

**CHALLENGES FACED BY UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES IN  
DELIVERING EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICES  
IN SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA**

**A Thesis**

**Presented to the School of  
Postgraduate Studies and Research  
Kampala International University  
Kampala, Uganda**

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**In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts in Project Planning and Management**

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**BY:**

**ABDULLAHI MOHAMED ALI**

**JUNE, 2011**

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## DECLARATION A

"This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a Degree or any other academic award in any University or Institution of Learning".




**ABDULLAHI MOHAMED ALI**

26-6-2011

Date

## DECLARATION B

This thesis entitled **Challenges Faced by United Nations Agencies Delivering Emergency Response Services in South Central Somalia** was done under the supervision of Prof. Sunday Nicholas Olwor it is submitted to the School of Post Graduate Studies at Kampala International University.


Signed: .....

Date:  .....


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## APPROVAL SHEET


This dissertation entitled " **Challenges Faced by United Nations Agencies Delivering Emergency Response services in South Central Somalia** " prepared and submitted by **Abdullahi Mohamed Ali** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Project Planning and Management has been examined and approved by the panel on oral examination with a grade of PASSED.

  
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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my father **Mohamed Ali**, and my **Mother Kadijo Muse**.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My heartfelt gratitude goes to my supervisor **Prof. Sunday Nicholas Olwor** whose support and advice enabled me accomplish this research successfully.

I also thank the management of UN Agencies for humanitarian support in South Central Somalia for giving me a chance to carry out my research with them; their parental support especially on giving me necessary information regarding this research is an unforgettable part that positively contributed to the success of this thesis, may Allah reward them accordingly.

I would like to give thanks to my family and friends who have been giving there love and support, also specially to my brother **Mohamed Tahlil** to his support and encouragements to education.

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Lastly to all of you, who wished me good lucky, may Allah rewards you inspiringly.

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## **ABSTRACT**

The impact of growing insecurity on the humanitarian situation is severe and the delivery of aid to the 3.2 million Somalis in need has been seriously reduced as NGO workers, UN agencies have become prime targets, This calls for investigations on the challenges faced by the United Nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in war affected areas in order to come up with policies that can be employed to positively address the situation.

The main Purpose of the study was to establish the challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

The required data was collected from various UN Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia, through questionnaire guides for primary data and secondary data being the library, internet and analyzed using Microsoft Excel and SPSS.

Questionnaires and Observation methods were used to collect data from the respondents; self-administered questionnaires were ideal. The questionnaires comprised of both closed-ended and open-ended questions. Out of the 65 questionnaires distributed, the researcher only receives 62 questionnaires back.

The research show that the decline of humanitarian space, security concern, clan dynamics, continued fighting between the TFG and insurgents, logistics and transportation, lack of government institutions, among others are the challenges facing the UN Agencies.

The study therefore recommends that; the international community should either develop a strategic plan toward humanitarian assistance for Somalia or support the TFG both in kind and capital to reach the humanitarian need of the needy people in Somalia, U.N agencies and member states should fully fund and staff emergency humanitarian assistance program to meet the needs of vulnerable Somali people.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This contains the background of the study, problem statement of the study, objectives of the study, research questions, the scope of the study, and significance of the study.

### **Background of the Study**

South Central Somalia is one of the most dangerous and difficult place in the world for humanitarian agencies to work in South Central Somalia (WFP, 27 March 2008). Fighting and attacks have regularly forced aid agencies to pull out staff and stop operations. During the last 5 years, More than 10 international staff working in United Nation Agencies had been killed and 11 of them kidnapped and also Local Staff working with the United Nation Agencies, 22 of them killed (IRIN, 2010).

Convoys have been systematically targeted for looting and extortion. The insecurity has been greatest in the South-Central Region especially in Mogadishu following the killing of three World Food Program (WFP) and two United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) staff.

In January 2008, most UN agencies decided to close their emergency response projects in the southern port city of Kismayo. An attempted kidnapping in Garowe also forced UNHCR to evacuate their international staff from most of South Central Somalia (UNHCR, April 2008). On 22 June 2008, the Head of UNHCR in Mogadishu was abducted. In May, one of the insurgent leaders issued a direct threat to Americans working for humanitarian organizations in Somalia (AI, 2008).

The extent of roadblocks set up by government and non-state forces such as the rebels is also a significant problem. Eric Laroche, the Humanitarian Coordinator of Somalia until December 2007 up to now, reported counting 213 blockades on one journey into south and central Somalia. Trucks were forced to pay from \$50 to \$500 to pass through each roadblock. Without full protection from militias those vehicles were thus unable to deliver humanitarian response projects to the population's need (UN News, 2009).

According to the Independent Expert from the United Nations on the situation of Human Rights in Somalia said "this difficulty of humanitarian access has forced thousands of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) to go with-out any form of support for weeks, living in the open and often even forced to pay a "shade tax" to shelter from the sun and rains" (UN SC, 2010). Fluctuating levels of insecurity have hampered the humanitarian agencies, systematic collection of information about (IDPs) and to plan and deliver humanitarian assistance particularly in central and southern Somalia, humanitarian access has constantly been obstructed by unpredictable political dynamics and violence (UN OCHA, 2009).

United Nation Agencies are basically volunteer organizations formed to carry out defined or predetermined roles to the benefit of the society or a target part of the society without any profits or financial gain out of the activities. United Nation Agencies in Somalia have extensively promoted and protected the rights of people who have been forced to flee their home areas. UN agencies especially, World Food Program (WFP), United Nation's Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) have provided humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, removal of landmines, and have also supported the return and repatriation of victims' into their homes. They also undertake basic activities like provision of shelter kits, construction of latrines and water tanks, rehabilitation of schools, vocational training, and livelihood support and assistance to returning refugees (UNHCR, 2007).

### **Statement of the Problem**

The impact of growing insecurity on the humanitarian situation is severe and the delivery of aid to the 3.2 million Somalis in need has been seriously reduced as NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets. Although, this violence has principally been stemming from grudges of some local groups against some relief agencies some insurgent groups is deliberately organizing this violence focusing aid workers. This is majorly witnessed due to the decline of humanitarian space, security concern, clan dynamics, continued fighting between the TFG and insurgents, logistics and transportation,

lack of government institutions, and many other factors largely identified as obstacles in the implementation of relief agency projects in many war torn areas, Somalia in particular. This calls for investigations on the challenges faced by the United Nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in war affected areas in order to come up with policies that can be employed to positively address the situation.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The main Purpose of the study was to establish the challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

### **The specific objectives of the study were:**

1. To find out the challenges facing UN agencies delivering emergency response projects.
2. To examine the effects caused by the challenges in emergency response projects.
3. To suggest the possible ways of reducing the challenges faced UN agencies.

### **Research Questions**

1. What are the challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia?
2. How do the challenges affect emergency response projects in South Central Somalia zones?
3. What are the possible ways of reducing the challenges faced UN agencies working in South Central Somalia?

### **Scope of the Study**

Geographically, the study was carried out in south central Somalia. The study concentrated on the period between (2005-2010).

The study established and determined the challenges faced by the United Nation Agencies that deliver the emergency Response projects in Somalia. The research also



identifies the obstacles and barriers within the country that face UN Agencies when implementing the Emergency Response projects.

### **Significances of the Study**

This study will be useful for the following ways:

- The findings of this study will contribute to the knowledge for the United Nation Agencies working in emergency response projects in Somalia. It will also help to enhance a broad understanding of the obstacles; challenges faced by United Nation Agencies, and the cause and effects for need of humanitarian emergency response projects.
- It will also assist the stakeholders including project beneficiaries, donors, implementing agencies, Somalia government, UN agencies, humanitarian aid workers and Somali community to know the existing challenges Emergency Response delivering project so that the problems can be dealt with.
- This will guide the students and other researches to find the appropriate information which can facilitate other studies in the future period.

## CHAPTER TWO


### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

This chapter related literature to the study. It consists of the following: -

Theoretical review, United Nations Somalia in general, early United Nations efforts, key issue of humanitarian aid in Somalia, decline humanitarian space, Security situation, Clan dynamics, Closure humanitarian space, Regional Variation, and the effect of humanitarian Aid services in south central .

**Figure 2. 1: Conceptual Framework**



**Source:** Conducted 2011

The conceptual framework above UN Agencies' is the independent variable which the emergency response projects are the dependent variable, United Nations Agencies are mandated by various conventions to review emergency humanitarian response assistance for the affected communities. The operations are in most cases expected to restore hope in the helpless affected communities. However, their authorities are always affected by a number of variables both dependent and extraneous as reflected in the figure above.

