviation were applied to determine the other objectives. The results obtained from the interview guide and the focus group discussions were central on the set objectives of the study which determined the effects of the struggles for control and access to the defence and security-related budgets on conflicts and formation of rebel militia groups in South Sudan and investigate the effects of dualistic nature of the military and security forces on access to these budgets. Lastly, the study determined the effects of the relationship between the SPLA and the SPLM and the practice of military personnel holding public positions retaining their military ranks and privileges on development of democratic principles and corruption.

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The researcher needed to know the demographic distribution of the respondents to help in making sense of the data presented. The interview guide was adjusted several times to take care of the concerns of the respondents who insisted on not mentioning their gender and marital status for 'security' reasons. The below tables indicate the analysis of the collected data for the study,

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percent
Age		
20-25	20	10.0
26-30	95	47.5
31-35	20	10.0
36-40	24	12.0
41 and above	41	20.5
Total	200	100
Nationality		
Southern Sudanese	200	100
Category	Frequency	Percent
Where were you during the civil crisis in old Sudan between 1983 and 2005?		
Southern Sudan	18	9.0
IDP camp in Northern Sudan	78	39.0
Khartoum	46	23.0
Refugee camp in East Africa	37	18.5
Europe or other Western countries	21	10.5
Total	200	100
Educational level before or during crisis	Frequency	Percent
Total illiterate	88	44.0
Primary school	78	39.0
High school	12	6.0
Diploma	11	5.5
Degree or above	11	5.5
Total	200	100

Present Education level

	Frequency	Percent
Total illiterate	41	20.5
Primary school	65	32.5
high school	59	29.5
Diploma	16	8.0
degree or above	19	9.5
Total	200	100

Did you support the SPLM/A during the war

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	45	22.5
No	30	15.0
Too young to take decision	125	62.5
Total	200	100

What form did your support take?

	Frequency	Percent
Financial	8	4.0
moral	45	22.5
combatant	19	9.5
logistics	8	4.0
Intelligence	120	60.0
Total	200	100

How do you rate the contribution of SPLAM/A to the struggle for independence in south Sudan

	Frequency	Percent
Nothing extra-ordinary	28	14.0
ordinary	2	1.0
significant	65	32.5
very significant	48	24.0
Extra-ordinary	57	28.5

Total	200	100
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Table 4.1 showed the number of respondents who were interviewed were 200 and their age distribution. Distribution by gender and marital status was not done because most of the respondents believed that the 'National Security' could trace them if their gender and marital status were known in spite of the assurances from the researcher that the interview sheets will not be handed over to the security agencies. The table indicates that 10% of the respondents were between the ages of 20-25 years while 47.5% were between the ages of 26-30 years. 10% of respondents were between age brackets of 31-35, 12.5% were between 35-40 while the rest totaling 15% was above 40 years old. The nationality of respondents is not shown in the table because 100% of the respondents were South Sudanese and the research was conducted in South Sudan.

Also, the table indicated that 9% of the respondents stayed back in South Sudan during the civil crises, 34% relocated to various IDP camps in Northern Sudan while 23% stayed in Khartoum for the duration of the crises. 17.5% of respondents stayed in various refugee camps in East Africa while 10.5% of respondents stayed in European and other western countries during the crises in Sudan.

IN addition, the table indicated that 44% of total respondents were illiterates before or during the crises, 39% finished primary school or equivalent while 6% had completed high school. 5.5% of respondents had diplomas in various fields including vocational skills before or during the crises while another 5.5% had completed the equivalent of University degree or above during the same period. The table indicated that 20.5% of total respondents were total illiterates at present while 22.5% finished primary school education or equivalent and 29.5% had high school certificates. 8% of respondents held various diplomas including vocational training diplomas while 9.5% were university graduates or above.

The table indicated that 22.5% of the respondents supported the SPLM/A during the war, 15% did not support the SPLM/A while 62.5% were too young to take a decision independently on the issue. Most became SPLM/A supporters because their parents, relatives or friends were also supporters and it was fashionable to be seen as part of the 'liberation struggle'. Justification for this assertion could be found in the number of respondents who rated the contributions of the SPLM/A to the struggle for independence from significant to extra-ordinarily significant. While 14% of respondents thought the contribution of the SPLM/A was nothing extra-ordinary and 1% thought it was ordinary, 32.5% of respondents believed it was significant, 24% thought it was very significant while 28.5% thought it was extra-ordinarily significant. The outcome tallies with the researcher's observations over a six year period in South Sudan about the SPLM/A in the consciousness of most South Sudanese and confirmed the general impression that even if most South Sudanese does not agree with the policies of the government, they acknowledge the contributions of the SPLM/A to achievement of independence and citizenship of a country they can call their own.

Access to Defence and Security Related budgets

The opinions of respondents on the issue of access to defence and security-related budgets, transparency and accountability in its disbursement from the people's perspective was one of the areas of interest to the researcher as one of the necessary conditions for an objective analysis of the subject matter of defence budgets and conflicts in South Sudan. This section will therefore look at the response and analysis of relevant questions asked respondents on the issue of relationship between the defence and security-related budgets, conflicts and accountability.

Table 2: Do you have access or benefit from defence and security related budgets in South Sudan

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	149	74.5
No	51	25.5
Total	200	100
Describe how you benefit from defence and security budget in south Sudan		
	Frequency	Percent
Member of armed forces	32	16.0
others	168	84.0
Total	200	100
How do you rate the allocation of resources to defence and security related expenditures in south Sudan		
	Frequency	Percent
Below requirement	28	14.0
Enough	45	22.5
Slightly above requirement	18	9.0
Grossly above requirement	109	54.5
Total	200	100

Table 2 sought to elicit responses from respondents on sundry issues that include;

Confirmation of whether they are accessing defence and security-related budgets and how, rating of allocation of resources going to defence and security, professionalism of the SPLA and whether the respondent is confident of the ability of the SPLA to defend South Sudan from external aggressors.

The table above shows that 74.5% of respondents access defence and security-related budgets in one form or the other while 25.5% of respondents do not

access defence and security-related budgets. For the 74.5% who benefit from the budgets, 21.5% claimed to be member of armed or security forces while the rest 78.5% fell into the category of 'others' which included former combatants and women associated with armed forces and groups. On evaluation of the resources going to defence and security in South Sudan, 14% of respondents decided that it was below requirements, while 23% said it was enough. 9% of respondents said it was slightly above requirements while 54% of respondents said it was grossly above requirements. SPLA may have played a very important part in the liberation struggle in South Sudan but this does not mean that views about its professional credentials were uniform among respondents. 34.5% of respondents said the SPLA was unprofessional while 23.5% said the SPLA was professional. 16% of respondents said the SPLA was very professional while 26% said the SPLA was exceptionally professional. The SPLA as mentioned above may have contributed to achievement of independence but this does not mean that all respondents believed in the ability of the SPLA to protect the country from external aggression. 42% of respondents refused to express any opinion on the ability of the SPLA to protect South Sudan from external aggression while 17.5% did not think the SPLA is able to protect the country from external aggression. However, 40.5% of respondents believed that the SPLA has the capacity to protect South Sudan from external aggression.

