AFRICAN UNION OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINABILTY OF PEACE BUILDING IN MOGADISHU SOMALIA

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DECLARATION

I, Abdukadir Omar Ali hereby declare that this thesis is my origin work and has not been submitted to any other University or Institution of higher learning for any academic award.

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APPROVAL

This thesis has been done under my supervision as a student's academic supervisor and submitted to the College of Higher Degree and Research for examination with my approval

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ABSTRACT

The study examined the role African union operations and sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia. The objectives of the study were to; to investigate the sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia, to examine the effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia and to analyse the relationship between African Union peace operations and peace building in Mogadishu Somalia. The research used a descriptive design, descriptive co relational, cross sectional and survey designs. It was descriptive in that it described the characteristics of respondents in collecting data from the study population totaling 356 respondents. Sampling technique was used to select the sample of 188 respondents from Mogadishu, Somalia, Ministry of interior affairs committee, other community members, Parliament committee, Local government committee were interviewed. Data was analyzed using descriptive analysis option of SPSS, and was then presented using Pearson correlation. It was found out that; males greatly participated in the study as represented by 58.5% whereas 41.4% of the respondents were females; implying that African union peace operation in Somalia involved males as they are known of their strong influence and ability in resolving conflict compared to females. Further findings revealed, based on the findings detailed from the respondent, it is clear that AU has made an important and substantial contribution to improving the security situation in Somalia. In particular, this relates to the seizure of Mogadishu from al-Shabaab in 2011. This turn of events was facilitated by several factors, including the 2010 authorisation of an increase in AU troop numbers, which increased the manpower of the mission. The study recommends that a shortage of funds prevents the AU from producing a substantial peacekeeping mission. This reality therefore prescribes the AU to investigate more economically efficient means of attaining peace; mediation has proven promising in this regard as has peace building and preventative diplomacy. Also for regionalism to take hold there must be some economic interdependency. African union in this vain requires the AU membership to maintain the development of infrastructure and economic interdependency between members. However, a large caveat to this is infrastructure in Africa most likely originates from foreign investment overseas. This requires AU membership to be economically dependent upon foreign investment rather than being interdependent upon each other.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the background of the study in terms of historical, theoretical, conceptual and contextual perspectives. It described the research problem (the statement of the problem), purpose of the study, research objectives, research questions, scope of the study and its significance.

1.1 Background of the Study

The background of the study covers the conceptual perspective, the historical, theoretical and contextual perspectives.

1.1.1 Historical Perspective

In the 21st century the need for effective peace building and conflict resolution is as great as ever. Many long-running conflicts remain unresolved. Pessimists even see the menacing potential for new wars looming just over the horizon. Somalia has been without a functioning state since 1991 when former SiyadiBarre was overthrown. None of the competing functions was strong enough to take gradually a formation state less order. The international interventions have ever since failed and counterproductive intervention on by the United Nations and the United States in the early 1990 exacerbated rather than mitigated the problem, let alone solved them. This was especially the case for the Ethiopian invasion (December 2006 to January 2009), which produced utter chaos and a severe humanitarian crisis. Since the withdraw of the Ethiopian forces, islamist extremist militians have been establishing control of Somalia and they may or may not be able to maintain this control. If they pursue their radical programme of islamisation, their reign is likely to be short, but if they moderate themselves they may retain control.

In the 1970s, Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung first created the term peace building through his promotion of systems that would create sustainable peace. Such

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systems needed to address the root causes of conflict and support local capacity for peace management and conflict resolution. Galtung's work emphasized a bottom-up approach that decentralized social and economic structures, amounting to a call for a societal shift from structures of coercion and violence to a culture of peace. American sociologist John Paul Lederach proposed a different concept of peace building as engaging grassroots, local, NGO, international and other actors to create a sustainable peace process. He does not advocate the same degree of structural change as Galtung.

Peace building has since expanded to include many different dimensions, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and rebuilding governmental, economic and civil society institutions. The concept was popularized in the international community through UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report An Agenda for Peace. The report defined post-conflict peace building as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" At the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations began creating a peace building architecture based on Kofi Annan's thesiss. The thesis called for three organizations: the UN Peace building Commission, which was founded in 2005; the UN Peace building Fund, founded in 2006; and the UN Peace building Support Office, which was created in 2005. These three organizations enable the Secretary-General to coordinate the UN's peace building efforts. National governments' interest in the topic has also increased due to fears that failed states serve as breeding grounds for conflict and extremism and thus threaten international security. Some states have begun to view peace building as a way to demonstrate their relevance. However, peace building activities continue to account for small percentages of states' budgets.

Peace building, Power, and Politics in Africa is a critical reflection on peace building efforts in Africa. The authors expose the tensions and contradictions in different clusters of peace building activities, including peace negotiations; state building;

security sector governance; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Essays also address the institutional framework for peace building in Africa and the ideological underpinnings of key institutions, including the African Union, the African Development Bank, and the Pan-African Ministers Conference for Public and Civil Service, The volume includes on-the-ground case studies of Sudan's the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Niger Delta, Southern Africa, and Somalia, analyzing how peace building operates in particular African contexts. The authors adopt a variety of approaches, but they share a conviction that peace building in Africa is not a script that is authored solely in Western capitals and in the corridors of the United Nations. Rather, the writers in this volume focus on the interaction between local and global ideas and practices in the reconstitution of authority and livelihoods after conflict (Kutesa, 2009).

1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective

This study was based on the 'Human Needs theory" by Burton, (1990) Burton, combined the main theoretical assumptions of peace building and conflict resolution and came up with the human needs theory. This theory operates on the premise that a pre- condition for the peace building which is directly linked to conflict resolution and urged that fundamental human needs must be met. This theory adopted eight fundamental needs from the basis of the work by the American sociologist Paul Sites and introduced one further need of his own. Those adopted needs included control, security, justice, stimulation, response, meaning, rationality and esteem/recognition. Burton's additional need was 'role-defense' the need to defend one's role. Burton called these "ontological needs" as he regarded them as a consequence of human nature, which were universal and would be pursued regardless of the consequence. Experiences to human needs theory came from a variety of disciplines. In the biological and socio-biological disciplines conflict is perceived to result from competition over scarce resources as a result of common needs.

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1.1.3 Conceptual perspective

Dawn, (2010) asserts that Peace Operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace Operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another intergovernmental organization within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally.

Similarly, Breonne (2009) said that the AU Peace operations initiatives conducted in Somalia are aimed at bringing peace back in the warring communities of Somalia in its entirety and where this seems elusive; we aim to restore relative peace and understanding amongst community members and community leaders.

According to Julie A. Mertus and Jeffrey (2007) Peace building is a term describing outside interventions that are designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace. Peace building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically. The exact definition varies depending on the actor, with some definitions specifying what activities fall within the scope of peace building or restricting peace building to post-conflict interventions.

According Forsyth, D. R. (2009) peace building is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of some social conflict. Often times, committed group members attempt to resolve group conflicts by actively communicating information about their conflicting motives or ideologies to the rest of the group (e.g., intentions; reasons for holding certain beliefs), and by engaging in collective negotiation. Ultimately, a wide range of methods and procedures for

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addressing conflict exist, including but not limited to, negotiation, mediation, diplomacy, and creative peace building.

In other words, this study conceptualises African Union Peace Operations as peace support organisations positively intervening to restore peace and stability in a given area by conflict prevention, peace enforcement and carrying out peace keeping operations. Similarly, peace building will be looked at as processes in terms of negotiation, reintegration and demobilisation to achieve the ultimate peace and security.

1.1.4 Contextual Perspective

Since Somalia has been known as the world's most famous failed state, currently it is in the midst of pivotal change; with impending elections and increased interest by the West, Somalia is not only on the agenda of world leaders, but its future also seems more brighter than it has in a long time. On 23 February 2012, over 40 governments gathered in London to decide the future of Somalia. British Prime Minister, David Cameron was the first to candidly explain how Somalia, in his words "directly threatens British interests". These threats predominantly arise because of the presence of Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda associate, the lack of stable governance and the notorious Somalia pirates. Cameron went on to highlight how nations such as the UK understand that unless they help the people of Somalia to build a stable future, the problems will keep reoccurring. Considering that the following this speech the African Union (AU) increased its troop presence in Somalia from 12, 000 to 18, 000, and the West signalling will be a renewed appetite for intervention as a final solution to Somalia's problems.

From a humanitarian perspective, Somalia has been in a perpetual state of revolution since the civil war began there in 1988 and has created an environment which facilitates the creation of issues such as piracy, a problem that extends the violence and disruption beyond Somalia's borders In order to understand the conflict and the

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attempts made at resolving it, one must understand the history and major players that comprise the Somali Civil War.

The internationally-recognized central government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), exists in name but in reality lacks a national parliament and controls only a small region of the country. In fact, Somalia is generally regarded in the academic and policy communities as an example of a "failed state" and a "stateless society," which means that the government is unable to collect taxes, pass laws, enforce regulations, or keep warlords under control even with outside intervention and aid. Outside of the central government's weak control, the rest of the regions are practically autonomous and independent.