### **Theoretical Review**

A UN endorsed and US - led mission to help stabilize Somalia was launched in late 1992 following the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. This was overtaken by UN sanctioned UNOSOM I and II. However, this operation which aimed to provide humanitarian aid and restore stability in Somalia failed miserably. UNOSOM forces were not able to reach out to the needy and vulnerable population in Somalia. Subsequently, in October 1993, there were raging battles in Mogadishu between US and UN forces on one side and the late Gen. Aideed on the other. In the aftermath, eighteen US soldiers and thousands of Somalis, many of them non-combatant women and children, were killed in the failed operation to arrest the late Gen. Aideed. In March 1994, there was a subsequent shift in US strategy when all western troops were withdrawn from Somalia. As a result, civil war was rekindled and contributed greatly in the weakening of the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia. Similarly, in March 1995, UNOSOM II officially closed its operations in Somalia worsening the already fragile humanitarian situation. In 1998 the SSDF handed over the reins of power after the self-proclamation of the autonomous region of 'Puntland' under Abdullahi Yusuf as its president (Abdi, 1998)

In 2000, the Djibouti-led "Somali National Peace Conference" was held in Arta, Djibouti and led to the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia. Put under President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the TNG found little local acceptance in its four years in power. During this time, the humanitarian situation of the country remained worse. A high level of lawlessness in the country led to another

reconciliation conference in Eldoret, Kenya in late 2002. This process continued for two years, from 2002 to 2004. With a clan-based representation in a Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), the process selected Abdullahi Yusuf (leader of the autonomous region of 'Puntland' at the time) as president in October 2004. While local communities were weathering the vagaries of bad season, inflation, droughts that caused crop failure this government had no clear agenda for humanitarian aid. In 2006, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and parliament was relocated from Kenya first to Jowhar and later to Baidoa in Somalia, basically for security reasons. With Ethiopian military support, the TFG later on moved to Mogadishu after the emergency of an armed Islamist group called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) who ruled Mogadishu and much of South-central Somalia (UN News, 2007).

The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and counter-terrorism (ARTPCT) was formed in Mogadishu in February 2006 by a group of warlords and businesspeople with pressure and support of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, immediately thereafter heavy fighting broke out in December 2006 between the TFG and ICU militiamen. The latter were controlling parts of Mogadishu at the time and the hitherto recovering humanitarian aid situation was made worse. Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1725, expressing its support for a regional peacekeeping operation in Somalia. By then, the ICU was launching attacks around Baidoa. At the request of the TFG, Ethiopian forces launched a military offensive on the ICU in Mogadishu and much of South-central where the latter held control. By the end of the year, the ICU was defeated and driven out of the capital by the Ethiopian military. As a result, some ICU leaders and troops retreated to southern Somalia making Kismayo and Ras Kiamboni their final stronghold. This heavy fighting between the ICU forces on one side and the TFG and its Ethiopian military backer on the other, and the subsequent retreat to the southern side of the country occurred in the midst of a humanitarian emergency due to cyclical wars and a combination of severe drought and the devastating floods that followed. This emergency created heavy internal displacement and became a great obstruction to the delivery of the much needed humanitarian assistance (UN AID, 2009).

From 2008 onwards, the *unknown elements* started attacks against aid workers sooner after the United States' enlisting of *Al-Shabaab* as a terrorist organization (in March 2008) on the one hand and the killing of one of the *Al-Shabaab* key leaders, Aden Ayro, by a U.S. missile strike on a safe house in Dhusamareb district in May 2008. In addition, Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia after the signing of the agreement by the ARS, Sheikh Sharif's wing, and TFG's Nur Adde's government. On the humanitarian front, the Dutch navy ended its escort services for the WFP sponsored food relief - carrying ships in June 2008. This led to WFP's warning that it might have to stop deliveries altogether.F

In early 2009, members from TFG and ARS gathered in Djibouti for a new round of talks. This resulted with the expansion of the transitional federal parliament from 278 to 550, half of which would come from the ARS wing. Sheikh Sharif was also elected as a president and immediately appointed the son of the late Sharma'arke, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as prime minister. Thereafter Sheikh Sharif relocated to Mogadishu where disagreements with the former ICU worsened. After this fall out members from *Al-Shaabaab* started launching their war against the new government led by Sheikh Sharif, targeting all government officials and journalists, aid workers and therefore making everybody vulnerable to their attacks and humanitarian access difficult in Mogadishu in particular and Somalia in general.

On June 16<sup>th</sup> 2009, more violence in Mogadishu's Karan and Hodan districts between government forces and insurgents killed at least 30 people, including the Mogadishu police chief while more than 120 others were wounded. According to UNHCR, the total number of IDPs from Mogadishu alone since 7 May 2009 was nearly 126,000 people. Given the new spate of violence even the largest in-patient facility in South-central Somalia was close while a suicide car bomb killed at least 34 people, including the Minister for Internal Security in Beletweyn, Hiran. Field sources indicate that more than 30 people were injured in the incident. Similarly, while Kenya's border has been officially closed since early 2007 there has been growing tension along

the Kenyan/Somali border between Kenyan military forces and Somali Islamists. This, however, has not slowed the pace of new asylum seekers arriving at Dadaab refugee camp. According to OCHA field reports, since the recent fighting started in Mogadishu, increasing number of Somalis are crossing the border.

### **Early United Nations Efforts**

Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Barre, the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia and, by March 1991, was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On 27 December 1991, then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia. Accordingly, after consulting incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he asked then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James O.C. Jonah to visit the area (AI, 2008).

In early January 1992, despite continued fighting in Mogadishu, Mr. Jonah led a team of senior United Nations officials into Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. During that visit, support for a ceasefire in Mogadishu

was expressed by all faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed, however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation.

The results of the visit were reported to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who then consulted with the members of the Security Council on the appropriate course of action. On 23 January, by its resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Council requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the affected population and to contact all parties involved in the conflict to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, to promote a ceasefire and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict.

On 31 January, the Secretary-General invited LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, to send their representatives to participate in consultations at United Nations Headquarters from 12 to 14 February. The talks succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of the ceasefire, and to a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations to conclude a ceasefire agreement. The joint delegation arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February 1992. On 3 March, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed an "Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire". This Agreement also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. At the same time, the joint delegation undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited (Unisom, 1994).

On 17 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 746 (1992), supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. The Council also requested that the team

develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April. Following discussions with the team, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the ceasefire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance (Erica 1995).

## **UNOSOM Deployed**

### **Establishment of UNOSOM**

On 24 April 1992, in response to a recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 781 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The Council also asked the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity. It also called on the international community for financial and other support for the Secretary-General's 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to appoint a Special Representative for Somalia to provide overall direction of United Nations activities in that country. Mr. Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed Special Representative on 28 April 1992 and left for the area on 1 May (Machel, 2001).

### **Original Concept of Operations**

In accordance with the agreements reached with the two main Somali factions in Mogadishu, the ceasefire in the capital was to be monitored by a group of 50 unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers. As regards humanitarian assistance, the security personnel envisaged in the agreements were to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs.



In its resolution 781 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to deploy immediately 50 observers to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu. It also agreed, in principle, to establish a security force to be deployed as soon as possible, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu in this regard.

On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the immediate deployment of the unarmed observers. The Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Imtíaz Shaheen of Pakistan, and the advance party of UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. On 12 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after considerable delays and difficulties, agreement had been reached with the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations security personnel in the capital as part of UNOSOM. The Government of Pakistan had agreed to contribute a unit for the purpose. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992.

### **Enlargement of UNOSOM**

Between 4 May and 19 July 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative undertook extensive consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. On 22 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the complex political and security situation in Somalia, as well as the desperate situation the country faced in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building. The Secretary-General concluded that the United Nations must "adapt" its involvement in Somalia and that its efforts needed to be enlarged in order to bring about an effective ceasefire throughout the country, while at the same time promoting national reconciliation.

On 27 July, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate United Nations efforts to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The Council

strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch another technical team to Somalia.

Following the technical team's visit to Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, the Secretary-General submitted his further report, dated 24 August, to the Security Council, in which he described a number of urgent steps, being planned or already taken, to mitigate the widespread starvation in the areas of Somalia most seriously affected by the civil war and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. Noting that the United Nations and its partners were ready and had the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance, the Secretary-General stated that they were prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security prevailing throughout Somalia. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport (Feing, 2008).

Given the difficulties, the Secretary-General concluded that the airlift operations already being carried out by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as well as by ICRC, needed to be enhanced substantially, with priority given to central and southern Somalia. In addition, a "preventive zone" on the Kenya-Somali border should be established for special deliveries of food and seed, in an attempt to reduce famine-induced population movements.