Recruitment, Appointments, Promotions and Retirement

The perception of respondents on sundry issues within the SPLA was sought and the following is the summary of their responses.

Table 3: Perception of Sundry Issues within the SPLA by Respondents**Recruitment**

	Frequency	Percent
Fairly distributed	86	43.0
Un fairly distributed	114	57.0
Total	200	100

Promotion

	Frequency	Percent
Fairly distributed	72	36.0
Unfairly distributed	128	64.0
Total	200	100

Retirement of soldiers and officers

	Frequency	Percent
FAIRLY DISTRIBUTED	56	28.0
Unfairly distributed	144	72.0
Total	200	100

Housing

	Frequency	Percent
substandard	15	7.5
standard	17	8.5
above standard	27	13.5
Extra ordinary above standard	141	70.5
Total	200	100

Salaries and allowance

	Frequency	Percent
Not adequate	15	7.5
Adequate	21	10.5
Very adequate	46	23.0
More than adequate	118	59.0
Total	200	100

As the table above shows, perceptions of the respondents on the issues examined above were divided. While 43% of respondents agreed that recruitment into the SPLA was fairly distributed, 47% said it was unfairly distributed. On promotions, 36% of respondents agreed that it was fairly distributed while 64% said it was unfairly distributed. Appointments in the SPLA into 'juicy' positions remain a controversial issue. 36% of respondents agreed that appointments in the SPLA were fairly distributed while 64% said they were unfairly distributed. 28% of respondents said retirement of soldiers and officers were fairly distributed while 72% of respondents said they were not fairly distributed.

Service Delivery to SPLA Officers and Families

All armed forces are dualistic in nature but the degree of dualism varies and affects service delivery to categories of armed and security forces in every country. The dualism observed by the researcher within the SPLA was very high in relative terms compared to what was observed in Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Botswana. The following table indicates the services provided and the opinion of respondents on these services.

Table 4: Service Delivery to SPLA Officers and Family Members

Housing

	Frequency	Percent
substandard	15	7.5
standard	17	8.5
above standard	27	13.5
Extra ordinary above standard	141	70.5
Total	200	100

Salaries and allowances

	Frequency	Percent
Not adequate	15	7.5
Adequate	21	10.5
Very adequate	46	23.0
More than adequate	118	59.0
Total	200	100

Access to health care

	Frequency	Percent
very poor	6	3.0
poor	11	5.5
average	15	7.5
Good	95	47.5
Excellent	73	36.5
Total	200	100

Post-Retirement Benefits	Frequency	Percent
Not adequate	9	4.5
Adequate	14	7.0
Very adequate	126	63.0
More than adequate	51	25.5
Total	200	100

Based on the table above, 7.5% of respondents rated housing for officers and families as sub-standard, 8.5% rated same as standard while 13.5% and 70.5% rated housing as above standard and luxurious respectively. On salaries and allowances for officers, 7% rated it as not adequate, 11% rated it as adequate while 23% and 59% rated it very adequate and more than adequate respectively. On access to healthcare, 3% of respondents rated it as very poor, 5.5% rated it poor, 7.5% rated it good while 47.5% and 36.5% rated it good and excellent respectively. On training and educational opportunities, 4.5% of

respondents rated it not adequate, 7% rated it adequate while 63% and 25.5% rated it very adequate and more than adequate respectively. Retirement and post-retirement benefits were rated not sufficient by 3% of respondents while 8% rated it sufficient. 72.5% of respondents however rated it very sufficient while 16.5% rated it more than sufficient.

Accountability, Transparency of Defence and Security budgets and Conflicts

The perception of accountability, transparency or lack of it in disbursement of defence and security-related budgets and the relationship between conflicts is the main objective of this study. We now analyze the perception of the respondents in respect of the variables examined to strengthen the main study objective.

Table 5: Perceptions on Accountability, Transparency and Conflicts
Do you think the disbursement of defence and security related expenditures in South Sudan is transparent?

	Frequency	Percent
Not transparent	76	38.0
Somehow transparent	116	58.0
Transparent	5	2.5
Very transparent	3	1.5
Total	200	100
What do you think about the accountability of defence and security related expenditures in South Sudan?		
	Frequency	Percent
Not accountable	139	69.5
Somehow accountable	33	16.5
Accountable	19	9.5
Very accountable	9	4.5
Total	200	100

The defence and security related budgets could be better utilized in other sectors of the economy, such as health care, roads, and education

	Frequency	Percent
Do not agree	19	9.5
Somehow agree	23	11.5
Agree	114	57.0
Totally agree	44	22.0
Total	200	100

The struggle for the control and access to defence and security related budgets in South Sudan is one of the major reasons for conflict

	Frequency	Percent
Do not agree	8	4.0
Somehow agree	39	19.5
Agree	134	67.0
Totally agree	19	9.5
Total	200	100

The details of defence and security related expenditures should be matters of public record

	Frequency	Percent
Do not agree	38	19.0
Somehow agree	60	30.0
Agree	79	39.5
Totally agree	23	11.5
Total	200	100

Based on the table above, 39% of respondents were of the opinion that defence and security budgets were not transparent while 58% said they were somehow transparent. 2.5% of respondents said it transparent while 1.5% said it was very transparent. On accountability of defence and security expenditures, 69.5% of respondents said they were not accountable while 18.5% said they were somehow accountable. 9.5% and 3.5% said they were accountable or very accountable respectively. On better uses that part of defence and security

expenditures could be put, 9.5% do not agree that it could or should be put to better uses while 11.5% somehow agreed that the budgets could be put to better uses. 57% and 22% agreed and totally agreed that the budgets could be put to better uses respectively.

On the contribution of defence and security-related budgets and the struggle for access and control to insecurity and conflict, 4% of respondents do not agree that there was a relationship while 19.5% somehow agreed that there was a relationship. 67% and 9.5% agreed or totally agreed respectively about the relationship between defence and security-related budgets and conflicts. On matter of making defence budgets public documents, 19% of respondents did not agree while 30% somehow agreed. 39.5% and 11.5% agreed or strongly agreed that defence budgets should be public documents.

Focus Group Discussions Summaries

The study also made use of focus group discussions to reach as many respondents as possible, most especially those not covered with the interview guide questions. Three focus groups were organized and different questions drafted for each group (attached as appendixes) to guide the proceedings, stimulate discussions and encourage the group to also ask questions.

Group I: Former Combatants Male (FCM) 60 Participants

The FCM have been coping with life after military service by returning to their communities, offering themselves for manual labour, fishing and 'resting' while waiting for the DDR programme to commence or the government to start paying pensions. The pension issue is a very sensitive and close to the FCM minds. All FCM hope to receive some sort of training to enable them become contributing members of their communities. Most of the FCM agreed that those of them who retired as soldiers are in a worse position economically than the retired officer comrades who as a result of their close connection with the seat of power, education and exposure, are better placed to take advantage of opportunities in civilian life. More than half of the FCM said they will return to the

SPLA if permitted. Main reason was that the SPLA offered them a steady source of income and assurance of stability in their lives. Most FCM could not cope with the idea of taking orders from the 'civilians' such as the Payam Administrator and Clan Chiefs. Most FCM missed the stability, regularity and safety of the SPLA. Most also missed their comrades and the power that wearing uniform gave them while in service.

