THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION AND PEACE BUILDING IN SOMALIA:

A CASE STUDY OF MOGADISHU

BY

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BIR/1296/172/DC

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A BACHELOR DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF KAMPLA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

SEPTEMBER 2019

DECLARATION

I **ABDIKADIR MOHAMED ABDI** hereby declare that this piece of work is my original work. It has never been presented before in any institution of learning either in part or full, for any academic award, publication or otherwise.

SIGINATURE .... DATE.... 10/10/2019 ....

i

APPROVAL

I certify that MR **ABDIKADIR MOHAMED ABDI** carried out this research under my supervision and has submitted with my approval as the University Supervisor.

Mr. John Ibembe Daniel

Signature... Date...

Supervisor

DEDICATION

I dedicate this pieces of work to my beloved father Mohamed Abdi,Mother Amina Osman, my brother Mohamud Mohamed who have scarified a lot for my education. My friends Abdihakim Mohamed,Abdifatah Noor,Ahmed Abdikarim and who ever gave me a hand in my studies .

May the Almighty God bless them abundantly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Table of Contents

ABSTRACT

The peace building functions by Africa Union is one of the good efforts towards retaining peace in Somalia. Somalia has experienced turmoil's for so many decades. The peace buildings by AU are caught up by many challenges. The main one been funds to facilitate the functions. Though those challenges are there, the study has found out that, the AU has really tried to calm down the war. The research also wanted to find out the intentions of AU towards those functions, but it can ascertain that they are positive. The objectives of the study are to investigate the role of AU in peace building in Somalia. The roles of AU can be classified as positive. If the AU had enough funds towards these functions it could have done tremendous job. The other objective is to examine if the citizens of Somalia are benefiting out of these functions by African Union, the answer to that is yes, because it has been witnessed as majority of Somalia citizens who were refuges going back to their country. The linkage between peace building functions and peace keeping operations. So the study can conclude by saying, unlike other Unions with hidden agendas in aiding other nation the African Union has none. The study used structural conflict theory as a theoretical framework. The bases of this theoretical framework are on issues of competition of resources. Every individual is struggling to have resources. This issue led to people fighting each other because of resources, as result they ended up killing each other. This issue of competition for resources it has made the functions of peace building by African Union very complicated. Those who acquired resources unjustly are against peace building for the fear their resources will be taken away. The key finding of the study is that the institutions of Somalia need to be strengthening if not to re-made a new. These institutions like Judiciary they must be there to collect the injustices which are there in Somalia. To add on that the issue of funding also needs to be looked at. Issues of funds have made the functions of peace building in Somalia complicated. All nations need to be supporting the nations in conflicts like Somalia Finally the research conclusions are that, for the peace building functions to be successive they need the contribution of every individual, that is the individual from Somalia and also the outside countries

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFS   -   African Stand by Force

AIDS   -   Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

AMISOM -   African Mission in Somalia

APF   -   African Peace Facility

APSA   -   African Peace and Security Architecture

ARPCT   -   Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter- Terrorism

ARS   -   Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia

BBC   -   British Broadcasting Corporation

EU   -   European Union

FAO   -   Food and Agriculture Organization

G8   -   The Group of Eight

HIV   -   Human Immunodeficiency Virus

ICISS   International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

ICU   -   Islamic Courts Union

IEDs   -   Improvised Explosive Devices

IGAD   -   Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IR   –   International Relations

KDF   -   Kenya Defense Forces

NATO   -   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs   -   Non -governmental Organizations

UNSOA -   United Nations support Office for AMISON

WFP   -   World Food Programme

WHO   -   World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the background, problem statement, general objective, specific objectives, research questions, scope of the study and significance of the study.

1.1. Background of the study.

This section provides the historical, theoretical, conceptual and contextual perspective, those perspective outline the key issues of the research problem.

1.1.1. Historical perspective

The state of Somalia since January 1991 has not experienced peace for the last three decades so this has been as result of civil war which has engulfed Somalia. Due to these instabilities and wars the country has gone down in terms of developments, economically and socially. The citizens have sought refuge from the neighboring countries, for example in camp Daadab in Kenya; it contains more refugees from Somalia. The United Nations and other states have put a lot of efforts to stop conflicts in Somalia (Hehir, 2008) The UN intervention in Somalia has its origin in which to provide desperately needed food and other relief supplies to war torn famine stricken country. The United nation operation in Somalia (known as Unisom) was established to provide security for united nation personnel and supplies and escort humanitarian supplies to distribution centers. That is to show the United nation has tried to aid the Somalia but all in vain. Due to that, the African Union under the umbrella of united nation is trying to build peace and keep peace in Somalia. The operations started by Kenya defense force that got to Somalia land due to threats posed to its people and territory (Bassiouni, 2006).

Thereafter through interventions of UN the operation of peace building in Somalia is in progress. In doing that there are so many other operations which have been done and this study will be analyzing them. The challenges which have resulted in process of these operations will also be looked onto. In February 2007 the United Nation Security Council gave the African Union mandate and authority to deploy peace keeping mission in support of Somalia transitory federal institutions. This peace keeping also involves the issue of peace building. All operations starts with peace keeping, as scholar by the name Gaya says, peace

keeping entails the use of peacekeepers to keep conflicting parties apart and keep conflict at current low levels,That is to say cease fire, humanitarian aid and any aid the conflicts parties may need. After peacekeeping, the issue of building peace arises. The term Peace building has been defined by Akerlund who says "the focus is taken away from the warring parties, their behavior, their attitudes and the dispute and is placed instead of community" (Akerlund, 2005). This involves building structures both social and the one which boast the economics. The process is not easy and so the study will be analyzing if the AU has done anything of significance in Somalia towards peace building.

1.1.2 Theoretical perceptive

Gaya says, Theories like Marxism, in its thesis on historical materialism presents conflicts as mostly tied to economic structures and social institutions(Collier, 2000).He continue to say, the main argument of structural theory is that conflict is built into particular ways societies are structured and organized. So that to mean the structural theory deal with challenges to do with social problems for example, political and economic exclusion,poverty,diseases,exploitation and also injustice, and more so inequality mostly towards women and children. This theory maintains that conflicts occur because of what we can call exploitation and in just nature of human societies, domination of class by another.

In Africa in general and Somalia in particular considering the challenges the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) faced. The development and assigning of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) should be understood in the context of the unrelenting failure to deploy IGASOM after the March 2006 IGAD meeting. IGAD did not abandon IGASOM post March 2006 but continued to seek ways to solve its problems and deploy contingents to Somalia. The United Nations on the other hand, did not exhibit tangible interest in Somalia conflict especially given the views of the UNSG Mr. Ban Ki-moon in 2007 that "deploying UN peacekeepers to Somalia was neither realistic nor practical".Nonetheless, the worsening of the Somali peace process, increased Western backing for a peacekeeping mission, and the inability of IGAD to solve IGASOM's problems combined to give birth to AMISOM.10th March 2006 witnessed an increase in the Somali civil war. Western states, in particularly the United States, were concerned about the growing strength of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an alliance of Islamic-based factions, which reportedly harbored terrorists including those who bombed the American embassies in Kenya

and Tanzania in 1998. The United States also avowed that the ICU maintained ties with the Al-Qaeda terrorist network (Pushkina, Darya (June 2006).

The AU's founding documents foresee an organization empowered to play a major role in resolving Africa's armed conflicts. The former chairperson of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, described the AU's advent as a shift from the old norm of "noninterference" in armed conflicts to a new stance of "non indifference" to member states internal affairs. The AU's member states, bureaucrats, and external donor states are building a set of institutions and instruments commonly referred to as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that enables the AU to play a much greater role in conflict management. Compared to its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), there has been an enormous change in the new union's ambition, the tempo of its peace operations and conflict management initiatives, and its embrace of new and controversial political values(Pushkina, Darya (June 2006).

1.1.3 Conceptual Perspective

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations in Somalia. It is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, and train the Somali security. AMISOM's actual birth can be traced to January 2007 when the AU's Peace and Security Council voted to assume the mandate and responsibility from IGAD for a peacekeeping mission in Africa. Moving the mandate from IGAD to the AU was a result of needing greater African military involvement in the operation. The UN presented its authorization in Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006) for non-IGAD African states to contribute forces to IGASOM in recognition of the few IGAD members available for deploying delegations. In recognition of this statement, the AU assumed responsibility for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia on 19 January 2007 and officially mandated the operation. The AU by this action officially opened the peacekeeping operation to all AU members and not just those of IGAD. Members of IGAD officially backed the transfer of responsibility to the AU on 28 January. Nevertheless, this left one possible legal technicality, the United Nations authorization of December 2006 explicitly named IGAD and IGASOM in reference to a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. To remove any possible question of international authorization, Resolution 1744 (2007) was approved by the UN

Security Council on 20 February 2007. In the same resolution, the UN provided a specific partial exemption to the 1992 arms embargo for AMISOM. A small advance element of Ugandan peacekeepers arrived in Somalia on March 2007 and was quickly followed by a battalion sized unit under the banner of AMISOM.

1.1.3.1 Peace Building

Peace building. According to Julie A. Mertus and Jeffrey (2007) Peace building is a term describing outside interventions that are designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace. Peace building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically. The exact definition varies depending on the actor, with some definitions specifying what activities fall within the scope of peace building or restricting peace building to post-conflict interventions.

In 2007, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee defined peace building as follows: "Peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives" (Jeffrey; 2007).

1.4. Contextual perspective

Closing capability gaps in the AU's conflict management portfolio requires both political commitment and technical reform across a variety of issue areas. Technical reforms are urgently needed to strengthen the AU Commission, particularly its Peace Support Operations Division and the Peace and Security Council's secretariat; to enrich the AU's capacity to undertake effective early warning and response, mediation initiatives, as well as targeted sanctions; and to guarantee the African Standby Force becomes genuinely operational. Such reforms will only succeed, however, if complemented by more proactive and sustained high-level political support. Most urgently, the AU's senior leadership need to forge a strong and

creative relationship with the UN's new Office to the African Union and encourage more AU member states to develop and prioritize their own peacekeeping and mediation skills.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Somalia's state collapse in 1991 engendered insecurity and a humanitarian crisis which progressively alarmed the international community. By 2005, this insecurity threatened regional and international security while attempts, since 1992, to fill the politico-security void had been fruitless. Lengthy diplomatic engagements, among and between African actors and the rest of the international community, and background intelligence not worth detailing here, resulted in a decision in which the AUPSC created AMISOM on 19 January 2007. On 21 February 2007, the UNSC (Res. 1744) approved AMISOM with a 6-month mandate to support Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), build Somali security structures, and support the war against al-Shabaab. AMISOM, "the only peace operation launched under AU command and control" and the "biggest and most complex peace operation ever conducted by the AU" (Bruton &Williams, 2014: 2), initially faced limitations of troop commitment, suffered many personnel losses and exposed the AU's material, financial, and bureaucratic limitations. Nevertheless, the mission has scored military, political, and state-building successes. This has resulted in unembellished internally displaces persons (IDPs) and refugee problems further complicating the security situation in and around such conflict areas. Additionally, players in the processes may have vested interests impeding the peace process. The endless conflicts in Africa particularly in Somalia cry out for peace keeping intervention. This research mainly tries to examine role of AMISOM in peace building in Mogadishu Somalia.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study was to examine the role of Military Intervention in peace building in Somalia since 2007 to date.