The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of four additional United Nations security units, each with a strength of up to 780, to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. Also, in accordance with his earlier proposal, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of four zone headquarters of UNOSOM. Each would be headed by a civilian official who would assist the Secretary-General's Special Representative in all aspects of his duties.

On 28 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 778 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM. The

Council requested the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, his efforts to seek a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Somalia.

On 8 September, the Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's plan to deploy three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel to support the enhanced UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM was to be 4,219 all ranks, including the unit of 500 authorized in Mogadishu and 719 for logistic units.

## **Key issue of Humanitarian Aid in Somalia**

### **Decline of Humanitarian Space**

The impact of growing insecurity on the humanitarian situation is severe the delivery of aid to the 3.2 million Somalis in need has been seriously reduced as NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets. Although, this violence has principally been stemming from grudges of some local groups against some relief agencies some insurgent groups are deliberately organizing this violence focusing aid workers. For example, *Médecins Sans Frontières* lost three staff for the first time in a bomb attack in January 2008. MSF activities in Bakol included the Health Centre in Hudur which has provided 272,700 outpatient consultations since 2002 and four outlying health posts in Labatan Jirow, Ceel Garas, Ceel Berde and Rubdhure. This was a serious setback for the region as the International Medical Corps was forced by *Al-Shabaab* to suspend all their activities (mainly nutrition interventions) in the area in October 2008 (Wold Bank, 2009).

### **Security Situation**

The new wave of aggression and hostilities against humanitarian aid workers in Somalia is putting the lives of children and women at great risk. A press statement issued by UNICEF on 17 June 2009, said that it had been a month since the Jowhar compound in Middle Shabelle was attacked and occupied by militiamen, rendering it inaccessible to its staff members. The looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affected UNICEF's ability to deliver services to the most vulnerable children and women Similarly, after *Al-Shabab* leaders

threatened that NGOs might be attacked. As a result, Care, International Medical Corps and other NGOs working in Somalia were obliged to withdraw entirely because of such threats. This was under the suspicions that some humanitarian agencies were cooperating with the US war on terrorism by identifying insurgent locations. Kidnappings, assassinations and other attacks on NGO and UN humanitarian agency staff have increased further since August 2008 as more areas of the country are sucked into the violence (CIA,2008).

Piracy off the Somali coast has complicated matters further. Piracy started after the collapse of the central government of Somalia but became popular some years later; the pirates developed an agenda of making an economy from Somalia's coast. Hundreds of vessels were captured by pirates in 2008 and were released only after paying ransoms worth billions of dollars. This has encouraged pirate leaders to recruit new local youth. Since November 2007 (WFP) charters have been targeted and have required naval escorts to safely deliver cargo. Land routes are expensive, and there is little alternative to the sea for the needed scale of emergency relief. After the Dutch navy ended their escort for WFP ships in June 2008 the organization warned it might have to stop deliveries altogether.

The TFG also puts obstacles in the way of humanitarian operations, both roadblocks and time consuming and financially draining bureaucracy. Officials often accuse NGOs for operating without respect for national sovereignty and bypassing the government. They also tend to resent the channeling of aid to IDPs whom they believe support the insurgency. At the same time, donors have put pressure on the agencies not to cooperate with insurgent factions even to gain access to the suffering population. Somalia has never been safe for U.N. agencies and NGOs and yet aid agencies have been under enormous pressure to keep operating, both to respond to the humanitarian emergency and to reinforce a political perception that Somalia is reasonably safe, important for those seeking to shore up the TFG's flagging legitimacy. The U.N. Political Office for Somalia is planning its own physical relocation from Nairobi to Somalia at

some point in the future for this reason, but agency personnel fear that politically inspired security decisions will result in avoidable deaths and kidnappings.

### **Clan Dynamics**

Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and to a common ancestor. But, the genealogical ties have also provided the basis on which divisions among Somalis have occurred, division historically being more common than unity. As clan-families, too large and scattered for practical cooperation, in the past had no real political or economic functions, hence it is the basis of the collective Somali inclination toward internal fission and internecine conflict, as well as of the Somalis' sense of being distinct--a consciousness of otherness that borders on xenophobia(Danish ministry affairs, 2003).

Subsequently, with the renewal and intensification of clan feuding in the wake of Siad Barre's fall from power in early 1991, the clan-families have assumed crucial significance as pseudo-religio-political movements have pitted against one another along tribal lines in a disastrous civil war. As a result clan inter-relationships are extremely complex and often present hidden power dynamics that are difficult for external agencies to comprehend. Within the Somali context, aid is a valuable resource and, as a result, often becomes politicized and intertwined in clan dispute

Furthermore, the peace process that led to the creation of the TFG was deeply divisive, with each clan staking claims to key cabinet posts. Although the 4.5 clan quota system for allocating cabinet posts was agreed, it was inevitable that some clans who failed to obtain such posts would feel aggrieved. Beneath the unity and reconciliation rhetoric, therefore, TFG infighting also reflects complex inter-clan rivalry. Therefore, mistrust and rivalry among major clans in Somalia have disfigured politics since independence and their relationship and cooperation among them has been always an uneasy *détente* (Ayub, 2007).

## **Closure of Humanitarian Space**

The rise of criminal gangs operating largely outside the clan system is another fresh phenomenon. The new organized crime – piracy, people smuggling, counterfeit banknotes and kidnapping – is run by syndicates that have forged cross – clan networks. This is particularly visible in the south-central Somalia and the north-eastern autonomous region of Puntland, where sophisticated syndicates have emerged.

Over the years, it has frequently been accused by aid workers of being too risky, preventing agencies from committing personnel in parts of the country. At the same time it is sometimes accused of succumbing to political pressure not to designate a region a NO GO zone. All of these are indicators of political and institutional pressure on the U.N. department of security that could compromise its ability to render accurate, dispassionate judgment on security conditions.

Secondly, the food prices have skyrocketed, eroding the IDPs and other households to feed themselves. The rise in food prices is due to global spike in the cost of grains and fuel; chronic conflict, insecurity and crime, which has badly disrupted the flow of commercial food into the country; and an epidemic of counterfeit Somali shilling by politicians and business people, creating hyper inflation and robbing poorer Somalis of their purchasing power. Mother nature is not cooperating either; a severe conflict and drought is gripping much of South-central Somalia, increasing displacement, killing of livestock and reducing harvests in farming areas.

Thirdly, humanitarian agencies in Somalia are facing daunting obstacles to deliver food aid. There is now virtually no “humanitarian space” in which aid can safely be delivered. Since 2008, the insurgent cells in Mogadishu have become an incessant threat to humanitarian actors, they are engaged in a campaign of threats and alleged assassinations against any and all Somalis working for western NGOs or collaborating with UN aid workers. However, not all insurgent members embrace this policy. For instance, the leader of Bay and Bakol regions, Mukhtar Robow, has adopted different policy from that of *Al-Shabaab* condemning the assassinations and attacks against the

UN and aid workers and is known to be working to provide protection for aid operations in his region, but the Jihadists in Mogadishu have been targeting the national aid workers and civil society leaders. As a result, Somali aid workers and other civic leaders face a terrifying combination of threat from elements in the Jihadist, TFG, Criminal gangs, and Al-Shabaab. These attacks have put thousands of Somali professionals, aid workers, business community, and civil society leader and immediate risk.

A critical dimension of this closure of humanitarian space is the role that western foreign policies have unintentionally played in creating it. As indicated earlier the *Shabaab* attack against aid workers is a direct response to the US designation of *Shabaab* as a terrorist organization in March 2008 and the May 2008 U.S assassination of Aden Ayro. After the missile attack, the *Shabaab* declared its intent to widen the war to any and all western targets inside and outside the country, including Somalis working in any way with the west. Prior to these policies the *Shabaab* was directing its attacks against the TFG and the Ethiopian military (UN Report, 2007).

Fourth, the piracy problem, which began to develop in the late 1990s, dramatically increased in 2008. The waters off the Somali coast are now ranked "the number one piracy hotspot" in the world. The reported attacks on ships in the third quarter of 2008, the pirates threaten to choke off the Gulf of Aden, one of the world's busiest and most vital waterways. The audacity and sophistication of these pirates, as well as their ambition to extend operations well beyond Somalia's territorial waters, have deeply alarmed the world. Major naval powers have scrambled to craft a response amid an unprecedented media outcry, particularly after a Ukrainian ship with 21 crew members and a cargo of heavy weaponry officially headed for Kenya was hijacked. An outbreak of security resolution of was issued, authorizing deployments off the coast and use of "all necessary means" to fight piracy.

