

**UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMANITARIAN AID IN  
MOGADISHU, SOMALIA**

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**A THESIS REPORT PRESENTED TO THE COLLEGE OF HIGH DEGREES AND  
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## DECLARATION

This thesis report is my original work and has not been presented for a Degree or any other academic award in any university or institution of learning.

**ABDULKADIR MOHAMED HUSSEIN**

(STUDENTS)

Sign 


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## APPROVAL

I confirm that the work reported in this thesis report was carried out by the candidate under my supervision.

Name and Signature of Supervisor

(Supervisor)

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Gepolisa Ekenah', written over a horizontal line.A handwritten date '12/11/2014' in blue ink, written over a horizontal line.

Date

### **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis report to members of my family, who have been very supportive and of a great encouragement to me to pursue my graduate study in International Relations and Diplomacy.

### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The main objective of this study to investigated the contributions of United States policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu Somalia. The research was based on the primary data and focused on United States foreign policy and humanitarian aid.

Data analysis was based on univariate analysis and bivariate analysis the study concluded that international humanitarian aid has grown exponentially over the past sixty years in the number and variety of donors and aid workers, as well as the amount of money transferred to vulnerable countries for emergency, relief ,rehabilitation and development. we recommended that to facilitates simplified customs procedures and consult the model agreement in customs facilitation in humanitarian assistance between the united nations and government drawn up by OCHA in 1996 in order to establish measures to accelerate the important, export and shipment of relief aid and articles belonging to relief personnel in disaster and emergency situations.

## ABREVIATIONS

US	United States
HOA	Horn of Africa
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
VOA	Voice of Africa
FRUD	Front for the Restoration of the Democratic Unity
UN	United Nations
NGO	Non government organizations
WFP	World food program
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
OSAFA	Office for the Supervision of the Affairs of Foreign Agencies
IMF	International monetary fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Security and Safety
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEDs	Landmines and improvised explosive devices

## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background to the Study**

This section includes the Historical Perspective, the Contextual Perspective, the Contextual Perspective and the Theoretical Perspective of the background of the research.

#### **1.1.1 Historical Perspective**

U.S Foreign Policy has long been guided by its national interests: Access to resources and markets. To secure these interests U.S has had global reach militarily, economic and control. In pursuit of these global interests U.S applies a corded range of strategies, overt and covert. Humanitarian aid is one such strategy. Countries in civil wars or struck by disaster or a combination of these desperately need aid. Somalia since 1991 has been gripped by civil war as well as natural calamities. For long Somalia was considered critical to U.S. strategic interests.

Intra-state conflict or civil war has been a constant throughout human history as nations have been repeatedly plagued by divisive internal wars. Yet as much as civil wars have beset nations, other states have sought time and time again to intervene in these conflicts. By the past century, intervention by a third party in an intrastate conflict became a prominent feature of the international system. Prior to the end of the Cold War, powerful nations routinely intervened in the civil wars of other nations in an attempt to favor one combatant over the other for a multitude of reasons including strategic, political, and economic interests. While such a mode of foreign involvement in civil war still exists, the last two to three decades of international politics has seen the growth of a new variant of intervention: multilateral intervention. This multilateralism is markedly different from the previous means of foreign involvement in intrastate conflict. Interference in domestic conflicts by via multilateralism is not supposed to be performed primarily out of geopolitical self-interest. (Wheeler, Nicholas J, 2000).

Rather, it is to be done under the auspices of alleviating the humanitarian crises endemic to violent intrastate warfare. Furthermore, as the name implies, foreign involvement is to be conducted by a number of parties usually under the authority of an intergovernmental

organization rather than by one major state acting unilaterally. By the 1990s multilateral intervention via international organizations like the United Nations and under the leadership of the United States gained prevalence, leading author Nicholas J. Wheeler to argue that it had become the norm of intervention. Different forms of multilateral involvement included providing humanitarian aid and putting in place post-conflict peacekeeping missions. Yet, a more expansive form of multilateral intervention involved the use of military force by interveners. (Wheeler, Nicholas J, 2000).

However, multilateral intervention even if primarily carried out by the United States differed from unilateral intervention as it was predicated on the approval and assistance of other actors in the international system. While meeting resistance from policy and military officials who saw such intervention as risky and strategically disadvantageous, this approach gained a number of proponents in the early 1990s.<sup>2</sup> Scholars like Stanley Hoffmann argued “military intervention [was] ethically justified when domestic turmoil threatens regional or international security and when massive violations of human rights occur.” New advocates of military multilateral intervention like Hoffman claimed humanitarian aid could not go far enough in mitigating severe civil wars. (Western, Jon 2002).

As it gained proponents, multilateral military intervention in intrastate conflict occurred more frequently in the international system as a number of conflicts in the last twenty years saw action taken by multilateral coalitions often led by the United States. More often than not, as was the case with Bosnia and Somalia, nations that saw military intervention initially were the recipients of humanitarian aid until the intervening forces felt compelled to resort to force. However, despite Stanley Hoffmann’s assertion that military intervention was justified in cases where civil war undermined regional stability and human rights, military intervention was not constantly utilized by the United States to mitigate intrastate conflict around the globe. Furthermore, while some intrastate conflicts saw the delivery of humanitarian aid followed by military intervention, some intrastate conflicts never saw any foreign involvement beyond humanitarian aid. (Hoffman, Stanley 1995).

### 1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective

**Theory:** explains how some aspect of human behavior or performance is organized. It thus enables us to make predictions about that behavior.

Ampaw (2002) believes the modernization paradigm is “a historical construct, not fashioned by a critical analysis of Africa’s present condition as a product of history, structural presuppositions and process.” Ampaw says even a national economic policy choice that is driven by the logic of structural adjustment program and its neo-liberal underpinnings will not make Africa experience autonomous development. And he doubts if this paradigm that propagates the role of foreign capital investments catalyst to growth is really beneficial since the long-term dependence on aid puts the continent in a vulnerable position. Despite commitments by OECD countries to increase aid,

Ampaw argues the trend of Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been falling since the beginning of the 1980s. He mentions that this fall has been confounded by the rise in ODA for “global housekeeping activities” such as managing the environment, controlling illicit drugs, and preventing infectious diseases such as AIDS. Ampaw notes that these activities in the last few years have risen to about 40% of ODA. This suggests that monies that previously targeted poverty reduction in Africa are now being channeled to deal with these global issues. Yet donors still want everyone to believe aid is flowing at an increased rate.

In 2006, \$103.6 billion dollars of foreign aid flowed to developing countries. Over the past 50 years, the amount of foreign aid dispersed totals over \$2.3 trillion 2006 dollars (Easterly 2006a, p. 4). However, despite a large amount of time and resources devoted to development assistance, a lack of theoretical consensus surrounding the effectiveness of foreign aid remains. Two competing theories have emerged. The public interest theory argues that foreign aid is necessary to fill a financing or investment gap, and this will in turn lift countries out of a so-called poverty trap (for example, Sachs 2005).

Upon recent examination, a large empirical literature illustrates that foreign aid exhibits a zero effect on growth or any other indicators of poverty, supporting the public choice theory (Boone 1996; Svensson 1999, 2000; Knack 2001; Brumm 2003; Ovaska 2003; Easterly et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2006a; Easterly 2006a; Powell and Ryan 2006; Williamson 2008). Svensson (1999) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) do find a positive effect of aid on growth when combined with the right conditions, specifically the right policy and institutional environments. However, Leeson (2008) offers an alternative explanation. Most developing countries have weak institutions and bad policies, contributing to why they are poor. Thus, where aid is needed, it will be unhelpful because the necessary institutions are lacking. Where it can do some good, in those countries with good policies and institutions, it is not needed.

For example, Easterly (2007b) states that “\$568 billion in today’s dollars flowed into Africa over the past 42 years, yet per capita growth of the median African nation has been close to zero. The top quarter of aid recipients...received 17 percent of their GDP in aid over those 42 years, yet also had near-zero per capita growth. Successful cases of development happening due to a large inflow of aid and technical assistance have been hard to find...” Also, Easterly notes that the recent success stories of China, India, and Vietnam received a small percentage of aid relative to their GDP (Easterly 2007b).

### **1.1.3 Contextual Perspective**

The United States considers Somali to be a strong strategic location. Its location sitting atop the Horn of Africa, (HOA), provides access to the Gulf of Aden. This prominent shipping lane is the main source of income for Somalia, and of importance to the United States' proactive global war on terror. Somalia was a role-player in the early 1990's Gulf War and after September 11th, 2001 it became a very important location of the United States. The United States has its only military base in the African continent, in Somalia. This base serves as a dual purpose. Its' primary initiatives include humanitarian efforts in the region, both inside and outside the borders of Somalia, as well as a counterterrorism effort that focuses on military operations and land mine removal. (McKenzie, CNN) The humanitarian side of the United States' policy includes setting up the only forward



operating warehouse of food and emergency relief in the continent of Africa and outside of the U.S. (State.gov) this precaution ensures that natural disasters are responded to in a timely manner as to maximize the effectiveness of its effort. More than just providing emergency food relief, the US also helps build schools in remote locations and poor communities throughout the region, not just in Somalia (Cowan, Jane K. 2006)

Somalia has been cooperating in the US-led war against terrorism, and several hundred American troops have been stationed at Le Monier barracks since April 2002. On 19 September 2002 US military officials said 800 special-operations troops have been moved to Somalia, where they could be used to hunt for al-Qaida terrorists in nearby Yemen. Military Police personnel are also known to be deployed in Somalia, although Pentagon officials stress police deployments are routine for security purposes during foreign deployments. Dispatching the troops to , and also sending a ship to the region with two-thousand Marines, US officials said they had no specific intelligence on any al-Qaida terrorists in Yemen or anywhere else in the region (Evans & Tony 2005)

From 1991 to 2000, the Somalia government fought a civil war against Afar rebels of the FRUD (Front for the Restoration of the Democratic Unity). In 1996 and 1997, Yemen expressed an interest to improve relationships with the United States. The Navy was looking for another port at that time, partially because of the unsatisfactory conditions that existed in Somalia. The US Navy had been in Somalia for refueling, and was interested in terminating that contract because at that time in Somali the threat conditions were far worse. The port was extremely busy, with many small boats and the conditions ashore and in the government t was not satisfactory. (Hill, 1993)

#### **1.1.4 Conceptual Perspective**

According to a late November VOA news report, about 450 Army troops plus 50 civilian defense workers were reportedly operating a forward staging base for soldiers and military equipment heading to Kuwait in support of Operation "Desert Spring". This task had previously been carried out in Kuwait, but Somali had become the site of choice, as a result of the training opportunities it provides to the Army's combat service support personnel and in moving troops and equipment into potential battle zones using both naval and aerial routes. According to the news report, an estimated two brigades worth of equipment and troops had moved through Somali, with half of it transiting to Kuwait and the other half transiting back to the United States. Foreign relations with the government of Somalia are maintained by the Somalia Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Somalia is greatly affected by events in Somalia and Ethiopia, and therefore relations are important and, at times, very delicate. The fall of the Siad Barre and Mengistu governments in Somalia and Ethiopia, respectively, in 1991, caused Somalia to face national security threats due to the instability in the neighboring states and a massive influx of refugees estimated at 100,000 from Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia's military and economic agreements with France provide continued security and economic assistance. Somalia has been the host country for French military units since independence (Cowan, 2006).