The UN led multiple military and humanitarian interventions in the country in the early to mid-1990s, officially known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNSOM) I and II and the united Task Force (UNITAF). This event highlights one facet of the international nature of the conflict which has made finding a resolution difficult - at the time of the UN's actions many critics around the world decried the US' involvement in the mission as the US had much to gain from the oil contracts which would be restored along with Siad Barre. All in all, any policy aimed at bringing this conflict to a close must be holistic and far-reaching, addressing both the humanitarian and political causes and effects of years of anarchy, factionalism and violence (Allen L. Lutz, 2004). Now, as new fighting has broken out in Mogadishu, it becomes even more necessary for the international community to take a closer look at the conflict in Somalia and consider new and inventive techniques which might be used to bring this decades-long fighting to a peaceful close. The Conflict and Peace Building Initiatives conducted by the Somalia aim at bringing peace back in the warring communities of Somalia in its entirety and where this seems elusive, we aim to restore relative peace and understanding amongst community members and community leaders. (David & EUWEMA 1994).

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1.2 The Statement of the Problem

Competition for resources and power, repression by the military regime and the colonial legacy are the background causes of the conflict. The Somali civil war has multiple and complex causes including political, economic, cultural and psychological. Terrorism and piracy emerged as result of the prolonged conflict, lack of control and weakness on the side of Somali civilian population. Various external and internal actors like the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) have played different roles during the various stages of the conflict to resolve issues including solutions and top down approaches for restoration of peace. As a result, on 20th February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, the aim of the peacekeeping mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (Peter, 2009). However, these operations are characterized by poor coordination, competition and individual countries pursuing their national interests contributed not only determined failures of peace building but also perpetuated the armed conflict and warlords. Furthermore the young Somali Federal Government is unable to be successful against the difficult organization of criminals and restore peace and security as the first is dominated by corrupted individuals and former warlords though there is some efforts to recover the peace at all. In Mogadishu the challenge is overwhelming as violence is still increasing, deepening insecurity in areas where there was security before, destruction of infrastructures are all now happening in rural areas and violence against humanity have been reported repeatedly, this impose a query on sustainability of peace building and effectiveness of peace support operations to ensure peace building in Somalia. This prompted the researcher to conduct this research on African Union Operations and peace building in Mogadishu.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study was to identify the African union peace operations and peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia. The research aim was to explore the impact of African union peace operations and peace building in Somalia.

1.5 Objectives of the study

The researcher has the following objective:

i.   To investigate the sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia.

ii. To examine the effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia.

iii. To analyse the relationship between African Union operations and peace building in Mogadishu Somalia.

1.4   Research Questions

i.   What is the sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia?

ii. What is the effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia?

iii. What is the relationship between African Union operations and peace building in Mogadishu Somalia?

1.5 Null Hypothesis of the study

There is no significant relationship between African Union operations and peace building in Mogadishu, Somalia.

1.6 Scope of the Study

1.6.1 Geographical Scope

This study was conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia. It covered the ministry of internal affairs, conflict resolution committee of the parliament and conflict resolution department of the local government in Mogadishu, Somalia and also African Union fields in Mogadishu Somalia.

1.5.2 Content scope

The variables to be investigated upon in this study included Peace operation which was broken into accommodation, avoiding and cooperation, and the dependent variable (peace building) was conceptualized in terms of negotiation, reintegration and demobilization.

1.5.3 Time scope

The data which was used in this study covered a period of one year from August 2014 to March 2015. The researchers divided the scope into three categories. The study focuses on the African union operations and peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia, with precise and detailed analysis on the factors that contributes the sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia. Primary and secondary data ranging from August 2014 – March 2015 is considered relevant for this study.

1.6 Significance of the study

The findings of this study were useful to the following groups.

The findings of this study helped the Somali government members to learn the contribution African union operations in Somalia, and also study how always standing African union to work the peace building in Somalia.

As a student of M.A (IR) I am hopeful that the studies findings was a large extent improve my profession in researching and enable me to have a practical approach to solving conflict related problems, as the course requires.

Political organizations of local government's body got to know important overview of conflict resolution and how they practice it if they want to achieve required peace buildings.

The community intellectuals will get the process to peace building

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the theories of relevance to this study and the studies related to the specific objectives of the study as shown below.

2.1 Theoretical perspective

This study is based on the human Needs theory which looks conflict resolution (Burton, 1990) Burton, synthesized the main theoretical assumptions of conflict resolution, which are known as 'human needs theory'. This theory operates on the premise that a pre- condition for the resolution of conflict is that fundamental human needs be met. This theory adopted eight fundamental needs from the basis of the work by the American sociologist Paul Sites and introduced one further need of his own. Those adopted needs included control, security, justice, stimulation, response, meaning, rationality and esteem/recognition. Burton's additional need was 'role-defense the need to defend one's role. Burton called these "ontological needs" as he regarded them as a consequence of human nature, which were universal and would be pursued regardless of the consequence. Experiences to human needs theory came from a variety of disciplines. In the biological and socio-biological disciplines conflict is perceived to result from competition over scarce resources as a result of common needs.

In social psychology Henry Murray, Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and Abraham Maslow (1908-1970) describe needs (some say 'drives') as important in understanding factors for human motivation. Human Need distinguishes ontological needs from values and interests. And defines ontological needs as non-negotiable; values as offering some limited opportunities for negotiation; and interests as negotiable issues. Burton distinguishes conflict from the related term of 'dispute'. He defined 'conflict' as an action over these non-negotiable human needs, whereas a 'dispute' was over negotiable values. Burton distinguishes conflict resolution, from the related terms of

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conflict management and conflict settlement. To Burton conflict resolution solved deep seemingly intractable issues, whereas settlement only addressed the superficial factors of conflict. The term "conflict resolution" is sometimes used interchangeably with the term mitigation litigation, and formal grievance processes through an ombudsman, are part of dispute resolution, and therefore they are also part of "conflict resolution." The concept of conflict resolution can also encompass the use of non-violent methods such as civil resistance by a party to a conflict as a means of pursuing its goals, on the grounds that such means are more likely than armed struggle to lead to effective resolution of the conflict (Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, 2011).

In other theories, Jeffrey Haynes (2009) conducted a study on conflict Resolution and Peace-Building in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. The findings of this study revealed that the conflict resolution is an important factor on peace building activities. In some, probably most, cases, it is inevitable conflict situations but trying to resolve it immediately is the base of peace building. Arguably, however, peace building should not only be about the short-term achievement of peace. It should, in addition, aim to develop restorative justice and/or the establishment of what is considered 'right relationships' between formerly conflicting groups through acknowledgement of each other's positions and the acceptance of accountability by those acting on behalf of community leaders. Effective medium- and long-term peace building requires that peace builders look more closely at the structural problems that underlie the conflict, aiming to work towards addressing the important background issues that make future conflict more likely. These findings imply that conflict resolution is an effective factor in peace building process among the community and it is inevitable to community intellectuals to resolve the conflicts in their way of peace building.

2.2 Conceptual frame work showing the relationship between African Union Operations (IV) and Peace building (DV)

African Union Operations	Peace Building (DV)
- Peace keeping operations - Peace enforcement operations - Conflict prevention	**Peace Operations** - Negotiation - Reintegration - Demobilization

Intervening variable

- Political climate

- Government policy

Source: Primary data (adopted from Martin, 1995).

According to Martin and Fortmann (1995), second-generation peace operations have become much harder and more dangerous for at least three reasons: (1) Peace Operations encompass an ever growing number of tasks, therefore becoming more difficult to comprehend; (2) The goals of peace operations have become more confusing and less clear-cut; and (3) Soldiers on peace operations have been revealed to be fallible human beings.

The nature of the crisis will determine the level and type of response. It is possible for multiple types of PO to occur simultaneously within a geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) area of responsibility. The military objective in these operations is to create the conditions for other diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian activities to achieve the political objective stated in the mandate and to transition from

involvement. Optimally, Peace Operations forces should be able to transition from one type of peace operations to another, though in some circumstances, the peace operations force may have to be replaced with another peace operation force under a different mandate during this transition. Peace building creates a self-sustaining peace and avoids a relapse into conflict. Peace keeping and peace operations are designed to establish a stable environment in which peace building can occur. Although not in the lead, the military provides necessary support to ensure peace making and conflict prevention succeed; however, because peacemaking and conflict prevention are primarily diplomatic efforts.

Peacekeeping Operations

Peace keeping operations consist of military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, and are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Before Peace keeping operations begin, a credible truce or cease fire must be in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. Peace keeping operations take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and the potential troop contributing nations. The UN Charter makes no specific mention of Peace keeping operations, Peace keeping operations seek to settle disputes through the medium of peaceful third-party initiatives. Peace keeping operations have usually been conducted in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Using force in a Peace keeping operations is generally limited to self-defense. A loss of consent by the parties usually necessitates the withdrawal of the peace opeation force or a change in its mission to Peace keeping operations.

Peace Enforcement Operations

Peace enforcement operations are generally coercive in nature and rely on the threat or use of force; however, Peace enforcement operations may also be co-optive in nature, relying on the development of working relationships with locals. Peace

enforcement operations may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting foreign humanitarian assistance missions, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. However, the impartiality with which the peace opeation force treats all parties and the nature of its objectives separates Peace enforcement operations from major operations. Should it be necessary to conduct operations in support of one particular party against another, impartiality would be lost and Peace enforcement operations would deteriorate. If this situation develops, then the authorizing authority must reassess the peace operation. The purpose of Peace enforcement operations is not to destroy or defeat an adversary, but to use force or threat of force to establish a safe and secure environment so that peace building can succeed. The term "peace enforcement" is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter; however, the UN Charter's language allows the UNSC to authorize military operations "as may be necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security." Peace enforcement operations are often conducted by lead regional organizations or a coalition of states under a lead nation. Since Peace enforcement operations may include offensive and defensive operations, missions must be clear and end states defined. In a particular operational area, offensive, defensive, and stability operations may occur simultaneously. Due to the nature of peace operation, civilian considerations are key.

Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and military actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement short of conflict. Military activities will be tailored to support a political agenda that meets the situational demands, but will generally fall within the following categories: early warning, surveillance, training and security sector reform, preventative deployment, and enforcement of sanctions and embargoes.

Sustainability of Peace Building

Sustainable Peace is more than the absence of violence or the implementation of efficient technologies. It requires the fostering of macro-level change in societies or communities - change that promotes an internal ability to respond to disturbance and adapt to change. The concept of Sustainable Peace building is premised on the idea that long-term success and durable peace require a holistic approach that considers all facets of a society - the natural environment, people, governance, politics, etc.

Before investigating the relation between stability and sustainability, there is a need to take a closer look at peace building systems. Here the term "system" is used to emphasize the complexity and interaction or interdependence of different entities in peace building projects (international and regional organizations and actors, national and local governmental and civil society organizations, international and local businesses, etc.). It furthermore aims to highlight the work on the common aim, the reconstruction of society after conflict – building peace. Peace building systems primarily address the societal insecurity of the post-conflict society. To establish sustainable peace, a careful, comprehensive and systemic approach through peace-building systems is needed. Moreover, such an approach depends heavily on an integration of environmental security management in the peace building system.

Indeed, peace building has become more successful. The positive development in the pacification of civil wars since the middle of the 1990s is clearly visible. The problem, however, peace building systems are facing is their focus on "situational stability," meaning almost exclusively the immediate provision of societal security. Societal security in that context concerns the security of societies and their economic, cultural and national existence. The societal security approach is regularly adopted in contemporary peace building systems. Considering the urgency of economic and social problems faced by post-conflict societies, the type of economic policies frequently promoted include (a) privatization of the industrial sector, (b) creation of conditions for external investments and (c) urbanization.

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Such measures, in combinations with strong state institutions and a functioning infrastructure, are supposed to bring economic wellbeing that would, in return, generate legitimacy of the state with its citizens, eventually bringing political stability and societal unity. Nevertheless, these situational and unyielding actions are likelyto affect the environment in an adverse manner.

Thus, peace building systems do increase environmental insecurity in the long run because the focus is invariably on bringing together humanitarian, social and economic security while ignoring environmental security. It is not just the mentioning of environmental protection in a superficial manner, but there is a serious need for sustainable economic policy as a systemic approach in peace building systems. Sustainable economic policies have the possibility to unite humanitarian and environmental factors, and thus, bear a crucial contribution for environmental protection. Therefore, any peace building policy should be guided by sustainable values, such as a long-term planning of development actions, which provide sustainable economic policies. Instead peace building systems today are dominated by neoliberal state building agenda favoring situational short-term solutions, which sacrifice long-term environmental concerns and resource availability.

Despite major advances in bringing sustainable development as a concept to the attention of the public and politics, we argue that serious sustainable planning is often neglected for the sake of short-term solutions and the provision of stability. This is particularly true for international peace building policies imposed on war-torn societies. This specific problem of sustainable planning in peace building strategies must be prioritized in the research of warfare ecology when looking at the key elements of post-war activities. It is crucial to provide policy recommendations on how sustainable planning in peace building systems can be developed to provide long-term security and the possibility for lasting peace. Sustainable development asks for a proportional importance of social, economic and environmental factors in

development policies. It is, however, a fact that peace building systems, in the quest to provide societal security, often concentrate on the first two factors, ignoring widely the environmental part.

Military actions for counter insurgency operations also cause serious damage to the quality of available renewable natural resources. Moreover, environmental problems created by the conflict persist or increase once the battles are ceased. Heavy military vehicles destroy the ground, and the pollution through weapons testing and combat, not to speak of landmines, makes cultivatable areas unusable among others. In conflict situation, military activities to maintain peace pollute and destroy critical natural resources, adding further environmental stress and insecurity to an already insecure societal situation. Conflict induced displacement is known to cause environmental stress. Thus it becomes another major problem for building peace and creating stable and sustain-able livelihoods for citizens after armed conflict.

Bringing Sustainability into Peace Building Systems

The recent examples of peace building projects clearly illustrate one serious challenge: stabilizing a country after conflict causes tremendous trials and tribulations for sustainability, not just for the environment, but also for peace itself. To achieve lasting peace, peace building systems need to address environmental stress due to conflict and conflict-induced migration. To limit the possibility of reoccurrence of the conflict and support the cooperation between adversaries, peace building systems should pursue a sustainable economic policy for growth and development, which will not only be sensitive to the local needs and the environment, but will also take the support of the local resource base to promote cooperation and peace in the long run. Here, three recommendations are outlined to create and implement sustainable development policy and stability. This will help to overcome the feedback cycle between conflict and environmental stress that is sustained through the peace building system. These recommendations are: (1) good governance of natural

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resources,(2) improved early warning of conflicts, and (3) building peace over the shared management of natural resources.

Peace building in Africa regional and International efforts

During the past fifteen years, the African continent has enjoyed extraordinary progress in promoting peace, security, and economic development. Over this period, incidences of armed conflict, coups, and mass atrocities have declined. Prospects for interstate warfare have also dramatically decreased. Additionally, despite the lingering effects of the global financial crisis, Africa generally has managed to maintain a bright economic outlook.

Together, African institutions at the local, regional, and international levels have also undergone innovations, which combined, act to further reduce possibilities for conflict and lay the foundation for continued economic growth. With the development of institutions, new pathways and opportunities for peace building have also emerged. In particular, the African Union (AU) has undergone significant institutional advancement by steadily expanding its normative influence and ground-level operations on the continent. In the background, new bridges of cooperation to international intergovernmental economic organizations, private sector institutions, and states in the developed world have supported these developments, and could hold the key to sustaining and accelerating such progress in the future.

On the other hand, myriad significant issues could derail or offset Africa's security and economic gains. These include risks emanating from economic and social turbulence, gaps within the institutional fabric of the African Union (AU), and the persistence of weak domestic governance. Effective multilateral cooperation regarding peace building at the regional and international levels is vital to ensure gains witnessed in Africa over the past decade are maintained and strengthened.

As part of the Rising Regionalism Workshop series, the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) program and Center for Preventive Action (CPA) cosponsored a workshop on November 1, 2011, in Washington, DC. The workshop gathered experts on Africa and peace building, including U.S. government officials, representatives from the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, and members of major international economic organizations. The purpose of the Workshop was to take stock of positive developments towards peace and stability and Africa as well as illuminate steps to maintain and expand on these gains in the short, medium, and long term. What follows is a summary of the intimate discussion, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis.

Peace building

According to Julie A. Mertus and Jeffrey (2007) Peace building is a term describing outside interventions that are designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace. Peace building activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically. The exact definition varies depending on the actor, with some definitions specifying what activities fall within the scope of peace building or restricting peace building to post-conflict interventions. In 2007, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee defined peace building as follows: "Peace building involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives" (Jeffrey; 2007).

The international community has come to recognize that warring parties require assistance not only in negotiating peace agreements but also in sustaining and

consolidating the peace to implement peace accords the parties to the conflict must act on many fronts disarming and demobilizing former combatant reintegrating demobilized soldiers demilitarizing police forces restructuring and reforming the security sector enforcing respect for human rights resettling refugees reforming the judicial system holding elections and promoting economic and social revitalization the parties capacity to meet these demands is however severely constrained by institutional weaknesses limited and financial resources and economic fragility . In consequence the parties concerned have frequently appealed to the international community for financial and technical assistance as well as political support (Mac Ginty and Roger, 2011).

Pre-conflict peace building interventions aim to prevent the start of violent conflict. These strategies involve a variety of actors and sectors in order to transform the conflict. Even though the definition of peace building includes pre-conflict interventions, in practice most peace building interventions are post conflict However, many peace building scholars advocate an increased focus on pre-conflict peace building in the future. Post conflict peace building into three dimensions: stabilizing the post-conflict zone, restoring state institutions and dealing with social and economic issues. Activities within the first dimension reinforce state stability post-conflict and discourage former combatants from returning to war (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or DDR). Second dimension activities build state capacity to provide basic public goods and increase state legitimacy. Programs in the third dimension build a post-conflict society's ability to manage conflicts peacefully and promote socioeconomic development (Porter and Elisabeth, 2007).

Disarmament in Somalia

Disarmament is the act of reducing, limiting, or abolishing weapons. Disarmament generally refers to a country's military or specific type of weaponry. Disarmament is often taken to mean total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear arms. General and Complete Disarmament refers to the removal of all

weaponry, including conventional arms. Disarmament can be contrasted with arms control, which essentially refers to the act of controlling arms rather than eliminating them. A distinction can also be made between disarmament as a process the process of eliminating weapons), and disarmament as an end state (De Waal and Frans B. M. 1989).