Group II: Former Combatants Female and Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAFFGs) 60 participants

The WAAFFGs have been coping with life outside the military environment through farming of vegetables, petty trading, tending the cattle of their husbands and as full time housewives. WAAFFGs are also waiting for DDR to enable them receive some reintegration training while some of them (35%) are waiting for the government to finalize plans for pension payments so that they can start receiving pensions. The WAAFFGs had no problems with the communities because they are regarded as heroines of the liberation and respected.

WAAFFGs claimed that they fear discrimination in terms of benefits they will receive and their pensions because of their gender. Most WAAFFGs also missed the military for reasons of stability, orderliness and safety of livelihood. Most complained of hardship now that the regular salaries are not coming and more than half said they would love to return to the SPLA to be able to receive regular salaries again.

Most WAAFFGs miss the armed forces because of the respect they commanded while there and the opportunity to travel around instead of staying in their communities at present.

Group III: Community Youths Mixed (CYM) 75 Participants

Most of the CYM who participated wanted to join the SPLA (80%) to have steady employment. When prodded on the other options for gainful employment within the community or outside it, most CYM mentioned their lack of education or

vocational skills as the main reason why they preferred the SPLA as entry into the SPLA does not require any formal education or vocational skills.

Most of the CYM also think they have the right to join the SPLA because they were South Sudanese and also support the SPLM. Joining the SPLA is therefore perceived as reward for being a member of the SPLM. All the CYM who indicated interest in joining the SPLA readily agreed that the prospect of steady employment and salaries for the foreseeable future remains their chief motivation for wanting to join the army.

However, most of the CYM said they would consider not joining the SPLA if they had opportunities elsewhere to get skills and education that will make them compete in the labour market. Almost all the CYM have had good, bad or ugly experiences with the SPLA. The recent civilian disarmament operations carried out by the SPLA was still vivid in the memories of all the CYM. They recalled being beaten or detained or family members being beaten or detained by SPLA troops. Some of the special privileges enjoyed by the SPLA according to the CYM included the ability to beat and detain persons, free food, regular salaries and opportunities to travel around outside their communities.

CHAPTER FIVE

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

As mentioned at the beginning of the study, the complexities of defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan and the associated struggles to access these budgets is one of the major causes of conflicts in South Sudan and in Jonglei state in particular. When the issue of the welfare of the SPLA personnel is taken into consideration also, we see the obvious links between the struggles for control and access to defence and security-related budgets and conflicts. The obvious low levels of professionalism among the SPLA junior troops can be indirectly attributed to the poor state of their welfare while the rates at which most of them are ready to desert and follow those they think could improve their fortunes is also very alarming.

The Sudan People's Liberation Army is steeped in history as the main organization that fought for liberation of the Southern part of old Sudan and the part it played in the signing of the Comprehensive peace Agreement (CPA) and the subsequent secession of the Southern part of Sudan as the new Republic of South Sudan on 9 July 2011 but its history is also tainted by its inability to transform without hiccups from a rebel group into a professional army.

The allegations of corruption against top Generals and other top civil servants and the lack of freedom for opposition politics to flourish has convinced most opponents of the SPLA/SPLM government that being recognized as a 'player' or a 'spoiler' is the best way to become prominent and be granted access to the national defence budgets. The SPLM government prefers to co-opt opposition figures into government instead of allowing them to criticize it, paving the way for formation of clan-based rebel militia groups to further the interest of powerful individuals who need to be recognized as 'power brokers' and or 'opinion leaders' in their communities.

While it is difficult to diminish the importance of the SPLM/SPLA in the consciousness of the average South Sudanese, it is however not difficult to sense and feel the sense of disappointment of some of the population on the dashed hopes and unfulfilled dreams of the new nation right from the signing of the CPA that granted the South autonomy since 2005. The divine position that the SPLA thus enjoyed in the hearts and souls of some South Sudanese does not cut across the board. Dissenting voices are silenced either through intimidation or co-opting into government of 'unity' through offers of juicy appointments to critics.

Most South Sudanese expect their leaders to hit the ground running after the signing of the CPA to bridge the gap in development as a result of the years lost to civil war but this has not happen as the government has been mostly run on the basis of trial and error. While the senior government officials are comfortably well off in terms of conditions of service which include chauffeur-driven luxury SUVs, nice houses, regular foreign trips, health care access in well-equipped hospitals in Nairobi, Kampala and Europe with their children attending nice schools in Kenya, Nairobi and Europe, their junior counterparts had to make do with taking buses or bikes to work, living in cramped and damp 'Tukuls', poor medical facilities and sending their children to the sub-standard schools in south Sudan.

Conditions in the army are not different as the top army officers, who also doubles as top SPLM functionaries corners all the best in terms of luxurious accommodations, regular trips abroad for medical treatments and holidays, luxurious cars, quality education for their kids at prestigious schools in Uganda, Kenya and European countries and other privileges associated with high offices in South Sudan which may include immunity from prosecution. The junior officers make do with sub-standard accommodation; medical access and either leave their children at home or put them in the sub-standard schools available around the military establishments.

Investigations or researching disbursement of defence and security related budgets in South Sudan are like looking for the 'Holy Grail'. While government budgets are published and could be accessed by nearly everyone, the detailed expenditures are shrouded in secrecy. There are no public records of payments to defence contractors, equipment supplied, and names of contractors and troop's strengths at various locations while it was also difficult to conduct focus group discussions with serving soldiers and officers or distribute questionnaires at military locations for security reasons.

The research however benefitted from the long years of association of the researcher with the SPLA and other government agencies and the long term presence of the researcher as a resident of various locations in South Sudan as a player in post-conflict stabilization programmes.

FINDINGS

Justification of the government of South Sudan to spend money on security and defence-related expenditures.

The study concluded that there was need for the government to spend part of its budget on defence and security-related issues as part of its basic responsibilities to the citizens of South Sudan (Mean = 4.5). The clear and present threat posed by Sudan to the north and the tense relations between the two countries based on their history dictated that the government maintains troops in state of readiness to counter threats of aggression from Republic of South Sudan. The presence of rebel militia groups (RMGs) in parts of South Sudan also justifies maintaining a security sector on a permanent basis while the police are required to maintain security in the civilian sector. The governments also have Wildlife and Fire Services as part of the security services whose responsibilities are essential to maintenance of necessary conditions for citizens to pursue their legal activities unmolested and free from fear.

Is the government of South Sudan making use of available scientific methods in the determination of its defence needs?