Even if it does, is it growth measured by GDP or one that is measured by levels of poverty and basic living standards? There is no agreement in the literature on this question. While Rostow (1990) sees foreign assistance – the “external intrusion by more advanced societies” – as a precondition for the take-off into economic success, Hayter (1971) argues it is a disguised form of imperialism and as such cannot result in any desired economic benefits. To her any benefit that could arise from aid would only be incidental, not planned. These two divergent schools of thought in the aid/development literature are still present to date. A paper by Burnside and Dollar (1997) was emphatic that there is a correlation between aid and economic growth, but only when aid is applied in a good policy environment. The paper, using a sample of 56 countries and six four-year time periods from 1970 - 1973 until 1990 - 1993, shows that where aid coincided with good policies, its impact on growth was strong and positive. Collier and Dollar

(2001) also argue “aid is conditionally effective,” with conditions including policy environment, governance, rates of corruption and conflicts. Despite the support the Burnside and Dollar stance has amassed (Dovern and Nunnemkamp, 2007; John and Sackey, 2008), there are other studies that show no significant correlation between aid and growth. In the first place, besides the point that the four-year ranges they used is too short to measure significant growth, if the focus is “good policies” then very poor countries will not be selected for aid since they will mostly not meet this criterion.

Thus, eradicating poverty will not be realized soon. On this same matter, Easterly et al. (2003) found different results when they added more data and also extended the year range from 1993 to 1997. Although they do not actually argue that aid is ineffective, they find that with the introduction of the new data, the positive relationship between aid and growth withers away. Easterly (2003) has pursued this argument further, stating that “the idea that ‘aid buys growth’ is an integral part of the founding myth and ongoing mission of the aid bureaucracy.” Another argument is that aid reduces the incentives to invest, especially when the recipient is assured that future poverty will call for more aid. This phenomenon is known as the Samaritan’s Dilemma (Gibson et al., 2005; The Economist, 1995). Aid can also reduce the recipient country’s competitiveness (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005), culminating in the Dutch disease (a condition that reduces competitiveness of the manufacturing sector due to overabundance of foreign assistance).

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

United States foreign aid has never been perfect, but the seeping of military and antiterrorism initiatives into development work threatens to take humanitarian efforts to a new low. In an attempt to win the hearts and minds of local populations in Ethiopia and Somalia, the U.S. military reasoned that it must demonstrate the concrete benefits of collaborating with Americans in the fight against al shabab, al Qaeda and the Taliban. They used soldiers and other military personnel to build schools and bridges in these countries with mixed success. This engendered a tendency to apply the approach anywhere in the world where there was a whiff of al shabab activity. To this end, the percentage of U.S. foreign aid channeled through the military increased from 6 to 20 percent worldwide between 2002 and 2007 (Harrell-Bond, Barbara 2002).

But though using the military as a development agency can make sense in a war zone, mixing the two very different missions is enormously problematic in most other contexts. The U.S. government provides assistance to Somali's military to manage and contain the Al Qaeda bands in this small area of the country. As such, recent attempts by the U.S. military to become involved in development in Somali and its neighbors make little sense. The United States is already viewed positively by the local population. Other agencies rather other than the military are better positioned to facilitate and have a track record of positive change. When the military becomes involved in development work, the local population comes to see these efforts as part of a larger military campaign. And that's a dangerous precedent to set (Donnelly, Jack 2006). This study investigates the nexus of the United States foreign policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu Somalia.

### **1.2 Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study is to investigate the contributions of United States Policy and Humanitarian Aid in Mogadishu, Somalia.

### **1.3 Objectives**

- I. To investigate the United States Foreign Policy in relation to the conflict in Mogadishu Somalia.
- II. To investigate the U.S Humanitarian Intervention in relation to the conflict in Mogadishu Somalia.
- III. The Identify the challenges facing the United States Foreign Policy on humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

- I. What is the United Nations Foreign Policy in relation to the conflict in Mogadishu Somalia?
- II. How does is the u.s humanitarian Intervention in relation to the conflict in Mogadishu Somalia?
- III. What are the challenges facing the United States Foreign Policy on humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia?

### **1.5 Hypothesis**

There is no significant relationship between United State foreign policy and humanitarian aid.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

#### **1.6.1 Geographical scope**

The study was carried out in Mogadishu; Mogadishu is a town of Somalia Region of Somalia. Lying east of Lake Fer Fer, It is situated about 350 kilometers Southwest of Somalia City and 490 km (370 mi) south of the border with Ethiopia. The town is home to a population of around 3 Million people. Somalia is served by Mogadishu Airport. The place-name literally means "Water hole or a well" in the Somali's language. The respondents of the study will include local people, government and non-government officials.

#### **1.6.2 Theoretical scope**

The study was based on evaluation theory which gives the way of consolidating humanitarian aid (Carol Weiss, 1985).

#### **1.6.3 Content scope**

The study was limited to the evaluation of foreign policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu town; Somalia. The study covered the level of evaluation of United States foreign policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu town, Somalia.

#### **1.6.4 Time scope**

The study was carried out for a period of four months starting from January 2013 up to May, 2014, in this time period, the researcher was able to collect the relevant data that is presented in the research findings.

### **1.7 Significance of the Study**

The findings and recommendations were a major significance to the following:


The study enlightened the ministry of internal affairs and other organizations that increasing productivity, need to retain well implemented humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia.

The research was beneficial to the researcher, through interacting with various respondents; the researcher's ability and skills were widened and enhanced through literature gain in research.

The study was beneficial to other scholars who conduct studies in related field in future.

### 1.8. The conceptual Framework

The variables involved in the study should be in chapter two.



Source: Adapted from Teachers' Education Management Programme handbook (TEMDEP 1993)

#### Explanation of the model of the conceptual framework

The figure 1 of the conceptual framework has two main variables such as independent variables and dependent variables which influence each other. It is many-to-many, where the indicators under the independent variable influence the one indicator under the dependent variables. The model will consider U.S. Foreign Policy and Humanitarian aid in Mogadishu Somalia. However, the model above indicates that there are extraneous variables that may also affect U.S. Foreign Policy and compete with the independent

variables such as geopolitical interests, resources access, war on terror and military training. These are; cultural factors, religious factors, other powerful states such as Russia and China, gulf states, tribal wars and terrorism.

## **1.0 Operational Definitions of Key Terms**

### **Humanitarian aid**

Humanitarian aid is material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises including natural disaster and man-made disaster. The primary objective of humanitarian aid is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. It may therefore be distinguished from development aid, which seeks to address the underlying socioeconomic factors which may have led to a crisis or emergency. Conflicts adversely affect civilians both directly, and indirectly, through the resulting "complex emergencies" that protracted conflicts create. In the immediate area of conflict, the primary aim is preventing human casualties and ensuring access to the basics for survival: water, sanitation, food, shelter, and health care. Away from the main fighting, the priority is to assist people who have been displaced, prevent the spread of conflict, support relief work, and prepare for rehabilitation (Horn, David G. 1988).

### **Tructure of the dissertation**

This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter one: gives the introduction of the study background of study, statement of the problem, objective, research questions, hypothesis, scope of the study, significance of the study and conceptual framework. Chapter two literature review factors influencing humanitarian aid according terms. Chapter three methodology that was used in the study which includes research design, research population, sample size, sampling procedure, data analysis, ethical consideration and limitation in the study. Chapter four data presentation, analysis and interpretation and chapter five Discussions, conclusions and recommendation.



## CHAPTER TWO

### REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on this topic. The purpose of the review is to clarify the problem and identify the gaps in the existing literature.

#### 2.1 Theoretical Review

Theoretical debate in political science literature regarding what kind of conditions are conducive to an escalation of humanitarian to military intervention is limited to a degree. Instead, a number of different perspectives on intervention have looked at specific factors that might encourage or deter intervention. A few authors have looked at a cross-section of factors for intervention. Among these authors, Patrick Regan notably argues that a mix of domestic and international “audience constraints” motivate states to become involved in external intrastate conflicts. While broad comparative analyses of different influences behind intervention are few in number, perspectives on intervention have been viewed by authors like Martha Finnemore as falling within two broad schools of how to view the international system, realism and liberalism. Liberal perspectives of intervention commonly see it as motivated by altruistic humanitarian intentions while realist perspectives tend to view interventions, even those of a humanitarian nature, through the prism of self-interest. This study, while answering the fundamental question of what prompts multilateral military intervention, also serves to agglomerate and contrast the array of viewpoints on the subject. On a broad level, the perspectives regarding why military intervention occurs can be grouped into three categories or condition sets: those that see intervention as motivated by severity of conditions on the ground, those that see it as the product of domestic political influences, and those that see it as a product of geopolitical considerations. (Regan, Patrick M 1998).

Evaluation theory does more than help us make good judgments about what kind of methods to use, under what circumstances, and toward what forms of evaluation influence. First, evaluation theories are a way of consolidating aid received, that is, of synthesizing prior experience. Carol Weiss’ (1985), work can help evaluators develop a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the way organizations make decisions

and may be influenced by evaluation findings. Theories enable us to learn from the experience of others (as the saying goes, we don't live long enough to learn everything from our own mistakes). George Madaus, Michael Scriven, and Daniel Stufflebeam (2002), had this function of evaluation theory in mind when they said that evaluators who are unknowledgeable about theory are "doomed to repeat past mistakes and, equally debilitating, will fail to sustain and build on past successes."

Second, comparing evaluation theories is a useful way of identifying and better understanding the key areas of debate within the field. Comparative study of evaluation theory likewise helps crystallize what the unsettled issues are for practice. When we read the classic exchange between Michael Patton and Carol Weiss, for example, we learn about very different perspectives on what evaluation use can or should look like.