After two decades of violence and civil war (which began in 1986) and after the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia captured Mogadishu and Kismayo, the TFG attempted to disarm the militias of the country in late 2006. According to the UN/World Bank's Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) coordination secretariat, "the total estimated number of militias militia members] to be demobilized is 53,000. In 2005, they estimated that "there are 11-15,000 militia people controlling Mogadishu out of national estimates ranging from 50,000 to 200,000.

Since the 1991 war, there have been over a dozen attempts to bring an end to the Somali Civil War. They were often shoaled by warlords and inter-clan rival. Islamic courts union in 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) attempted to disarm the secular warlords—a contentious issue which led to the Second Battle of Mogadishu. The Islamist victory resulted in the routing or forced surrender of many warlords and their caches of arms, and the rapid Union. By late 2006, their attempts to disarm the secular militias and their consolidation of power pitted them also against the Transitional Federal Government. The ICU attempted to curb the private possession of weapons, closing down the infamous Mogadishu arms market, and impounding or appropriating technical for use solely by the Islamic Courts forces. Many Somali warlords, along with the nation of Ethiopia, sided with the TFG against the ICU. Once the momentous battles were concluded in December 2006, the TFG proceeded with its plans to bring a general disarmament of the nation and closure to the Somali Civil War (Castles, 1998).

Ghedi's decree for disarmament also applied to non-government troops in the autonomous state of that time where it was seen as questionably enforceable. On January 1, 2007, Somali Prime MinisterAli Mohammed Ghedi announced "The warlord era in Mogadishu is now over. He said all civilian groups and businesses would have three days to disarm and turn their weapons in to the government. Technical were to be brought to the old port in Mogadishu. All collected arms would be registered at Villa Somalia. Villa Baidoa was also mentioned as an arms collection point an amnesty to Islamists was also extended. The Agreement to Disarm On January 12, the same day as the Battle of RasKamboni ended, Somali warlords tentatively agreed with President Abdullahi Yusuf to disarm their militias and to direct their members to apply to join the national army or police forces. An estimated 20,000 militia were said to exist throughout Somalia. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah said the clans were "fed up" with militias and agreed to disarm his own men. Muse SudiYalahow was less conciliatory. Meanwhile, even as the meeting was taking place, fighting outside Villa Somalia killed seven people. The members of government and warlords present for the meeting included the following individuals (Jacob Bercovitch, 2009).

Demobilization in Somalia

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. Demobilization is the process of standing down a nation's armed forces from combat-ready status. This may be as a result of victory in war, or because a crisis has been peacefully resolved and military force will not be necessary. The opposite of demobilization is mobilization. Forceful demobilization of a defeated enemy is called demilitarization (Peter G. and Frans B. M, 1993).

Demobilization, in principle, follows the registration and disarmament of ex-combatants, it is both a physical and a mental process in that the physical dimension involves the separation of ex-combatants from an armed group, while the mental aspect focuses on the ex-combatants attempt to leave behind the armed structure and join a community. Whereas the mental dimension is addressed more fully during the reinsertion and reintegration phase, demobilization programs should aim to incorporate a component that identifies former combatants with specific post-trauma needs.

Reintegration

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance. Reinsertion and reintegration programs address the specific needs of male and female adult combatants, child soldiers, women and children associated with armed groups, disabled or chronically ill ex-combatants, and dependents Programs attempt to address the following dilemmas.

Negotiation is a discussion among two or more people with the goal of reaching an agreement. Sometimes called "direct" or "unassisted" negotiation refers to any dialogue involving two or more people in an effort to resolve a dispute or reach an agreement. The first significant political man composition came in November 2007, when President Yusuf and his uncompromising former Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi parted friendship. The ensuing appointment of two individuals - a new premier, Nur Hassan Hussein, who worked on the humanitarian field, and a new special representative, the Mauritanian-born diplomat Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah changed the picture.

These two individuals made contact with the main leadership of the insurgency, the ICU and former parliamentarians who had opposed Ethiopia's incursion. The ICU, led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, was based in Asmara, capital of Eritrea (Ethiopia's bitter rival). These significant contacts led to ten days of talks between government and opposition in Djibouti, which resulted in an accord signed on 11 June 2008. The Djibouti accord provided for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, a key insurgency demand; the cessation of hostilities, a key government demand; and the merging of the two militias to ensure security after the Ethiopian mass departure (Johnson, 1976).

The ongoing violence has disappointed the expectations raised when members of the international community welcomed the new Somali president to Brussels and pledged substantial funds in support of his government. A powerful trio - the United Nations, the European Union and the United States - all declared full support for Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the Somali leadership, describing the new situation as "the best and most credible opportunity for Somalia for a long time". The international community's response has in rhetorical terms at least been firm. The UN special envoy, AhmedouOuld-Abdallah, described the militias' operations as an attempt to overthrow the government. A number of other authorities - including the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and the United States under-secretary for Africa, Johnnie Carson - also condemned the attacks (Saxberg, 1971).

The new government attempted to regroup by assembling an impromptu force - including military personnel trained in Ethiopia and Uganda (inherited from Abdullahi Yusuf's unpopular government), several hundred former ICU fighters, and an equal number of militias from loyal clans. This body was in turn supported by about 4,000 troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom), who had been defending the government and key installations in Mogadishu (among them the seaport, airport and the presidential palace). Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed retains considerable political capital in the south of Somalia, as well as in Mogadishu itself (where

Abdullahi Yusuf's government failed to get the support of the local clans). However, the new president and government are faced with a highly-trained and well-led opposition that composes the most powerful military force in Somalia today (Yaacov, 2004).

It was the return of Sheikh Hassan DahirAweys from Asmara that inspired the opposition to launch its attack on the government. Sheikh Aweys is another former prominent figure in the ICU who once worked alongside President Ahmed. However, when Ahmed himself left Eritrea in early 2008 to begin negotiations in Djibouti with the TFG government, Sheikh Aweys was sceptical - and stayed behind in Asmara. As the talks in Somalia progressed, the differences between the two leaders grew wider - to the point where their political coalition, the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), broke apart in May 2008 after only eight months of existence (Jon. D. R, 2011).

Mediation is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and a way of resolving disputes between two or more parties with concrete effects. Typically, a third party, the mediator assists the parties to negotiate a settlement. Disputants may mediate disputes in a variety of domains, such as commercial, legal, diplomatic, workplace, community and family matters. The term "mediation" broadly refers to any instance in which a third party helps others reach agreement. More specifically, mediation has a structure, timetable and dynamics that "ordinary" negotiation lacks. The mediator acts as a neutral third party and facilitates rather than directs the process Paul Collier, 2003).

In Khartoum 2 November 2006 (IRIN) - Mediators have called off talks between Somalia's transitional government and the Islamic group that is dominant in the south, saying further consultations were needed before the peace process could proceed. The talks, which were due to be held in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum,

were intended to reconcile Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) with the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).

It was commonly established and agreed that there is a need for further consultation on both substantive and procedural issues to move the dialogue forward," the mediation team comprising the African Union, League of Arab States, European Union, Organization of the Islamic Conference, United Nations and the East African Regional Inter Governmental Authority on development (IGAD), said in a combined statement (M. & Mannix, 2003).

The Somali parties are urged to exercise full restraint and to commit themselves to their previous agreements reached in Khartoum," they said, in reference to earlier agreements in which both parties undertook not to pursue military solutions to the conflict. The UIC delegation insisted that Ethiopian troops leave Somali territory before it sits down to talks with TFG representatives. The UIC claims the troops have been deployed inside Somalia to support the TFG. The TFG, meanwhile, has denied the presence of Ethiopian troops, claiming that the only Ethiopians in the country are military instructors. Ethiopia has declared war and invaded Somalia," Ibrahim Hassan Adow, head of UIC's foreign affairs department, who led the group's delegation to the talks in Khartoum, Both parties to the conflict were also at odds over the composition of the mediation team (Filippo, 1997).

The Arab League was to co-chair the talks with Kenya, the current chair of IGAD, but the TFG expressed reservations over the League's neutrality. The UIC has objected to Kenya's mediation, saying the country is biased in favor of the TFG, and that Kenya is one of the states favoring the deployment of foreign troops to Somalia - an idea strongly opposed by the Islamic Courts. The UIC took control of the capital, Mogadishu, in early June and has continued to extend its authority over much of southern and central Somalia, challenging the legitimacy of the TFG, which was set

up in 2004 in a bid to restore law and order after 15 years without a national government (Augsburger, 1992).

Officials in the Arab League and the Islamic Courts Organization expressed their belief that the agreement concluded between the Somali interim government and the Islamic Courts in Khartoum might not be the best solution for the problems of Somalia. They warned that the agreement, rather than providing a vehicle for reconciliation among the parties to the Somali crisis, had built-in self-destruct factors (J. K, 2007).

Conflict Resolution

An appreciation of conflict resolution styles is integral to understanding the communication process. While the names may differ slightly, there are five major responsive approaches to managing conflicts. There is no right or wrong conflict resolution style, and each conflict participant is capable of choosing the approach he deems most appropriate in any given situation.

From a humanitarian perspective, Somalia has been in a perpetual state of anarchy since the civil war began there in 1988 and has created an environment which facilitates the creation of issues such as piracy, a problem that extends the violence and disruption beyond Somalia borders. In order to understand the conflict and the attempts made at resolving it, one must understand the history and major players that comprise the Somali Civil War. Beyond the occasional news headline or what has been portrayed in the media by films such as "Black Hawk Down," many citizens of Western societies know very little about the country officially known as the Somali Republic and of the complexities of the conflict, which has been going on there since 1988 (De Waal, 1998).