1.4 Specific objectives of the study.

1. To evaluate the effectiveness of AMISOM military Intervention in peace keeping in Somalia

2. To establish the Challenges AMISOM has faced in Peace Building process in Somalia

3. To determine whether AMISOM and other Non-State Actors are working together to ensure Peace building in Somalia

1.5 Research questions

1. How effective is AMISOM military Intervention in peace keeping in Somalia?

2. What are the challenges faced by AMISOM in Peace Building process in Somalia?

3. Is AMISOM and other Non-State Actors are working together to ensure Peace building in Somalia?

1.6 Scope of the study.

1.6.1 Geographical scope

The study was carried out from Mogadishu Somalia where AMISOM is stationed; Mogadishu is the capital and most populous city of Somalia. Located in the coastal Banadir region on the Somali Sea, the city has served as an important port for millennia. As of 2017, it had a population of 2,425,000 residents. Mogadishu is the nearest foreign mainland city to Seychelles, at a distance of 835 mi (1,344 km) over the Somali Sea.

1.6.2 Content scope

The study will focus on AMISOM and its mandate in peace building, Challenges and work with other Non-State Actors (NSAs) in Somalia.

1.6.3 Time scope

The study will relate from 2007- 2019 this is the period in which AMISOM has been operating.

1.7 Significance of the study.

- The findings of this study which will be published for social study to encourage the peace builders.
- It will also bring out the challenges the AU is undergoing, so in future they can be avoided.
- It will also contribute to literature in this field of study and other related research work and provides basis for further investigation.
- In the academic it will aid the researchers on approach which should be employed when starting such functions.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0. Introduction

This chapter shows the literature written by scholars on the AMISOM and peace building, theories, conceptual review and related literature.

2.1 Theoretical Review

The first grouping of assumptions by liberal theorists is about the social role of the state. The theorists contend that the state is identical with or essential to society, and as something without which a decent life is impossible. argues that liberal scholars systematically ignore arguments that stateless life might be preferable to life under the state, in what can be argued to be an intellectual doubling of the move of liberal states to ruthlessly suppress movements aspiring to stateless life. Despite these theorists' criticisms of particular state policies, liberals consistently think about social life from the perspective of the state. Further explains that liberalism identifies with the state by adopting its subject-position. The fixation on the state manifests itself normatively in the attachment of overriding significance to themes of security, order and stability. On the other hand, metonymic slippage is established between terms like barbarism, statelessness, anarchy, chaos and lawlessness(Chonghaile, Clar Ni, 2014). This conceptual conflation combines into a single concept at least four distinct phenomena: state collapse as such, a societal collapse, the existence of a set of 'lawless' actions similar to criminality and that of a situation of civil war.

Statists have attributed other aspects of a complex emergency to social conflict and 'lawless' actions, to the absence of a state (or of the right kind of state). These aspects however, fail to distinguish between peaceful and warring stateless societies, or between 'lawless' stateless societies and those with some degree of diffuse 'governance'. Societies such as Somalia are stateless hence assumed to be plagued by civil war and social predation. The general assumption by the liberal theorists is that the response to problems related to civil war and 'lawlessness' must be resolved by the restoration or construction of a proper state. An absence of state is taken as the explanation for various effects, while remaining silent to what specific forces cause these effects. The possibility that the worst problems in complex emergencies could be mitigated instead by moving towards a more peaceful and less predatory type of statelessness - a possibility at the forefront of the empirical literature on Somalia for example

- is simply ruled out upfront. Further, the need to establish and engage with contingent causes of intergroup conflict is also excluded in the frame (Shinn, 2011).

Peacekeepers in Somalia found themselves in a society with very different assumptions about state power. Menkhaus, opines that 'there is perhaps no other issue on which the worldviews of external and internal actors are more divergent than their radically different understanding of the state'. Menkhaus adds that for many Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population (Shinn, 2011). He concludes that, state building in Somalia was misconceived as necessary for peacebuilding in a setting where it was virtually impossible. Menkhaus and Pendergast contend that the 'radical localization' of politics in Somalia is often misunderstood as disorder and crisis, when in fact it is part of the functioning of local social life. He challenges the international community to attempt to work with this "stateless" political reality in Somalia rather than against it.

2.2 Conceptual framework

Independent variables

Dependent variables

AIMSOM	PEACE BUILDING
- Humanitarian intervention - Social order necessitated state - Strengthening of armed forces	- Stabilizing the most conflict Zone. - Restoring state institutions - Dealing with social and economic issues (Youth,Women,Health, Unemployment, Education)

2.3 Review of relation literature

2.3.1 Role of AMISOM

In March 2007 in the aftermath of the Ethiopian military campaign that had installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu in December 2006 AMISOM was deployed to Somalia. It was originally mandated by the African Union (AU) in January 2007 but was endorsed shortly afterwards by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. AMISOM had an initial authorized strength of 8,000 and was mandated to protect transitional government personnel and institutions, conduct military enforcement operations against anti-

government actors, principally al-Shabaab, and facilitate humanitarian assistance and civil-military operations. Murithi, (2007). The mission's small police component was mandated to help train, mentor and advise the Somali Police Force, although very few of them deployed to Mogadishu before 2011 because of the dire security situation on the ground. AMISOM's initial deployed strength consisted of approximately 1,600 Ugandan soldiers. The Ugandan soldiers were later joined from December 2007 by a battalion of Burundi troops. After that, the mission grew in size incrementally and evolved, reflecting the changing context in Somalia and international responses to the country's many problems. In early 2009, AMISOM protected key members of the TFG and a number of strategic locations in the city from armed opposition until the last Ethiopian troops withdrew from Mogadishu. These included the air and sea ports, the presidential palace at Villa Somalia, and the K4 junction linking them. The AU originally envisaged that after six months a UN peacekeeping operation would take over from AMISOM. This did not happen for a variety of reasons. Instead, AMISOM was supported by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and from 2009, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provided a logistical support package to AMISOM forces in Mogadishu.

The Ugandan and Burundian troops who made up the AU force became the principal barrier preventing the TFG from being overrun by al-Shabaab fighters – and AMISOM itself came under increased attack following the Ethiopian withdrawal. During 2009 and 2010, battles raged across the city but they resulted only in stalemate: neither AMISOM nor al-Shabaab could decisively defeat the other. Probably in an attempt to weaken Uganda's resolve, al-Shabaab carried out two suicide bombings in Kampala in July 2010. Instead of pulling out, Uganda responded by deploying additional troops to Mogadishu. Faced with a growing enemy, al-Shabaab launched a major offensive against the TFG and AMISOM during Ramadan of 2010 but the insurgents were repelled and sustained heavy losses. AMISOM then went on the offensive and engaged in many months of bloody street fighting across Mogadishu in order to expand its areas of control. The result was the withdrawal of al-Shabaab's core fighters from the centre of the city in early August 2011, although fighting continued in the suburbs and outskirts for another nine months.

Kenyan forces launched a unilateral military intervention into southern Somalia in October 2011, ostensibly in retaliation for al-Shabaab attacks on Kenyan territory (and the group's alleged involvement in the kidnapping of foreigners), but also reflecting parochial Kenyan

politics and interests. Shortly thereafter, Ethiopian forces once again entered Somalia and advanced on al-Shabaab positions across Bay, Bakool, and Hiraan regions. In December 2011, the AU, the UN, and their various partners developed new strategic and military concepts of operations for AMISOM to take account of these major developments.

According to David Kilcullen (2009) The new concept of operations outlined a larger AMISOM force of nearly 18,000 uniformed personnel and hugely expanded its theatre of operations across four land sectors covering south-central Somalia. It also included a maritime sector, although AMISOM lacked significant maritime assets. This new posture was endorsed by the AU's Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council in January and February 2012 respectively. In the first half of 2012, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone all signed a memorandum of understanding pledging to join AMISOM. During this period, AMISOM also conducted operations to capture from al-Shabaab the remaining suburbs and outskirts of Mogadishu, most notably along the 'Afgooye corridor', a critical roadway linking the capital to the agricultural town of Afgooye on the Shabelle river.

2.3.2 Challenges facing AMISOM

Prior to the AMISOM, the precarious security situation in Somalia reinforced the call on AU and IGAD to deploy a force in the late 2006. Nonetheless, the restrictions placed on the frontline states to intervene in Somalia as well as other administrative problems inherent in the arrangement of it become necessary to review the original plan of deploying an IGAD force that was expected to hand over to the AU within 6 months.

The Government of Somalia and the Heads of State and government of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) issued a communiqué on the 31 January 2005 meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on their intentions to deploy a Peace Support Mission to Somalia after realizing the worsening security situation in Somalia. It provided for security support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD Peace Process and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security including training of the Police and the Army. The intentions of this communiqué were endorsed by the Fourth Ordinary Session of the African Union and authorized by subsequent decision of the 24th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union held on 7 February 2005.

In 2005, the AU/IGAD sent a first Fact-Finding and Reconnaissance Mission on to determine the mandate, force size, structure and tasks of the Peace Support Mission. The proposed IGAD Forces for Somalia (IGASOM) Deployment Plan was presented by the Military Experts from the IGAD Member States, refined by the Chiefs of Defense and finally approved by the Ministers of Defense at the 14 March 2005 meeting in Entebbe, Uganda. The IGASOM Deployment Plan was subsequently adopted at the 24th IGAD Council of Ministers on 18 March 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya. Nevertheless, the IGASOM deployment did not take place in light of extant difficulties which were mainly due to the UN Security Council's inability to lift the arms embargo on Somalia. Hence a request was made for a Joint AU/IGAD Planning Team and the Somali National Security and Stabilization Plan for the deployment of forces to Somalia.

On 20 March 2006, the 11th IGAD Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Nairobi recapped its decision to deploy IGASOM. Subsequently an Extra-Ordinary Council of Ministers Meeting on 13th June 2006 in Nairobi reiterated the need for deployment of IGASOM. On 5 July 2006 a second AU/IGAD mission to Somalia undertook political and technical consultations with the TFG, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Business Community, Civil Society and Traditional Leaders in order to finalize the modalities for deployment of forces to Somalia. Consequently, on 1 August 2006, an Extra-Ordinary Council of Ministers' Meeting in Nairobi directed the Chiefs of Defense Staff of IGAD to prepare a revised Detailed Mission Plan based on the situation in Somalia and in accordance with the Somali National Security Stabilization Plan. It was finally by the PSC, at its Meeting held in Addis Ababa on 19th January 2007 the AU Commission was mandated to establish a Peace Support Mission in Somalia. The decision was therefore taken to deploy an AU Force that incorporated elements from IGAD to be called African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Since the days the AMISOM became operational, it has been facing numerous attacks on its base in Mogadishu. For instance, on February 22, a double suicide bomb attack on an AU base in Mogadishu left 11 Burundian soldiers dead and another 15 wounded. On September 17, 17 soldiers were killed and 29 wounded in a suicide attack by Islamist rebels on the headquarters of the African Union force in Mogadishu. At least four civilians were also killed and more than 10 wounded. 12 of those killed were Burundian soldiers and five were Ugandan. Among the dead was the AMISOM deputy commander Maj. Gen. Juvenal

Niyonguruza, from Burundi and one of the wounded was AMISOM commander Gen. Nathan Mugisha, from Uganda.