All available evidence points to the absence of utilization of scientific methodologies in determination of defence needs from troop requirements to types of equipment and forecasting of threats and methods to counter them. The defence and security sectors in South Sudan reflect the general challenges faced by every facet of life and administration in the new country. Since there are no precedents to follow except those laid by Sudan before secession, it is very difficult to have positive role models that the armed forces and security services could be molded after. The number of personnel in the SPLA at any given time depends on among other things, which rebel militia group had just been 'integrated' into the SPLA and the number of Generals also determined by the number of former fighters claiming to be 'Generals' able to bluff their way into the army with field or self-awarded ranks (This section written through the interaction of the researcher with the SPLA and Security Sector Reform activities in South Sudan).

Is SPLA as presently constituted, equipped to deal with the various threats (internal and external) to the new country?

The SPLA has had a long history of fighting and still possess most of its battle-hardened troops who will fight once provided the basic requirements. The SPLA might be poorly trained in relative terms, poorly paid and contain very high numbers of illiterate and semi-literate troops but its ability to fight is never in doubt. The SPLA is therefore equipped to deal with the various threats to South Sudan including external aggression from Sudan.

Efficient management of resources going to defence and security in South Sudan.

While there is no evidence that defence and security budgets are being mismanaged, there is also no concrete evidence to suggest that it is being efficiently managed by the government. Defence expenditures are matters of national security and no information is available to the general public on where

the money goes and to who apart from the very obvious ones like payment of salaries and allowances to armed forces personnel.

Alternative uses that defence budgets could be put in South Sudan

When opportunities forgone are analyzed, defence budgets in South Sudan could also be evaluated in terms of the number of roads that could be constructed, schools that could be rehabilitated and number of children that could attend such schools and the number of lives that could be saved with better hospitals and health centers.

Cheaper Alternatives to Achieve South Sudan's Defence Needs

The alternative open to the government of South Sudan is emphasis on quality over quantity and more openness in defence expenditures management. These are not happening at present since South Sudan's defence expenditures are shrouded in secrecy like other African countries and open to abuse. The security sector reforms being pushed for by international donors will take another generation to start bearing fruits unless concerted efforts are made to support the government through mentoring of military units and discouraging the integration of rebel militia groups with inflated ranks into the SPLA.

The Main players in Disbursement of Defence Budgets in South Sudan

The main players identified in the determination of defence needs, budgeting and disbursement of South Sudan's defence needs are the Presidency officials, the Generals and Ministry of Defence high-ranking officials. The Generals determine the defence needs of South Sudan and also have access to the defence budgets through allocations to the military units through the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency.

Main Beneficiaries of South Sudan's Defence Budgets

The main beneficiaries of South Sudan's defence and security-related budgets are the military personnel who benefits in terms of salaries and allowances, the high-ranking military officers who benefits in terms of trainings, travels and possibly, on 'commissions' from recommending certain defence contractors to the Ministry of Defence and Presidency officials.

Transparency in the Disbursement of South Sudan's defence and Security-related budgets

Transparency is not something that is synonymous with disbursement of defence budgets in most countries with functional institutions and established methods of public enquiry into government activities. South Sudan at this particular stage does not have functional institutions and a clearly established method for public enquiries into government activities. Coupled with a very weak civil society, there are no ways to pressurize the government to maintain transparent disbursement of budgets for defence. Details of defence contracts are never published. Defence contractors are shadowy and parliament never discusses defence related issues in open sessions.

Efforts to encourage local Production of Some components of Defence Needs

At present, South Sudan does not have any industrial capacity to produce most of its civilian needs. Most goods are imported from neighboring countries including food while services are mostly provided by foreigners. Lack of industrial capacity in South Sudan has therefore made efforts to encourage local production of some components of defence needs a non-starter.

Consequences of the Relationship between the SPLA and SPLM

The lack of a clear line of demarcation between the SPLA and the SPLM does not bode well for democracy in South Sudan and has always been one of the ready excuses given by the various RMGs in South Sudan for taking up arms against the government. The top military brasses of the SPLA are also the top cadres of the SPLM and it is very hard if not impossible to get to the top in the SPLA without being a member of the SPLM and vice-versa. What this relationship does is stifle the growth of a vibrant opposition and encourage a culture of cronyism and corruption.

Consequences of the refusal of the public office holders in South Sudan to relinquish their military ranks

The relationship between the SPLA and the SPLM has been explained elsewhere in detail but one of the consequences of this relationship is the holding of military ranks by public officials. It is about getting the best of both worlds as public officials retain their military ranks while holding civilian positions in government. It is therefore not unusual to see public officials with retinue of military guards from their units providing security for them in addition to the civilian police attached to them for security purposes. This anomaly has been one of the main reasons for proliferation of rebel militia groups and demands of these groups for inclusion in government in addition to granting of inflated military ranks.

Consequences of integration of Rebel Militia Groups into the SPLA

The weaknesses of the government of South Sudan includes the inability to deal decisively with the issue of proliferation of rebel militia groups who causes insecurity as part of the plan to be recognized as players and strong men with followership in their immediate communities. Since the political space is more or less closed for meaningful opposition and the benefits of access to defence and security-related budgets limited to the high-ranking SPLM and SPLA officers (often the same people), the only other option open to join the elite is through formation of RMGs.

Once these RMGs are recognized by the government and signed 'peace agreements', the integration of their 'troops' into the SPLA takes place. The fighters get a source of steady employment and income while the senior officials are elevated to high ranks of 'Generals'. The consequence of integration of RMGs into the SPLA is the weakening of morale in the SPLA by officers and troops who remain loyal to the government. It is envisaged that sometimes in the future, these category of officers might be tempted to right the wrongs by violently overthrowing the government.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this research point to the fact that defence and security-related expenditure in South Sudan is as controversial as any other country in the world. The controversial nature of defence and security-related expenditure in South Sudan is exacerbated by the unique circumstances of the country itself. South Sudan is a new nation that became independent just a little more than a year ago. It is also a post-conflict country as the independence was preceded by a long-fought guerilla war that lasted for twenty-three years. The interim period after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was spent experimenting with different types of governance models and catching up with all the years of deprivation by the senior government officials. The semi-autonomy enjoyed by the government of Southern Sudan during the interim period (2005 to 2011) was not used to establish and nurture institutions and structures that could improve defence and security-related expenditure including building in measures and policies that could improve sustainability, transparency and accountability. The failure to build the institutions and formulate policies is not limited to defence and security alone, it cuts across the whole strata of other government institutions.

With the findings from the Focus Group discussions with the three groups put in the mix, the research concludes that the state of defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan could be better managed as it leaves a lot to be desired in terms of transparency, accountability, sustainability and creation of employment opportunities outside the military environment through the encouragement of industrial development. The following findings also support the main crux of the research in terms of the conflict generation capacities of the defence expenditures as various groups within and outside the army struggles to corner large chunks of it or just to be recognized as being strong enough to partake of the free-for-all bazaar that is defence budgets in South Sudan.