The internationally-recognized central government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), exists in name but in reality lacks a national parliament and controls only small parts of Mogadishu. In fact, Somalia is generally, regarded in the academic and policy communities as an example of a "failed state" and a "stateless society", which means that the country is largely under control of Islamists, distinct regional states while the government is unable to collect taxes, pass laws, enforce regulations, or keep warlords under control even with outside intervention and aid. Outside of the central government's weak control, the rest of the regions are fairly autonomous and independent. Arguably, the most functional region, Somaliland, which used to be a British protectorate rather than an Italian colony like the rest of Somalia, views itself as an independent republic but lacks the formal recognition it needs from the international community to officially secede.

Community and members of the Somali Diaspora cut across the clan and/or regional divide and are found throughout Somalia. The powerful Islamic Militants that have emerged from the conflict in south central Somalia have consistently became obstacle to peace in the country and the region The more weakened Somali civil society and the Somali Diaspora are caught up in the task of peace-building and state building in an extremely insecure Somali political environment. They are also partly to blame for being partial and partly contributing to fuelling the war (Farah, 2010).

2.3 Related Studies

Jeffrey Haynes (2009) conducted a study on conflict Resolution and Peace-Building in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. The findings of this study revealed that the conflict resolution is an important factor on peace building activities. In some, probably most, cases, it is inevitable conflict situations but trying to resolve it immediately is the base of peace building. Arguably, however, peace building should not only be about the short-term achievement of peace. It should, in addition, aim to

develop restorative justice and/or the establishment of what is considered 'right relationships' between formerly conflicting groups through acknowledgement of each other's positions and the acceptance of accountability by those acting on behalf of community leaders. Effective medium- and long-term peace building requires that peace builders look more closely at the structural problems that underlie the conflict, aiming to work towards addressing the important background issues that make future conflict more likely. These findings imply that conflict resolution is an effective factor in peace building process among the community and it is inevitable to community intellectuals to resolve the conflicts in their way of peace building.

In 2011 Professor Alan Smith conducted a research on the relationship between conflict resolution and peace building in New York, United States of America. His findings revealed that Conflict resolution is conceptualized as an essential component of basic peace building and to resolve conflict peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level is the first importance of peace builders and it is one of the major factors of peace building skills that can be applied in post- conflict settings. Throughout the past decade, an increase in conflicts has met with an increase in programs that exist to address peace. However, the most significant change has been with particular innovative programs relying less on content and more on how to 'approach' learning that contributes to peace building, for example, selecting locations to resolve the conflicts are known to experience tension creating peaceful environments. The findings of Professor Alan Smith imply that conflict resolution is a major component of peace building in society.

Ginnett (2009), highlights that during his research on conflict resolution, he showed that middle- level political leaders spend 25 % of their time resolving conflicts. Knowledge of conflict resolution should therefore be one of the leader's strongest characteristics. Increased understanding of how conflicts arise and what they depend on can contribute to conflict resolution in a more efficient manner. This can lead to

more time spent on bringing the projects forward, time is money. Except the negative effects of conflict like reduced productivity, stress and decreased cooperation Ginnet also claims that from a conflict, positive effects could arise as well. Positive effects worth pointing out are that feelings get aired, enhanced understanding of others, improved decision making and stimulation of critical thinking.

De Dreu (2004) investigated the sources for conflicts in societies and found that there are tendencies of people developing their own conflict culture. Citizens are often according to De Dreu (2004) affecting each other and the way different procedures and tasks are performed within the village boundaries. De Dreu (2004) also argued that some teams have developed a certain culture or a so called conflict management style such as open-minded debate or conflict avoidance. Different views on conflict is expressed by De Dreu (2004) to be developed as well, some teams might see conflict as an opportunity while others see it as a threat.

Somech (2009) in his study on conflict resolution brings forward studies that show that task interdependence demands team members to collaborate, followed by that high task interdependence implies the need for intense interactions among members, creating more opportunities for conflict. On the contrary Somech (2009) also found research that supported the belief that high task interdependence and intense interaction among people promotes collaborative behaviour through increased communication and joint planning. Somech (2009) expresses that competitive styles are most common in the early stages of economic development and when there is a competition for project resources. Later on when the team has developed further and roles and relations have been created, cooperative styles tend to evolve.

De Church (2001), expresses that active conflict management allows groups to openly talk about issues and disagreements, allowing them to share information and confront a conflict together. In addition he argues that openness makes it possible to contradict arguments and that research has shown that there are great possibilities in

open conversation and argument confrontation. The positive effects of conflict resolution are according to DeChurch (2001) a result of the active approach which benefits team effectiveness. Also there is potential innovativeness and development of ideas possibilities that will be lost when different groups tend to avoid confronting each other. DeChurch et al. The use of active conflict resolution will enhance team performance, and the use of passive conflict management will detract from leaders' performance.

Identifying the gaps

Based on the reviewed literature, the following gaps were identified and filled by the researcher. Many of the reviewed researches were based on the experiences of Europe, America and Asia whose socio-cultural and economic statuses are generally different from those of Somalia. For those who made studies in Somalia, some of the studies were carried out in other areas not in Mogadishu. Though the literature review above talked about peace operation and reintegration, but it did not talk about the relationship between peace operation and peace building in Mogadish Somalia. Therefore, based on the related studies, the researcher succumbs to the conclusion that the previous studies were carried out from different perspectives and in different geographical environments; this partly prompted the current study.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design, research population, and sample size, sampling procedures, research instruments, validity and reliability of the instruments, data gathering procedures, data analysis, ethical considerations, as well as the limitations of the study.

3.1 Research Design

This study followed a descriptive design, descriptive co relational, cross sectional and survey designs. It was descriptive in that it described the characteristics of respondents. The descriptive co relational design was used to determine significant relationship between the level of AU peace operation and sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu Somalia. It was cross-sectional in that data was collected from all respondents at the same time. It was a survey because it involved a large number of respondents.

3.2 Research population

The target population comprised workers in the ministry of internal affairs department, committee of the Somalia parliament and department of the local government for conflict resolution. According to the report of the Somalia government (2012), the conflict resolution committee consists of 356 from different departments mentioned above, from the above total 152 for local government, 146 from interior affairs and 58 from the parliament.

3.3 Sample Size

From the population of 356 Committee in those three departments, a sample of 188 was selected, and this was computed using Slovene's Formula for computing samples, which is stated as follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e2)}$$

Where: n= sample size

N= target population

e= level of significance/marginal error (0.05)

n=*188.36 ≈ 188*

Respondents of the Study

No	Categories	Population	Sample size
1	Ministry of interior affairs committee	60	32
2	Other community members	86	45
3	Parliament committee	58	31
4	Local government committee	152	80
Total		356	188

Source: Primary Data, 2014

3.4 Sample procedure

This study used stratified sampling and simple random sampling techniques. Stratified sampling technique was used to calculate the proportion of each strata in the sample. Simple random sampling technique was used to select the calculated proportion from the strata.

To calculate the proportions the researcher used the proportional to size sampling formula which is like below:

n'= *xsample size*

From ministry committee

$n' = \times 188 = 77$

From local government committee

$n' = \times 188 = 80$

From parliament committee

$n' = \times 188 = 31$

3.5 Research Instrument

This study used three sets of researcher made questionnaire to collect data. The first questionnaire was the face sheet and this was used to collect data on profile of respondents. The second part of the questionnaire was on conflict resolution, this involved questions on accommodation, avoiding and cooperation. The third part of the questionnaire was on peace building and this involved on negotiation, reintegration and demobilisation. All the questions on conflict resolution and peace building were based on a four point likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree and 4=strongly agree).

3.6 Validity and Reliability of the Instruments

The questionnaire was given to three lecturers to judge the validity of questions according to the objectives. After the assessment of the questionnaire, the necessary adjustments were made bearing in mind the objectives of the study. Then a content validity index of 0.79 (CVI) was also computed using the following formula,

$$CVI = \frac{No.\,of\ questions\ declared\ valid}{total\ no.\,of\ questions\ in\ the\ questionnaire}$$

A minimum of 0.75 of CVI level of significance was used to test validity.

To ensure the reliability of the instrument, the researcher used Test-Retest method. The questionnaire was given to 10 people and after two weeks the questionnaire were given to the same group of people. A Cronbatch Alpha of 0.76 was used and computed using SPSS since the minimum Cronbatch Alpha to declare an instrument reliable is 0.75.

3.7 Data Gathering Procedures

Before the administration of the questionnaires

Before the administration of the questionnaires the researcher took an introductory paper from the CHDR (College of Higher Degrees and Research). The researcher also had to seek a permission letter from the different departments. When approved, the researcher secured a list of the respondents from different departments of the field research and through simple random sampling from this list to arrive at the minimum sample size. The respondents were taught about the study and were requested to sign the informed consent form (Appendix III). Enough questionnaires were reproduced for distribution after selecting the research assistants who assisted in data collection, and these research assistants were briefed and oriented in order to be consistent in administering the questionnaires.