### **Regional Variations:**

***Somaliland:*** The collapse of the central government caused chaos into the whole system and regional developments in terms of humanitarian interventions. The

early efforts to consolidate peace and security that began in Somaliland in 1991 took a very different path from that of the South as significant progress was made on the economic front, customs offices were established and revenue collection restarted. A government-controlled central bank was created and the Somaliland shilling was introduced as a new currency in 1994. This developed the lives of the north-western people. Due to the skirmishes and conflicts of the southern central zone Somaliland was receiving IDPs that maintained the humanitarian crisis. Following the influx of refugees the UN provided Somaliland with humanitarian aid while it continues to assist the IDPs. In Somaliland, particularly Hargeisa, the situation for displaced persons is complicated by a lack of international recognition of Somaliland's self-declared statehood. While the government of Somaliland considers displaced southern Somalis to be refugees on their territory, international aid agencies designate these same individuals as IDPs. This confusion over their status comes in addition to inadequate financial and material support to the displaced Somalis in Somaliland.

***Puntland:*** Puntland plays a significant role both in the development crisis and political development of the southern and central zones. Since the TFG landed into the country, Puntland had been supporting the government having the will to build the state together, while looking after its interest of regional integration under federalism. Puntland receives thousands of IDPs from south-central Somalia and Ogaden region every month. Most of these IDPs reach Puntland as transit route on their journey to the Yemen refugee camps. According to UN reports hundreds of Somali refugees lose their lives on their journey to Yemen annually. The humanitarian situation in Puntland is similar to that of the central regions and it is caused by the pirates, regional conflict, and corruption within the government and refugee influx.

***South – Central:*** The humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia is as a result of a lethal cocktail of factors. However, the large scale displacement caused by the fighting in Mogadishu is the most important driver. The displaced have fled mainly into the interior of the country where they lack access to food, clean water and basic health care, livelihoods and support networks. IDPs are the most vulnerable populations in any



humanitarian emergency. Over 700,000 people out of the population of perhaps 6 million in south-central Somalia have been forced to flee their homes.

## **The effects of Humanitarian Aid Services in South Central Somalia**

### **Lack of access to Humanitarian Assistance:**

Funding, access and security for humanitarian organizations have been and continue to be insufficient in the provision of adequate support for displaced civilians in Southern and central Somalia. Every day humanitarian aid workers face checkpoints, road blocks, extortion, car jacking, perpetual suspicion of the impartial nature of their assistance and numerous bureaucratic impediments and confusion among government authorities which obstruct humanitarian access, travel and humanitarian supplies. Risks were grave for humanitarian organizations operating in Somalia. Staff from CARE (May 2007) and Médecins Sans Frontières (December, 2007) and a French journalist (December, 2007) were abducted and later released, in Puntland, reportedly, by non state armed groups. Similarly, in January 2008, three Médecins Sans Frontières staff members were deliberately targeted and killed in Kismayo (Muse, 2010).

### **Mistrust between Government Institutions and NGOs:**

There is a profound mistrust between the TFG as well as other government institutions such as local authorities and civil society. This is not limited to internally funded COs. Grass-roots and locally formed CBOs feel this tension as well. The TFG has recently shown a tendency to try to take over civil society projects without proper procedures in place, while understandably COs are not keen to accept government's takeover. This has already created confusion among the TFG and COs.

### **Lack of Regulation and Self-Regulation:**

A meaningful and reliable regulatory authority is lacking, COs in South-Central are largely unregistered and are not under the supervision of any authority and are subsequently not subject to any legal or regulatory framework and lack a national umbrella group.

### **Loose Structure and Lack of Clarity:**

A source of the tension between the COs and the TFG is the loose structure of the COs and the insecurity felt by local authorities. There is neither a clear and concrete framework nor a structured strategy that COs set out for their activities. COs have become vulnerable to external manipulation.

### **Dependency on External Funding:**

Somali civil societies at large depend on foreign funding. This is not only results into competition amongst different groups but also means that when foreign aid is withdrawn, the groups have little or no other resources to draw on and many of them will not be able to sustain their activities.

### **Little International Engagement and Support:**

The international community and international NGOs operating inside Somalia have had limited engagement with local COs. The lack of such a closer collaboration has limited the capacity of local organizations to mature or assume a larger role. Few United Nation Agencies have developed initiatives to build the capacity of local Somali NGOs. Such leadership capacity building efforts are not only important to overcome the lack of leadership capacity and organizational structure but might also help Somali COs to become more sustainable over time and reduce the dependency on external donor funding.

### **External Pressure for Networking:**

Donors frequently require local groups to collaborate in order to receive project funding. While this can sometimes lead to stable networks, founded on common goals, it often encourages partnership whose only reason for collaboration is to secure foreign funding.

### **Unchanging Faces:**

Like all other organizations, COs run the risk of suffering from stagnant structures that frustrate the injection of new ideas and the necessary agility to adapt to the fast-changing humanitarian environment.

**Closure of International Borders:**

Kenya government closed its border with Somalia fearing the influx of insurgent groups. Subsequently, thousands of refugee “asylum seekers” fleeing the Somalia conflict are denied their right to enter the refugee camps in Kenya.

**Limited focus:**

Limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic coverage is another problem that has adversely affected humanitarian efforts in Somalia. This has also reduced the outcome of the activities of majority of the COs.

**International Funding:**

On the international (and funding) front, the Somalia CAP requirements have been revised downwards from US\$984 to \$849 million during the CAP mid-year review. The reduction is mainly in the food aid cluster amounting to \$129 million. There have also been some reductions in other clusters. As of 14 July, based on the revised requirements, the Somalia CAP was 50 percent funded, having received \$426 million. The best funded cluster was food with 69 percent of the requirements met, followed by nutrition and logistics at 49 percent each, coordination at 38 percent, education 11 percent, and protection 22 percent. Shelter was the only sector that was funded below 10 percent, that is, (8%). Two clusters have remained critical with their funding levels seriously affecting life-saving activities on the ground and these are Water & Sanitation at 18 percent and Health at 12 percent (Brodhead, 2009).

The Humanitarian Response Fund has funded 26 projects worth \$5.1 million as of 7 July 2009, of which 50 percent was implemented by local Somali non-governmental organizations directly or in partnership with United Nation Agencies . The fund balance is currently \$5.9 million. The bulk of the funds has been spent on WASH interventions and has received 63 percent of funding disbursed in 2009 (IRIN, 2008).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter consists of how the study was conducted, the research population, sample size, and sample design. It also indicates the research instruments and how data was collected, interpreted, and analyzed.

#### **Research Design**

The study employed a cross-sectional survey design to identify the challenges faced by UN agencies delivering humanitarian services in Somalia.

Cross sectional survey design examines several groups of people at one time (Salkind, 2000).

#### **Research Population**

This study was conducted among United Nations Agencies. The target population were staff field workers, project and program managers of the United Nation Agencies. Field workers project and program managers were selected because they have the information and meet the challenges, obstacles and barriers delivering emergency response projects to help internally displaced people in Somalia.

United Nation Agencies in Somalia were divided into separate groups such as relief organizations and health organizations. Two UN agencies were selected from each group. This was done to find out the challenges faced by each group and the influence it had their activities. The research population of this study was 78.

#### **Sample Size**

The sample size of the study was 65 respondents out of total of 10 of the UN agencies. The researcher employed Slovene's formula to determine the sample size.

See the below illustration: -

$$N = \frac{N}{1+(Ne^2)}$$

Where n= sample size, N= population size, and e= margin of error, 5%

### **Sampling procedure**

The study used purposive sampling and simple random sampling. Simple random sampling is a sample obtained from the population in such a way that samples of the same size have equal chances of being selected (Amin, 2005). Thus simple random sampling used to select the United Nation Agencies and purposive sampling was used to select the respondents using the following criteria for the fieldworker:

1. Experience of the problem.
2. Working with United Nation Agencies for one year.

For the project/program managers:

1. Overseeing the field workers.
2. Experience of the problem.
3. Working with United Nation Agencies for at least 1 year and above.

The target was ten United Nation Agencies and selected four agencies according to the sections the researcher mention above, the field workers, project and program managers of the selected Agencies were 78 respondents , and 65 has been chosen as a sample size of the study. The reason the researcher chose the staffs and the managers was, he believes they have the information and the data he was gathering.

### **Research Instrument**

The researcher used questionnaires consisting self administered with a combination of both open and closed questions for the collection of the required data. Interviews were used because there was information that could not be directly observed or were difficult to put down in writing. The technique allowed control to be gained from the line of questioning and historical information.

## **Reliability and Validity of the Instrument**

The reliability of the research instruments concerned with the degree to which the research instrument give way the same result.