Proportion of National budgets that goes to Defence and Security

Defence and security-related expenditures consumes on average forty-five percent of the national budgets from 2005-2011 budget years. Extra-budgetary allocations are not included in the calculations of the average. When the extra-budgetary allocations are taken into consideration, defence and security budgets in South Sudan consumes more than half of the annual government budgets. When this is viewed in terms of opportunity costs, we can look at the number of hospitals, schools and boreholes not constructed or rehabilitated and equipped, kilometers of roads not constructed and thousands of civilian jobs not created. In the opinion of this researcher, the resources going to defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan is 'too much' for the output on the ground including the professional state of the SPLA.

The huge amounts of resources allocated to defence and security in South Sudan can also be explained in terms of unsustainable policies of the government such as integration of former rebel militia groups into the SPLA to swell the already huge numbers of men at arms. Some of these former fighters are also sent to the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS), Fire Service, Wildlife Service and Prisons service also to swell the numbers. The government of South Sudan has also not found the courage to implement recommendations for restructuring and professionalization of its army. The security sector restructuring (SSR) plan cannot be implemented at present because it would have brought probity, cut down the huge numbers of armed forces personnel and eliminate ghost soldiers on SPLA payroll. Most importantly, restructuring would have blocked the easy avenue to embezzle public funds via defence and security votes.

Other factors for the huge defence budgets include the failure of the government and donors to agree on the modalities for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former fighters. The bone of contention remains the issue of compensation for former fighters and pension scheme that will see the ex-combatants; regarded as heroes by most South

Sudanese paid for life from public coffers while they can still earn income through other means through access to training. Political expediency is another reason for bloated defence budgets. The government found it more convenient to recruit youths and other disgruntled elements into the armed forces than take the hard decisions of confronting high rates of youth unemployment. Lastly, corruption is a contributing factor to the huge defence and security budgets. Since disbursement of the budget is shrouded in mystery, it becomes very easy to pad costs to take care of the usual ten percentage points for public officials.

No Plans to Source Defence Needs Locally due to weak Industrial Base

The government has reiterated its commitment to 'develop' South Sudan several times on pages of newspapers but has not yet put this into practice. There are no industries in South Sudan at present that could kick-start the march into industrialization. There are no Research and Development institutes that could produce civilian breakthroughs with military applications and vice versa. SPLA itself is challenged in terms of educational qualifications of most of the personnel and cannot even dream of sourcing defence needs locally at present. Sourcing defence needs locally might also open up defence procurement susceptible to scrutiny and expose the seamy corrupt practices identified in the present arrangements for defence expenditures.

Transparency of Defence and Security-related Expenditures

There are no proof of transparency and accountability in defence and security-related expenditures in South Sudan. Defence and security expenditures are cloaked under 'national security' and not open to public scrutiny. Any attempt to investigate it attracts severe sanctions. There are no records of approved defence contractors or what they are supplying to the government. Most of the contractors are also shadowy businessmen from Eastern European countries who are not averse to paying the required bribes to obtain the contracts. Defence expenditures in South Sudan are therefore not transparent and no one is held accountable for mismanagement of the budgets.

Beneficiaries of Defence and Security-related Budgets

The main beneficiaries of South Sudan's defence expenditures are the bigwigs in the SPLA and SPLM including officials from the Ministry of defence and Presidency. These groups are the ones that rake in the percentages from defence contractors. The defence contractors and foreign defence firms and marketers are also beneficiaries while defence expenditures trickle down to the junior officers in the defence and security-related sectors in terms of salaries and allowances and basic equipment.

Widespread Dualism in Access to Defence and security-related Expenditures

There was enough evidence gathered during the research to suggest and substantiate widespread dualism in disbursement and access to defence resources. Officers get relatively decent accommodation built for them in the barracks from the defence budgets, official cars to ease their mobility, allowances for entertainment, domestic help at home, manicured gardens and educational grant for their kids which enable most of them to send their children to the best schools in Uganda, Kenya and in some cases, United States and other Western countries.

Soldiers construct their own houses using materials sourced locally to make 'Tukuls', the round mud shacks topped with thatch that dots the barracks. Soldiers and other junior security officials are not entitled to educational grants and are therefore not able to provide quality education for their kids or access quality healthcare when sick. Defence and security budgets in South Sudan are therefore used to reinforce the dualistic nature of the armed forces and security forces and the larger society as a whole. The sharp differences in salaries and allowances and access to defence and security expenditures is a source of conflict as it encourages desertion and improved the chances of rebel militia groups to recruit personnel with the assurance that they will be reintegrated into the SPLA with higher ranks that will enable some of them enjoy the benefits of being high-ranking officers and also enjoy unfettered access to defence budgets.

Consequences of the Relationship between the SPLA and SPLM

The consistent rallying cry of rebel militia groups and their supporters in South Sudan has always been the absence of 'democracy' and closing of the political space for a credible opposition to emerge as an alternative to the SPLM. The SPLM and the SPLA are synonymous in that the top members of the SPLM are also the top Generals in the SPLA. The President is a four star serving General of the SPLA as are most of his Ministers. Nine of the ten Governors are still holding military ranks while in office as civilian governors.

It is not possible to become a top General in the SPLA without being a member of the SPLM unless such a person is recognized as 'trouble maker' or an 'opinion leader' who has demonstrated a capacity for mobilizing youths to cause insecurity and violence. Part of the restructuring recommended for the SPLA includes the separation of the SPLM from the command structure of the SPLA and banning SPLA officers from being members of the SPLM which is a political party. SPLA Generals appointed into public office are also recommended to resign their commissions and not retain their military ranks and privileges while holding civilian positions. The symbiotic relationship between the SPLA and SPLM is an obstacle to development of democracy in South Sudan and a source of conflict.

Motivation of youths for wanting to join the SPLA

The focus group discussion with the youths was very revealing in that it confirmed what the researcher was already aware of about the economic realities of life in South Sudan. Unemployment figures provided by the World Economic Outlook for Sudan in 2011 are 13.7% of all able-bodied persons while for 2012, it was 12.00 % of all able-bodied persons. Unemployment figures for South Sudan ranges from 75% of able-bodied persons in the main towns to around 90% in the rural areas when unpaid labour is counted as part of the unemployment figures population. Unemployment is aggravated by lack of marketable skills and education for the teeming youth and a culture and

traditional practices that abhors hard labour with a non-existent industrial capacity and no history of entrepreneurship among the population.

It is therefore not surprising that most of the youths see the SPLA as a means of steady employment and will readily join because of the monthly salaries which make them relatively better than their unemployed contemporaries in the villages and the security of tenure provided by being a member of the SPLA. The focus group discussion with the former combatants was also revealing as most participants (4.5) resented their disengagement from the SPLA and source of regular income and would like to go back not to fight but to be able to continue receiving regular salaries in the absence of pensions. The focus group discussion with the women associated with armed forces and groups also revealed the same trend as 90% of them also wanted to go back to their former status as it provided regular source of income and security. The conclusion is that majority of those joining the SPLA and other security forces are doing so not out of conviction of making careers or patriotism but out of necessity of escaping unemployment and poverty.