During the administration of the questionnaires

The respondents were requested to sign and answer the questions in the questionnaires, and the researcher and assistants emphasized retrieval of the questionnaires within five days from the date of distribution. And lastly, all returned questionnaires were checked whether all were answered.

After the administration of the questionnaires

The data gathered were corded and entered into the computer and statistically treated using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

3.8 Data Analysis

The researcher used frequencies and percentage distributions to analyze data on profile of respondents. Means and standard deviations were used to determine the extent of peace operation and the sustainable of peace building. Item analysis was used to determine the strengths and weaknesses of respondents of peace operations and peace building.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

Permission was sought from the respondents and their views were respected, and this was important for the protection of the respondents from harm or harassment and the confidentiality of the respondents and their leaders' sensitive information. The researcher acknowledged all the authors and academicians whose ideas were used in this study and the authors of the standardized instrument through citations and referencing.

3.10 Limitations of the Study

The researcher was faced with some limitations and they included the following:

Funding this research thesis was one of the major challenges to hinder the progress of this project. Issues related to transport; food accommodation were not as easy as it should have been, consequently date of collection was a problem as many were missing because some of participants not honoring- the appointment and given of the distance in the study area. The researcher tried to encourage the participants to portray positive attitudes when collecting data to avoid bias.

Extraneous variables were beyond control of the researcher such as honesty, personal biases of the respondents and uncontrolled setting of the study. The use of research assistants could bring about inconsistency in the administration of the questionnaires in terms of time of administration, understanding of the items in the questionnaires and explanations given to the respondents plus being costly. To minimize these threats, the research assistants were oriented and briefed on the procedures to be done in data collection. Not all questionnaires were returned back neither completely answered nor even retrieved back due to circumstances on the part of the respondents such as travels, sickness, hospitalization and refusal/withdrawal to participate. To overcome this threat, the researcher reserved more respondents by exceeding the minimum sample size. The respondents were also reminded not to leave any item in the questionnaires unanswered and did not closely follow up as to the date of retrieval.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presented the facts, which the research discovered. The findings were presented in line with the objectives of the study whereby the raw data in form of questionnaires was edited and interpreted which ensured uniformity, legibility and consistency. The data-filled questionnaires were copied and analysed by tallying and tabling in frequency tables while identifying how often certain responses occurred and later evaluation was done. The information was then recorded in terms of percentages. Also, interview results were coded on frequency tables which were calculated in terms of percentages and presented in this study as illustrated below.

4.1 Background Characteristics of the respondents

The Background information of the respondents was important because they comprised of both sexes but of different marital statuses and age groups from various settings. This was intended in order to get a variety of views and unbiased responses which made the study a reality. The respondents were divided into the administrative and general staff in Mogadishu. The findings are shown in the figures below;

Classification of respondents by gender

During the field survey, it was found out that; males greatly participated in the study as represented by 58.5% whereas 41.4% of the respondents were females; implying that African union peace operation in Somalia involved males as they are known of their strong influence and ability in resolving conflict compared to females as illustrated below in the table.

Table 4.2: Classification of respondents by gender

Gender of respondents		Frequency	Valid percent
	Males	110	58.5
	Females	78	41.4
	Total	**188**	**100.0**

Source; Primary data

Table 4.1: Classification of respondents by age

Age of respondents		Frequency	Valid percent
	Under 25yrs	28	14.8
	25-34 years	70	37.2
	35-45 years	50	26.5
	45 and above	40	21.2
	Total	**188**	**100.0**

Source; Primary data

Table 4.1 above show that; the biggest percentage of the respondents were in the age bracket of 25-34 years, followed by 26.8% of the respondents who were in the age bracket of 35-45 years, then 14.8% of the respondents were under 25 years of age, implying that; these African union peace operation in Somalia employed mature people who are energetic and help in decision making.

Table 1.4: Respondents level of education

Respondents' level of education		Frequency	Valid percent
Valid	Diploma	30	15.9
	Degree	80	42.5
	Masters	50	26.5
	Certificate	20	10.6
	PhD	08	4.2
	Total	**188**	**100.0**

Source: Primary data

The biggest percentage of respondents had their degrees as it was revealed by 42.5% of the respondents, then 15.9% represented respondents who had Diploma's in different fields whereas 26.5% of the interviewees were Masters holders, 10.6% of the respondents had attained their Certificates and lastly 4.2% of respondents were qualified with PhD's in table 4.4 above.

Table 4.2: Number of years of service of respondents

Years of service		Frequency	Valid percent
	Less than/below a year	10	5.3
	1-2 years	60	31.9
	2-3 years	70	37.2
	3-4 years	40	21.2
	4 years and above	08	4.2
	Total	**188**	**100.0**

Source: Primary Data

From the table above, it was found out that the biggest percentage of the respondents had worked with the African union peace operation in Somalia for a period between 2-3 years as represented by 37.2% whereas 31.9% shows respondents who had with African union peace operation in Somalia for the period between 1-2 years, 5.3% represents interviewees who had worked in the African union peace operation in Somalia for the period of less than and lastly 4.2% of the respondents shows 4.2% of respondents who had worked for African union peace operation in Somalia for 4 years and above, implying that they have been employees for a long time thus possess enough experience.

4.2 Objective One: To investigate the sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia.

The first objective of the study was to investigate the sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia. The items showed the average response from the respondents for each item in relation to sustainability of peace building. The items were rated on the 5 point likert scale ranging between strongly disagree, disagree, not sure, agree and strongly agree.

4.2 Sustainability of Peace Building

Using item means of peace building, an assessment of sustainability of peace building was carried out. The items were rated on the 5 point likert scale ranging between strongly disagree, disagree, not sure, agree and strongly agree. The findings are shown in table 4.1below:

Table 4.1: Frequencies of Sustainability of Peace Building in Mogadishu-Somalia.

	Item	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev
1.	Discussion among conflicting parties is always used as a method of solving conflicts in Mogadishu Somalia	1	5	2.45	1.23
2.	There is always agreement reached upon as a way of solving conflicts in Mogadishu Somalis	1	5	2.74	1.01
3.	After negotiation among conflicts parties there is always a withdraw of troupes	1	5	2.65	1.10
4.	Majority of political leaders in Somalia have always supported the negotiation programmes for the conflict group in Mogadishu Somalia	1	5	3.45	1.32
5.	Peace can be resulted in thorough collecting small and heavy weapons.	1	5	1.22	0.71
6.	Collection of weapons can reduce anti security problems.	1	5	1.33	.719
7.	Elimination of weapons is a policy of gradual reduction of crimes.	1	5	3.47	.652
8.	Standing down a nation's armed from combat ready status.	1	5	2.1	.342
9.	Resolving war militias is an important factor for peace.	1	5	1.78	1.3
10.	Forceful demobilization is best process for peace recovery.	1	5	4.12	2.23
11	Employing the combat parts is useful for creating peaceful environment.	1	5	2.67	2.0
12	integrating fighting groups can develop peaceful society	1	5	4.21	0.45
13	You make accountability to the upper part of the government.	1	5	2.52	2.31
14	The active combatants have been discharged from armed forces and this has maintained peace in Mogadishu Somalia	1	5	3.21	.451
15	Demobilization has always helped in the different of enemies in Mogadishu is Somalia	1	5	2.21	2.37

Source: Primary data

The results shown in table 4.1 above reveal that, respondents agreed that discussion among conflicting parties is always used as a method of solving conflicts in Mogadishu Somalia (mean=2.45, agreed).

Respondents strongly agreed that; there is always agreement reached upon as a way of solving conflicts in Mogadishu Somalis as revealed by (mean= 2.74, strongly agreed) this was evidenced by the A range of peace initiatives had been undertaken in order to address the situation, including major peace conferences supported by the international community. Several peace agreements had produced new governments, but these never managed to establish control outside of Mogadishu because none was able to gain the overall acceptance of the various warring factions.

Responses on whether majority of political leaders in Somalia have always supported the negotiation programmes for the conflict group in Mogadishu Somalia were as follows (mean= 3.45, agreed) as some respondents emphasized that The negotiations did not involve al-Shabaab, but managed to bring together the warring clans that the President and the Speaker were representing. In August 2012, a new Somali Federal Parliament was inaugurated in Mogadishu. This was followed in September with the Members of Parliament electing Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the country's new president.

Mean= 1.22, strongly agreed that after negotiation among conflicts parties there is always a withdraw of troupes. An armed presence was needed to fill the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of al-Shabaab and there was a need for the TFG to build sustainable administrative structures in these areas. The UN and AU therefore considered the adoption of a new strategic concept, coupled with a further expansion of AMISOM.

As indicated in the above table, Collection of weapons can reduce anti security problems. (Mean=1.33, agreed) also this was emphasized by respondents that

AMISOM had also received weapons from various parties in order to decommission them and had provided escorts to humanitarian organizations.

Interviewees also revealed that elimination of weapons is a policy of gradual reduction of crimes (Mean=3.47, agreed).and although al-Shabaab has clearly been suffering military defeats in Somalia as a result of offensive operations conducted by AMISOM and its partners, the decline of al-Shabaab can also be attributed to more prosaic factors, such as a reduction of its support among the Somali population. In particular, two main factors have led to a reduction in the organization's popular support: the mishandling of the 2011 drought and internal divisions within the organization

Responses on whether standing down a nation's armed from combat ready status (mean=2.1, agreed) revealed by respondents from the field into AMISOM. This position is not too surprising given Ethiopia's usually secretive stance on all defense related issues. Ethiopia was also better equipped than Kenya for sustained unilateral operations. In addition, Ethiopia's involvement in AMISOM had always been considered controversial given Ethiopia's role in the Somali conflict.