There is a realization on the part of the AU that the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000 have far-reaching implications for AU and regional peace support efforts, especially in the areas of organization, equipment, training, doctrine and capacities. It is also acknowledged that the Panel's contention that "[t]here are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should go" necessitates serious consideration of those issues relating to mission-capable forces on the African continent. Furthermore, it is also duly acknowledged on the part of the AU that the Brahimi report has made collaboration with the UN system even more fundamental.188 In this regard it should be noted that a number of events have taken place in Africa that clearly suggest a trend that regional and sub-regional organizations are the first to respond to emerging crisis situations. Such organizations undertake short robust stabilization or peace enforcement operations, and after some time, these operations are transformed into multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions.

This division of labor between the UN and regional organizations appears to play into the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of both types of organizations. The UN is relatively slow to respond to crises on the African continent. The regional organizations are

In short, credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. Using this as a point of reference for deployment time-lines, Kent and Malan argue that the AU will need the capacity to react quickly on three interdependent aspects of rapid deployment: personnel, materiel readiness, and funding.34 In the opinion of Denning, "speed and teeth" should be regarded as the core competencies of "any credible ASF", i.e. the ability to organize and deploy rapidly and the ability to conduct Chapter VII operations (Heinlein, Peter, 2014).

This said, it should be noted that one of the realities of recent peacekeeping missions in Africa (AMISOM) relates to financial constraints. In the past years, the extent of African peacekeeping was not limited by political will or the availability of troops, but rather by insufficient funding. Peacekeeping endeavors are by their very nature costly affairs. The recent peacekeeping experience is that even the relatively small and less logistically demanding unarmed military observer missions undertaken were so costly that the AU and its

predecessor, the OAU, were unable to finance them from their own budget. Moreover, it could be pointed out that the budget for the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE) amounted to $1.8 million per year in 2000. Its original planned strength was Moreover, as the AU already stands in arrears of $40 million from previous budgets, the AU will have to depend on the strength and goodwill of 'lead nations' among its member states and the international community for financial support if it wishes to develop and utilize the ASF as a standby reinforcement system on the continent(Dualeh, 1994).

Realizing that financial and technical assistance will be pivotal to the successful development of the ASF, a joint Africa/G8 Action Plan aims to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations so that by 2010, African partners will be able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent. In this regard, it specifically provides for the establishment, equipment and training of coherent, multinational, multi-disciplinary standby capabilities at the AU and sub-regional level which would be available for UN-endorsed missions undertaken under the auspices of the UN, AU or an African sub-regional organization. However, it should be noted that the initial G8 response to the ASF was anything but blank check acceptance. The G8 clearly indicated that the development of five regional brigades was considered to be overly ambitious and expensive. In the words of Denning: "While the G8 did not offer the AU a blank check, neither did its members categorically dismiss the ASF initiative". Substantial support – both funding and technical assistance – has already been contributed by G8 partners towards institutional capacity-building for peace and security, the development of capacity for peacekeeping operations and of an effective network in Africa of peace training centers for military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations.

Security Challenges

Since its creation in 1960 when the territories of the former British protectorate and an Italian colony merged; although after Civil war in 1991 the Country has been divided into Two States thus Somaliland and Somalia, this has left the Country of Somalia Divided which has continuously affected the Security of the Country. Somalia has struggled to build state civility. (Winter 2004-05), the security situation in Somalia has deteriorated over time; since 1991 the country has been the archetypal failed state. There have been several failed attempts to create a transitional set-up, and the current one may equally not succeed, it has been

overtaken yet again by an Islamist insurgency in spite of the support of an Ethiopian military intervention since December 2006. It is claimed that the military defeat and the dispersal of the ICU forces of south central Somalia following Ethiopian occupation have occasioned the destruction of a tenuous civil peace in the area, the exacerbation of Darod-Hawiye competition and the emergence of a resistance movement with increasingly radical credentials.

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia failed to create a broad-based government. In the beginning, President Abdullahi Yusuf marginalized large parts of the population, a move that exacerbated divisions. Earlier confrontation with parliament and the prime minister underlined that Yusuf was hampering progress on peace, and that he had become a liability for the country's survival and was encouraged to resign which in deed happened.

The political development in Somalia saw Ethiopia's attitude hardening creating a hostile mood in certain circles in Addis Ababa to the TFG leaders. The political motive for Ethiopia to withdraw from Somalia reflected frustration, as well as unwillingness to continue to accept considerable losses in a war against the insurgency that was going badly. Analysts argued that the opposition to the previous Ethiopian occupation had been the single issue on which the many elements of the fractious Islamist insurgency could agree. At the same time, when Ethiopian forces withdrew, it was feared that it would likely cause that infighting to increase, making it difficult for the insurgency to sustain victory, and to creating opportunities for political progress.

After Ethiopia's withdrawal, in the course of time the Islamist fighters managed to gain some more ground. As all major towns in south-central Somalia were captured by one faction or another except for Mogadishu, where TFG control is ever more contested, and Baidoa The Islamists already dominate nearly as much territory as they did before the Ethiopian invasion, and a takeover of the entire south seemed almost inevitable. A peace process was initiated in Djibouti but did not achieve much partly because it was not all inclusive; for instance parts of the Islamist insurgency that had the most guns and territory did not participate. In the dialogue it appeared that the TFG had signed this accord with the hope to preserve some semblance of credibility to add to the shaky international recognition it enjoyed, while on the other hand, the representatives of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) had

hoped to gain negotiated withdrawal of Ethiopian forces propping up the TFG in preparation for a new power-sharing agreement(Cilliers, 2008).

Following the political development in Somalia, the actual threat to security has come from Al-Shabaab, who had \ initially rejected the power sharing deal ensued between an Islamist splinter group led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia Djibouti faction (ARS-D) and TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan held in Djibouti. Al-Shabaab had separated itself from the moderate Islamists of the insurgency, rejected the peace deal and continued to take territories. Later, Al-Shabaab was joined by Hizbul Islam, which is an amalgamation of four Islamist group including the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia-Asmara faction. Throughout 2007 and 2009, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, they had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to withdraw from the country, leaving behind an underequipped AU's peacekeeping force. Amidst the happenings in Somalia, another Islamist group 'Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'ah', allied to the TFG and supported by Ethiopia, continues to attack al-Shabaab and take over towns as well although they have been effective only in the central region of Galguduud, where they ousted al-Shabaab from most of the region.

2.4.3 The Role of State and Non-State Actors in Peace Keeping

Eritrea

In mentioning Somalia's conflict, Eritrea's position and role cannot be over-emphasized. There is no documented role of the incumbent regime in Eritrea in the Somali conflict. Eritrea's role in the conflict is analyzed from the perspective of its hostile relationship with the incumbent regime in Ethiopia. Eritrea secured its political independence after thirty years of armed struggle against regimes in Ethiopia in 1991. Moller153 contends that after overthrowing the communist dictator in Ethiopia together with the incumbent regime in Ethiopia which the latter officially recognized Eritrea's independence and seemed to create a fertile ground for a new era in the relationships which was almost successful but gradually started to deteriorate till a full-scale border war broke out in the years1998-2000 between the two countries (Moller, 2009).

Since then rather than resuming direct warfare, the two countries seem to opt for waging proxy wars against each other. While Ethiopia supports the TFG, Eritrea opted for helping initially the UIC and later the ARS-A wing. Even though Eritrea does not seem to have neither religious nor ideological affinity with the Islamist forces of Somalia, Moller154 argues that She has been providing the remnants of the UIC with both the right to establish base-like facilities on its territory as well as with arms which both the UN and the US could not welcome. Cornwell155 furthers the argument by contending that the insurgents have the support of Eritrea, which would no doubt like to see their enemy, Ethiopia, routed in Somalia (Cornwell ,2009).

Ethiopia is one of the most important neighboring states for Somalia and thus assumes to have several reasons for engagement in Somalia's politics, consequently the conflict. First, Somalia and Ethiopia has had long and historical conflict-prone relations since the late 1970s. In 1978 the two countries were at war with each other caused by the aggression of Somalia against Ethiopia. Ethiopia has always been unwelcoming to see in the foreseeable future a potentially aggressive neighbor in case a strong Somali state comes into existence. This is particularly true in as long as there is still claims by Somalia's political forces over Ogaden which seems not to be abandoned.

Secondly, the fear that Somalia may ferment unrest among ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia due to the fact that Ethiopia's ethnic-based federalism can be put in danger. As most analysts argue out of its regions, the so-called 'Somali region' or region five remains marginalized from Ethiopian politics and government's repression has been quite criticized for being severe. (Muthuma, 2007)As a result there is a fertile ground for any Somali attempts to instigate conflict inside that region and most likely in a form of call for struggle to ensure Muslim rights, perhaps even by proclaiming Jihad, as did the UIC. The main reason for the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia's conflict is the priority it gives to its national interest.Muthuma further contends that Ethiopia never opts to see a strong government in Somalia which might revive demands for the return of the Ogaden province from itself. Therefore, albeit the unpopularity of the Ethiopian troops, President Yusuf dared not have the Ethiopians withdraw, since that would mean the collapse of his government (Moller, 2009).

Djibouti, the Sudan, Kenya and Yemen

Compared to Ethiopia and Eritrea which in one way or the other seem to have been strongly engaged in Somali conflict, the roles and motives of Djibouti, the Sudan, Kenya and Yemen are not as such very significant. For instance, there is not much animosity between Somalia and Djibouti despite it like Ethiopia being a target of irredentist Somali national project. Djibouti has tries to play a role of a broker in hosting conferences devoted to Somali-state building and the most recent reconciliation between the TFG and the factions of the ARS-A which did not boycott the event in August 2008. On the same note, the role of Sudan has been quite minor but constructive in the sense that Sudan has remained at least neutral throughout the conflict except playing the role of an 'honest' broker. For instance, Sudan hosted a reconciliation talks between the TFG and the UIC (Mollor, 2009).