Reliability of the respondent's instruments questionnaire was established through a test-retested method. The researcher conducted a pre-test for the instruments questionnaire in Mogadishu and the test was conducted after one week in the same city and the same respondents and it gave the researcher the same result. This shows the consistency and the reliability of the instruments. Validity is the quality of the test doing what is designed to do (Salkind, 2000).

## **Data Gathering Procedures**

Data gathering of the research started June 2010 when the proposal was approved. The researcher was given an introduction letter from the office of the director of school of postgraduate studies and research. The researcher distributed 65 questionnaires to the selected and target respondents 3 of the distributed questionnaires were spoiled and were not analyzed.

## **Data Processing and Analysis**

By use of the questionnaires the data collected from the study area, was edited, collated and tabulated. For quantitative data sets questionnaires, data was manually entered, then tabulated using Excel / SPSS statistical packages and analyzed. The Researcher then entered the data, edited and produced tally sheets after which the report writing took course.

Descriptive research was used to obtain information concerning the current status of the phenomena describing "what exists" with respect to variables or conditions in a situation. The methods involved range from the survey which describes the status quo, the correlation study which investigates the relationship between variables, to developmental studies which seek to determine changes over time.

Quantitative data analysis was based on the quantification of the size, distribution and association of variables of the study population, Data was collected through open ended questionnaires.

### **Limitation of the Study**

The researcher faced number of problems including some of the respondents not knowing the English language so translating local language into English language was difficult. Also, the researcher faced some of the respondents who didn't answer the questionnaire properly or correctly.

### **Ethical consideration**

The study engaged all target people in Mogadishu who were necessary for data collection. The information they provided was treated with a high degree of confidentiality.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

#### Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the empirical findings of the study and their interpretations that is based on the research questions and objectives which included: - to examine the challenges facing UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in south central Somalia; examine the effects caused by the challenges in emergency response projects in South Central Somalia zones; and to suggest the possible ways of reducing the challenges faced UN agencies working in South Central Somalia.

The findings are a representation of the relationship between UN Agency performance and emergency response projects. Findings of this study are in a tabular and graph format so as to determine percentages and frequencies of the different respondents.

#### Empirical Analysis

The study was set to establish the challenges faced by the United Nation Agencies Delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

The sample size was 65 respondents however the researcher collected 62 questionnaires back as three (3) had been spoilt by the respondents before filling. The respondents were given questionnaires for which they provided the following information: -

#### Analysis of the Response Rate

**Table 4. 1: Respondent's Response**

Type of Gender	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Collected	62	95
Spoilt	3	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>



In table 4.1, the study findings revealed that; out of the 65 questionnaires that were distributed, only 62 questionnaires were received back by the researcher from respondents as 3 of the questionnaires were claimed to have been spoilt by the respondents.





Figure 4. 1: Respondent's by Age

In figure 4.1, the study findings revealed that; 16% were of age bracket between 20 and 30, 44% were aged between 31 and 40 years, 24% were aged between 41 and 50 years and only 16% of the respondents were aged 51 years and above. This clearly indicates that most individuals running UN humanitarian organizations in South Central Somalia are youths aged between 31 and 40 years. This is due to the fact that most people belonging to that age bracket are believed to be active with a wider range of developmental ideas.

**Table 4. 2: Respondent's by Gender**

Type of Gender	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	49	79
Female	13	21
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100</b>

In table 4.2, the study findings revealed that; 79% of the respondents were men and only 21% were female. This indicates that a highest number of humanitarian people in South Central Somalia are male (79%) as compared to a small number of women who only constitute 21%. This indicates that running humanitarian organizations in the area under study is risky thus male dominance.



**Figure 4. 2: Respondent's Educational Qualification**

In figure 4.2, the study findings revealed that; 16% of the respondents are primary level holders, 32% of the respondents were secondary level academic holders and 52% of the respondents were university level humanitarian personnel. This indicates that most of the humanitarian personnel in South Central Somalia are either diploma or degree holders at university level.

**Table 4. 3: Respondent's Years of Experience**

Type of Response	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Less than 6 Months	5	8
6 Months – 1 Year	27	44
1 Year – 2 Years	20	32
2 Years and above	10	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100</b>

In table 4.3, the study findings revealed that; 8% of the respondents have experience of less than six months, 44% have experience of between 6 months and 1 year, 32% of the respondents have experience of between 1 year and 3 years, where as 16% of the respondents have experience of 2 years and above. This clearly shows that most UN humanitarian personnel in South Central Somalia have been running the organizations for a period of at least 6 months (44% are of between 6 months and 1 year and 32% are of between 1 and 2 years).

**Table 4. 4: Respondent's type of Humanitarian Service offered by the Organizations**

Condition		Food distr'n	Childcare	Education	Health	Dev't	HIV/AIDS	Nutrition	Livelihood Programmes	Shelter and Protection	WASH	Others
R E S P O N S E S	<b>Freq</b>	45	20	25	15	19	27	5	30	30	5	5
	<b>Perc (%)</b>	73	32	40	24	31	44	8	48	48	8	8

In table 4.4, the study findings revealed that; 73% of the respondents agreed that their humanitarian organizations offers services related to food distribution, 32% childcare, 44% education, 24% health, 31% development, 44% HIV/AIDS, 8% nutrition, 48%

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livelihood programmes, 48% shelter and protection, 8% wash and 8% others. This indicates that most activities or services almost offered by most organizations include; food distribution (73%), childcare (32%), education (40%), development (31%), 44% HIV/AIDS (44%), livelihood programmes (48%) and shelter and protection (4%).

**Table 4. 5: Key Challenges faced by United Nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia**

Condition		Strongly Agree (A)	Agree (B)	Disagree (C)	Strongly Disagree (D)	Neutral (E)	TOTAL
Decline of humanitarian space	Freq	32	18	2	0	10	62
	Perc (%)	52	29	3	0	16	100
Security situation	Freq	60	2	0	0	0	62
	Perc (%)	97	3	0	0	0	100
Clan dynamics	Freq	40	15	0	0	7	62
	Perc (%)	65	24	0	0	11	100
Regional variations	Freq	5	10	20	18	9	62
	Perc (%)	8	16	32	30	14	100
Logistics and transportation challenges	Freq	30	25	0	0	7	62
	Perc (%)	49	40	0	0	11	100
Lack of government institutions	Freq	20	30	5	0	7	62
	Perc (%)	32	49	8	0	11	100
Continued fighting between TFG and insurgents	Freq	45	17	0	0	0	62
	Perc (%)	73	27	0	0	0	100

In the interpretation in table 4.5, it revealed the following: -

Concerning declaration of humanitarian space; 52% of the respondents strongly agreed, 29% agreed and 16% of the respondents were neutral. This indicates that decline of humanitarian space is among the major challenges facing United nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (52% and 29% either strongly agreed or agreed respectively).

On the issue of security; 97% of the respondents strongly agreed and the remaining 3% agreed. This is a very strong indication that security concern is a major challenge faced by the UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

About the clan dynamics; 65% of the respondents strongly agreed, 24% of the respondents agreed, and only 11% of the respondents were neutral. This is another indication that clan dynamics is among the main challenges facing UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Concerning regional variations; 8% of the respondents strongly agreed, 16% of the respondents agreed, 32% of the respondents disagreed, 30% of the respondents strongly disagreed and 14% of the respondents were neutral. Though a challenge, this indicates that regional variations is not among the major challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Concerning logistics and transportation challenges; 49% of the respondents strongly agreed, 40% of the respondents agreed and only 11% of the respondents maintained neutrality. This strongly (49% and 40% for strongly agreeing and agreeing respectively) shows that logistics and transportation challenges are among the major challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

About lack of government institutions; 32% of the respondents strongly agreed, 49% of the respondents agreed and only 11% of the respondents were neutral. This is yet another strong indicator that lack of government institutions is among the major challenges facing UN Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Concerning continued fighting between TFG and insurgents; 73% of the respondents strongly agreed and 27% of the respondents agreed. This is a very strong indication that continued fighting between the TFG and insurgents is a very strong challenge faced by United Nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

**Table 4. 6: How the Challenges faced affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia**

Condition		Strongly Agree (A)	Agree (B)	Disagree (C)	Strongly Disagree (D)	Neutral (E)	TOTAL
Lack of access to humanitarian assistance	Freq	32	30	0	0	0	62
	Perc (%)	52	48	0	0	0	100
Mistrust between government institutions and UN agencies	Freq	10	15	20	10	7	62
	Perc (%)	16	25	32	16	11	100
Lack of regulation and self-regulation	Freq	5	5	30	10	12	62
	Perc (%)	8	8	49	16	19	100
Loose structure and lack of clarity	Freq	10	20	12	15	5	62
	Perc (%)	16	32	19	25	8	100
Dependency on external funding	Freq	25	30	0	5	2	62
	Perc (%)	40	49	0	8	3	100
Little international engagement and support	Freq	10	10	30	7	5	62
	Perc (%)	16	16	49	11	8	100
External pressure for networking	Freq	5	10	30	10	7	62
	Perc (%)	8	16	49	16	11	100
Unchanging faces	Freq	10	35	5	10	2	62
	Perc (%)	16	57	8	16	3	100
Closure of international borders	Freq	0	0	40	17	5	62
	Perc (%)	0	0	65	27	8	100
Limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic	Freq	20	15	5	12	10	62
	Perc (%)	32	25	8	19	16	100