A mean of 1.3 agreed that resolving war militias is an important factor for peace in that the advances made against al- Shabaab can partly be considered a result of regional and international power politics and partly attributed to a largely unprecedented effort in African multilateralism: attributing the turning point in the fight against al-Shabaab to the moment when fighting forces in Somalia – Kenya, Ethiopia, AMISOM, the TFG and proxy militias began cooperating and developing a coherent vision of how the defeat of al- Shabaab was to be achieved.

Respondents strongly agreed (mean 4.27) that forceful demobilization is best process for peace recovery for example this request was also picked up by the AU and was perceived favourably by Kenya, probably as an exit strategy from a campaign that

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was proving to be both costly and difficult.105 As previously mentioned, such an authorisation was made by the Security Council in early 2012. In March 2012, the Kenyan troops were subsequently incorporated into to AMISOM, which also received additional troop contributions from Djibouti, significantly augmenting the mission and allowing for the capture of Kismayo

From the same table 1 above, a series of responses from the field also, you make accountability to the upper part of the government (Std. Dev=2.31). The active combatants have been discharged from armed forces and this has maintained peace in Mogadishu Somalia (mean=2.31, agreed) Demobilization has always helped in the different of enemies in Mogadishu is Somalia (Std. Dev =2.37).

4.3 Objective Two: The effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia.

The second objective of the study was to examine the effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia. The items showed the average response from the respondents for each item in relation to the effectiveness of African Union intervention and peace building. The items were rated on the 5 point likert scale ranging between strongly disagree, disagree, not sure, agree and strongly agree.

4.3.1 Effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building

Using item means of customer expectations, an examination of the effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia was carried out. The items were rated on the 5 point likert scale ranging between strongly disagree, disagree, not sure, agree and strongly agree. The findings are shown in table 4.2 below:

Table 2: 4.2: Frequencies effectiveness of African Union intervention and Peace building

	Item	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev
1.	African union in Mogadishu carryout only those operation agreed upon by all member states	1	5	2.35	1.12
2.	African union operations only seeks to settle disputes through the medium of peaceful third-parties	1	5	2.45	.452
3.	African union is well facilitated in terms of financial resources to achieve its mission in Somalia	1	5	3.2	1.11
4.	African union has frequently followed the rule of law in Mogadishu	1	5	1.43	0.72

Source: *Primary data*

Table 3: 4.3: Frequencies effectiveness of Peace building

Civilians now move freely on the streets of Mogadishu even at night without being attacked	1	5	2.45	00.1
No major fighting has occurred in Mogadishu since the deployment of AU militants	2	4	3.25	00.1
AU has trained more Youths in peace keeping and prevention of conflicts techniques	1	5	3.33	2.06
AU usually re-assess their operations for complete restoration of peace in Mogadishu	2	4	4.35	1.1
AU attacks anyone who seems to be a threat to peace and security in Mogadishu	1	5	4.15	1.21
AU militias are deployed in every corner of Mogadishu day and night to ensure no attacks from terrorists	1	5	4.20	1.10

Source: *Primary data*

Also, AU attacks anyone who seems to be a threat to peace and security in Mogadishu received a weighted (mean of 3.23). This was an indication that The AU originally deployed AMISOM with the intention that the UN would take over the responsibility for the peace operation within six months. As the UN considered such a take-over inappropriate, due to the lack of a peace to keep in Somalia, the AU was forced to extend AMISOM's mandate over and over again.63 On each occasion, the organisation reiterated that the UN, especially considering the limited capacity of the

AU to manage and fund the mission, carried ultimate responsibility for international peace and security and, thus, should increase its support to AMISOM and AU militias are deployed in every corner of Mogadishu day and night to ensure no attacks from terrorists this was revealed by (mean=4.20).

4.4 Objective Three: the relationship between African Union peace operations and peace building

The third objective of the study was to establish the relationship between African Union peace operations and peace building in Mogadishu Somalia. The items showed the average response from the respondents for each item in relation to relationship between the two variables. The items were rated on the 5 point likert scale ranging between strongly disagree, disagree, not sure, agree and strongly agree.

Table 4.4; A correlation analysis between African Union peace operations and peace building

		African Union peace operations	Peace building
African Union Peace operations	Pearson Correlation		.350 **
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
	N	30	30
Peace building	Pearson Correlation	.350 **	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
	N	30	30

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

A strong positive relationship (r=.350*, p<0.01) was established because .350 is close to 1, with a p-value of 0.000 which is less than 0.01 implying that a positive relationship that was significant at 0.01 level existed between African Union peace operations and peace building.

To further establish the significance of the relationship between African Union peace operations and peace building the coefficient of determination (r^2) was computed.

Since r=0.350, r^2=0.300. This implies that African Union peace operations contributed 70% on the levels of peace building while 30% was contributed by other factors. The implication of the above relationship was that effective African Union peace operations positively influence peace building and therefore reminds the African Union the need to make AMISOM effective and start contributing its own resources that AMISOM began generating results of scale. Even so, generating the support architecture for AMISOM was a complex and strenuous task that should not be considered easy or self-evident. The result was, however, a new and extensive partnership between the UN and AMISOM (its Troop Contributing Countries and the AU);

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter mainly deals with summary of key findings, conclusions and recommendations related to the African union peace operations and sustainability of peace building using Somalia Mogadishu as the case study all was being drawn from the findings and analysis made after conducting the study. The contribution of African union peace operations was characterized by; Supporting dialogue and reconciliation, working with key stakeholders, Providing, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions and their key infrastructure, assisting in the implementation of the National Security and stabilization Plan, particularly the re-establishment and training of Somali security forces, Providing, within their capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts, monitoring, in areas of deployment, the security situation among others.

5.2 Summary of key findings

It was found out that; males greatly participated in the study as represented by 58.5% whereas 41.4% of the respondents were females; implying that African union peace operation in Somalia involved males as they are known of their strong influence and ability in resolving conflict compared to females.

Further finding revealed that the biggest percentage of the respondents had worked with the African union peace operation in Somalia for a period between 2-3 years as represented by 37.2% whereas 31.9% shows respondents who had with African union peace operation in Somalia for the period between 1-2 years, 5.3% represents interviewees who had worked in the African union peace operation in Somalia for the period of less than and lastly 4.2% of the respondents shows 4.2% of respondents who had worked for African union peace operation in Somalia for 4 years and above,

implying that they have been employees for a long time thus possess enough experience.

The first objective of this study was to investigate the sustainability of peace building in Mogadishu-In addition, based on the findings detailed from the respondent, it is clear that AU has made an important and substantial contribution to improving the security situation in Somalia. In particular, this relates to the seizure of Mogadishu from al-Shabaab in 2011. This turn of events was facilitated by several factors, including the 2010 authorisation of an increase in AU troop numbers, which increased the manpower of the mission. Another important facilitator was the support provided to AU by its partners, such as the UN, EU and individual states, which strengthened the mission on several different levels. This included enabling the deployment of new troops, providing training and increasing the capability of the troops, and the planning of operations. The advances made in Mogadishu were, however, also enabled by a weakening of al-Shabaab which was not directly related to AU, but rather a consequence of a range of factors inherent to al-Shabaab itself.

The second objective was the effectiveness of African Union intervention Peace building in Mogadishu-Somalia More so, AU was established to confront the situation in Somalia at a time when no one else would. At the same time, the AU lacked the capacity to make AU effective and it wasn't until the international community, and particular the UN, started contributing its own resources that AU began generating results of scale. Even so, generating the support architecture for AU was a complex and strenuous task that should not be considered easy or self-evident. The result was, however, a new and extensive partnership between the UN and AU (it's Troop Contributing Countries and the AU); a partnership which could surely, as the Secretary-General suggested, be transferred to other regional missions. However, the lesson to be learned from AU is that the support architecture to make the mission viable also went far beyond the UN and required a great commitment of both individual states and other regional organisations, such as the EU.

The third objective of this is study was the relationship between African Union operations and peace building Furthermore, it was revealed that other major security gains, such as wresting control of the cities of Kismayo and Baidoa from al-Shabaab, are more directly related to separate security interventions launched by neighbouring states Ethiopia and Kenya. One notable aspect of this is, however, that, at the time of the seizure of Kismayo, the Kenyan troops had been integrated into AU and, as such, cannot be ascribed to a separate unilateral intervention, but rather a further increase in AU troop levels, with better equipped and skilled soldiers.

5.3 Conclusion

In short, the major internal changes to AU, which has enabled the mission to contribute to the improved security in Somalia has included changes in AU's mandate, increasing the authorised troop levels from an initial 8,000 to 12,000 and finally to 17,700. AU's mandate has also been revised to allow the mission to expand both geographically and in terms of scope, enabling a more offensive stance, using all necessary means to defeat al-Shabaab. Another major internal enabler has been the support provided to the mission by international partners. In particular, this support has been crucial in making AU a viable force by helping to ensure that the mission, which for several years struggled to reach the authorised troop levels, finally fully deployed in 2012. This was done by, for example, providing funding for troop allowances and providing strategic airlift to actually get the troops and their equipment into Mogadishu. In addition, the external support provided also aimed to increase the capacity of AU in terms of improved management, planning and training.