Kenya has been perceived as an anchor of stability in the region. Not until recently when its forces joined the AMISOM, its role has been less crucial albeit receiving a large number of Somali refugees and becoming still target for Somali irredentism. It has in general terms pursued a multilateral track in connivance with sub-regional arrangements particularly the IGAD. Yemen has also played a minor role in the Somalia conflict. Muthuma162 argues that there is ample evidence that quite few shipments of arms- to both the TFG and the Islamists-have come from Yemen but with no conclusive evidence as to whether the Yemeni government was involved or not. On the contrary, Muthuma163 argues that the insurgents in Somalia have the covert support of some Arab regimes. This may be because the Arabs view the struggle as being primarily between Islam and Christianity, owing to the fact that Ethiopia is largely assumed 'Christian' (Moller, 2009).

The United Nations (UN)

The UN operations can be considered is one of the examples of interventions by international organization in the Somalia conflict. Since the beginning of the Somalia conflict in early 1990s, the UN embarked on two unsuccessful operations called UNOSOM- I and- II between 1992 and1995. (Mollor, 2009) The UN's involvement has however been low-key with a focus on humanitarian issues with its various subsidiaries and agencies like the UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, the FAO, and the OCHA. In addition, on high politics level Somalia has always been on the priority agenda of the UNSC since its sanction was put into effect as of January 1992. The UN set up a Committee to oversee the sanctions. A Panel of Experts

followed by a Monitoring Group was established to prepare comprehensive reports on the violations of the sanctions regime. In regard to the crises in Somalia, the Secretary-General has presented regular situation reports along with the UNSC resolutions mainly in concomitant with the various IGAD and AU initiatives for an international force. IGAD's deployment plan for instance clearly states that countries that border Somalia cannot deploy peace-keeping troops to Somalia. (Muthuma ,2007).

The African Union, IGAD and the Arab League

The African Union and IGAD are the two major institutional arrangements that are directly engaged in the Somali conflict. Long before the AU, the OAU had already recognized the TNG which the AU chose to view the TFG as the former's successor. Its role was modest due to the lack of armed forces and other resources till a decision was taken by the PSC of the AU in January 2007 to send a peace-keeping mission to take over from Ethiopian forces. Albeit the AMISON was expected to constitute 8,000 troops, only Uganda and Burundi initially sent forces, later even Kenya sent its forces to Somalia. In late November 2011 Kenyan and Ethiopian forces was sent into Somalia, as these neighboring countries felt the unease of the situation. AMISOM assumed official command over the Kenyan troops on 6 July 2012(Mollor, 2009).

The AU has always been in collaboration with RECs particularly the IGAD in the course of sending a mission to Somalia. IGAD has been on the side of the so-called the Somali government partially because Ethiopia has a large say in the organization. IGAD has become the first start and inclined favorably towards the TFG's request of armed protection, as well as the relaxation of the arms embargo on Somalia so as to help it build-up of the armed forces. Besides IGAD, the Arab League has been playing a minor role as a mediator in the crisis in connivance with mainly the AU and occasionally the UN.

Non-State Actors

If only because of the absence in Somalia of any functioning state to serve as a 'gate -keeper' between the inside and the outside, there are plenty of opportunities for various non-state actors to interfere in domestic affairs in this stateless environment. When the civil war broke out since there was a dire need for humanitarian assistance a number of western as well as Islamic agencies became important actors. However much such agents strive for strict

impartiality, this is often impossible to ensure. First of all, not everybody can be helped all the time, necessitating choices of whom to help and whom not and the recipient of assistance will usually be able to transform humanitarian assistance somehow into politically or even militarily relevant assets, thereby strengthening themselves relative The conditions under which such humanitarian agencies used to work became worse making their activities rather challenging. The security situation compelled almost all of these charity organizations to evacuate Somalia. Amongst these to mention are CARE, OXFAM, the Red Cross and Save the Children. In contrast, some Islamic relief agencies were mostly religiously founded on Islam's tenets about alms and Zakat. As a result, they might have been influenced to support the idea of 'jihadism' though with little success. In addition to these, Somalia has been an inter play of a number of other non-state actors. Amongst are extreme Islamic religious elements who fight for a particular cause but have been shaping and affecting seriously the security situation in that country and in the region of the Horn as a whole (Muthuma ,2007).

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter review the methodologies involved and executed in the research. It includes the research design, the study population, Sampling Procedure and Target Sample Size, data sources and data collection instruments, Data Processing and Analysis and presentation, validity of instruments, Data processing and analysis and limitations of the study.

3.2 Research Design

A descriptive survey design was used. A survey is used to collect original data for describing a population too large to observe directly (Mouton, 1996:232). A survey obtains information from a sample of people by means of self-report, that is, the people respond to a series of questions posed by the investigator (Polit & Hungler, 1993:148). In this study the data will be collected through self-administered questionnaires distributed personally to the subjects by the researcher. A descriptive survey has been selected because it provides an accurate portrayal or account of the characteristics, for example behaviour, opinions, abilities, beliefs, and knowledge of a particular individual, situation or group.

3.3 Study Population

Enon (1998) defines population as a whole universe of people that a researcher is targeting, in this study the researcher is targeting AIMSOM Peace keepers, NGOs Personnel's Operating in Somalia and Community Leaders, to include in the study for information gathering. the respondents will be both gender and traverse across various age brackets. Therefore, the target population will be 60 people.

3.4 Sample size

A sample size of 52 respondents was selected basing on a formula for determining sample size by (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970).

Table 3.1 Showing Study Population

Category	Population	Sample size	Sampling technique
AMISOM Peace Keepers	20	18	Purposeful sampling technique
NGOs personnel	15	12	Random sampling technique
Community leaders	25	22	Purposeful sampling technique
Total	60	52	

Source: primary data 2019.

3.5 Sampling Technique

In this study the researcher used simple random sampling and stratified random sampling. Under simple random it's where all members have an equal chance of being selected and it has the less bias where respondents were issued with questionnaires to answer questions.

Slovene's Formula states that, given a population, the minimum Sample size was given by:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne^2}$$

Where; n = the sample size

N = total population of respondents.

e = the level of significance, that is 0.05

$$n = \frac{60}{1+60*0.05^2.} = 52$$

3.6 Sample size

The sample size 52 was selected basing on a formula for determining sample size by (Krejcie and Morgan, 1970).

a) Primary Data

Primary data was collected from AIMSOM Peace keepers, NGOs Personnel's operating in Somalia and Community Leaders. This was done through administering a structured questionnaire with the help of one research assistant. Respondents were guided through the questionnaire to ensure high level of accuracy in data collection process.

b) Secondary Data

Secondary data is collected from other related literature about the subject and from journal articles from publishers like the emerald publishing group. A previous dissertation by Masters and PhD students from the library was also reviewed. Other secondary sources contain Newspapers, reports, journals and conference proceedings.

3.7 Data Collection Methods

Data will be collected through administering a questionnaire that contained close ended questions relating to each study variable the items in the questionnaire were attached such that; Strongly agree, Agree, Not sure, Disagree, Strongly disagree. Mean that are close to Disagree and strongly disagree reflect Disagreement while that mean that are at least equal to Agree, indicate agreement. Mean that is close to not sure show uncertainty. The respondents will answer based on the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statements in the questionnaire.

3.7.1 Questionnaire survey

Under this, close ended questionnaire were used to collect data. Questions were asked and a list of valid responses presented to the respondents for selection (Gibson, 2000). These responses were in terms of the extent to which the respondents agree to the statement in question.

3.7.2. Documentary review

The researcher reviewed newspapers, articles, journals, dissertations from libraries and online.

23

3.8 Reliability and validity of the research instrument
3.8.1 Reliability of Data

The answers collected were seen as an enough trustworthy data that can be applied to any other developing countries. But it should be noted that, if the same investigation would be conducted after a very long period of time, the results may not be the same as the ones collected.

3.8.2 Validity of Data

Validity is the most critical criterion and indicates the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure Kothari, (2004). Again, Anastasi and Urbina (1997), "validity refers to the degree to which the test actually measures what it purports to measure." To measure validity of data in this study, the construct validity was employed. According to Smith (1981) cited in van Zyl and van der Walt, (1994), "construct validity concerns the extent to which a test/ questionnaire measures a theoretical construct or trait.

3.9 Data Analysis

From the field data were compiled, sorted, edited and coded to have the required quality accuracy and completeness. Due to accuracy in performing the statistical functions, many scholars have used SPSS and other statistical packages for data analysis. The data and findings were presented by in form descriptive method.

3.10. Ethical considerations

The entire research process was conducted with due respect to ethical considerations in research. The researcher obtained the consent of the respondents to participate in the study. The researcher also minded about treating the respondents' views with utmost confidentiality.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

4.0. Introduction

This chapter presents findings from the study based on the study objectives, due to the nature of research, the researcher adopted doctrinal research with quantitative method so as to obtain the necessary information based on the objectives.

4.1 Effectiveness of AMISOM military Intervention in peace keeping in Somalia

The current Federal Government and Parliament are no longer transitional like before. This means that the government has a degree of authority and legitimacy domestically and has been recognized by the international community, including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and many other organizations and countries. The President has set out a vision and priorities for the country including security and justice, economic recovery, governance and combating corruption. Where government institutions are in place, the work of AMISOM can be enhanced. For there to be significant impact from external support, it must be leveraged on viable institutions that advance the quest of the state in nation building. In Somalia, local governance is intended to be a key instrument for reconciliation and peace building, as well as serving as the basic political structural framework that enable the Somali population, through decentralized service delivery, to benefit from better social services and livelihood opportunities.

The Capture of Kismayo presents another opportunity, since the KDF was incorporated into AMISOM and the eventual capture and control of the port of Kismayo; AMISOM has gained critical leverage because this has denied al-Shabaab access to the main seaport that had been a major source of income. The intervention by the Kenyan military was both successful and important to the AMISOM and the Somali Government not only because they were able to gain ground and extend their area of control but also to demonstrate to the Somali community that al-Shabaab could be outdone. Indeed, without the control of the port of Kismayo and the surrounding areas, al-Shabaab could have gained the necessary financial resources and continue to command the needed moral authority to mount and sustain a military campaign against Mogadishu.

In recognition of the risks of fighting among an urban population, AMISOM reviewed its engagement strategy and re-prioritized its interventions paying more attention to Somali cultural ties to attract the support of the population. Regular meetings with community leaders, outpatient clinics for treating civilians, and the provision of clean drinking water have been purposefully used by AMISOM to build and maintain the support of the population and political leaders during the most intensive periods of the military campaign.

The success of this strategy was demonstrated by the fact that despite its sophisticated propaganda capacity and sustained efforts to discredit AMISOM, al-Shabaab has failed to create substantial opposition to the mission among the majority of the Somali population. AMISOM has been able to fully exploit the withdrawal of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and the waning support for the militants particularly following their unpopular response to the famine and aid efforts of 2010.

Since deployment AMISOM, it has been supported by various partners who have provided the necessary resources to sustain the mission. To date, AMISOM, in concert with the Somali government, has provided and is seen as the central pillar of stability in Somalia. The Somali government forces have greatly complemented AMISOM operations through the provision of vital human intelligence and facilitating the mobilization of the populace to support the mission. In addition, Militia forces, including the Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a and Ras Kamboni, have been vital allies to AMISOM and have assisted in operations outside Mogadishu, particularly in the capture of the port of Kismayo and its environs.