A third reason for studying evaluation theory is that theory should be an important part of our identities as evaluators, both individually and collectively. If we think of ourselves in terms of our methodological skills, what is it that differentiates us from many other people with equal (or even superior) methodological expertise? Evaluation theory, as Will Shadish said in his presidential address to the American Evaluation Association, is "who we are." But people come to evaluation through quite varied pathways, many of which don't involve explicit training in evaluation. That there are myriad pathways into evaluation is, of course, a source of great strength for the field, bringing diversity of skills, opinions, knowledge sets, and so on

## **2.2 Conceptual framework**

Humanitarian "clusters," or sectors focused on specific relief activities, are usually established during humanitarian crises to enable the United Nations to coordinate partners, prioritize resources, and facilitate planning. In the Horn of Africa region, clusters are led by various aid agencies or specific government ministries, and most have been in place for some time in response to the slow onset of the drought crisis. In Somalia and Ethiopia, all clusters are active. For example, in Somalia, U.N. led clusters focus on a range of typical humanitarian activities including food aid, nutrition, health, shelter, water and sanitation, agriculture/livelihood, and protection. In Ethiopia, similar activities

are led by the government and also include camp management, while humanitarian aid agencies focus on early warning, early recovery, and emergency telecommunications. There are no clusters in Somalia; instead a humanitarian focal point has been assigned by the U.N. Development Program. In Kenya, the clusters are the responsibility of the Kenyan government (Cohen, Ronald 1989).

Landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) add to the dangers facing aid workers. The increasingly difficult security situation drove many international aid groups out of Al Shabaab-controlled areas by late 2009. WFP, which Al Shabaab had accused of undermining Somali farmers by importing food, suspended operations in the south in January 2010 amid growing threats and intimidation, and Al Shabaab issued an official statement banning WFP from areas under its control the following month. On July 5, 2011, facing a mounting humanitarian crisis, Al Shabaab publicly requested international assistance for previously inaccessible southern Somalia. The group's spokesperson, however, later announced that aid agencies that had been previously banned, like WFP, had "hidden agendas" and were not welcome. He also accused the United Nations of exaggerating the severity of the drought and politicizing the crisis. Since July, WFP has scaled up assistance in Somalia and has begun to open new routes by land and air to serve famine-stricken areas, although it remains restricted from operating in Al Shabaab territory. WFP began food aid airlifts to Mogadishu in late July, and reports suggest that it has opened up a new logistics corridor to transport food supplies from Somaliland, through Ethiopia, to the Ethiopian border town of Dollo Ado. From there, food supplies can be transported across the border to people in accessible areas of southern Somalia. Other relief organizations have been able to continue operations in Al Shabaab-controlled areas, including multiple Islamic aid organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which operates through the Somali Red Crescent Society. Given the restricted access of WFP and other relief agencies, ICRC has significantly increased its delivery of food aid, feeding an additional 1.1 million southern Somalis affected by drought and conflict (Lewin, Carroll Mac. 1993).

In Somalia, for example is one of the most hostelling countries to humanitarian aid workers. The security context and the humanitarian operational environment that both

local and international aid agencies face have severely restricted humanitarian activities, particularly in areas under the control of the radical Islamist group, al Shabaab. Aid organizations responded to al Shabaab's threats by limiting areas of operations or fully suspending operations in southern Somalia. The majority of the organizations that remain active in Somalia have concentrated operations in and around territory under government control in Mogadishu, territory under the control of government-aligned administrations in central Somalia, and in the semi-autonomous regions in northern Somalia of Puntland and Somaliland. In the south, the withdrawal of humanitarian aid organizations has exacerbated the effect of the Horn's severe drought on the Somali people (Session, Noni 2004).

The drought in the Horn of Africa has left over 3.2 million Somalis in need of immediate food assistance. Of these, 2.8 million live in southern Somalia, an area that has proven to be the most inaccessible in the country. There is a famine in Bay and Lower Shabelle region, in parts of Middle Shabelle and Bakool regions, in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in the Afgoi Corridor, and also in the IDP camps in Mogadishu. The UN has noted that two other regions, Lower and Middle Jubba regions are expected to be experiencing famine conditions. The hardest-hit regions remain under the control of al Shabaab (Moore, Erin 1995).

Denial of access by al Shabaab militants, and in some cases by other armed militias, is the single greatest obstacle to the provision of humanitarian assistance, as noted in the UN's most recent monitoring group report.

Al Shabaab not only creates a prohibitive security environment, but also restricts humanitarian operations in southern Somalia. The group has banned many international aid agencies from operating within territories under its control.

Al Shabaab has enforced this ban with violence: militants raid local offices, destroy foodstuffs and medical supplies, and kidnap aid workers. The group's actions against aid organizations have created the humanitarian emergency that many Somalis now face (Rawls, John 1999).

Efficiency and Effectiveness. An effective and timely humanitarian relief operation has the capacity to save thousands of lives. It is also, however, an extremely difficult undertaking. Potential beneficiaries may be located within a zone of conflict or in areas with poor infrastructure, making it difficult and dangerous for humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance. As a result, help may reach only the most accessible areas, with other potential beneficiaries being neglected (Session, Noni 2004).

The ever-increasing number of agencies on the ground, the difficulty of obtaining accurate intelligence, and the unpredictability of humanitarian crises make effective management and coordination extremely difficult. Solving this problem requires improved intelligence gathering and sharing, as well as tight management and coordination (Smillie, Ian and Larry Minear 2004).

Political Dilemmas. The 'humanitarian alibi' has been defined as "the misuse of the humanitarian idea and humanitarian workers by governments eager to do as little as possible in economically unpromising regions like sub-Saharan Africa." Humanitarian aid gives the appearance that the international community is at least doing something, but "humanitarian intervention in the absence of a political solution solves nothing. In the case of Sudan, relief efforts have been called "an excuse to do nothing," a result of the fact that the West has "no great interest" in political intervention to end the fighting (Harrell-Bond, Barbara 2002).

Humanitarian aid that ensures that non-combatants are fed, sheltered, and healthy, but does not alleviate the violence around them, can lead to the "specter of the well-fed dead." Even more disturbing, the provision of humanitarian assistance can give noncombatants a mistaken sense of security and protection by the international community, with tragic consequences (Van Arsdale, Peter W. 2006)

Humanitarian aid can prolong and fuel conflicts, undermining its ultimate goal of saving lives: For fighting parties, aid can become a resource to be fought over. Aid leakage, or 'political taxation' of aid, refers to situations in which a portion of the aid goes directly to the fighting parties, who then use it, themselves or sell it to buy weapons. Aid is fungible;

because populations and troops are being fed by aid, fighting parties no longer have to worry about providing for this need themselves and are thus able to put more resources into fighting (Horn, David G. 1988)

Aid that helps only one side in a conflict can fuel tensions and competition between the sides. Simply ensuring equal distribution to different ethnic groups can reinforce divisions and 'labels' and make the groups less dependent on each other. Aid can create private incentives for continuation of the war, for example by paying relatively high wages to local people employed by aid agencies. Imported food aid can undermine the local economy and make an activity like agriculture less profitable. Solving these problems through aid conditionality carries the risk of harming the poorest and most vulnerable members of society. 'Smart aid' responds to this dilemma by applying the principle of conditionality to aid that is of greatest benefit to warlords and political leaders (Wu, David Y.H. 1974)

Incursions on national sovereignty: Governments may refuse to allow humanitarian agencies to assist their citizens and may object to conditionality of aid and development assistance, citing defense of their national sovereignty. However, there is a growing acceptance of the changing norm of sovereignty to "sovereignty as responsibility," which implies a government's responsibility for the well-being of its citizens (Horn, David G. 1988).

The basic criticism of aid is that it neither goes where it was intended nor helps those intended. According to Collier, there are four known traps that contribute this problem. The first such trap is known as the conflict trap. Aid should not be used to finance military endeavors. It is difficult to "design aid in such a way that it works even in the environments of poor governance and poor policy that are most at risk of conflict. The second trap is called the natural resource trap. Countries that are resource rich already have a large volume of capital flowing into their economies. However, it is not being used to its potential. The third trap occurs when a country is entirely landlocked, making it difficult for the country to engage in global trade. The fourth trap is that of bad governance. However, "there are three ways in which aid can potentially help

turnarounds: incentives, skills, and reinforcement.” Policy conditionalities, or structural adjustments, were reservations put on aid until a government agreed to aid implemented in the 1980s. This did not work. Aid needs to somehow provide incentives for giving the people power. Power needs to be transferred from the governments to the people. Aid should be restructured in order to allow for skills building in country. According to Collier, “technical assistance is not negligible money spent on countries with the skilled people who constitute technical assistance is a quarter of total aid flows.”(Donnelly, Jack 2006).

Prior to the Ogaden War, Somalia had been allied with the Soviet Union, and its relations with the United States were strained. Largely because the Soviet Union sided with Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, a United States-Somali rapprochement began in 1977 and culminated in a military access agreement in 1980 that permitted the United States to use naval ports and airfields at Berbera, Chisimayu, and Mogadishu, in exchange for military and economic aid. The United States subsequently refurbished facilities originally developed by the Soviet Union at the Gulf of Aden port of Berbera. The United States Rapid Deployment Force used Berbera as a base for its Operation Bright Star exercises in 1981, and American military advisers were permanently stationed there one year later. Somali military units participated in Operation Bright Star joint maneuvers in 1985. The base at Berbera was used in the fall of 1990 during the deployment of personnel and supplies to Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Persian Gulf War.

Controversy over the Siad Barre government's human rights policies clouded the future of United States military cooperation with Somalia. Siad Barre's policy of repression in the north aroused criticism of his regime in the United States Congress, where the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives held extensive hearings during July 1988 on human rights abuses in Somalia. In 1989, under congressional pressure, the administration of President George Bush terminated military aid to Somalia, although it continued to provide food assistance and to operate a small International Military Education and Training program. In 1990 Washington revealed that Mogadishu had been in default on loan repayments for more than a year. Therefore, under the terms of the Brooke Amendment, this meant that Somalia was ineligible to receive any further

United States aid. During the height of the fighting in Mogadishu in January 1991, the United States closed its embassy and evacuated all its personnel from the country. The embassy was ransacked by mobs in the final days of the Siad Barre regime. The United States recognized the provisional government shortly after its establishment. Since the outbreak of the civil war, the United States has consistently urged all parties to come together to resolve their dispute by peaceful means. The United States government has supported the territorial unity of Somalia and as of May 1992 has refused to recognize the independence of northern Somalia proclaimed by the SNM.

Not only is aid given with anterior motives, it often does not reach those who are intended to receive it. For example a report composed by the World Bank in 2006 stated that an estimated half of the funds donated towards health programs in sub-Saharan Africa did not reach the clinics and hospitals. Money is paid out to fake accounts, prices are increased for transport or warehousing, and drugs are sold to the black market. Another example is in Ghana, where approximately 80% of donations do not go towards their intended purposes. This type of corruption only adds to the criticism of aid, as it is not helping those who need it, and may be adding to the problem (Fassin, Didier 2005).