Other than the circumstances external to AU that have facilitated the improvements in the security situation and which have already been mentioned, the bilateral interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as the weakening of al- Shabaab, the advances made in the political process in Somalia are important factors for explaining and understanding the recent positive developments in the country. These political

advances, which in 2012 yielded a new government, which is widely considered to be legitimate, are the primary driver of peace and security in Somalia, both now and in the future.

Examining the role of AU in supporting the political process and exploring the effects of advances in the political process on AU's ability to establish security presents a challenge in terms of establishing causality, providing a case of 'the chicken and the egg'. As an example, one could argue that AU itself has only had a limited impact on the security situation in Somalia as al-Shabaab was, in fact, weakened, not so much by AU's offensives, as by a reduction in popular support resulting from the establishment of the new government. At the same time, the presence of AU enabled the political process, which, in turn, affected al-Shabaab in a way that was advantageous to AU. Despite the difficulty in assessing the exact role of AU in the security advances which have been made, the findings of this report indicate that the presence of AU alone cannot explain the security gains. However, it is also clear that the improvements in the security situation in Somalia are unlikely to have occurred without the presence of AU. AU is clearly one important piece of the Somalia puzzle, although several other factors also constitute important pieces.

There was a further danger in depicting AU as a peacekeeping success, in that doing so may be interpreted as arguing that AU was a superior option to other types of mission, particularly UN-led missions. As a peace operation, AU has lacked the desired resources and equipment. Formed as an illequipped peacekeeping force operating as a peace enforcer, AU has, in fact, embodied most of the traits of bad peacekeeping that the 2000 Brahimi report warned against. AU has become a model for the regionalization of peacekeeping, sometimes described as an outsourcing of peacekeeping by Western countries to regional organisations, or more maliciously "peacekeeping on the cheap". Leaving the responsibility for peace and security to an under- strength, under-resourced and under-equipped mission, whose relationship to the UN is undefined, is problematic, to say the least. Even though AU has been able

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to achieve some success, several challenges to the task of consolidating peace in Somalia still remain, and it is still too early to tell what the final assessment of AU will be once the mission eventually withdraws.

5.4 Recommendation

If the AU is to salvage any peacekeeping validity, some changes ought to be considered. First, the AU must start peacekeeping with international support, rather than requiring it later. This partnership could use the colonialist attitude many African dictators take towards international aid and use it to their advantage, creating a "good-cop, bad-cop" dichotomy. However this partnership is spun, the AU must frame their peacekeeping endeavors with international partnership in mind given the effects great nations have on the outcome of

Second, a shortage of funds prevents the AU from producing a substantial peacekeeping mission. This reality therefore prescribes the AU to investigate more economically efficient means of attaining peace; mediation has proven promising in this regard as has peace building and preventative diplomacy. Thirdly, for regionalism to take hold there must be some economic interdependency. African union in this vain requires the AU membership to maintain the development of infrastructure and economic interdependency between members. However, a large caveat to this is infrastructure in Africa most likely originates from foreign investment overseas. This requires AU membership to be economically dependent upon foreign investment rather than being interdependent upon each other.

Finally, if a sub-regional organization has a better understanding of regional and cultural issues, then this could potentially lead to better peacekeeping operations vis-à-vis sub-regional advisory (e.g. ECOWAS). However, given the conflicting needs, interests, and opinions of the member states that have joint membership to the AU as well as to sub-regional organizations, the path to peace may be stymied by organizational conflict of interest, leading to distrust. Since regionalism requires the

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AU membership to relinquish their sovereignty to the organization, then this organization is only as strong as the mutual trust of its members.

5.5 Areas for further study

The challenges of African union's peacekeeping missions in Somalia

An analysis of African Union efficacy in making and keeping the peace in Somalia

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APPENDIX 1 A

TRANSMITTAL LETTER

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY VICE CHANCELLOR (DVC)

COLLAGE OF HIGHER DEGREE AND RESEARCH

Dear Sir/Madam, _____

RE: INTRODUCTION LETTER TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN YOUR
INSTITUTION

Mr.Abdukadir Omar Ali student of Kampala International University pursuing Master of Arts in International Relations am currently conducting a field research for his thesis entitled, entitled, African Union Operations and Sustainability of Peace building in Mogadishu Somalia. Your organization has been identified as a valuable source of information pertaining to her research project. The purpose of this letter then was to request you to avail him with the pertinent information he may need.

Any data shared with him was used for academic purposes only and was been kept with utmost confidentiality.

Any assistance rendered to him was be highly appreciated.

Yours truly, _____

APPENDIX IB

INFORMED CONSENT

I am giving my consent to be part of the research study of Mr. Abdukadir Omar Ali that will focus on African Union Operations and Sustainability of Peace building in Somalia. I assured of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality and that I was been given the option to refuse participation and right to withdraw my participation anytime. I have been informed that the research is voluntary and that the results were given to me if I ask for it.

Initials:_____

Date_____

APPENDIX IC

TRANSMITTAL LETTER FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Dear Sir/ Madam, _____

Greetings!

I am master degree in International Relations and Diplomatic Study candidate of Kampala International University. Part of the requirements for the award of the thesis. My study was entitled, African Union Operations and Peace building in Mogadishu Somalia. Within this context, may I request you to participate in this study by answering the questionnaires? Kindly do not leave any option unanswered. Any data you will provide shall be for academic purposes only and no information of such kind shall be disclosed to others.

May I retrieve the questionnaire within 10 days?

Thank you very much in advance.

Yours faithfully,

Mr.Abdukadir Omar Ali

APPENDIX II

SECTION A: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

Gender (Please Tick):

(1) Male   (   )

(2) Female (   )

_____Age

_____Marital Status

1. Married_____

2. Single_____

Qualifications Under Education Discipline (Please Specify):

(1) Certificate   (   )

(2) Diploma   (   )

(3) Bachelors   (   )

(4) Masters   (   )

(5) PhD   (   )

Other qualifications other than education discipline _____

Number of Years Teaching Experience (Please Tick):

(1) Less than/below one year ( )

(2) 1- 2yrs   (   )

(3) 3-4yrs   (   )

(4) 5-6yrs   (   )

(5) 7 years and above   (   )

APPENDIX III

SECTION A: QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AFRICAN UNION INTERVENTION IN PEACE BUILDING IN MOGADISHU-SOMALIA

Direction 1: Please write your rating on the space before each option which corresponds to your best choice:

A. For the level of conflict resolution

Mean Range	Response Mode	Interpretation
3.26-4.00	Strongly agree	Very high
2.51-3.25	Agree	High
1.76-2.50	Disagree	Low
1.00-1.75	Strongly disagree	Very low

Questions	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Peace keeping operations				
African union in Mogadishu carryout only those operation agreed upon by all member states				
African union operations only seeks to settle disputes through the medium of peaceful third-parties				
African union is well facilitated in terms of financial resources to achieve its mission in Somalia				
African union has frequently followed the rule of law in Mogadishu				
Force during operations is only used by African militants in self-defence				
AU operations have a positive effect on socio-economic development of Mogadishu				

Only multiple commands are simultaneously used when intensive fighting erupts				
No human rights violation of any nature has ever been committed by AU Soldiers				
Conflict prevention				
Civilians now move freely on the streets of Mogadishu even at night without being attacked				
No major fighting has occurred in Mogadishu since the deployment of AU militants				
AU has trained more Youths in peace keeping and prevention of conflicts techniques				
AU has enforced preventive deployment and civilians are happy with them				
AU work hand in hand with the military sector of Somalia to put an end to fighting.				
Peace enforcement				
AU usually re-assess their operations for complete restoration of peace in Mogadishu				
AU attacks anyone who seems to be a threat to peace and security in Mogadishu				
AU militias are deployed in every corner of Mogadishu day and night to ensure no attacks from terrorists				
AU is neutral to all fighting groups in Somalia their mission is only peace keeping				

SECTION B:

PEACEBUILDING

The table below shows the alternative responses and the number assigned to each response. For the following sections please evaluate statement by ticking in the box with the number the best suits your response.

Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1	2	3	4	5

Questions	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Negotiations				
Discussion among conflicting parties is always used as a method of solving conflicts in Mogadishu Somalia				
There is always agreement reached upon as a way of solving conflicts in Mogadishu Somalis				
After negotiation among conflicts parties there is always a withdraw of troupes				
You protect the clashes.				
Majority of political leaders in Somalia have always supported the negotiation programmes for the conflict group in Mogadishu Somalia				
1. Peace can be resulted in thorough collecting small and heavy weapons.				
2. Collection of weapons can reduce anti security problems.				

3. Elimination of weapons is a policy of gradual reduction of crimes.				
Demobilization				
4. Standing down a nation's armed from combat ready status.				
5. Resolving war militias is an important factor for peace.				
6. Forceful demobilization is best process for peace recovery.				
Reintegration				
7. Employing the combat parts is useful for creating peaceful environment.				
8. integrating fighting groups can develop peaceful society				
9. You make accountability to the upper part of the government.				
10. The active combatants have been discharged from armed forces and this has maintained peace in Mogadishu Somalia				
11. Demobilization has always helped in the different of enemies in Mogadishu is Somalia				