The continued support by the EU In the training of the forces that began in 2010, complemented by additional training by US forces and other partners; has been instrumental, for example, in the fight against al-Shabaab. This commitment to train both the African Union led force and the Somali forces are expected to continue and even gain more momentum in the wake of international commitments made at the 2013 Somalia Conference in London. This engagement offers a perfect opportunity to develop the necessary capacity and required security infrastructure in Somalia.

In Somalia, the establishment of AMISOM was meant to replace Ethiopian military involvement, but the neighbor's forces have repeatedly intervened after an official withdrawal in 2009. Furthermore, Kenya directly intervened in Somalia after October 2011 and got approval from the AU later, followed by the plan to incorporate Kenyan forces into

AMISOM. Similarly, the Eastern DRC has time and again seen military interventions by neighboring Rwanda based on an agreement between the Congolese and the Rwandan Presidents after November 2008. The international community finds it convenient to argue for the regionalization of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Africa and the principle of "African solutions for African problems.This was also the consequence of the death of American soldiers which not only influenced American public opinion towards UN peacekeeping but also acted as a major warning against putting Western boots on the ground in African war zones.

The close relationship between traditional elders, business community and the new political leaders can lead to identify an inclusive recovery strategy to accelerate the rate of economic recovery of the country. The private sector has contributed to peace building in Somalia by paying for the disarmament, rehabilitation and employment of thousands of former gunmen. In Mogadishu, many telephone repairmen, petty traders, drivers and company or business guards are former gunmen.

Somalia is rich in natural wealth and if properly and sustainably harnessed can play a critical role in alleviating poverty and rebuilding the required infrastructure. Therefore the FGS has to promote sustainable development and management of natural resources by developing legal and regulatory frameworks and building capacity in Natural Resources Management. Somalia natural resource is the backbone of the economy but also could be a driver of conflict and increase vulnerability both economically and politically, at local and regional levels. To ensure sustainable environmental and natural resource management the FGS should develop technical options for natural resources revenue-sharing and build the capacity of key natural resource management institutions.

Somalia at peace with itself and the world, and for the benefit of its people For the most of its existence, AMISOM has operated with just two troop contributing countries, and under the strong leadership of Uganda. The role Uganda played, initially as lead nation, and throughout as the bedrock of the mission, and the backing President Museveni of Uganda was able to mobilize for the mission from the AU & UN, the USA and the EU, resulted in the AMISOM having a very solid political and military anchor.

In contrast, there is no one country in West Africa that has stepped up to play such a strong leadership role. Historically Nigeria played this role, but it is currently consumed by its own

internal Boko Haram insurrection, and it is thus not able to play a similar leading role in AFISMA. After Kenya crossed the Somali border on 16 October 2011 and mustered diplomatic support to join AMISOM organisations involve their Troop and Police contributing countries in a similar manner, but the degree to which this resulted in political commitment and the provision of technical support for the mission shows that it has been very effective in the case of AMISOM.

The AU and ECOWAS should consider how to similarly engage the Troop and Police contributing countries in the strategic direction and support of AFISMA. On the battlefield, interoperability of equipment and doctrine, and communication between the two longest-serving AMISOM contingents, English-speaking Ugandans and French- speaking Burundi's, took time to work efficiently. AFISMA will face similar language, and other interoperability challenges, and it will do well to dedicate some of it mission and sector HQ assets to regularly review and adjust its operating procedures to create mission and context specific solutions as the force composition develops84.The strategies used by AMISOM is excellence. That issue of working together can bring very successive results in Somalia. The next focus is peace education in peace building functions in Somalia.

Creating a secure environment, establishing the appropriate political institutions, addressing justice- related issues and revitalizing economic development are necessary but not sufficient to rebuild trust and confidence among Somali groups and individuals. The current de facto clan borders will help create and maintain stereotypes and prejudices between clans. In this context, Islam-informed peace education programmes become necessary. Since the overwhelming majority of Somalis are Muslims, any peace education efforts should draw upon Islam, which revolves around peace.

According to the teachings of Islam, a Muslim consciously submits to the will of God and subsequently gains internal and external harmony, synchronicity and peace. 'Internal peace' refers to one's psychological wellbeing as a result of lack of conflict within the self, while 'external peace' stems from a harmonious and loving relationship with God as well as the social, physical and spiritual environment. Continues to says, Islam-informed peace education would stress the kinds of values and behaviors that would unite the Somalis as Muslims in a bond of brotherhood, mutual love, sympathy, help, care and fellow feeling. These are some of the important social rights among Muslims. Being a Muslim thus obliges

one to avoid transgressing boundaries and infringing on the rights of the self and others85.These kinds of teaching are of much help

A Barise, The effect of cultural globalization on Muslim families and socio-cultural unity, Proceedings of the International Conference on Muslim Unity in the 21st Century: Opportunities and Challenges, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1–2 October 2003, V 1, pp 241–258.

to building peace it is only that majority do not put them into perspective. Islam-informed peace education would also aim at eradicating Thulm (oppression or aggression). As the above analyses indicate, Somalis have failed to respect the above unifying Islamic values, and the rights of fellow Somalis have been violated. Social values and behaviors that damage Muslim social unity include fighting, unlawful competition for resources and power, mutual envy, jealousy, suspicion, stereotyping, spying, hostility, oppression, hatred, humiliation, despising, prejudice, discrimination, exploitation and abuse.

This is very true the Muslims as the study had said above have ignored this unifying teachings, If every Muslim can agree to this teaching then the issues of conflicts in Somalia would stop at once. Mohhamed Abu also notes that, any peace-building efforts that attempt to address the Somali conflict should draw upon Islamic teachings. Islam provides one of the identities that unify Somali clans. It also has conflict-resolution mechanisms that resonate with the conflicting parties. Abu-Nimer identified 17 Islamic values that can be used for peace education programmes, including the pursuit of justice, social empowerment by doing good (Ihsan), the universality of dignity and humanity, equality, sacredness of human life, a quest for peace (peacemaking), knowledge and reason, creativity and innovation, forgiveness, importance of deeds and actions, involvement through individual responsibility, patience (Sabar),collaborative actions and solidarity, the concept of Ummah, inclusivity and participatory processes, as well as pluralism and diversity. If people of Somalia can pour down their differences, that is to say the hatred brought by the wish to acquire resources and power then the peace.

4.2 The Challenges AMISOM Has Faced In Peace Building Process in Somalia

Security Challenges

A dimension of the problem was coordination between AMISOM's military, police and civilian components. This was not a major issue in the early years of the mission because the dire security situation on the ground in Mogadishu meant that it was inappropriate to deploy significant numbers of police officers and other civilian personnel. The latter were a scarce commodity within AU circles at any rate while the former carried out various training initiatives mostly outside Somalia and did not start deploying into Mogadishu in large numbers until mid-2012 when the first Formed Police Units arrived from Uganda and Nigeria. The majority of the civilian component of the mission also arrived only late in the day from 2012 but the exact nature of the tasks civilian peacekeepers would perform and how they would relate to the military efforts became the subject of considerable debate within AMISOM as it moved beyond Mogadishu and started to become embroiled in governance and stabilization issues.

Another aspect of the problem related to the relatively disengaged stance of AMISOM's political leadership. The fact that AMISOM's head of mission was based in Nairobi until the end of 2012 not only sent an unhelpful political signal to both locals in Somalia and the outside world, but it left several AMISOM force commanders in the difficult position of having to act as the principal political representative of the mission in Mogadishu. While this task was handled more astutely by some AMISOM force commanders than others, this was not a position they should have been placed in and badly undermined international attempts to kick-start a peacemaking process and reconciliation. It was a task made even more difficult because of the lack of a dedicated and appropriately-sized force headquarters in Mogadishu until 2012. While this geographical problem could have been overcome by a major commitment to regularly travel to Mogadishu on the part of AMISOM's heads of mission, they did not all oblige.

After the new military and strategic concepts of operations were developed for AMISOM in late 2011 and early 2012, AMISOM had to contend with more problems of internal coordination with the arrival of new TCCs and the mission's deployment across the four land sectors which covered most of south-central Somalia. During 2012, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Kenya each signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU to join the mission.

However, all of them experienced protracted debates over details of their deployment, either logistical or financial. From this point on, AMISOM faced the additional challenge of coordinating activities across the four sectors and the respective contingent commands. This proved easier in some cases than others: the Djiboutian battalion slated for deployment to sector four arrived approximately one year late, while the Kenyan forces in sector two were particularly concerned with operational security and hence not always forthcoming about their activities even with the AMISOM force headquarters. This was especially true in the run up to the assault on Kismayo in September 2012.

Initial International Pessimism

The second major challenge AMISOM faced was the widespread pessimism about embarking on the mission in the first place. This pessimism was evident across many member states of the African Union and beyond. It was partly rooted in the legacy of the UN peace operations in Somalia in the 1990s but was dramatically amplified by views that AMISOM simply would not work and was an ill thought out mission.

Several elements combined to generate this pessimism. First, there were arguments between the AU and UN over whether a military peace operation was an appropriate response to the conditions in Mogadishu in early 2007. Initially, the AU's Commissioner for Peace and Security had assumed the UN Security Council would take over the AU mission after six months but had failed to secure agreement for this course of action with the Security Council members in New York. This generated considerable resentment in New York where it was widely felt that the UN was not there simply to take over an AU operation hatched in Addis Ababa.

The AU mission was widely seen as providing cover for the imminent withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Mogadishu. Having installed the TFG in Mogadishu, the continued presence of Ethiopian troops stirred up a considerable local backlash and violence intensified dramatically throughout 2007 and the casualty levels and numbers of displaced people rose significantly. Ethiopian authorities were thus well aware that the presence of their troops in Mogadishu was undermining the legitimacy of the TFG they had installed but they were unwilling to withdraw without an alternative force to fill the subsequent security vacuum. AMISOM was conceived as the solution to that problem and Ethiopia pushed the mission

through the AU Peace and Security Council without respect for the internal procedures which are supposed to govern the deployment of AU peace operations.

This assessment of the mission and the fact that Mogadishu was an active warzone at the time meant that very few countries were willing to come forward and champion the mission despite its authorization by the AU and endorsement by the UN Security Council. Indeed, only Uganda stepped forward until December 2007 when Burundi also committed troops. But these two states were left as the only troop-contributing countries (TCCs) for nearly four years. Some African states, including Nigeria, conducted their own technical assessments of the situation in Mogadishu and concluded the circumstances were not right for them to deploy forces. This negative perception was further reinforced by the fact that AMISOM forces came under fire from the outset from some of the warlord factions which were vying for control of the airport. The combination of these factors created a widespread aura of pessimism around the mission and its prospects for success and contributed significantly to leaving Uganda and Burundi as the only TCCs for the first four years of the operation.