Pressure from the International Community on RMGs

Part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan's mandate include extension of government mandate over the whole of South Sudan, peace consolidation, security and enabling development. The pressure from the UN mission on the government of South Sudan to maintain peace and security has most times led to arm-twisting the government to adopt policies that are not agreeable to it but will portray the UN mission as performing its duties and keeping to the letters of its mandate in South Sudan. Reintegration of RMGs is one of the contradictory policies the government was forced to adopt as it is not in line with the goal of professionalizing the security forces and also stopping disgruntled politicians, military officers and sundry opportunists from forming militia groups and getting into the armed forces with inflated ranks with no qualifications. What the UNMISS pressure on the government is doing is weakening the government's resolve to deal with the dissidents and encouraging

the formation of more militias knowing fully well that the UN mission will advise and pressurize the government to negotiate a peace treaty with any group in the name of 'peace consolidation'. The study therefore concluded that apart from corruption and sundry issues, pressure and interference from the UN mission in South Sudan is contributing to the conflicts and competition for access to defence budgets in the country.

Past, Present and Future Threats from Sudan

Sudan is the northern neighbor of South Sudan and former country mates. After the secession and declaration of independence by South Sudan on 09 July 2011, there have been several allegations of covert and overt operations by the Sudanese government to destabilize the new country through various means that include military and logistic support to the various militias operating in South Sudan, blockading of imports and diversion of crude oil exports from South Sudan as 'oil transit fees'. The impact of the meddling of the Sudanese government cannot be discounted but the government officials in South Sudan have also learnt to use the Sudanese threat as one of the excuses for increased allocations to defence and security while siphoning funds from the treasury.

Destruction of Morale and Discipline in the SPLA

The integration of former militia members into the SPLA is a policy accepted by the government of South Sudan in its bid to maintain its relations with international donors, keep up an appearance of respecting 'human rights' and attracting investors. What the integration of former militia members into the SPLA has done and is still doing could be measured in economic terms (increase in number of troops, more pressure on scarce resources to take care of the increased numbers) but it is difficult to measure the damages to the internal cohesion and spirit de corps of the SPLA as fighting force. Former militia members invariably remain loyal to their commanders and not to the national army. Since most were formed and populated by members of particular ethnic groups, the ethnic divisions in the army, which is one of the main hurdles to professionalization and reform, is worsened.

Officers loyal to the government and keen to remain true to their professional calling are also tempted to join the free for all formation of militias to fast-track their promotion prospects as serving military officers who defected are never court-martialed on return but integrated with higher ranks while those who remain loyal remain at the same ranks for years. Before the adoption of the policy of integrating militia members into the armed forces, the SPLA had a total of 15 Major-Generals. At present, the SPLA has a total of 32 Major-Generals, with 17 of these coming from various rebel militia groups. It is therefore envisaged that restructuring efforts to professionalize the SPLA will fail due to the presence of a large number of unqualified Generals who will cause problems if retired.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of this study supports the research questions and has proven conclusively that one of the main causes of unending conflicts in South Sudan is the struggle for the control of access to the huge defence and security-related budgets of the government of South Sudan. The study also concluded that the percentage of resources going to defence and security is higher than normal, even for an African country at almost 50 percent average and that disbursement of huge chunks of the national budgets are not transparently disbursed and present an attractive option for corrupt enrichment to public officials in South Sudan. The study also concluded that the closed political space in South Sudan combined with widespread corruption encourages formation of militia groups as the only way to access the huge defence and security budgets is through the recognition of a person's nuisance value and ability to cause insecurity and embarrass the government.

Based on the above summary, the following are recommended correcting or addressing the findings of this research by the various stakeholders in South Sudan.

Government of South Sudan

- i. Trimming of the huge expenditures on defence and security through the scrapping of the integration of former rebel militia group members into the SPLA as this increases the burden on the government and destroys the spirit de corps of the SPLA and weakens the resolve of loyal officers to remain loyal when disloyal officers are returning to the army and security services with higher ranks after carrying out treasonable acts against the government and the constitution they swore to protect.
- ii. Commence the implementation of the security sector reforms policy document by paying particular attention to the reduction of the number of personnel in the armed and security forces, increasing the level of educational requirements for entry into the armed and security forces, increasing the length of training period for all security personnel and inculcating human rights education as a core component of the training of armed and security forces.
- iii. Return to the drawing board to revise the present DDR policy to include finalization of pension scheme for former combatants being demobilized from the armed and security forces. The absence of a pension plan has been one of the main hurdles to the implementation of the present DDR policy and the reason for the presence of old, frail and decrepit service personnel in the armed forces as a result of the fear of the future after their disengagement from the army.
- iv. Remove the shroud of secrecy surrounding defence expenditures in South Sudan at present by promoting open discussion of defence and security related issues in the parliament as opposed to the present arrangement of holding 'caucus' meetings to discuss security and defence issues.
- v. As part of the policy of openness in defence and security issues, the government must scrap the present policy of procuring its defence

needs from black market operators and deal with licensed and recognized defence contractors. Once the shroud of secrecy is removed and the government starts dealing with recognized defence contractors, the corrupt practices associated with defence procurement in South Sudan will be eliminated or at least sharply reduced and provides no attraction to buccaneers.

- vi. Start using the defence and security expenditures to promote industrialization by encouraging South Sudanese entrepreneurs to establish factories that could produce civilian components of defence needs, most especially those that do not require complex engineering or machining to produce. Textile mills could produce the fabrics for uniforms and industrial tailoring setups could sew the uniforms (ceremonial and combat types). Shoes and leather goods factories could produce combat boots, belts and pouches while plastic factories will be able to produce mess tins and the food packaging companies will be able to fulfill the meats ready to eat requirements for combat operations. Apart from promotion of industrialization, all these activities could generate around 300,000 new jobs for South Sudanese nationals and reduce the pressure on the government to recruit into the armed forces.
- vii. As part of the openness advocated for above, records of defence procurements, defence contractors and equipment being supplied matters of public records for accountability purposes.
- viii. Streamline the disbursement of defence and security expenditures as indiscriminate access to defence and security expenditures encourages the struggles to be part of the inner 'caucus' in South Sudan. A streamlined procedure will involve the submission of defence requirements by military Commanders for vetting by the Ministry of Defence and approval by the Presidency. Tenders are sent out by the Ministry of Public Procurement and paid for by the Ministry of Finance

after confirmation by the Anti-Corruption and public procurement's inspection units. Generals should not be permitted to be involved in the selection of contractors or authorization of payment for defence supplies. No single individual should also be involved directly or indirectly in more than one step of the process.