Besides criticism of motive, aid may be criticized simply on the grounds that it is not effective: that is to say, it did not do what it was intended to do or help the people it was intended to help. This is essentially an *economic* criticism of aid. The two types of criticism are not entirely separate: critics of the ideology behind a piece of aid are likely to see it as ineffective; and indeed, ineffectiveness must imply some flaws in the ideology. Statistical studies have produced widely differing assessments of the correlation between aid and economic growth, and no firm consensus has emerged to suggest that foreign aid generally does boost growth. Some studies find a positive correlation, but others find either no correlation or a negative correlation (Kennedy, David 2004).

Summing up the experience of African countries both at the national and at the regional levels it is no exaggeration to suggest that, on balance, foreign assistance, especially foreign capitalism, has been somewhat deleterious to African development. It must be



admitted, however, that the pattern of development is complex and the effect upon it of foreign assistance is still not clearly determined. But the limited evidence available suggests that the forms in which foreign resources have been extended to Africa over the past twenty-five years, insofar as they are concerned with economic development, are, to a great extent, counterproductive (Fassin, Didier 2005)

The economist William Easterly and others have argued that aid can often distort incentives in poor countries in various harmful ways. Aid can also involve inflows of money to poor countries that have some similarities to inflows of money from natural resources that provoke the resource curse. Many individuals and organizations criticize U.S. Aid. Emergency funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, for instance, are linked to a wide range of free-market policy prescriptions that some argue interfere in a country's sovereignty. Policy prescriptions from outsiders can do more harm as they might not fit the local environment. The IMF can be good at helping countries over a short problematic financial period, but for poor countries with long lasting issues it can cause harm. In his book *The White Man's Burden*, Easterly argued that if the IMF only gave adjustment loans to countries that can repay it, instead of forgiving debts or lending repetitively even if conditions are not met, it would maintain its credibility (Jaffe, Carolyn and Carol H. Ehrlich (1997).

The logistics in which aid delivery occurs can be problematic. An earthquake in 2003 in Bam, Iran left tens of thousands of people in need of disaster zone aid. Although aid was flown in rapidly, regional belief systems, cultural backgrounds and even language seemed to have been omitted as a source of concern. Items such as religiously prohibited pork, and non-generic forms of medicine that lacked multilingual instructions came flooding in as relief. An implementation of aid can easily be problematic, causing more problems than it solves (Rappaport, Roy A.1967).

James Shikwati, a Kenyan economist, has argued that foreign aid causes harm to the recipient nations, specifically because aid is distributed by local politicians, finances the creation of corrupt government such as that led by Dr Fredrick Chiluba in Zambia bureaucracies, and hollows out the local economy. In an interview in Germany's *Der*

*Spiegel* magazine, Shikwati uses the example of food aid delivered to Kenya in the form of a shipment of corn from America. Portions of the corn may be diverted by corrupt politicians to their own tribes, or sold on the black market at prices that undercut local food producers. Similarly, Kenyan recipients of donated Western clothing will not buy clothing from local tailors, putting the tailors out of business. In an episode of *20/20*, John Stossel demonstrated the existence of secret government bank accounts which concealed foreign aid money destined for private purposes. Some believe that aid is offset by other economic programs such as agricultural subsidies. Mark Malloch Brown, former head of the United Nations Development Program, estimated that farm subsidies cost poor countries about US\$50 billion a year in lost agricultural exports (Cowan, Jane K. 2006).

On July 20, 2009, al Shabaab announced its establishment of the Office for the Supervision of the Affairs of Foreign Agencies (OSAFA) to monitor the movements of all NGOs and international organizations operating within Somalia. The same day, al Shabaab accused the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Department of Security and Safety (UNDSS), and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) of engaging in activities deemed hostile to Islam and ordered all of the organizations' offices closed. Al Shabaab militants immediately enforced this edict, raiding the UN offices in Baidoa in Bay region and in Wajid in Bakool region. The group had already forced CARE and the International Medical Corps to close on suspicion that the two organizations provided the intelligence leading to the successful U.S. airstrike on former al Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Ayro. By November 2009, the local al Shabaab administration in Bay and Bakool regions required that humanitarian aid agencies abide by 11 conditions, including a registration fee, the removal of all logos from vehicles, and a ban on female employees (Fassin, Didier 2005)

Al Shabaab leadership particularly targeted the UN's World Food Program (WFP), severely impacting its operations in southern Somalia. In early November 2009, al Shabaab deputy leader Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali, also known as Abu Mansur, accused the WFP of destroying Somalia's local agriculture market through its distributions of food aid during harvest time and banned branded aid, including aid with the American

flag on it. Al Shabaab then ordered the WFP to only purchase food from local farmers and to clear out all food warehouses by the end of the year. On January 1, 2010, al Shabaab militants raided a WFP warehouse in Marka, a coastal city in Lower Shabelle region, and burned over 300 sacks of food, claiming that the food had expired. The WFP responded by suspending its operations in Wajid, Bu'aale, Garbaharey, Afmadow, Jilib, and Beledweyne, citing a lack of security. The WFP has not been able to resume operations in southern Somalia. (World food programme report 2009)

### **2.3 Foreign policy and aid in Mogadishu, Somalia**

Foreign interventions are often motivated by the best of intentions: helping those in need. The many interventions in Somalia over the previous decades are no different (Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2011). According to Leeson and Williamson (2009) conclude that anarchy in Somalia is a constrained optimum given that ideal political institutions are not within Somalia's feasible institutional opportunity set.

However, most of these interventions have failed to achieve the outcomes they sought after. There are two main reasons why this is so. First, foreign interventions typically focus on outcomes instead of the underlying process that generated those outcomes (Coyne 2009, North et al. 2009). Interventions are usually designed and carried out by those living in developed countries. People in these countries may have a 'Western bias' regarding how institutions should look elsewhere. In reality, the institutions that characterize developed countries were not delivered wholesale in a neat bundle. Instead these institutions emerged over significant periods of time without a central plan imposed from above. Foreign interventions tend to neglect this underlying process in the hopes of achieving a 'quick fix' to the problems that plague underdeveloped countries. The irony is that foreign interventions are least likely to work where they are, in theory, needed most. In theory the poorest and most underdeveloped countries are those most in need of the change that foreign interventions attempt to engender. However, interventions based on outcomes already achieved in developed countries are likely to be ineffective in these countries precisely because they are not within the set of feasible institutional arrangements. Attempting to impose these outcomes presupposes an array of certain

institutional prerequisites that do not exist in Somalia or in other countries in similar situations ( Coyne 2007).

The severe food insecurity and famine is estimated to have claimed 257,500 lives in Somalia between October 2010 and March 2012, half of which were children under the age of five (FSNAU). The following graph shows contributions through the UN Somalia CAP, with a peak in funding, US\$241.6 million, in July 2011. This coincides with the date that the famine was officially declared by the UN, and the month with the highest number of excess deaths recorded at 33,000. While the original requirements for the Somalia CAP 2011 were just over US\$500 million, requirements were later revised to over US\$1 billion.

After the introduction of strict US counter-terrorism legislation in 2009 there was an 88% reduction in US funding for Somalia, with aid agencies apparently reluctant to apply due to concerns of not being able to comply with its requirements. US funding for Somalia had previously made up 40% of all aid financing in the country, so this reduction had a huge impact on resources available until the restrictions were eased in July 2011.

The delay was further exacerbated by political problems, with the conflict in Somalia seriously hampering the humanitarian community's ability to respond, and in Kenya, an early reluctance by the Kenyan government to officially act further delayed the response there. Political negotiations over the number of people affected in Ethiopia also had an effect. As long as the funding community continues to respond to acute humanitarian situations with a clear 'trigger' plunging people into crisis over protracted situations of chronic need in which people are consistently living close to or in humanitarian crisis, avoidable disasters like the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis will continue to take place.

According to Norwegian Peace-building Resource Centre (2013), Turkish current president who was the then Prime minister-Erdogan-was the first leader outside Africa in 20 years who travelled to the capital city of Somalia, Mogadishu in 2011 at a time when there was humanitarian crisis in South and Central part of Somalia. According to Norwegian Peace-building Resource Centre (2013), through Turkish Cooperation and

Coordination Agency (TIKA) which is under the office of the Prime Minister provided development assistance to Somalia to the amount of \$93.4 million which makes Somalia by far the greatest recipient of Turkish assistance in Africa.

#### **2.4 U.S. Foreign Policy and aid in Somalia**

When Somalia broke ties with Soviet Union in 1977, Somalia simultaneously shifted to U.S. side, and a military tension for control over Ogaden region between Somalia and Ethiopia became another site of Cold War rivalry.<sup>46</sup> The warring and the alarming conditions in Somalia called for international response. The UN and the USA responded, providing for almost three years of peacekeeping between April 1992 and March 1995. The UN looked to the USA help when UNOSOM 1 met severe resistance in Somalia. President George H. W. Bush was reluctant at first, but eventually agreed to establish a multinational force to secure the humanitarian mission in 1992 due to the dreadful conditions of a starving population in the war-torn nation (Bjorg marie Eide Wennesland, 2013).

According to Bjorg marie Eide Wennesland, (2013) the American troops entered Somalia with the aim of restoring order, feed the hungry and eventually hand over the peacekeeping mission to the UN. Operation Restore Hope, as the intervention was named, succeed in feeding the starving people and partially in encouraging diplomatic contact between the warlords. The setback started when the UN including 8,000 American soldiers, took over and tried to restore political stability.

According to John G. Sommer (1994) despite clear warning signs during 1990-91 of a famine emergency to come, Somalia fell victim to U.S. Government (USG) diplomatic neglect. This was due to several factors: multiple post-Cold War crises competing for government attention and resources especially the Gulf War and humanitarian emergencies in the former USSR; lack of a clear national interest in Somalia; and a Presidential election campaign dominated by domestic priorities. A major problem for Office of U.S. Foreign disaster Assistance (OFDA) proved to be focusing the attention of State Department and National Security Council (NSC) leadership on Somalia.

According to John G. Sommer (1994) stated that ultimately, in mid-August 1992, the White House dramatically boosted the U.S. response by initiating a Department of Defense (DOD) food airlift, Operation ProvideRelief: The President's decision reflected in some part the success of OFDA inter-agency "lobbying", as well as its advocacy on Capital Hill and with the media.

On the contrary, the parallel US mission adopted a "selective disarmament" approach, proceeding with disarmament only in case of danger to humanitarian aid distribution or international personnel (UN Security Council Resolutions on Somalia, 1992). The situation on the ground remained unchanged due to the two missions' lack of a clear and equal disarmament mandate, and the belief that mediation among the leaders of armed groups could suffice (Matteo Guglielmo, 2010).

According to Hon. Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs of the United States of America (2006) suggested that while political dialog continues to take place between Transitional Federal Government and Islamic Union of Courts, ongoing civil strife, inter-clan conflicts, and the lack of a functioning central government further complicate the humanitarian situation and limit access to affected areas in Somalia. Access to basic services remains a key friction point between communities in Somalia. The presence and intensity of conflict will continue to be a key factor in the humanitarian situation and affect how the international community can best respond to dynamics in Somalia (Hon. Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs of U.S., 2006).