In the interpretation in table 4.6, it revealed the following: -

Concerning lack of access to humanitarian assistance; 52% of the respondents strongly agreed and the remaining 48% of the respondents agreed. This strongly shows that lack of access to humanitarian assistance is a key factor affecting the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

About mistrust between government institutions and UN agencies; 16% of the respondents strongly agreed, 25% agreed, 32% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed, and 11% of the respondents were neutral. This indicates that though there is mistrust between government institutions and UN agencies most respondents disagree with this

matter meaning that this does not effectively affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Concerning lack of regulation and self-regulation; 8% strongly agreed, 8% agreed, 49% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed and 19% were undecided. This implies that lack of regulation and self-regulation does not effectively affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

In regard to loose structure and lack of clarity; 16% of the respondents strongly agreed, 32% agreed, 19% disagreed, 25% strongly disagreed and 8% remained neutral. The corresponding 16% (strongly agree) and 32% (agree) clearly shows that loose structure and lack of clarity in South Central Somalia is one of the key factors that affect the emergency response projects in the area.

About dependency on external funding; 40% strongly agreed, 49% agreed, 8% strongly disagreed, and 3% were neutral. This implies that though a few organizations do not entirely depend on the external funding (8%, strongly disagreed), it still remains that most organizations can not effectively run its affairs without external funding, (40% strongly agreed and 49% agreed). This strongly indicates that dependency on external funding greatly affects the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Little international engagement and support; 16% strongly agreed, 16% agreed, 49% disagreed, 11% strongly disagreed and 8% were neutral. This shows that little international engagement and support only to lesser extent affects the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

About the external pressure for networking; 8% strongly agreed, 16% agreed, 49% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed and 7% were undecided. This implies that external pressure is not considered as a major factor affecting / challenging the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Concerning unchanging faces; 16% strongly agreed, 57% agreed, 8% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed, and 3% remained neutral. This strongly indicates that unchanging faces in South Central Somalia is a posses a major negative effect on the progress of emergency response projects in the area.

About closure of international borders; 65% of the respondents disagreed, 27% strongly disagreed and 8% of the respondents were neutral. This clearly shows that closure of international borders does not greatly affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Concerning the limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic; 32% of the respondents strongly agreed, 25% agreed, 8% disagreed, 19% strongly disagreed and 16% were neutral. This shows that some organizations are not affected by the limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic matters; though a major number of organizations are affected.



**Table 4. 7: Possible ways of reducing the Challenges facing UN Agencies working in South Central Somalia**

Condition		Strongly Agree (A)	Agree (B)	Disagree (C)	Strongly Disagree (D)	Neutral (E)	TOTAL
To develop a strategic plan towards humanitarian assistance in Somalia	Freq	40	22	0	0	0	62
	Perc (%)	65	35	0	0	0	100
To develop international humanitarian law against the violation of humanitarian aid workers	Freq	55	7	0	0	0	62
	Perc (%)	89	11	0	0	0	100
The government has to serve the people and ensure protection for all aid workers	Freq	60	2	0	0	0	62
	Perc (%)	97	3	0	0	0	100
To reduce the risks of the humanitarian assistance	Freq	32	20	0	0	10	62
	Perc (%)	52	32	0	0	16	100
Create networks in order to avoid the targeting of humanitarian aid workers	Freq	28	15	5	0	14	62
	Perc (%)	45	24	8	0	23	100
The government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in Somalia	Freq	40	22	0	0	0	62
	Perc (%)	65	35	0	0	0	100
The U.N agencies and member states should increase the security of humanitarian assistance in Somalia	Freq	45	7	0	0	10	62
	Perc (%)	35	11	0	0	16	100
The humanitarian workers should increase their focus to a specific goal and well defined geographic areas where the humanitarian interventions will be benefited by the vulnerable Somalia community precisely.	Freq	35	20	0	0	7	62
	Perc (%)	57	32	0	0	11	100

In the interpretation in table 4.7, it revealed the following: -

About developing a strategic plan towards humanitarian assistance in Somalia; 65% strongly agreed, and 35% agreed. This strongly shows that developing a strategic plan towards humanitarian assistance in Somalia is a key factor in reducing the challenges facing UN Agencies working in South Central Somalia.

Concerning development of international humanitarian law against the violation of humanitarian aid workers; 89% strongly agreed, and 11% agreed. This strongly indicates that development of international humanitarian law against the violation of humanitarian aid workers is yet another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

About the government having to serve the people and ensure protection for all aid workers; 97% strongly agreed, and 3% agreed. This strongly indicates that having to serve the people and ensure protection for all aid workers is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

Concerning reducing the risks of the humanitarian assistance; 52% strongly agreed, 32% agreed, 16% were neutral. This also clearly indicates that reducing the risks of the humanitarian assistance is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

About creating networks in order to avoid the targeting of humanitarian aid workers; 45% strongly agreed, 24% agreed, 8% were undecided, and 23% were neutral. Though not very effective, it shows (45%, strongly agreed) that creating networks in order to avoid the targeting of humanitarian aid workers is another possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

About the government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in Somalia; 65% strongly agreed, and 35% agreed. This strongly indicates that the government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in Somalia is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

Concerning the U.N agencies and member states should increase the security of humanitarian assistance in Somalia; 35% strongly agreed, 11% agreed, 16% were neutral. This is a clear indication that U.N agencies and member states should increase the security of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

About the humanitarian workers should increase their focus to a specific goal and well defined geographic areas where the humanitarian interventions will be benefited by the

vulnerable Somalia community precisely; 57% strongly agreed, 32% agreed, and 11% were neutral. This is a clear indication that the humanitarian workers should increase their focus to a specific goal and well defined geographic areas where the humanitarian interventions will be benefited by the vulnerable Somalia community precisely is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

## **ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY**

### **The Key Challenges Facing United Nation Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia**

From the research findings the decline of humanitarian space is among the major challenges facing United nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (52% and 29% either strongly agreed or agreed respectively).

Also the research revealed that there is a very strong indication that security concern is a major challenge faced by the UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (97% of the respondents strongly agreed and the remaining 3% agreed).

According to the research clan dynamics is among the main challenges facing UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (65% of the respondents strongly agreed, 24% of the respondents agreed, and only 11% of the respondents were neutral).

The research findings also revealed that regional variations is not among the major challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (8% strongly agreed, 16% agreed, 32% disagreed, 30% strongly disagreed and 14% neutral).

The research findings also showed that that logistics and transportation challenges are among the major challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response

projects in South Central Somalia (49% strongly agreed, 40% agreed and only 11% maintained neutrality).

According to the research findings there was a strong indication that lack of government institutions is among the major challenges facing UN Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (32% strongly agreed, 49% agreed and only 11% were neutral).

Also the research findings indicated that continued fighting between the TFG and insurgents is a very strong challenge faced by United Nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (73% strongly agreed and 27% agreed).

### **How the Challenges faced affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia**

The research findings show that lack of access to humanitarian assistance is a key factor affecting the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (52% strongly agreed and 48% agreed).

Also the research findings reveal that though there is mistrust between government institutions and UN agencies most respondents disagree with this matter meaning that this does not effectively affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (16% strongly agreed, 25% agreed, 32% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed, and 11% were neutral).

The research findings also show that lack of regulation and self-regulation does not effectively affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (8% strongly agreed, 8% agreed, 49% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed and 19% were undecided).

Also the research findings show that loose structure and lack of clarity in South Central Somalia is one of the key factors that affect the emergency response projects in the area (32% agreed, 19% disagreed, 25% strongly disagreed and 8% remained neutral).

The research findings also revealed that dependency on external funding greatly affects the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (40% strongly agreed, 49% agreed, 8% strongly disagreed, and 3% were neutral). This showed that most organizations can not effectively run its affairs without external funding, (40% strongly agreed and 49% agreed).

According to the research findings little international engagement and support only to lesser extent affects the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (16% strongly agreed, 16% agreed, 49% disagreed, 11% strongly disagreed and 8% were neutral).