- ix. Address the extreme dualism in welfare conditions between the high-ranking officers and the junior ones as observed during the study. While the study agrees that the military is dualistic in nature and hierarchical, it is not necessary to take this to the extremes observed during the field studies in accommodation provided to both categories, access to medical services, education for family members and even in the general appearance of both categories of service personnel. The desire to move up is one of the reasons why junior officers are always willing to desert their posts to join militia groups.
- x. Scrap and outlaw the present practice of public officials holding civilian appointments retaining their military ranks and privileges. Military officers must be encouraged to remain true to their professional calling and not be hustling for political appointments. Those willing to serve in civilian capacities must be made to resign their commissions in the army before being confirmed.
- xi. Clear separation between the SPLA and the SPLM. SPLA personnel must be outlawed from being members of political parties while politicians must not be permitted to remain in the army.
- xii. Creation of other employment opportunities to the youths in South Sudan through improved access to education and vocational skills to reduce rural-urban drift and pressure on youths to engage in criminal activities or join militias as a means of economic survival. Provision of alternative employment opportunities also mean that those showing up for enlistment into the army and other security forces are those

genuinely interested in serving and not those escaping from poverty and unemployment.

- xiii. Address the gender imbalance issue in the military and security forces by giving opportunities to and encouraging educated female South Sudanese to join the military and security forces. The study estimates that around 5 percent of total strength of the SPLA and other security forces are females.
- xiv. Stop the abuse of the SPLA by public officials who use them in addressing political issues or oppressing the local population. The usual practice of using the SPLA to break opposition rallies should be discouraged and perpetrators punished.
- xv. Start serving the people of South Sudan and open up the political space for genuine opposition to grow. The roles of the SPLA and SPLM in the struggle for liberation cannot be over-emphasized but the choice to hold different views is a right and not a privilege.
- xvi. Genuine efforts to fight corruption and eliminate it from the national psyche must commence without delay. The culture of impunity in public service and the military must be outlawed and perpetrators punished through the rule of law. The government must therefore demonstrate a commitment to good governance, lead by example and strive to change the age-long customs and traditions that encourage dependency, corruption and backwardness. Opportunity must also be given to the civil society groups to become stronger and carry out their watchdog roles more effectively.

International Community

While the roles of the international community in the realization of nationhood for South Sudan and the support through the years of long struggle is appreciated, the roles that the international community should be playing at this crucial period need to be reviewed critically to avoid meddling in the internal affairs of the new nation. While it is

important to continue to provide support in terms of capacity building, development of necessary structures to extend government authority, keep peace and enhance development, it is also important to examine how these functions collide with the sovereignty of the South Sudan government.

It is important to stop the present practice of putting pressure on the government to adopt policies that diminishes its dignity in the eyes of the local population. One of these policies is the integration of former members of militia groups into the SPLA as part of the peace-building process. Proliferation of militia groups in South Sudan and increased insecurity can be traced to this policy. Jobbers, opportunists and every other person able to muster 30 or more community youths with few rifles forms a 'militia', declares the intention of his group to fight the government and 'liberate South Sudan from tyranny and corruption', signs a peace agreement with pressure from the international community on the government and push for integration into the SPLA with inflated ranks. Case closed until another militia group surfaces and the whole process is repeated all over again. This must stop forthwith if the mushrooming of militia groups is to stop.

The decision to integrate militia members must come from the government alone as it is the one carrying the burden of paying them. The international community can however tie development support to genuine efforts at curbing rampant corruption, security sector reforms, employment creation and strengthening the rule of law institutions. Release of funds will be predicated on objectively verifiable indicators on corruption, employment generation, security sector reforms and sustainable DDR program.

There is hope for South Sudan to change and improve on the gaps identified. The country is young, endowed with natural resources that

could change the lives of its people but not benefitting from benefit of experience as most South Sudanese have never lived under an organized government while most public officials have never ran a government before this time.

Other Areas for Future Research

- i. Security Sector Reforms and development: Case study of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army after reform.
- ii. Gender balance and armed forces: The roles of female combatants in the history of the SPLA.
- iii. Regional peacekeeping efforts and combat fatigue: SPLA and its regional peacekeeping responsibilities after independence.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

TRANSMITTAL LETTER FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Dear Sir/Madam,
Greetings!

I am a Masters of Conflict Resolution and Peace Building candidate of the Kampala International University in Uganda. Part of the requirements for the award of the masters' degree in my discipline is the presentation of a thesis. My research effort is titled 'the roles of defence and security-related budgets in sustaining conflicts and formation of militias in South Sudan (2005-2011)'

Within this context, may I kindly request your participation in this study by filling the questionnaire. Please Endeavour to answer all questions. Any data provided by you will be used only for academic purposes and no personal information shall be divulged to others.

Can the questionnaire be ready for collection in five (5) days time?

Thanking you very much in advance in anticipation of your cooperation.

Yours Faithfully,

Mr. Olaide Abdulmummini Omideyi

APPENDIX II

CLEARANCE FROM ETHICS COMMITTEE

Date_____

Candidate's Data

Name_____

Reg. #_____

Course_____

Title_____ of
Study_____

Ethical Review Checklist

The study reviewed considered the following:

- ___Physical safety of Human Subjects
- ___Psychological safety
- ___Emotional Security
- ___Privacy
- ___Written request for Author of Standardized Instrument
- ___Coding of Questionnaires/anonymity/ Confidentiality
- ___Permission to Conduct the Study
- ___Informed Consent
- ___Citations/Authors Recognized

Results of Ethical Review

- ___Approved
- ___Conditional (to provide the Ethics Committee with corrections)
- ___Disapproved/Resubmit Proposal

Ethics Committee (Names and Signatures)

Chairperson_____

Member_____

Member_____

APPENDIX III

INFORMED CONSENT

I am giving my consent to be part of the research study of Mr. Olaide Abdulmummini Omidayi that will focus on the roles of defence and security-related budgets in sustaining conflicts and formation of militias in South Sudan.

I shall be assured of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality and that I will be given the option to refuse participation and right to withdraw my participation at any time.

I have been informed that the research is voluntary and that the results will be given to me if I ask for it.

Initials: _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX IV
RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS

A. QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Respondent,

I am conducting a research study entitled "**Roles of defence and security-related budgets in sustaining conflicts and formation of militias in South Sudan**".

In view of this, may I request that you answer my questionnaire? I will appreciate it very much if you can return the questionnaire as soon as possible.

Please be assured that the data you provide will be used only for academic purposes and the information you provide will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you very much in advance.

Yours Truly,

Olaide Abdulmummini Omideyi

Candidate for Masters of Conflict Resolution
Kampala International University
Kampala, Uganda

APPENDIX V

FACT SHEET

Instructions; Please tick the correct answer.

Part A;DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

1. AGE

1. 20-25, ()
2. 26-30()
3. 31-35()
4. 36-40()
5. 41-above()

Qtn 2. NATIONALITY

1. Sudanese()
2. South Sudanese()
3. Others ()

Qtn 3. Where were you during the civil crisis in old Sudan between 1983 and 2005?

1. South Sudan()
2. IDP camp in Northern Sudan()
3. Khartoum()
4. Refugee camp in East Africa()
5. Europe or other western countries()

Qtn 4. Educational level before or during crisis

1. Total illiterate()
2. Primary school()
3. High school()
4. Diploma()
5. Degree or above()

Qtn 5. Present Education level

1. Total illiterate()
2. Primary level()
3. High school()
4. Diploma()
5. Degree or above()

Qtn 6. Did you support the SPLM/A during the war?