According to Hon. Jendayi E. Frazer (2006) stated that despite these rapidly changing dynamics, the goals for United States policy remain clear, that is, address the threat of terrorism, support the reestablishment of effective governance and political stability, respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, and promote regional security and stability. While counterterrorism remains a core concern for the United States, it is not the only tenet of our strategy. U.S. Foreign Policy to address Somalia's instability,

has to focus on governance and institution building, humanitarian assistance for the Somali people, and improving regional security and stability ( Jendayi Frazer, 2006).

## **2.5 Humanitarian intervention and aid**

It is necessary to recognize very real restrictions on humanitarian aid activities when considering the prospects of expanding operations into southern Somalia and Djibouti. The humanitarian operating environment is precarious in the country even without the presence of al Shabaab. There have been few improvements on the security conditions since the UN first deployed a peacekeeping force in 1992 to secure the supply lines for humanitarian aid delivery. The only clear realized gains have been made in Mogadishu, where a peacekeeping force assists the weak, UN-backed TFG. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has a force presence of about 9,000 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers. Territory outside of the TFG and AMISOM's security perimeter has often been contested by various armed factions, and it is likely that any insertion of resources into such an environment will result in violence as it did in the early 1990s. There have already been documented attacks on aid convoys in Bay and Hiraa regions, during which at least one aid worker was killed. A significant escalation in humanitarian activities throughout southern Somalia will very likely increase the risks to aid workers' safety (Harrell-Bond, Barbara 2002

Though al Shabaab is not the sole guarantor of security in Somalia, the group poses the greatest threat to aid workers in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab's shura council has made clear that it will not accept the presence of international humanitarian aid organizations and that it will enforce this ban with violence. This fact remains true even as humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate in areas under al Shabaab's control. Humanitarian aid organizations are ill-equipped to deal with the threat posed to their personnel by al Shabaab militants and it would be naïve to ignore the security aspect of any humanitarian operation in southern Somalia (Graham, Laura R. 2006)

The international community should be under no illusions about the requirements of undertaking a humanitarian operation in southern Somalia. There is a high likelihood that any such operation, which would entail establishing security in the heartland of al

Shabaab's territory, would be met with significant armed resistance. Al Shabaab's militias have already exhibited the ability to withstand AMISOM operations in Mogadishu, especially during its 2010 Ramadan offensive. During this offensive, al Shabaab militants successfully advanced the frontline of fighting toward AMISOM and TFG headquarters, despite the presence of 6,300 peacekeepers. It has taken a fifty percent increase in peacekeeping troops in Mogadishu and a sustained effort by the TFG to develop its own security forces to re-establish temporary control over the majority of the capital. Whereas in Mogadishu, al Shabaab conducted an insurgency against AMISOM and TFG troops, in southern Somalia, al Shabaab is the dominant power (Evans, Tony 2005)

Al Shabaab has a very strong power base in major southern cities such as the ports of Marka and Kismayo. Al Shabaab is able to operate military training camps openly and will be able to call up forces quickly if challenged. An armed conflict in southern Somalia will likely require the deployment of Western ground forces, forces that could readily defeat al Shabaab militarily if called upon. The international community should not cling to the false belief that a humanitarian operation in southern Somalia could be successfully accomplished without ground forces supporting the mission (Graham, Laura R. 2006)

The decision to pursue a humanitarian operation in southern Somalia ought to be made with these substantial costs in mind. Opting for a humanitarian aid operation in southern Somalia will require a military commitment. Seeking to purchase consent from or to cooperate with al Shabaab in order to insert humanitarian assistance into the south incurs future costs. Purchasing consent from al Shabaab does not guarantee future security or even the delivery of assistance to the people in need. What it does, however, is fund a virulent radical insurgent group that has stated its intentions to attack America and has increasingly established ties to al Qaeda's most operational franchise, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen. Cooperating with al Shabaab will likely permit the group to dictate aid distribution, strengthening al Shabaab in its territories. A humanitarian operation to respond to the spreading famine, however



morally imperative, must not be undertaken without a full understanding of the full requirements and the associated risks. (Evans, Tony 2005).

## **2.6 Challenges of United State's foreign policy in Somalia**

The United States and Somalia have a complicated history of political and military engagement from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror. Somalia's connections with Al-Qaeda and the rise and fall of the Islamic Court Union are a few examples of the security threats present in and from Somalia. The use of the Somalia state in direct connection to United States Embassy bombings complicating the security interests in the Horn of Africa for the United States. In particular, the policies and military strategy utilized to respond to the collapsed state of Somalia. (Ken Menkhaus, 2004).

The post-September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have resulted in failed states being rediscovered. President George W. Bush's administration has directly established the link between failed states and terrorism since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America explicitly states, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." The United States Department of State Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) further articulates the threat of failed states that communicates a clear link between failed states and terrorism threats. (Ken Menkhaus, 2004).

Early evidence suggests that Somalia is being used as a terrorist safe haven. The United States State Department has identified numerous terrorist groups operating within Somalia such as the Harakat al-Islah (al-Islah), Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ), Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaaliya (Majma'), Takfir wal-Hijra (al-Takfir), and the al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI). The International Crisis Group reported there is a "rise of a new ruthless, independent jihadi network with links to Al-Qaeda. The group is based in lawless Mogadishu and led by a young militia leader trained in Afghanistan." This particular group is linked to the murder of four foreign aid workers in Somaliland. The combination of Al-Qaeda, al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), and a new group associated with Al-Qaeda operating within Somalia is a pressing issue for security and counter-terrorism efforts. (Ken Menkhaus, 2004).

The permeable political climate of Somalia has made it ripe for an increase in presence and power by the Union of Islamic Courts in its affairs. This raises a concern for the legitimacy and power of the Transitional Federal Government. The leadership of the Islamic Courts is in the consultative council, or majlis al-shura, which is the political and spiritual body of the Courts. The new leader of the consultative council is Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, a man suspected of being an Al-Qaeda collaborator by the United States Department of State. Somali first minister Ali Mohamed Gedi has stated that, "Talking to Islamic Leader is like having discussions with Osama Bin Laden." Aweys is a former army colonel and Muslim scholar who has denied links to Al-Qaeda. The Chairmen of the Union of Islamic Courts, Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, sent a letter sent to the international community, stating, "[w]e categorically deny and reject any accusation that we are harboring any terrorists or supporters of terrorism in the areas where the courts operate." The letter continues with an explanation of goals such as a system of governance established, rehabilitation and rebuilding of Somalia and the desire for an establishment of a relationship with the international community. (Ken Menkhaus, 2012).

The resulting proxy war has prompted many to argue that America's strategy is losing "hearts and minds" in the Global War on Terror in Somalia. On January 8, 2007 the first United States air strike on three suspected Al Qaeda operatives in Southern Somalia. This has been the mark of the first projection of American military force in Somalia since Operation Restore Hope. "Failed States" do not present ideal terrorist safe havens, rather it is weak states with some forms of infrastructure and security. On the surface analysis, such states are ideal but the chronic instability and shifting political and security alliances make such states not ideal safe havens for terrorist activities. In the case of Somalia and the clan system, in order to operate effectively, alliances with clan leaders must be made which can alienate other clans leading to assured vulnerability. Somalia has not yet become a terrorist haven and camp, rather the space has been used as a transit point for terrorist activities in the cases of the terrorist bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in August 1998. There have been no other linked terrorist attacks or acts of terrorism from the geographic space of Somalia. The security situation in Somalia, in the case of the rise and fall of the ICU, presents other

nations challenges as the “state” of Somalia exists only on maps, merely a virtual reality not reflecting reality. (Menkhaus, 2012).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the methodology that the study followed. It explains the design; study area; population; sample size, sampling techniques and procedure; data collection instruments; methods of testing the validity and reliability of instruments; the research procedure that was followed; and the data management and analysis techniques that were used in conducting the study.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

Research design: refers to the overall strategy that you choose to integrate the different components of the study in a coherent and logical way, thereby ensuring you will effectively address the research problem it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data.

According to Yin (2003) when approaching research work, the best method to be adopted for the study depends solely on the research purpose of that study. Research approach can be divided into two categories namely; deductive and inductive, qualitative and quantitative research. Deductive research could also be called top down approach as it works from the more general to the more specific. Qualitative and quantitative approach on the other hand refers to the way a researcher interprets or analyzes the data collected. The researcher therefore used a descriptive survey design in particular, a descriptive correlational design which was used to determine the relationship between variables.

#### **3.2 Research Population**

Mogadishu is the largest city in Somalia and the nation's capital. Located in the coastal Banaadir region on the Indian Ocean, the city has served as an important port for centuries. As of 2009, it had a population of 220 residents. The target population of the study was therefore 142 respondents including; 50 local people, 22 government officials and 30 Non Government Officials, including 40 humanitarian officials from various organizations, totaling to 140 respondents in Mogadishu, Somalia.

#### **3.3 Sample Size**

Sample size selecting requires knowledge of the variance or proportion in the population and a determination as to the maximum desirable error. This researcher therefore picked

Solven's formula in determining Sample Size for Research Activities. The formula used for these calculations will be:

Solven's for calculations

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(0.05)^2} = \frac{220}{1 + 220(0.05)^2} = \frac{220}{1 + 220 \times 0.0025} = \frac{220}{1 + 0.55} = \frac{220}{1.55}$$

$$n = 141.9$$

$$n = 142$$

**Table 1 the selected sample size**

Category of respondents	Population	Sample size
Non-government officials	60	30
Government officials	40	22
Local people	70	50
Humanitarian officials	50	40
Total	220	140

### 3.4 Sampling Procedure

The purposive sampling was utilized to select the respondents based on these criteria:

Male or female respondents in any of the parishes in the town included in the study

Local people, Government and non-government officials with experience ranging from one year and above. From the list of qualified respondents were chosen basing on the inclusion criteria, the systematic random sampling was used to finally select the respondents with consideration to the computed minimum sample size.

### 3.5 Research Instruments

The research tool that was used in this study includes the following: (1) *face sheet* to gather data on the respondents' profile; - (gender, age, education qualification and Experience); (2) *researcher devised questionnaires* to determine the level of foreign policy and humanitarian aid. The response modes and scoring are as follows: *foreign*

*policy and humanitarian aid* (i) strongly disagree (ii); disagree (iii); agree (iv); strongly agree.

### ***Validity and Reliability of the Instrument***

The validity of an assessment tool is the extent by which it measures what it was designed to measure.

Educational assessment should always have a clear purpose. Nothing will be gained from assessment unless the assessment has some validity for the purpose. For that reason, validity is the most important single attribute of a good test.

The reliability of an assessment tool is the extent to which it measures learning consistently and accurately.

When the results of an assessment are reliable, we can be confident that repeated or equivalent assessments will provide consistent results.