Also the research findings revealed that external pressure is not considered as a major factor affecting / challenging the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (8% strongly agreed, 16% agreed, 49% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed and 7% were undecided).

According to the research findings, it is revealed that unchanging faces in South Central Somalia is a posses a major negative effect on the progress of emergency response projects in the area (16% strongly agreed, 57% agreed, 8% disagreed, 16% strongly disagreed, and 3% remained neutral).

Also, the research findings show that closure of international borders does not greatly affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia (65% of the respondents disagreed, 27% strongly disagreed and 8% were neutral).

The research findings also show that some organizations are not affected by the limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic matters; though a major number of

organizations are affected (32% of the respondents strongly agreed, 25% agreed, 8% disagreed, 19% strongly disagreed and 16% were neutral).

### **Possible ways of reducing the Challenges facing UN Agencies working in South Central Somalia**

From the research findings, it is evident that developing a strategic plan towards humanitarian assistance in Somalia is a key factor in reducing the challenges facing UN Agencies working in South Central Somalia. (65% strongly agreed, and 35% agreed).

The research findings also show that development of international humanitarian law against the violation of humanitarian aid workers is yet another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia (89% strongly agreed, and 11% agreed).

Also the research findings show that having to serve the people and ensure protection for all aid workers is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia (97% strongly agreed, and 3% agreed).

From the research findings it is revealed that reducing the risks of the humanitarian assistance is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia (52% strongly agreed, 32% agreed, 16% were neutral).

The research findings also show that though not very effective, it shows (45%, strongly agreed) that creating networks in order to avoid the targeting of humanitarian aid workers is another possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia (45% strongly agreed, 24% agreed, 8% were undecided, and 23% were neutral).

Also the research findings show that the government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in Somalia is another major possible factor

that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia (65% strongly agreed, and 35% agreed).

The research findings also show that U.N agencies and member states should increase the security of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia (35% strongly agreed, 11% agreed, 16% were neutral).

Also the research findings show that the humanitarian workers should increase their focus to a specific goal and well defined geographic areas where the humanitarian interventions will be benefited by the vulnerable Somalia community precisely is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia (57% strongly agreed, 32% agreed, and 11% were neutral).

## **Conclusion**

In brief, the following were the challenges faced by the UN Human Agencies in Emergency Projects in Central South Somalia: -

Lack of access to humanitarian assistance is a key factor affecting the emergency response projects; mistrust between government institutions and UN agencies; dependency on external funding greatly affects the emergency response projects; little international engagement and support only to lesser extent affects the emergency response projects; external; and unchanging faces poses a major negative effect on the progress of emergency response projects.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter specifically portrays a summary of the results of the study based on the findings presented in chapter four and these relates to the objectives of the study to the findings aforementioned. The conclusions are drawn and the recommendations are also given.

#### **Summary of the Findings**

In determining the feasible findings of the study, the researcher took into consideration a total number of 62 respondents as the study sample.

Demographically, according to the study findings more males (79%) were involved in the research as compared to the females (21%).

Also a bigger percentage of the respondents were youths aged between 31 and 41 years (44%).

Food distribution (73%), child care (32%), education (40%), development (31%), HIV/AIDS (44%), livelihood programmes (48%), and shelter and protection (48%) were the major activities marked by most of the organizations as the activities they carry out in South Central Somalia.

#### **CONCLUSION**

This subsection presents the conclusions of the research basing on the objectives of the study which included: - to find out the challenges facing UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in south central Somalia; to examine the effects caused by the challenges in emergency response projects in South Central Somalia zones; and to suggest the possible ways of reducing the challenges faced UN agencies working in South Central Somalia.



## **The Key Challenges Facing United Nation Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia**

From the research findings the decline of humanitarian space is among the major challenges facing United nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Also there is a very strong indication that security concern is a major challenge faced by the UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Clan dynamics is among the main challenges facing UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

The regional variation is not among the major challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

The logistics and transportation challenges are among the major challenges faced by UN agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

There was a strong indication that lack of government institutions is among the major challenges facing UN Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Also the continued fighting between the TFG and insurgents is a very strong challenge faced by United Nations Agencies delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

## **How the Challenges faced affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia**

Lack of access to humanitarian assistance is a key factor affecting the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Though there is mistrust between government institutions and UN agencies most respondents disagree with this matter meaning that this does not effectively affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

The lack of regulation and self-regulation does not effectively affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Also the research findings show that loose structure and lack of clarity in South Central Somalia is one of the key factors that affect the emergency response projects in the area (32% agreed, 19% disagreed, 25% strongly disagreed and 8% remained neutral).

The dependency on external funding greatly affects the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Also little international engagement and support only to lesser extent affects the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Also the external pressure is not considered as a major factor affecting / challenging the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

The unchanging faces in South Central Somalia is a posses a major negative effect on the progress of emergency response projects in the area.

Also, the closure of international borders does not greatly affect the emergency response projects in South Central Somalia.

Also a few organizations are not affected by the limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic matters; though a major number of organizations are affected.

### **Possible ways of reducing the Challenges facing UN Agencies working in South Central Somalia**

The developing a strategic plan towards humanitarian assistance in Somalia is a key factor in reducing the challenges facing UN Agencies working in South Central Somalia.

The development of international humanitarian law against the violation of humanitarian aid workers is yet another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

Also, having to serve the people and ensure protection for all aid workers is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

Reducing the risks of the humanitarian assistance is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

Also, creating networks in order to avoid the targeting of humanitarian aid workers is another possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somali.

The government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in Somalia is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

The U.N agencies and member states should increase the security of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

Also, the humanitarian workers should increase their focus to a specific goal and well defined geographic areas where the humanitarian interventions will be benefited by the

vulnerable Somalia community precisely is another major possible factor that can reduce the challenges facing UN Agencies in South Central Somalia.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

Basing on the research findings as discussed above, the research would recommend the following as possible ways of reducing the challenges faced delivering humanitarian aid in South Central Somalia: -

The international community should either develop a strategic plan toward humanitarian assistance of Somalia or support the TFG both in kind and capital to reach the humanitarian need of the needy people in Somalia.

Parties fighting in Somalia have to halt all violations of international humanitarian law.

The government has to serve the people and ensure protection for all displaced persons without discrimination.

The government of Kenya has to observe the international human rights and humanitarian laws, and allow access to its territory for the delivery of humanitarian services to Somali refugees in Kenya.

U.N agencies and member states should fully fund and staff emergency humanitarian assistance program to meet the needs of vulnerable Somali civilians in Somalia and throughout the region.

The U.N agencies and member states should increase the access to humanitarian assistance in Somalia, in terms of funding, and negotiate with the government for the access and security for humanitarian organizations.

The government should develop strategic planning for the humanitarian assistance to overcome hurdles of humanitarian crisis, the government also needs to sit with the both

local and international non-governmental organizations to make clear its agenda for the humanitarian assistance.

To reduce the risks of the humanitarian assistance, the government needs to sit with the international government, and clearly spell their capacities to the Piracy problems.

The government should also develop criteria for the NGOs working in Somalia to speed up the humanitarian assistance to the needy and vulnerable IDPs and other households.

The government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in the country in order to overcome past obstacles and mistrust between the NGOs and TFG.

The Somali Diaspora should also play their role in developing the humanitarian assistance to the needy and vulnerable Somali community without discrimination.

The international community and international NGOs operating inside Somalia have to increase engagement with local CSOs. The lack or limitation of such a closer collaboration has limited the capacity of local organizations to mature or assume a larger role. The NGOs have to develop initiatives to build the capacity of local Somali NGOs. Areas that need to be developed include leadership, capacity-building and organizational development to become more sustainable over time and reduce dependency on external donor funding.

Create networks in order to receive projects funding. Donors frequently require local groups to collaborate in order to receive project funding. While this can sometimes lead to stable networks founded on common goals it often encourages partnership whose only reason for collaboration is to secure foreign funding.

### **Areas of Further Study**

Further research can be conducted in the following topics: -

1. Effectiveness of United Nations Agencies in war zone areas.
2. The Impact of NGOS on women living in Somalia.
3. The Relationship between UN Based organizations and Community based organizations.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE**

Date:

Dear Respondent,

I am a student at Kampala International University studying a Master of Arts in Project Planning and Management, this questionnaire has been prepared for data collection concerning "Challenges faced by the United Nation Agencies Delivering emergency response projects in South Central Somalia". The purpose of the questionnaire is only for academic reasons and the information you provide treated with utmost will be confidentially. I kindly request you to answer the questions fully and honestly. Your assistance will be highly appreciated

Direction: Please tick in the blanks provided as your response.