1. Yes()
2. No ()
3. Too young to take decision

Qtn.7 what form did your support take?

1. Financial()
2. Moral()
3. Combatant()
4. Logistics()
5. Intelligence()
6. Others()

Qtn 8. How do you rate the contribution of SPLAM/A to the struggle for independence in South Sudan?

1. Nothing extra-ordinary()
2. Ordinary()
3. Significant()
4. Very significant()
5. Extra-ordinarily significant()

Part B; Access to defence and Security- Related Budgets

Qtn 9. Do you have access or benefit from defence and security related budgets in South Sudan?

1. Yes()
2. No ()

Qtn 10. If your answer to qtn 9. Above is yes, describe how you benefit from defence and security budget in South Sudan.

1. Member of armed forces()
2. Defence contractor()
3. Consultant()
4. Relative of security personnel()
5. Others()

Qtn 11. How do you rate the allocation of resources to defence and security related expenditures in South Sudan?

1. Below requirement()
2. Enough()

3. Slightly above requirement()
4. Grossly above requirement()

Qtn 12. How do you rate the SPLAM/A in terms of professionalism?

1. Unprofessional()
2. Professional()
3. Very professional()
4. Exceptionally professional ()

Qtn 13. Do you think the SPLA is equipped to defend South Sudan from external aggression?

1. No opinion()
2. No()
3. Yes ()

Part C; Recruitment, Appointments, Promotions and Recruitment

Qtn 14. Please evaluate the following based on your knowledge about South Sudan and SPLA.

a. Recruitment

1. Fairly distributed ()
2. Unfairly distributed ()

b. Promotions

1. Fairly distributed ()
2. Unfairly distributed ()

Appointments

1. Fairly distributed ()
2. Unfairly distributed ()

c. Retirement of soldiers and officers

1. Fairly distributed ()
2. Unfairly distributed ()

Part D; Service Delivery to SPLA Officers and Families

Qtn 15. Please evaluate the following for the SPLA officers and families.

a. Housing

1. Substandard ()
2. Standard ()

3. Above standard ()
4. Extra ordinarily above standard ()

b. Salaries and allowances

1. Not adequate ()
2. Adequate ()
3. Very adequate ()
4. More than adequate ()

c. Access to health care

1. Very poor ()
2. Poor ()
3. Average ()
4. Good ()
5. Excellent ()

d. Training and educational opportunities

1. Not adequate ()
2. Adequate ()
3. Very adequate ()
4. More than adequate ()

Qtn 16. Do you think the disbursement of defence and security related expenditures in South Sudan is transparent?

1. Not transparent ()
2. Somehow transparent ()
3. Transparent ()
4. Very transparent ()

Qtn 17. What do you think about the accountability of defence and security related expenditures in South Sudan?

1. Not accountable ()
2. Somehow accountable ()
3. Accountable ()
4. Very accountable ()

Qtn 18. The defence and security related budgets could be better utilized in other sectors of the economy, such as health care, roads, and education.

1. Do not agree ()
2. Somehow agree ()
3. Agree ()
4. Totally agree ()

Qtn 19. The struggle for the control and access to defence and security related budgets in South Sudan is one of the major reasons for conflict.

1. Do not agree ()
2. Somehow agree ()
3. Agree ()
4. Totally agree ()

Qtn 20. The details of defence and security related expenditures should be matters of public record.

1. Do not agree ()
2. Somehow agree ()
3. Agree ()
4. Totally agree ()

APPENDIX VI

ANNEX 2

QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

GROUP 1: FORMER COMBATANTS MALE (FCM)

1. How has it been coping with life after military service?
 - a. Livelihoods engaged in by ex-combatants to survive
 - b. Pensions
 - c. Training support to cope with life after military service
 - d. Acceptability by immediate communities on return.
2. Compare and contrast your present circumstances with retired officers and other comrades who are better 'connected'.
3. If given the opportunity, would you opt to return to the SPLA?
4. What are the things you miss most out of the army?

NB: Questions above served only as a guide to stimulate the discussions and encourage the group to independently arrive at answers that best reflect their opinions and also allow other pertinent questions to emerge.

APPENDIX VII

ANNEX 3

GROUP 1I: FORMER COMBATANTS FEMALE AND WOMEN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES AND GROUPS (WAAFGS)

1. How has it been coping with life outside the military environment?
 - a. Livelihoods engaged in by ex-combatants to survive
 - b. Pensions
 - c. Training support to cope with life after military service
 - d. Acceptability by immediate communities on return.
2. Are there differences in benefits you receive compared to your male comrades?
3. Do you feel better now as a civilian or prefer to be back with the armed forces?
4. What are the things you miss most about not being part of the armed forces again?

APPENDIX VIII

ANNEX 4

GROUP 1II: COMMUNITY YOUTHS MIXED (CYM)

1. Do you have ambitions to join the SPLA and why?
 - a. Explore the presence of other options for gainful employment and the possibilities and challenges to obtaining these options
 - b. Trainings and competencies that the group thinks qualifies it to be part of the SPLA
2. What are the things you admire most about the SPLA?
 - a. Explore the possibilities of being able to wield power and have access to weapons and women.
 - b. Let the group look at other issues like steady employment and salaries for the foreseeable future as part of their motivation for wanting to join the SPLA if not mentioned specifically by the group.
3. If other opportunities are made available to you outside the option of joining the SPLA (Vocational training or formal education), will it affect your admiration and decision to join the SPLA?
4. What experiences (good, bad and ugly) have you had with the SPLA?
5. Do you believe that the SPLA and other security personnel enjoy special privileges? Ensure the group mentions these privileges and how significant it is in their decision to join or not to join.

NB: Questions above served only as a guide to stimulate the discussions and encourage the group to independently arrive at answers that best reflect their opinions and also allow other pertinent questions to emerge.

APPENDIX IX

RESEARCHER'S CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Profile

Name: **Olaide Abdulmummini Omidoyi**

Gender: **Male**

Nationality: **Nigerian**

Educational Background

- Bachelors Degree (Honours) in Economics 1992-1997 at the University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri, Borno State Nigeria. Faculty of Social and Management Sciences.
- Depot Nigerian Army, June-December 1989
- Nigerian Army School of Infantry January-April 1991
- Nigerian Army School of Artillery April-July 2002
- Received other trainings in Project Management, Community Development and Monitoring and Evaluation Methods among others.

Work Experience

- 10 years service with the Nigerian army including combat tours in Sierra Leone and Liberia as part of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.
- 7 years with different international NGOs in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea as Project Manager, Programme Coordinator and Reintegration Coordinator
- 6 years to present with the United Nations Mission in Sudan and South Sudan in various capacities that encompasses post-conflict stabilization program design, implementation and monitoring (DDR, Community Security and Small Arms Control and Security Sector Control)