The researcher carried out a pre-test of the questionnaire before using it in the research. The other instruments also were cross examined for approval by a research expert, to ensure that the information they generate is appropriate and consistent. Before going out to carry out the study, the researcher first consulted his supervisor, to make sure that these instruments generate relevant information during the study.

To improve the validity of the data collection instruments, (mainly the questionnaire), the number of relevant questions were divided by the total number of questions, and the outcome will have to be above optimal.

$$V = RQ/TQ = 30/36 = 0.83$$

Where:

V= Validity

RQ= Relevant questions

TQ= Total number of questions

The number of relevant questions divided by the total number of questions was 0.83 which is above 0.5 hence the instruments were valid.

### 3.6 Data Gathering Procedures

The researcher started with writing the proposal. After the proposal is approved, the researcher went on to pre-test the research instruments. The researcher presented an introductory letter from the University outlining the objectives of the study to the head of Mogadishu town for endorsement. The researcher then proceeded to the respondents with copies of the endorsed introductory letter seeking permission to carry out the research in the area. After which the researcher will go on to collect data using the instruments from the respondents by himself moving from one parish to another. The researcher will do the data analysis when the work of collecting data is done. Finally the researcher will submit the report of the study findings to the college of High Degrees and Research for the fulfillment of the award of master degree of international relation and diplomacy study, for examination.

### 3.7 Data Analysis

The frequency and percentage distribution was used to determine the profile of the respondents. The means and interpretations were applied for the levels of humanitarian aid and foreign policy. The following mean ranges were used to arrive at the mean of the individual indicators and interpretation:

*A. For the level of foreign policy and humanitarian aid.*

Mean Range	Response Mode	Interpretation
3.26-4.00	strongly agree	Very satisfactory
2.51-3.25	Agree	Satisfactory
1.76-2.50	Disagree	Unsatisfactory
1.00-1.75	Strongly disagree	Very unsatisfactory

### **3.8 Ethical Considerations**

The researcher received an introductory letter from the Department of college of High Degrees and Research Kampala International University, stipulating the purpose of investigations. There was concern taken about the welfare of respondents including their mental, physical health and safety, avoiding embarrassments, guilt discomfort and risks to them, in addition the names and any other personal identification of the respondents were kept confidential and made known to them in the beginning of the exercise.

### **3.9 Limitations in the Study**

In view of the following threats to validity, the researcher claimed an allowable 5% margin of error at 0.05 level of significance. Measures are also indicated in order to minimize if not to eradicate the threats to the validity of the findings of this study.

*Instrumentation:* The research instruments on resource availability and utilization n are not standardized. Therefore a validity and reliability test will be done to produce a credible measurement of the research variables.

*Testing:* The use of research assistants can bring about inconsistency in the administration of the questionnaires in terms of time of administration, understanding of the items in the questionnaires and explanations given to the respondents. To minimize this threat, the research assistants will be oriented and briefed on the procedures to be done in data collection.

*Extraneous variables which* are beyond the researcher's control such as respondents' honest, personal biases and uncontrolled setting of the study.

*Attrition/Mortality:* Not all questionnaires are to be returned neither completely answered nor even retrieved back due to circumstances such as travels, sickness, hospitalization and refusal/withdrawal to participate. In anticipation to this, the researcher will reserve more respondents by exceeding the minimum sample size. The respondents will also be reminded not to leave any item in the questionnaires unanswered and will be closely followed up as to the date of retrieval.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the analysis and interpretation of the findings. For clarity and chronology, it is arranged by the three research questions that the study sought to answer. In the first section, however, background information about the respondents is presented, because it might be pertinent in interpreting the data that they provided. Thus, the chapter is divided into three subsections namely, introduction, background information about the respondents and the research objectives that the study sought to answer.

#### **4.1 Background information about the respondents**

Relevant background information about the respondents that participated in the study relates to their gender; jurisdiction; level of educational attainment; and among others, since they could influence the extent to which the respondents are knowledgeable about the variables that were involved in the study and the extent to which the data that they provided can be generalized to the population. Subsequently, information pertaining to these variables was elicited and the findings are summarized in table 4.1.

**Table 4: 1: frequency & percentage of the respondents**

Category		Frequency	Percentage (%)
Gender:	Female	50	35.8
	Male	90	64.2
<b>Total</b>		<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
Age:	20-39	20	14.3
	40-59	70	50.0
	60 and above	50	35.7
	<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
Education Level:	Diploma	30	21.3
	Degree	50	35.8
	Master	40	28.6
	PhD	20	14.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
Marital status	Married	80	57.2
	Single	50	35.8
	Widowed	10	7.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
Occupation 1 Year	Less than a year	20	14.2
	More than 2	70	50.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** *Field data 2014*

Table 4:1 Shows the demographic findings of the research data, in the sex section, the table shows that majority of the respondents were males with 90 (64.2%) compared to their female counterparts who were 50 (35.8%), it was thus concluded that the research covered both sexes.

The age group included 20-39 years with 20 respondents (14.3%), followed by 40-59 (50.0%) and then finalized with the age category of 60 and above with 50 respondents

(35.7%). All respondents were above 18 years and this indicated that all the respondents a research dealt with were adults Since Mogadishu Somalia deals with mature workers.

The majority of the respondents were married with 80 (57.2%) followed by the single ones 50 (35.8%) then widowed were 10 (7.0%) and the least were the widowed since they had responsibilities as single parents, among others.

The education background of the respondents shows that; 30 respondents (21.3%) had attained a Diploma in various courses, 50 (35.8%) had a bachelors degree in distinct fields, followed by 40 respondents (28.6%) who had a masters degree and then 20 (14.3) respondents with a PhD.

Most of the respondents were civil servants, government officials, and nongovernmental organization employees, when asked about the occupational period they have spent in the field, their response was as follows; 1 year 50 (35.8%), followed by less than one year 20 (14.2%) and then more than two years 70 respondents (50.0%). It was thus concluded that all related demographic background of the respondents was gathered.

#### **4.2. Extent of the United States Foreign Policy in relation to the conflict in Mogadishu Somalia**

This objective sought to investigate the extent at which foreign states spearheaded by the United States of America respond to the humanitarian aid needed by the population in Mogadishu through their foreign policy putting more focus on the U.S. foreign Policy. This is because it was necessary to investigate the ways through which the U.S. Foreign Ministry using its foreign policy response to the humanitarian concern in Mogadishu, Somalia before investigating the relationship that has existed between U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia. The respondents that were involved in the study were asked to specify the various ways through which U.S. foreign policy respond to the humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia. In the next subsection, the responses supplied are summarized according to the category of respondents.

**Table 4: 2: Extent of U.S. Foreign policy and aid on Mogadishu Somalia conflict**

INDICATOR	MEAN	INTERPRETATION	RANK
<b>UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND AID IN SOMALIA</b>			
All aid from the United States is labeled as from the American people	4.0	Very Satisfactory	1
The aid bears the United States of America flag.	3.7	Satisfactory	2
Aid logistics are run by United States based companies	3.4	Fair	3
The personnel are from the United States of America	3.4	Fair	3
The aid is based on the standards and measures of the United States.	3.2	Fair	3
Food and basic needs are provided on US Policies	2.0	Unsatisfactory	4
Access of refugee to the United States of America Citizenship	3.0	Fair	3
<b>Average Total</b>	<b>3.24</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>IMPACTS</b>			
Caused effective distribution of the aid.	2.8	Un - satisfactory	3
Improved efficiency in aid management and distribution.	2.3	Fair	4
Increased the understanding about United States commitment in humanitarian assistance.	3.0	Satisfactory	2
Famine and Drought have been controlled due to provision of food	4.0	Very satisfactory	1
Enabled people to find new opportunities in the United States of America.	3.0	Satisfactory	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.1</b>	<b>Very satisfactory</b>	<b>1</b>
<b><u>Overall Average mean</u></b>	<b><u>1.82</u></b>	<b>Unsatisfactory</b>	<b>5</b>

**Source:** Field data 2014

Table 4.2 shows the findings based on the US Foreign Policy and Aid in Somalia, from the findings, it is indicated that most respondents are contented with the US Policy as they abide and accept it in relation to aid. State performance based on deliverance of political goods is pivotal to understanding the difference between failing, failed, and collapsed states. States and state performance should be conceptualized as a continuum of government effectiveness described as strong states, weak states, failing states, failed states, and collapsed states. Strong states and weak states have key differences.

While “external” climatic variables play a role in triggering off a famine and heightening the social impact of drought, famines in the age of globalization are man-made. They are not the consequence of a scarcity of food but of a structure of global oversupply which undermines food security and destroys national food agriculture. Tightly regulated and controlled by international agri-business, this oversupply is ultimately conducive to the stagnation of both production and consumption of essential food staples and the impoverishment of farmers throughout the world. Moreover, in the era of globalization, the IMF-World Bank structural adjustment program bears a direct relationship to the process of famine formation because it systematically undermines all categories of economic activity, whether urban or rural, which do not directly serve the interests of the global market system.

**4.3. The impact of U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia.**

**Table 4: 3: US Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu**

INDICATOR	MEAN	INTERPRETATION	RANK
<b>HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND AID IN SOMALIA</b>			
Humanitarian aid is well managed	4.0	Very Satisfactory	1
Humanitarian aid is well distributed	3.7	Very Satisfactory	2
People are satisfied with the aid	3.4	Satisfactory	3
Aid covers basic needs	3.4	Satisfactory	3
Humanitarian aid provides health needs	3.2	Satisfactory	5
<b>Range Total</b>	<b>3.54</b>	<b>Very satisfactory</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>IMPACTS</b>			
Humanitarian Intervention has motivated social growth	3.0	Satisfactory	2
Humanitarian intervention has motivated political growth	2.5	Fair	3
Humanitarian intervention has motivated economic growth	3.1	Satisfactory	2
Humanitarian intervention has led to democracy	3.5	Very satisfactory	1
Humanitarian intervention has decreased on terrorism and crime rates.	3.2	Satisfactory	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>Very satisfactory</b>	<b>1</b>
<b><u>Overall Average mean</u></b>	<b><u>3.06</u></b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>1</b>

**Source:** Field data 2014

Table 4.3 shows the findings from the respondents view on United States policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia. The respondents majorly concurred with all variables explaining that foreign aid and humanitarian aid have really contributed to various growth policies in the country. The economic reforms were marked by the disintegration of health and educational programmes. By 1989, expenditure on health had declined by 78 percent in relation to its 1975 level. According to World Bank figures, the level of recurrent expenditure on education in 1989 was about US\$ 4 Per annum per primary school student down from about \$ 82 in 1982. From 1981 to 1989, school enrolment declined by 41 percent (despite a sizeable increase in the population of school age), textbooks and school materials disappeared from the class-rooms, school buildings deteriorated and nearly a quarter of the primary schools closed down. Teachers' salaries declined to abysmally low levels.