Strategic Coordination among External Partners

AMISOM also suffered from several challenges related to strategic coordination between its external partners, which came in a variety of forms. These problems were not unique to Somalia but are rather common features of the messy attempts to conduct what one recent analysis called 'collective conflict management' where informal coalitions of networks of state, intergovernmental and non-state actors that display diffuse, improvised, ad hoc and pragmatic patterns of cooperation temporarily converge to address a particularly complex conflict.

One challenge was that these external actors did not always speak with one voice on how to engage with Somalia. This was hardly surprising given that strategic coordination between different actors is always a deeply political process. In this case, differences quickly emerged over several issues. The most prominent early on was whether to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM. While in 2007 the Security Council was broadly in agreement that the time was not right to re-hat AMISOM into a blue helmet force, by late 2008 the George W. Bush administration in the United States led a political campaign to deploy a multinational stabilization force to Mogadishu which would pave the way for

transitioning AMISOM into a blue helmet mission. As it turned out, this course of action was rejected by most UN members who proved unwilling to supply the necessary troops for the proposed stabilization force or the UN peacekeeping operation proposed by the Americans. Nevertheless, the subsequent Security Council resolution 1890 passed on 16 January 2009 left open the prospect of a UN takeover of the mission at a later date when the circumstances became appropriate. It also authorized the UN Department of Field Support to establish UNSOA in order to deliver a logistics capacity support package to keep AMISOM afloat. This was seen as critical for boosting the operational effectiveness for AMISOM but also as a necessary preparatory step in case a UN operation was required.

Other issues that divided AMISOM's external partners included the amount of resources which should be devoted to anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and whether to engage al-Shabaab in peace talks. In relation to the former, in December 2008, the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a variety of other countries embarked on a major set of maritime security operations off the coast of Somalia to stem the rise in piracy. In Somalia, this unprecedented commitment of resources generated considerable bewilderment as it did almost nothing to tackle the causes of piracy which stemmed from the conflict dynamics on the mainland. Even the UN Secretary-General publicly noted that his efforts to generate forces to tackle Somalia's problems on land stood 'in such sharp contrast to the exceptional political will and commitment of military assets which Member States have shown in respect of the fight against piracy.

AMISOM also became increasingly frustrated with these maritime operations because although they helped protect the logistics and supply ships which arrived into Mogadishu, they did little to coordinate with AMISOM on how best to deploy these maritime assets to stem al-Shabaab's war economy, particularly its continued export of various illicit commodities, most notably charcoal traded out of the southern port of Kismayo.

When it came to the issue of talking to al-Shabaab, the picture was also mixed. At one end of the spectrum, the United States was firmly against the idea, having designated al-Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2008 and actively conducting air strikes and special-forces raids in Somalia to eliminate other al-Shabaab and al-Qa'ida targets. At the other end of the spectrum, actors including the League of Arab States, Finland, Kenya and even Ethiopia instructed their officials to talk to members of al-Shabaab in the hope of finding a

political route beyond the impasse or marginalization of the movement's most extreme elements.

Another challenge was raised by Kenya's unilateral intervention into southern Somalia in October 2011, and the renewed Ethiopian military campaign which followed shortly thereafter. While these operations obviously helped AMISOM's struggle against Al-Shabaab by opening up two new fronts, it also complicated things politically and logistically because it kick-started the process of AMISOM's expansion beyond Mogadishu and raised questions about coordination between the Kenyan, Ethiopian, AMISOM and TFG forces. Ethiopia quickly made it clear that its forces would not be integrated into AMISOM, although it did deploy a number of officers to the mission's new force headquarters in Mogadishu in 2012. Its troops also played the crucial stabilizing role in AMISOM's new sectors three and four throughout 2012 as the Djiboutian contingent slated to deploy to BeletWeyne failed to arrive until December, and the relatively small contingent of Ugandan and Burundian troops deployed to Baidoa operated largely in the Ethiopian's shadow.

Kenya's relationship with AMISOM was more sensitive because it was slated to run sector two in the south of the country. However, several issues arose. First, Kenya was initially reluctant to reveal the extent of its military forces in southern Somalia, including its air and maritime assets. Second, an argument occurred between Kenya and the EU over the start date for the payment of allowances to Kenya's contingent in AMISOM given that Kenya did not sign the memorandum of understanding with the African Union until 2 June 2012 but wrote into the document that its forces would be paid allowances backdated to February 2012 (the date of UN Security Council resolution 2036). A third problem was suspicions about Kenya's motives in pushing its so-called Jubaland initiative. These became particularly acute after September 2012 when the new Federal Government voiced its suspicions about Kenya's agenda in Jubaland and its approach to administering Kismayo.

Problematic Local Partners

As well as its own internal communications, AMISOM's mandate made it crucial that the mission work closely and effectively with the authorities in Somalia. It is an established element of counterinsurgency doctrine that the efforts of external forces are highly unlikely to succeed without a legitimate and effective local partner. Between March 2007 and September 2012, AMISOM's local partner in its campaign against al-Shabaab was the TFG, which

came in two versions. Both versions were far from being effective local partners for AMISOM to work with. The first TFG, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf from Puntland, was created in Kenya in 2004 but installed in Mogadishu by Ethiopian forces in December 2006. It remained in place until the end of 2008 when Yusuf resigned and the Ethiopian troops withdrew. It was perceived by many Somalis as both illegitimate – being foisted upon them by Ethiopia and other external powers – and ineffective inasmuch as it provided neither any form of public services to its citizens nor undertook any major attempts at reconciliation between the conflicting factions. The TFG's security forces also proved to be largely ineffective against al-Shabaab and regularly committed abuses against the local population.

The combination of local hostility towards Ethiopian troops and the TFG's weaknesses provided ample fodder for al-Shabaab to successfully recruit considerable numbers of fighters to its cause, both in Mogadishu and beyond. AMISOM was caught in the middle inasmuch as its mandate called for it to work with and support the TFG.

As Ethiopian forces drew down, AMISOM became more and more central to the TFG's continued survival and this, in turn, encouraged al-Shabaab to intensify its attacks on the AU force. The fact that the Ethiopian troops did not fully coordinate the details of their departure with AMISOM also meant that in early 2009, al-Shabaab forces were quickly able to occupy most of the former ENDF positions in the city, many of which were very close to AMISOM positions. In sum, despite AMISOM's best efforts, in the eyes of many locals, the mission's association with the TFG and Ethiopian forces meant that its first local partner was something of a liability rather than a help.

The situation did not fundamentally improve with the second iteration of the TFG, which formed in early 2009 after Yusuf's resignation. This was led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, one of the former leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts which had taken control of Mogadishu in mid-2006 and leader of the Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) which eventually decided to work within the TFG structure (unlike the Eritrean-based faction of ARS led by Hassan Dahir Aweys which refused). This configuration of the TFG was initially welcomed by some Somalis as an improvement on the previous authorities, but it still suffered from criticisms that it was too close to Ethiopia and too heavily influenced by diaspora elites and one particular clan, the Hawiye. It was also widely seen as corrupt, ineffective and largely uninterested in pursuing a strategy of conflict

resolution and political reconciliation across Somalia. Instead, its politicians spent much of their time engaged in a variety of acrimonious feuds. In addition, many of the TFG's members continued to reside outside Somalia and some of them were widely suspected to be al-Shabaab sympathizers if not outright supporters.

Within Mogadishu, the TFG still lacked an effective fighting force beyond a core group of militia that was little more than Sheikh Sharif's private army. Indeed, TFG troops and police quickly became associated with illegal roadblocks and looting. They were also accused by AMISOM of selling their weapons and ammunition on the black market and sometimes of selling information about AMISOM's activities to al-Shabaab. A particularly embarrassing incident along these lines involved Sheikh Sharif's elite personal guard, three of whom publically defected to al-Shabaab in July 2010. The TFG was therefore largely dependent upon AMISOM troops for its immediate physical survival and on external actors, primarily the UN and Western states, for its finances and the training and arming of its security forces. Once again, this fed local impressions that the TFG was 'more accountable to... the international community for its survival, than on the Somali people, a perception that continues to undermine trust in the TFG.'

At the operational level, AMISOM experienced its own lack of trust with the TFG's security forces, which were disorganized, poorly equipped, poorly motivated, and often unruly. Instead of being a reliable local partner in the fight against al-Shabaab, members of the TFG's security forces engaged in a variety of unhelpful activities including leading AMISOM troops into ambushes, selling their ammunition and weapons on the local market, and passing operational information to AMISOM's opponents. There were regular defections and an unwillingness to engage in risky operations, which was understandable given the lack of salaries, equipment, and medical support provided to them. All these things led to a major deficit of trust between AMISOM and TFG forces, which took considerable time and effort to close. This was eventually achieved from late 2010 onwards as AMISOM and TFG forces started to participate in more successful joint operations; first repelling al-Shabaab's Ramadan offensive and then working together to conduct joint offensive operations themselves. But trust took time to earn and build in the field and it had to endure several serious breaches by TFG forces along the way.

Even by 2012, however, the Somali security forces were in a dire state. Among the long list of challenges facing the Somali army, perhaps the most severe and urgent were problems of unresolved clan loyalties and more operational issues of command and control.18 These problems were particularly acute at the level of senior officers, between clan leaders, war-lords, and the official military commanders; they also involved an absence of collaboration between the existing brigades of the Somali National Army. An additional problem was that different components of the army had received different types of training, mostly abroad, and there were poor levels of training for non-commissioned officers. Salaries were also unreliable: most having been provided in the form of US$ 100 per month stipends paid by the United States and Italy to some but not all Somali soldiers. The forces also lacked modern weaponry with many ostensibly Somali National Army weapons belonging to warlords, clans, and individuals and effective logistical and medical support capacity. Finally, there remained major problems with recruitment, created by this long list of issues. In sum, AMISOM did not have the luxury of working alongside a popular and effective local partner in the pursuit of its mandate. Instead, its initial local partner was seen as a major part of the problem by large numbers of Somalis and AMISOM's central role in protecting the TFG brought more negative attention on the AU force.

Al-Shabaab: A Challenging Enemy

Another set of challenges flowed from the nature of AMISOM's principal opponent: Harakat Al-Shabaab ('The Youth'). Formally established in the early 2000s, the name al-Shabaab was not widely used until 2007 and came to refer to a populist and militaristic movement which gained popularity after the defeat of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts in 2006. In the space of a couple of years, al-Shabaab went from obscurity to being the principal anti- TFG and hence anti-AMISOM force. During December 2006 and January 2007, Ethiopian troops nearly destroyed al-Shabaab's relatively small forces and it was not until November 2007 that al-Shabaab was able to launch a serious counter-offensive.206 After that, however, growing linking Ethiopia's activities to Washington's nefarious counter-terrorism policies in the region presented al-Shabaab with a huge propaganda victory and its ranks swelled accordingly.