#### **A. Profile of the Respondent**

1. Age:

----- 20-30

\_\_\_ 31-40

\_\_\_ 41-50

\_\_\_ 51 and above

2. Gender:

\_\_\_ Male

\_\_\_ Female

3. Educational Qualification:

\_\_\_ Primary Level

\_\_\_ Secondary Level

\_\_\_ University level

4. Number of years experience:

\_\_\_ Less than 6 months

- ☐ 6 months—1 year
- ☐ 1 year—2 years
- ☐ 2 years and above

5. Type of humanitarian service offered by your organization

- ☐ Food distribution
- ☐ Child care
- ☐ Education
- ☐ Health
- ☐ Development
- ☐ H I V aids
- ☐ Nutrition
- ☐ Livelihood programmes
- ☐ Shelter and protection
- ☐ WASH
- ☐ Any other please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

**Instruction:** Please write your answer to the statements below. Kindly use the rating guided as follows for A, B, C, D and E

A= Strongly agree

B= Agree

C= Disagree

D= Strongly disagree

E= Neutral

**Section B:** The key challenges faced United Nation Agencies delivering emergency response projects in south central Somalia are:

No	Question	A	B	C	D	E
1	Decline of Humanitarian Space					
2	Security Situation					
3	Clan dynamics					
4	Regional Variations					
5	Logistics and transportation challenges					
6	Lack of government institution					
7	Continues fighting between TFG and insurgents					

**Section C:** how the challenges affected emergency response projects in south central Somalia

No	Question	A	B	C	D	E
1	Lack of access to humanitarian assistance					
2	Mistrust between government institutions and UN agencies					
3	Lack of regulation and self-regulation					
4	Loose structure and lack of clarity					
5	Dependency on external funding					
6	Little international engagement and support:					
7	External pressure for networking					
8	Unchanging faces					
9	Closure of international borders					
10	Limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic					

**Section D:** The possible ways of reducing the challenges faced UN agencies working in South Central Somalia

No	Question	A	B	C	D	E
1	To develop a strategic plan towards humanitarian assistance in Somalia					
2	To develop international humanitarian law against the violation of humanitarian aid workers					
3	The government has to serve the people and ensure protection for all aid workers					
4	To reduce the risks of the humanitarian assistance					
5	Create networks in order to avoid the targeting of humanitarian aid workers					
6	The government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in Somalia					
7	The U.N agencies and member states should increase the security of humanitarian assistance in Somalia					
8	The humanitarian workers should increase their focus to a specific goal and well defined geographic areas where the humanitarian interventions will be benefited by the vulnerable Somalia community precisely.					

**End**

## **APPENDIXES B: LIST OF UNITED NATION AGENCIES WORKING IN SOMALIA**

UNDP	United Nations development department
UNICEF	United Nations children, fund
UNHCR	United Nations high commission for refugee
UNPOS	United Nations political office Somalia
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization
UNOCHA	United Nations Office Common Humanitarian Affairs
UNAIDS	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations educational scientific and cultural
UNSS	United Nations Security Service

## APPENDIX C: UNIVERSITY INTRODUCTION LETTER



KAMPALA  
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

P.O.BOX 20000  
KAMPALA- UGANDA.  
TEL:-041-266813

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### OFFICE OF THE ASSOCIATE DEAN POSTGRADUATE STUDIES FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Dear Sir/Madam,

June 2,2010

**RE: ABDULLAHI MOHAMED ALI REG. NO. MPP/40358/91/DF**


The above mentioned is a bonafide student of Kampala International University pursuing a Masters of Arts in Project Planning and Management.

He is currently conducting field research and the title of the Research Project is **"Challenges faced by United Nations agencies in delivering emergence response projects in south central Somalia "** As part of his studies (Research work) he has to collect relevant information through questionnaires, interviews and other relevant reading materials.

Your Institution has been identified as a valuable source of information pertaining to his Research Project. The purpose of this letter is to kindly request you to avail him with the pertinent information he may need.

All information shared with him will be used for academic purpose only and we promise to share our findings with your institution should you require so.

We shall greatly appreciate your assistance to him.



Yours sincerely,

**Dr. Roseanne Mwaniki**

**ASSOCIATE DEAN, SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES & RESEARCH**

## APPENDIX D: CURRICULUM VITAE

### Curriculum Vitae (CV)

#### Personal Data :

- Name : ABDULLAHI MOHAMED Ali
- Date of birth : 17 July 1985
- Address : Nairobi Kenya
- Email Address : Abdullahi.ma@hotmail.com
- Mobile : +254723889001
- Sex : Male
- Nationality : Somali

#### Educational background :

2009 – 2010 Kampala International University, Kampala (KIU), UGANDA.

Master of Arts in project planning and Management.

#### Courses covered include:

- Research and development
- Principles Project planning and management I and II
- Monitoring and Evaluation ,
- Financial project management and procurement
- Strategic Management and Organizational Behavior
- Negotiation skills for project and ethics in project management
- Management information system

2010 2011 Diploma Community development Kenya institute of man Vision Empowerment institute Nairobi Kenya



2005-2009 (SIMAD University), Mogadishu, Somalia. Bachelor of science in information technology IT

Courses Covered Include:

- Database Management system, Oracle and SQL
- ASP.net and java programming (I and II)
- Management information system and visual basic .net (I and II)
- Business Management system and C++
- Business Communication and Software engineering
- Entrepreneurship and digital electronics
- Computer science , HTML and Networking
- Principles of Accounting

1998-2005 Abaal Primary and Secondary School, Mogdisho, Somalia.

- Secondary Leaving Certificate.

### Other Courses

27th Feb 2010	Mind Power Africa Capacity Building Successfully completed training project Monitoring And evaluation in Makerere university : Certificate of course completion
13th Feb. 2010	Mind Power Africa Capacity Building Successfully completed one week training for Public administration and management in Makerere university : Certificate of course completion
1st mach – 19th march 2010	Kampala international university two weeks training and implementing of routine HIV Prevention Strategies, counseling and Testing in clinical settings supported by Global Health and HIV / AIDS Initiative Uganda with Funding from USAID, DFID, European Union, in partnership with Ministry Of Health and Makerere University
22ndfeb to 1st mach 2010	Kampala international university ten days training course in research methodology
6th March 2010	Mind Power Africa Capacity Building one week training peace and conflict management in Makerere university : Certificate of course completion
15th Aug 2009	African Population Consult (APC) one month training : project planning and management course in Makerere university : certificate of course completion

5th Jan 2010	Successfully completed three months training course in procurement and logistic management certificate of course completion from Makerere university school of education
Feb 2008 – Aug 2008	Cisco networking Academy three months IT essentials : PC Hardware and software Certificate of course completion
26th Nov 2006 up to 16th Dec 2006	Successfully completed 20 days teacher training course conducted UNICEF in Somalia with a certificate awarded
Jan 2004 - June 2004	Somali Computer institute six months of Software and Hardware course, A+ certificate
Feb 2000- Aug 2000	Organization of technical training institute(OTTI) six months of health training: certificate of course completion , relevant with the final examination results
July 2001	Somali red Crescent society (SRCS) one month's first aid training with a certificate awarded

**Working Experience:**

Mach 2011 Up to date Program Coordinator Gender Education Empowerment and Leadership Organization(GEELo)

October 2010 Up to March 2011 civilian police project Assistance officer UNDP Somalia Rule of law & security program s Nairobi office .

May 2007 Up to October 2010 program coordinator Hiiraan water supply and community development organization in Nairobi office

January 2006 May 2007 Techno plane group of volunteers field Officer

Sept.2008-jan.2009 Developed graduation project titled as SIMAD Mailing system website as my final graduation project. The project was developed in ASP as a front –end and MY SQL as back – end

2004 -2006 Abaal primary and secondary school Mogadishu Somalia two years of teaching math and science language in Abaal primary and Secondary school. .Participated the school's important decision-making conferences and contributed to reaching its goals

October 2007 Up to date 2010 Hardware technician Assessing initial set-up requirements and implementing hardware and software solutions

October 2008 programmer Led a team developing a Supermarket management system software (desktop) Provided web designing and other programming practices

### PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES

Loyalty

Commitment

Honesty and integrity

Enthusiasm

Reliability

Ability to deal with pressure

### objective

To develop my career in the area of project planning and management and IT professionals

### Languages

- Somali mother tongue
- English fluent
- Arabic fluent
- Kiswahili good

### hobbies

- Reading.
- Participant.
- Making programs
- Searching

## Referees

1. Abdulhamid Osman Salah

Communication, HIV&AIDS, Empowerment & protection (CHEP)

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UNDP Somalia finance associate Nairobi office

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