International aid organizations have also begun linking military intervention to fighting poverty. The World Bank was among the first when it suggested in a prominent 2003 report, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, that aid combined with military action "could avert untold suffering, spur poverty reduction, and help to protect people around the world from....drug-trafficking, disease, and terrorism." The report suggested that such combined action could halve the probability of a civil war breaking out in a poor country from precisely 44 percent to 22 percent

This new approach to foreign aid has been encouraged, in part, by the concern of Western governments since September 11 that terrorist groups are emanating from war-torn, impoverished societies. But the influence of social scientists, building upon decades of thinking about poverty and development, should not be underestimated.

#### 4.4 The challenges facing U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia

**Table 4: 4: Challenges facing US Foreign policy and humanitarian aid in Somalia**

INDICATOR	MEAN	INTERPRETATION	RANK
<b>CHALLENGES AFFECTING UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION WITH AID IN SOMALIA</b>			
Political challenges	3.2	Very Satisfactory	2
Administrative challenges	3.5	Very Satisfactory	1
Personnel challenges	3.1	Satisfactory	3
Structural challenges	3.0	Satisfactory	3
Logistical challenges	3.2	Satisfactory	2
Transportation challenges	3.5	Fair	1
Financial challenges	3.1	Satisfactory	3
Language barrier	3.5	Very satisfactory	1
Terrorism attacks	3.2	Satisfactory	3
Inadequate funds	2.8	Fair	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>Very satisfactory</b>	<b>1</b>
<b><u>Overall Average mean</u></b>	<b><u>3.21</u></b>	<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>2</b>

**Source:** *Field data 2014*

According to table 4.4, there various challenges affecting both humanitarian and US aid and policies in Somalia, these challenges range from the delivery, transportation and the



provision of the aid to the final consumption by the recipients. Insecurity and terrorism is the major problem in the area, followed by transport and administration policies. The country is majorly infested by the conflict and therefore administration is still a big challenge.

The humanitarian operating environment is precarious in the country even without the presence of al Shabaab. There have been few improvements on the security conditions since the UN first deployed a peacekeeping force in 1992 to secure the supply lines for humanitarian aid delivery. The only clear realized gains have been made in Mogadishu, where a peacekeeping force assists the weak, UN-backed TFG. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has a force presence of about 9,000 Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers. Territory outside of the TFG and AMISOM's security perimeter has often been contested by various armed factions, and it is likely that any insertion of resources into such an environment will result in violence as it did in the early 1990s. There have already been documented attacks on aid convoys in Bay and Hiraan regions, during which at least one aid worker was killed. A significant escalation in humanitarian activities throughout southern Somalia will very likely increase the risks to aid workers' safety.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

In this chapter the researcher presents the major issues of the entire research that is the major summary, discussion, conclusion and recommendation.

#### **5.1 Summary of the findings**

The purpose of the study was to determine the performance of United States foreign policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia. The summary of the findings are arranged in accordance to the research objectives;

##### **The situation of humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia**

The provisional government established in February 1991 inherited a legacy of problematic relations with neighboring states and economic dependence on aid from Arab and Western nations. Relations between Somalia and its three neighbors Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya had been poisoned for more than two decades by Somalia's irredentist claims to areas inhabited by ethnic Somalis in each of these three states. The 1977-78 Ogaden War with Ethiopia, although a humiliating defeat for Somalia, had created deep suspicions in the Horn of Africa concerning the intentions of the Siad Barre regime. The continuing strain in Somali-Ethiopian relations tended to reinforce these suspicions. Civil strife in Ethiopia and repressive measures in the Ogaden caused more than 650,000 ethnic Somalis and Oromo residing in Ethiopia to flee to Somalia by early 1978. The integration of so many refugees into an essentially agrarian society afflicted by persistent drought was beyond Somalia's economic capacity. In the absence of a peace agreement, prospects for repatriation continued to be virtually nonexistent. The Siad Barre government's solution to this major political, social, and economic problem was to make the search for generous financial assistance a focal point of its foreign policy.

### **The impact of U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia**

The issue of the impact of the US Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Somalia, can be further explained prior to the Ogaden War, Somalia had been allied with the Soviet Union, and its relations with the United States were strained. Largely because the Soviet Union sided with Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, a United States-Somali rapprochement began in 1977 and culminated in a military access agreement in 1980 that permitted the United States to use naval ports and airfields at Berbera, Chisimayu, and Mogadishu, in exchange for military and economic aid. The United States subsequently refurbished facilities originally developed by the Soviet Union at the Gulf of Aden port of Berbera. The United States Rapid Deployment Force used Berbera as a base for its Operation Bright Star exercises in 1981, and American military advisers were permanently stationed there one year later. Somali military units participated in Operation Bright Star joint maneuvers in 1985. The base at Berbera was used in the fall of 1990 during the deployment of personnel and supplies to Saudi Arabia in preparation for the Persian Gulf War.

### **The challenges facing U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu Somalia**

The US Foreign Policy has incurred a number of challenges in the region, mostly is the terrorism issue. Controversy over the Siad Barre government's human rights policies clouded the future of United States military cooperation with Somalia. Siad Barre's policy of repression in the north aroused criticism of his regime in the United States Congress, where the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives held extensive hearings during July 1988 on human rights abuses in Somalia. In 1989, under congressional pressure, the administration of President George Bush terminated military aid to Somalia, although it continued to provide food assistance and to operate a small International Military Education and Training program. In 1990 Washington revealed that Mogadishu had been in default on loan repayments for more than a year. Therefore, under the terms of the Brooke Amendment, this meant that Somalia was ineligible to receive any further United States aid. During the height of the fighting in Mogadishu in

January 1991, the United States closed its embassy and evacuated all its personnel from the country. The embassy was ransacked by mobs in the final days of the Siad Barre regime. The United States recognized the provisional government shortly after its establishment. Since the outbreak of the civil war, the United States has consistently urged all parties to come together to resolve their dispute by peaceful means. The United States government has supported the territorial unity of Somalia and as of May 1992 has refused to recognize the independence of northern Somalia proclaimed by the SNM.

## **5.2 Discussions**

The discussion is arranged according to the three objectives of the study. Therefore, the section is subdivided into the following subsections: the humanitarian situation in Mogadishu, Somalia; the impact of U.S. Foreign Policy on humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia; and the challenges facing U.S. Foreign policy on humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia.

### **The situation of humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia**

The findings of the study revealed that the situation of humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia has been alarming the last two decades since the central government collapsed in 1991 though early 1990s and mid and later 2000s was the worse period for humanitarian issue in the country. In this way, the study concurs with Jendayi Frazer (2006), and Bjorg marie Eide Wennesland (2013) in their observations that the situation for humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia has been alarming and the International Community has been trying to respond to the situation despite the security challenges faced by most of the NGOs and UN staff who are either local and international by nature. At least, some of the data collected indicated that the U.S. used the television as a media to monitor the humanitarian situation in Somalia since Restoration Hope mission failed in 1990s which led to the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the soil of Somalia (see Table 4.2).

### **The impact of U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia**

The question pertaining to the impact of the U.S. Foreign Policy on humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia was raised because the U.S. has the hegemony of the world since the collapse of the USSR and the U.S. has been the key to any humanitarian crisis and aid in the globe since U.S. contributes 68% of UN budget and Somalia being geopolitically placed in strategic geography that is in the Horn of Africa which can be used to monitor the movement of Middle East states and supply of oil as energy for boosting modern technology and industrialization in North America and Europe which is a close ally of United States of America. In this way the study concurs with John G. Sommer (1994) and Matteo Guglielmo (2010), in their observation that the U.S. foreign policy aid in Mogadishu, Somalia was geared towards changing the government institutions in Somalia in the manner in which the U.S. wanted the governance of Somalia in democratic view held by the U.S. (see 4.3.). At least, data collected from respondents indicated that the U.S. Foreign Policy on humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia was aimed at monitoring the situation in Somalia rather helping the Somalia people to set government of their own and stabilize the country. The U.S. also consulted the neighbouring countries on the humanitarian concern in Somalia since there are some Somali ethnic group thinking that they have better knowledge of the Somali people and their issues which will help the U.S. to design a better foreign policy towards Somalia for geopolitical interest of Somalia.

### **The challenges facing U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu Somalia**

The question pertaining to the challenges facing U.S. Foreign Policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia was raised because the U.S. as hegemony has enemies in the globe that comprise of states, religious institutions and terrorist organizations. In this way, the study concurs with critical consideration of the findings of the study indicates that although the U.S. is involved in the provision of humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, Somalia in some ways, generally speaking, it faces challenges from terrorist organizations and Gulf States. At least, some of the data collected indicated that U.S.

always faces challenges in providing humanitarian aid in Somalia because of its foreign policy design since it became the world hegemony in 1990s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is because the U.S. has failed to understand the demands and needs of the local people to set their own government based on their culture and religion rather than shaping Somalia in the western perception of governance and democratization.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

International humanitarian aid has grown exponentially over the past sixty years in the number and variety of donors and aid workers, as well as the amount of money transferred to vulnerable countries for emergency, relief, rehabilitation and development. The delivery of effective and sustainable aid within the fast-changing world continues to present ongoing challenges to stakeholder communication and collaboration, keys to delivering quality services in a cost-effective manner. Although achievements in humanitarian aid amid ongoing change are impressive, there is a need on the part of donors, governments, aid workers, and the public to develop a clearer understanding pertaining to who does what, when, where and how. Clarifying differences between the emergency, relief, rehabilitation and development spectrum and the need to establish linkages as part of a flexible response to changes based on diverse roles, mandates, time frames and inevitable unfolding events is a vital first step. An understanding and acknowledgement of the unique attributes bonded together by a common motivation to communicate and collaborate will deliver the services that are needed to the right people at the right time and in the right place. To do less is tantamount to defining humanitarian aid as an insolvable problem, an attitude that is a disservice to host countries and to those stakeholders who generously contribute resources, knowledge and skills in order to improve the health and quality of life for vulnerable people worldwide.

Effectiveness and sustainability in humanitarian aid are not impossible dreams, and the achievement of acceptable and cost-effective outcomes in short and long terms is possible, as evidenced by successes in the past and present. The key to ensuring that successes continue and evolve lies in the understanding that humanitarian aid does not have an endpoint, but is a constantly unfolding process in which milestones mark the path paved by lessons learned.

#### **5.4 Recommendations for Recipient Authorities**

Facilitate damage assessment and analysis of needs (DANA) and share this information quickly and opportunely to orient actions of solidarity and donations

Knowing the damage and the real needs will make it possible to determine in greater detail the kind of assistance that is being requested. Although the process of carrying out the DANA can take several days, it is important that in just a few hours preliminary estimates are presented of the needs for assistance before donors begin to commit their emergency funds.