Al-Shabaab's military wing was organized in three main layers: the top leadership (qiyadah), the foreign fighters (muhajirin), and local Somali fighters (ansar). The qiyadah was thought

to be comprised of a small group of Afghanistan veterans, former members of al-Ittihad al-Islami, and Somali diaspora ideologues. The dominant ideologue was probably Sheikh Fuad Muhammad Qalaf and by 2012 Ahmed Abdi Godane (aka Sheikh Abu Zubeyr) was in command of the organization. Al-Shabaab also employed a range of media outlets and websites such as Hegaan, Kata'ib, Al Hesba and Al Qimmah. The movement proved particularly adept at producing anti- Ethiopian and anti-AMISOM propaganda using videos, websites, and later a Twitter account.

Part of the challenge in combating al-Shabaab was that its fighters came from several different feeder routes, making it difficult to identify and target a single centre of gravity. In brief, it comprised of a core of locally-focused fighters, particularly from the sub-clans associated with its leading figures; a larger number of what David Kilcullen called 'accidental guerrillas' – those fighting because they felt aggrieved at Ethiopia's presence in Mogadishu not because they wanted to invade Ethiopia or had strong ideological commitments to the messages disseminated by al-Shabaab's leadership and an unknown number of foreign, often takfiri, fighters associated with al-Qa'ida who had arrived in Somalia to fight the Ethiopians and other non-believers. Estimates for the number of foreign fighters (muhajirin) in al-Shabaab's ranks varied widely from 200 to over 1,500, with most said to hail from Kenya's Swahili coast, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, estimates of al-Shabaab's local strength varied considerably, in part because of the shifting allegiances of many rank and file fighters. While al-Qa'ida's ideas about the global struggle between Islam and the West were thought to influence some of al-Shabaab's leaders, most of its foot soldiers were initially motivated primarily by the desire to expel the Ethiopians and facilitate the operation of sharia courts in Somalia. Later, al-Shabaab entered into the longstanding issue of clan conflicts where it often sided with smaller sub-clans in local disputes. It was also widely believed that a significant part of al-Shabaab's attraction was that its leaders would pay new recruits and also compensation to the families of militiamen who died in action.

Lack of Exit Strategy

AMISOM biggest challenge is figuring out how to leave the scene. There are not clear demarcations or beacons to guide the exit strategy. Conventionally, a major component in any operation is the timelines and activities of the operation guiding it to eventual withdrawal

and closure by way of scaling down of the military forces and entire mission in general. Operations cannot be undertaken indefinitely especially in an international environment. AMISOM does not have a timeline nor does it define the stage at which the mandate will be handed over to the local actors or any other agency. In effect, this may be a cause of discontent on the part of local players as the mission may turn into an occupation force and elicit counteraction and counterforce from the local agents. It, therefore, appears that finding Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916(2010)

The political power in Somalia can be characterized as fragmented, local, violent, heterogenic and based on hybrid structures of formal and informal institutions controlled by clans or militias, in which different socio-political orders interact. The fluidity of structure, with access to resources and power being an important source of clan conflicts, has been an enduring challenge for peace negotiations and will continue doing so. Beyond clanism, there are disagreements about the nature, or even desirability of the state. Much of Somali society has traditionally been nomadic and suspicious of the interference of a central authority in their affairs, a sentiment reinforced by experience with military dictatorship. The major clans favour a federal system of governance where distinct units of the country are largely autonomous but federated into a loose nation state, thus giving them control over their own territories. The success of AMISOM is therefore partially reliant on whether centralized structures of government can demonstrate legitimacy among the Somali citizenly. This can be demonstrated through for example, through ensuring the timely and efficient delivery of the much-needed public goods and services and providing stability and peace throughout the liberated areas. The challenge with the recognition of legitimacy is already manifest in the country with accusations that the local leaders who have replaced former al-Shabaab leaders do not, often, come from the majority clans in their areas but are puppets of the central authority. To date, the central government continues to struggle to gain the needed legitimacy.

The mandate of AMISOM poses another challenge as it is renewed annually and id subject to political dynamics, financial and other factors out of control of the AU and the Somali government. There are a lot of negotiations that take place between African decision-makers, Somali government and their non-African partners. The outcome of these negotiations has complex motives and interests that have consequences on the autonomy of the mission. Also,

when contingents are yearly rotated, there are implications for performance as personnel leave just after they have been trained and have gathered sufficient knowledge on the terrain and on al-Shabaab operations and tactics.

The strength of AMISOM troops is a source of another challenge especially in regards to the Military component, the insufficient numbers of troops necessary to guarantee the stabilization of areas liberated from al-Shabaab and to continue with military offensive to root out all insurgency in the country. Indeed, the increase of troop levels from 12,000 to 17,731 through Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) had significant impact on the military operations.

However, there is need to increase the number, currently the number is still too low to stabilize whole of Somalia given its size and the asymmetric nature of threats posed by al-Shabaab. In a letter to the president of the UN Security Council sent in October 2013, it is noted that there was need to increase the capability of AMISOM to enable it, operating alongside the Somali forces, to liberate and secure territory in Somalia and to effectively deny al-Shabaab the opportunity to mobilize resources and/or forcefully recruit and train insurgents to prosecute its asymmetric warfare.

Another challenge is the shortage of skilled and specialized police Trainers in AMISOM. A challenge that is further compounded by the fact that the few skilled and specialized police trainers like all other police officers, are deployed on a rotational basis and so, have to leave at the end of their mission cycle. This negatively affects both the internal and external training cells in AMISOM. The training of AU Peace Support Operations remains a significant challenge because of low level of experience and language problems. Particularly since its latest expansion, AMISOM is hampered by a lack of Somali speakers, who could play a crucial role in the understanding of the local population and the National Security Force.

Similar to the Military and Police challenge, the Civilian component of AMISOM is understaffed and therefore faces difficulties in achieving its stated objectives. This makes it difficult to organize in-mission training as each unit needs specific training in addition to the generic peace support operations knowledge that is applicable to all the units in the component. The most significant purpose of training in a peace support operation is to enhance the capabilities of mission staff to efficiently perform the mandated tasks needed for

the effective execution of the mission mandate. Training must therefore be based on a function need and performance assessment basis. However, due to the absence of a structure for function and performance analysis, the training has been individual-needs led rather than mission led. Initially, the mission, the international community prioritized strengthening the Federal Government and mitigating the threat posed by the al-Shabaab. This in effect resulted in the neglect of recruitment and training of a capable civil component.

Increasingly, AMISOM is being called upon to deal with emerging security challenges for example, those pertaining to maritime security including piracy, dumping of toxic wastes, over-fishing among others along the coast of Somalia. The slow pace in liberating areas occupied by al-Shabaab and the sporadic attacks in the liberated areas can lead to anxiety among the Somali population. Indeed, the Somali government, which is receiving support from AMISOM, could face credibility deficit whereby legitimacy of government is questioned and the resulting vacuum could easily be retaken by al-Shabaab.

Large Numbers of IDPs and Refugees pose a challenge to AMISOM operations, UN agencies estimated that more than 1.2 million persons had fled their homes in Mogadishu and its surroundings as a result of targeted attacks by al-Shabaab and continued conflicts between National Forces and antigovernment groups. The Somalia office of the UNHCR, estimated that there were 1.46 million IDPs in the country as a result of internal conflict. Most IDPs continue to live in dire conditions in protracted displacement, and prospects for durable solutions remain distant for many of them. Refugees were estimated to be at 684 475 in 2011.

Since its establishment in August 2012, the new National Federal Government of Somalia has sought to promote peace, good governance and improve relations with parts of the country which have been seeking degrees of autonomy. However, the federal structure remains weak and potential for further instability remains. The Islamic militia Al-Shabaab, despite being ousted from some areas it controlled for years, remains a major threat to peace and security. Clan Rivalry among the Somali people homogenous group in Africa, both ethnically and religiously. Despite their homogeneity, they are deeply divided by an ancient family or clan system which stands at the foundation of political and social life. Somalia has five main clans and numerous sub-clans in the population structure of Somalia. The Hawiye clan is most closely associated with the Islamic extremists and represents some 25% of the population. Traditionally, it is located in the areas north of Mogadishu and stops below Punt land.

4.3 AMISOM and other Non-State Actors are working together to ensure Peace building in Somalia

There is a realization on the part of the AU that the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000 have far-reaching implications for AU and regional peace support efforts, especially in the areas of organization, equipment, training, doctrine and capacities. It is also acknowledged that the Panel's contention that "there are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should go" necessitates serious consideration of those issues relating to mission-capable forces on the African continent. Furthermore, it is also duly acknowledged on the part of the AU that the Brahimi report has made collaboration with the UN system even more fundamental. In this regard it should be noted that a number of events have taken place in Africa that clearly suggest a trend that regional and sub-regional organizations are the first to respond to emerging crisis situations. Such organizations undertake short robust stabilization or peace enforcement operations, and after some time, these operations are transformed into multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions.

This division of labor between the UN and regional organizations appears to play into the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of both types of organizations. The UN is relatively slow to respond to crises on the African continent. The regional organizations are not swift either, but they seem to be able to deploy somewhat sooner than the UN. Importantly, regional organizations are not required to meet the same criteria or minimum standards that the UN has adopted. Nor do they require units to meet the same level of readiness in terms of pre-deployment training or equipment tables. Drawing on the Brahimi report, the first six to twelve weeks following a cease-fire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and credibility of peacekeepers.

In short, credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. Using this as a point of reference for deployment time-lines, Kent and Malan argue that the AU will need the capacity to react quickly on three interdependent aspects of rapid deployment: personnel, materiel readiness, and funding. In the opinion of Denning, "speed and teeth" should be regarded as the core competencies of "any credible ASF", i.e. the ability to organize and deploy rapidly and the ability to conduct Chapter VII operations.

This said, it should be noted that one of the realities of recent peacekeeping missions in Africa (AMISOM) relates to financial constraints. In the past years, the extent of African peacekeeping was not limited by political will or the availability of troops, but rather by insufficient funding. Peacekeeping endeavors are by their very nature costly affairs. The recent peacekeeping experience is that even the relatively small and less logistically demanding unarmed military observer missions undertaken were so costly that the AU and its predecessor, the OAU, were unable to finance them from their own budget. Moreover, it could be pointed out that the budget for the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE) amounted to $1.8 million per year in 2000. Its original planned strength was civilian and military personnel, but it had an actual strength of 27 in 2000, comprising 11 military staff and 16 civilian support staff – directly as a result of financial constraints.

Moreover, as the AU already stands in arrears of $40 million from previous budgets, the AU will have to depend on the strength and goodwill of 'lead nations' among its member states and the international community for financial support if it wishes to develop and utilize the ASF as a standby reinforcement system on the continent. In other words, the AU will have to address and meet the glaring financial realities of the high costs of peacekeeping missions if it would like the ASF to play any significant peacekeeping role in African conflict resolution and peacekeeping requirements. Some observers even contend that from a funding perspective, the only viable peacekeeping operations in Africa are UN (funded) peacekeeping operations.