Determine what is needed and be categorical about what is not needed. When supplies are requested, avoid generic lists. For example, if you request "food", you could specify quantities, type, local customs etc. Be precise since such requirements bring more concrete and effective aid. Is it generally more costly to manage or do away with inappropriate donations which were never sought. On the other hand, it is recommended to mention clearly the level of priority of what is requested which will depend on the needs identified.

The national disaster prevention and response body is usually responsible for the coordination of humanitarian assistance, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. National Ministries take part in emergency actions and it is recommended that they establish coordination mechanisms by priority sectors as well as on an intersectoral basis. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the international cooperation entity are responsible for the request for international aid and the receipt and dissemination of information.

Cases where the sending of humanitarian aid has been stopped or delayed make up numerous anecdotal stories on the part of civil servants working in aid. If a protocol of procedures for the entry of humanitarian aid to the affected country does not exist, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must ensure that this mechanism is created and conveyed promptly together with the request for international aid.

It is also necessary to facilitate simplified customs procedures. You can consult the Model Agreement in Customs Facilitation in Humanitarian Assistance between the United Nations and a State/government drawn up by OCHA in 1996 in order to establish measures to accelerate the import, export and shipment of relief aid and articles belonging to relief personnel in disaster and emergency situations



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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I

#### CLEARANCE FROM ETHICS COMMITTEE

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Candidate's Data

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Reg. # \_\_\_\_\_

Course \_\_\_\_\_

Title of Study \_\_\_\_\_

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#### Ethical Review Checklist

The study reviewed considered the following:

- ☐ Physical Safety of Human Subjects
- ☐ Psychological Safety
- ☐ Emotional Security
- ☐ Privacy
- ☐ Written Request for Author of Standardized Instrument
- ☐ Coding of Questionnaires/Anonymity/Confidentiality
- ☐ Permission to Conduct the Study
- ☐ Informed Consent
- ☐ Citations/Authors Recognized

#### Results of Ethical Review

- ☐ Approved
- ☐ Conditional (to provide the Ethics Committee with corrections)
- ☐ Disapproved/ Resubmit Proposal

Ethics Committee (Name and Signature)

Chairperson \_\_\_\_\_

Members' \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX II**  
**INFORMED CONSENT**

I am giving my consent to be part of the research study of Mr. ABDULKADIR MOHAMED HUSSEIN. That will focus on United State foreign policy and humanitarian aid in Mogadishu Somalia.

I shall be assured of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality and that I will be given the option to refuse participation and right to withdraw my participation anytime.

I have been informed that the research is voluntary and that the results will be given to me if I ask for it.

Initials: \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

### APPENDIX III

#### FACE SHEET: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE

#### RESPONDENTS

- 1.0. Gender (Please Tick):
- 1.1     \_\_\_\_\_ Male
- 1.2     \_\_\_\_\_ Female
- 2.0     \_\_\_\_\_ Age
- 3.0     Qualifications Under Education Discipline (please tick):
- 3.1     Certificate \_\_\_\_\_
- 3.2     Diploma \_\_\_\_\_
- 3.3     Bachelors \_\_\_\_\_
- 3.4     Masters \_\_\_\_\_
- 3.5     Ph.D. \_\_\_\_\_
- 3.6     Others \_\_\_\_\_
- 4.0     Experience in humanitarian work in years (Please Tick):
- 4.1     Below 1 year \_\_\_\_\_
- 4.2     1- 2yrs     \_\_\_\_\_
- 4.3     3-4yrs     \_\_\_\_\_
- 4.4     5-6yrs     \_\_\_\_\_
- 4.5     7 years and above \_\_\_\_\_



## APPENDIX IV

### QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMANITARIAN AID IN MOGADISHU SOMALIA

(For Government officials only)

Please write your rating on the space before each option which corresponds to your best choice in terms of availability of resources in your organization.

Kindly use the scoring system below:

#### KEY

Response mode	Score	Description
Disagree	4	Fair
Agree	3	Satisfactory
Strongly agree	2	Very satisfactory
Strongly disagree	1	Poor

#### OBJECTIVE ONE

##### United States Foreign Policy and aid in Somalia

1. \_\_\_\_\_ All aid from the United States is labeled as from the American people.
2. \_\_\_\_\_ The aid bears the United States of America flag.
3. \_\_\_\_\_ Aid logistics are run by United States based companies.
4. \_\_\_\_\_ The personnel are from the United States of America.
5. \_\_\_\_\_ The aid is based on the standards and measures of the United States.
6. \_\_\_\_\_ Access of refugee to the United States of America Citizenship.

##### Impacts of the aid and US Policy

7. \_\_\_\_\_ Caused effective distribution of the aid.
8. \_\_\_\_\_ Improved efficiency in aid management and distribution.
9. \_\_\_\_\_ Increased the understanding about United States commitment in humanitarian assistance.

10. \_\_\_\_\_ Enabled people to find new opportunities in the United States of America.

## **OBJECTIVE TWO**

### **Humanitarian intervention and aid in Somalia**

1. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian aid is well managed
2. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian aid is well distributed
3. \_\_\_\_\_ People are satisfied with the aid
4. \_\_\_\_\_ The aid covers basic needs
5. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian aid provides health needs

### **Impacts of the humanitarian intervention**

6. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian Intervention has motivated social growth
7. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian intervention has motivated political growth
8. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian intervention has motivated economic growth
9. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian intervention has led to democracy
10. \_\_\_\_\_ Humanitarian intervention has decreased on terrorism and crime rates.

## **OBJECTIVE THREE**

### **Challenges affecting United States Foreign Policy and Humanitarian intervention with aid in Somalia**

1. \_\_\_\_\_ Logistical challenges
2. \_\_\_\_\_ Administrative challenges
3. \_\_\_\_\_ Personnel challenges
4. \_\_\_\_\_ Infrastructural challenges
5. \_\_\_\_\_ Religious challenges
6. \_\_\_\_\_ Transportation challenges
7. \_\_\_\_\_ Climatic challenges

8. \_\_\_\_\_ Language barrier
9. \_\_\_\_\_ Terrorism attacks
10. \_\_\_\_\_ Inadequate funds

## **APPENDIX V**

### **INTERVIEW GUIDE**

#### **QUESTIONS FOR NON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN MOGADISHU**

#### **THE IMPACT AND CHALLENGES FACING U.S FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMANITARIAN AID IN MOGADISHO**

- 2.0 \_\_\_\_\_ Do you know Humanitarian Aid?
- 3.0 \_\_\_\_\_ Have you ever benefited from humanitarian aid?
- 4.0 \_\_\_\_\_ Has foreign policy increased or decreased in humanitarian aid?
- 5.0 \_\_\_\_\_ How many people are benefiting from humanitarian aid in your organization?
- 6.0 \_\_\_\_\_ Why do you think the government should promote humanitarian aid in Mogadishu, town?
- 7.0 \_\_\_\_\_ How has United State foreign policy affected humanitarian aid?
- 8.0 \_\_\_\_\_ Do you have any fees you pay in addition to humanitarian aid?
- 9.0 \_\_\_\_\_ Does the government fully fund your organization?
- 10.0 \_\_\_\_\_ Do you think the quality of humanitarian aid has increased or decreased in Mogadishu town?
- 11.0 \_\_\_\_\_ What are the major achievements and challenges of humanitarian aid?

## RESEARCHER'S CURRICULUM VITAE

### Personal Details

Name : ABDULKADIR MOHAMED HUSSEIN  
Date of birth : 1986  
Sex : Male  
Nationality : Somali  
Reg/No. : 40201  
Religion : Muslim  
District of Birth : Mogadishu  
Marital status : Single  
Cell phone : 0700695224  
E-mail:- : Cawilsom1@hotmail.com

### Educational Background

1995-1998 Elementary al-Mathal Intermediate and development school  
1998-2001 Intermediate al-Mathal Primary and development school  
2001-2004 Secondary Al-Mathal Secondary and development school  
2007-2009 Green hope university diploma English literature  
2009-2012 Indian ocean university Bachelor Business Administration's (BA) in  
Somalia  
2013-2014 Kampala international university (KIU) Faculty of International  
relations & diplomacy (I R D) in Uganda  
2013-2014 S.t Lawrence university faculty of MBA General in Uganda

Candidate PhD in Conflict and Peace Building in Kampala International University

### Courses Of Computer

Jan-June 2004 studying of software programs in sohdec computer institute

These programs includes:-

Computer Fundamentals      ms dos, ms windows

Word Processing: -              ms word 2000

Spread Sheet: -                  ms excel 2000

Database: -                      ms access 2000

Network/ Internet: -            web browsing

### Work Experience

2003-2004 wyspo (public relations)

2004-2005 Syspo (Director)

2005-2006 Mogadishu Public Library (Director)

2006-2007 Zaylai Foundation (Secretary General)

2007-2008 Conflict Resolution and Mitigation Reconciliation (Teacher Teaching)

2008-2009 Somali Business Travel and Tourism Company (Sales & Marketing Manager)

2009-2010 Somali Children Care Organization (Founders & Program Manager)

2010-2011 Somali International Child Salvation Organization (Founders & Vice Chairperson)

2010-2012 Medal Welfare Organization International NGOs (Program Officer)

2011-2013 Rahma Foundation (Director)

2013 Continues Somali Diplomacy Association (Founders & Member Council)

### Workshops

15-16/Feb/2005 Training of Role Peace Building (PHRN)

8-13/July/2006 Training How to Manage Library (A.E.T)

17-20/Oct/2006 workshop Conflict Prevention (PHRN)

12-15/March/2007 workshop Peace Building (PHRN)

19-20/Dec/2007 training of Role Educators Peace Building (PHRN)

17-20/Jun/2008 Training of Role Youth in Peace Building (PHRN)

9-11/Feb/2009 Training of Role Press in Peace Building (PHRN)

2-5/Sep/2010 Training HIV/ AIDs (Youth Link Somalia)

15-17/Sep/2011 Training How to Solve Conflict (PHRN)

25/Aug/2012 Workshop Police & Community (PHRN)

17-19/Nov/2012 Conflict Resolution (PHRN)

28-30/Dec/2012 Good Governance (PHRN)

01-3/Jan/2013 Training of Role Youth in Peace Building (PHRN)

09-11/April/2013 Workshop Somali Political Future (Somali Community Activity)

#### Languages

Somali: - Mother's Tongue

English: - Good

Arabic: - Neutral

France: - Neutral

#### Hobbies

Holly Quran

Open Discussion

Problem Solving

Reading Management & Political Books

Decision Makers

Watching All Sports

Resistance

listening & Visiting Daily News Like:-

Playing Football

Al Jazeera English

Al Jazeera Sports

### **Referee**

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