Realizing that financial and technical assistance will be pivotal to the successful development of the ASF, a joint Africa/G8 Action Plan aims to enhance African capabilities to undertake peace support operations so that by 2010, African partners will be able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent. In this regard, it specifically provides for the establishment, equipment and training of coherent, multinational, multi-disciplinary standby capabilities at the AU and sub-regional level which would be available for UN-endorsed missions undertaken under the auspices of the UN, AU or an African sub-regional organization.

4.5 Discussion

The findings of this study have clearly established that since its debut in Somalia in 2007, AMISOM has made important and substantial contributions towards the improvement of security in Somalia. Key to this success was the defeat and subsequent ejection of the militant al-Shabaab group from the capital city in Mogadishu in 2011 followed by that of the port of Kismayo in October 2012. The liberation of these key areas have been instrumental and today after over 20-years of civil strife, Somalia has a functioning central government and its populace are slowly re-building their shattered lives. AMISOM, working together with the Government of Somalia, continue to liberate and hold more ground previously held by the al-Shabaab.

The chapter has pointed out that the achievements of AMISOM was made possible by several factors ranging from the implementation of more robust mandates, conducive political climate and goodwill within and outside Somalia, and provision of most needed resources by the international community, among other factors. Further, it has been revealed that there has been a genuine desire by the Somali population to see the end of the strife and commitment to see the re-birth of their country. The aforementioned have contributed to shift in public opinion that has increasingly seen al-Shabaab losing ground at all levels.

This chapter has also identified various challenges that face AMISOM, and its partners, in their quest to enhance security and enhance peace in Somalia. The analysis show that the challenges are diverse and range from the latent threat of the al-Shabaab manifested in sporadic acts of violence within and out Somalia, the question of legitimacy of the central authority/government, large number of internally displace persons and refugees, emerging new security threat and frontiers of conflict, lack of and uncertainty of guaranteed provision of resources among many other challenges.

The analysis at the same time has revealed that there has also been a myriad of potential opportunities available to AMISOM, and its partners, in its endeavour to realize its mandate. This includes, revamped and more realistic mandates, political goodwill, an educated and enlightened populace especially those in the Diaspora, untapped wealth from the country's natural resources, and entrepreneurial society, existing strong local structures of governance amongst other factors. AMISOM initiative has demonstrated that as a continent Africa has

44

come of age and the adage of 'Africans finding the solutions to African problems' is not a myth but a reality and opportunity for the continent to grab and embrace.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

Nonetheless, this study has revealed that the mission in general lacks the relevant human and logistic resources to facilitate its peace-keeping operation in one of the world's unsafe and dangerous place. AMISON's situation can be described as precarious to say the least and it has left the mission nothing but the most likely decision to evacuate the country if things continue in the same manner. Support from the international community including the US seems to be lacking in Somalia, rather, they are talking about the problem of piracy than focusing on the root causes of piracy and other security challenges which are entirely linked to the internal dynamics of Somalia caused by absence of a government.

On a general perspective on peacekeeping strategies in Africa, it has been revealed by the study that the AU's conflict management initiatives critically need adequate facilities, systems, and infrastructure to sustain peacekeeping missions and mediation efforts in the field. For peacekeeping operations, for example, safe and secure accommodation facilities are crucial, similarly, no mission can operate effectively without logistics chains to facilitate the deployment (and sustainment) of military and civilian capabilities into the theater of operations. Yet the AU has conducted its peace operations without an equivalent of the UN's Department of Field Support. This leaves the AU's Peace Support Operations Division without the capability to effectively manage planning processes in relation to movement control, logistics, human resources, finance, provisions, fuel, maintenance, troop rotations, stores management, and other elements crucial to mission support. To the extent that any of these gaps were ever plugged, it was by Western donor states and various UN agencies. Not only has the UN given the AU practical tools such as pre-deployment checklists and planning tools, it has also brought AU officials to its logistics bases in Brindisi, Italy, and Entebbe, Uganda, to help the AU establish a logistics base in Africa.

As most analysts contend the coloniality nature of the African statehood plays a pivotal role in explaining the security situation in Africa. Most of the factors are both directly or implicitly related to colonial statehood and its post-colonial impacts in igniting and fuelling a number of inter-state conflicts between or among newly independent countries. In the

immediate aftermath of independence, we have experienced a number of border wars between Ethiopia-Somalia, Nigeria-Cameroon, Chad-Libya, Morocco-Algeria, etc. In fact, due to the nature of state formation in Africa, inter-state conflicts later subsided (but with a potential to 'time-bomb') and were superseded by intra-state conflicts. Africa again has begun to face an ever increasing internal conflicts caused by the deliberate and distorted statehood formation. This in fact has been caused by the displacement of two or more ethno-linguistic /cultural identities between two or more independent states. Since independence the above coupled with other factors have become the main reasons to instigate many more inter- and intra-state conflicts in Africa than in any other continent.

The issue of Somali security should be treated from these two angles/causal relationships. First, likewise many of the newly independent countries in Africa, Somalia was an outcome of colonial artificial state formation. It came into existence with the merger of ex-British and ex-Italian 'Somalilands' in 1960. The young nation-state sooner found itself in full-scale border conflict with Ethiopia which assumes to 'take' the lion's share of its region by Somali speaking population. Two of such occasions were military disasters for Somalia. These later created a fertile condition to the weakening of the young state and to the emergence of a dominant factional politics and thereby to the escalation of clan-based power rivalries in the next few decades.

Second, from the perspective of the internal dynamics, even though unlike other African states, Somalia relatively constitutes a more or less homogeneous population liable enough to be called a 'nation-state citizens', the dynamic and fragile nature of association to clan cleavages than to the nation as a whole was and still is the core reason for the weakening of the Somali societal fabrics. This has significantly given rise to the intense clan division among the five major clans and the numerous sub-clans and to the dissection of the country's political forces along those loose clan lines.

While military assets are critical, multidimensional peace operations also require civilian capabilities. Here the AU suffers from a shortage of experts in the rule of law and security institutions such as police, justice, and corrections officers as well as expert trainers to build local capacity in Somalia.

However, the AU's biggest civilian deficit in conflict management is its lack of mediation capacity. Rather than developing a systematic approach to mediation, the AU has proceeded

on an ad hoc basis, largely dictated by the personalities of the senior figures involved. It has often deployed high-level candidates who lack the relevant expertise and experience, while investing meager effort in evaluating what went right or wrong in its previous mediation initiatives.

The AU consistently struggles to marshal the requisite military personnel and range of military assets needed for complex peace operations. Perhaps the most blatant example of military unpreparedness came in the early phases of AMISOM when the initial Burundian contingents lacked the most basic military equipment (which was ultimately provided by the U.S. government). Among the assets in highest demand in difficult African theaters such as Sudan and Somalia are helicopters (utility and attack), armored personnel carriers, communications and intelligence equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision goggles, and, in the case of AMISOM in Mogadishu, battle tanks. AMISOM also lacks a sophisticated mortar radar system, which could have helped it reduce levels of civilian casualties. As for military personnel, the AU's greatest deficits are specialists with niche skills including medicine, engineering, and intelligence gathering. To fill these gaps, AU missions rely on external donors to provide funding, training, and equipment directly to troop contributing countries hence bypassing AU systems.

5.2 Recommendations

Effective peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives require efficient management and bureaucratic structures both in Addis Ababa and in the field to provide strategic vision and support senior mission leadership teams. At present, however, AMISOM lacks the institutional capacity and human resources to conduct effective peacemaking initiatives and complex peace operations. According to its own internal assessment, the AU Commission suffers from weak bureaucratic processes and management systems; poor information technologies; inadequate physical infrastructure; a lack of professional and motivated personnel; weak reputation, presence, and reach; and inadequate sources of funds.

Arguably the most important dimension of conflict management is the political piece. As the UN secretary-general correctly concluded, "The African Union's effectiveness results from the sum of its members." Important political enablers that affect the AU's conflict management capabilities include: widespread agreement on what AU peacekeeping operations can (and cannot) be expected to achieve; unity within the PSC in support of those

objectives; sustained high-level political engagement to support AU special envoys, committees, and panels as well as peacekeepers in the field; and genuine cooperation from host-state authorities. Unfortunately, the AU has not performed well in these areas.

When confronting armed conflict, it is particularly important that there be strong and united PSC support for a viable peace process, the force generation phase of the peacekeeping operation, the conduct of the operation, as well as an exit strategy. During the crucial start up

Planning phase, powerful African leaders, and not merely commission officials, must champion the mission and play a proactive role in generating the required forces. Early and sustained high-level political engagement makes it more likely that the required technical capabilities will be allocated and maintained during the mission's life cycle.

The central Government needs to be reshaped again and give equal representations and this will make every citizen of Somalia represented and this will ease if not eliminate the conflicts. The equal distribution of resources is also issue which this study recommends. The resources of Somalia are owned by some few individuals mostly those who were in Government of Siad Barre's regime. They keep on acquiring resources for themselves and they people, hence the poor continues to be poor and rich continues to be rich. The distribution of resources can be done by bringing taxes to central Government and then distributed to all regions of the Nation according to the needs. All those acquired resources illegally needs to return them through Judiciary involvements hence the need of strong Judiciary has the study had suggest in its findings. The AMISOM needs to be strengthening by supply of funds in order to fulfill its mandate. The UN needs to use if powers to see to it that the functions of peace building in Somalia are complete as soon as possible.

Finally the study also recommends for following.AL-shabaab is a force which needs keen attention. This force once commanded all Humanitarians groups to vacate Somalia and it was done. The peace builders need to recognize this force. They can give them a chance to air out they grievances and who knows they can agree to reconcile and form a coalition government has it happened to Kenya in 2007-2008.If that is not possible they can sub divide the Nation and them to be given some part to control as it was done in the Sudan. The followings are some of research questions for further research, do Somalia conflicts have

49

any impact in horn of Africa? Can Africa Union be in a position to handle its own problems without involvement of other Unions?

5.3 Areas for Future Research.

Due to limited time the study did not cover all areas of interest therefore further studies should be conducted on Impact of Civil Wars in Somalia on Her Neighboring Countries.

Further studies should also be done on role of States and Non-state actors towards peace Building Process in Somalia.

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APPENDIX I

MAP OF SOMALIA

COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES

September 3, 2019

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: INTRODUCTION LETTER FOR ABDIKADIR MOHAMED ABDI
REG NO. BIR/1296/172/DC

The above mentioned candidate is a bonafide student of Kampala International University pursuing a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations.

He is currently conducting a field research for his dissertation entitled, "**THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION AND PEACE BUILDING IN SOMALIA. A CASE STUDY OF MOGADISHU**"

Your organisation has been identified as a valuable source of information pertaining to his Research Project. The purpose of this letter then is to request you to accept and avail his with the pertinent information he may need.

Any data shared with him will be used for academic purposes only and shall be kept with utmost confidentiality.

Any assistance rendered to him will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Muzaare Gerald
HOD, Department of Political & Administrative Studies

"Exploring the Heights"