

**ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND GOVERNANCE IN JONGLEI STATE,  
SOUTH SUDAN**

**BY;**

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## DECLARATION

I, Joseph Gibril Isaac Lomeri, declare that this Thesis entitled "***Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan***" is my own original compilation and has never been presented to any organization or institution of higher learning either as a paper or for any academic award.

I also hold full responsibilities for all the mistakes in this study.



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
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## APPROVAL

This is to acknowledge that, this Thesis "***Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan***" written by Joseph Gibril Isaac Lomeri, has been carried out under my close supervision and is now ready for submission to the College of Higher Degrees and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master's Degree in Public Administration of Kampala International University with my approval.

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(SUPERVISOR)

.....

Date

## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to my father, who taught me that the best kind of knowledge to have is that which is learned for its own sake. It is also dedicated to my mother, who taught me that even the largest task can be accomplished if it is done one step at a time.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>CNN</b>	Cable News Network
<b>CPA</b>	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Production
<b>GoSS</b>	Government of South Sudan
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
<b>ICG</b>	International Crisis Group
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced People
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>LDCs</b>	Less Developed Countries
<b>LRA</b>	Lord Resistance Army
<b>NLC</b>	National Liberation Council
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OECD</b>	Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PMSCs</b>	Private military and security companies
<b>SGI</b>	Sustainable Governance Indicators
<b>SPLA</b>	Sudan People's Liberation Army
<b>SPLM/A</b>	Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army
<b>SSDM</b>	South Sudan Democratic movement
<b>SSLA</b>	South Sudan Liberation Army
<b>SSR</b>	Security Sector Reform
<b>UNMISS</b>	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
<b>UPDF</b>	Ugandan People's Defense Forces
<b>VSS</b>	Veterans of South Sudan
<b>WGI</b>	World Governance Index

## ABSTRACT

This study was set to establish the relationship between Ethnic conflict and Governance in Jonglei State, and South Sudan. It was guided by the following specific objectives, that included determining the (i) profile of respondents, (ii) To establish the state of Ethnic conflict, (iii) to examine the extent of governance and (iv) To establish whether there is a relationship between Ethnic Conflict and governance in Jonglei, South Sudan. The study adopted a descriptive survey design .it used questionnaires, face to face interviews. The target population was 220 from which a sample size of 140 was derived. Findings revealed that respondents between 25-35 year were 32.1%, Female respondents dominated the study (64.3%); married were (53.6%) other marital status category; Secondary Certificate holders dominated the study 50% and on occupation others dominated the entire sample size with 54.2%. The findings on Ethnic conflict revealed that eight items were measured and rated as follows; cattle grazing and raids (Average mean=2.43, std. 99116) Environmental conflicts (Average mean=2.50, std 1.02221), ethnic security dilemma (Average mean=2.64, std. 1.08997) Disarmament and grab of power (Average mean=2.41 std. .99248), state political capacity (Average mean=2.18 std. 1.03375) religious issues (Average mean= 2.25 std. .85146) and abduction (Average mean=2.49 std .63617) with an overall mean of 2.41). The findings on Governance revealed that seven items were measured and rated as follows; Public participation and Democracy (Average mean=3.06, std .74603) Legislative branch (Average mean=2.83, std .59523), Executive and rule of Law (Average mean=2.92 std. .70057) Traditional & customary arrangement (Average mean=2.78 std. .68791), Transparency and accountability (Average mean=2.80 std. .72664) Human Security (Average mean= 2.81 std. .59522) with an overall mean of 2.87). Regarding ethnic conflict, it was recommended that; Equitable sharing of resources, Strengthening local administration, Empowerment of traditional leadership, Government to treat all communities equally, Governor visit all communities regularly, Provision of judges and public prosecutors; construction of courts in the counties, Upgrading of unqualified civil servants through capacity-building, compensation of salaries to chiefs. While issues of inclusive governance and equity are important drivers of conflict, these statements highlight complex and in some cases long-standing governance-related issues which largely went beyond the mandate of the peace conference. Political accommodation approach tackles governance issues directly. Regarding governance it was recommended that; if power sharing is to be done to the satisfaction of all different ethnic, religious, caste, tribal and linguistic identities, millions of people would have to be accommodated in various state structures. Hence, power sharing does not seem to offer any viable solution at all. Also inculcate regional autonomy and federation into the state system to enable local and regional authorities with a degree of autonomous power and authority. Allow external intervention to find a solution to their internal conflicts like those of the Nuer tribes, and Dinka. External interventions have two primary effects. Intervention can alter the internal balance of ethnic power and lead groups to moderate their demands. Provide guarantees for new ethnic contracts between the warring parties, at least during an interim period. Demobilized persons should be equipped with skills agriculture, carpentry, blacksmith and modern ways of livestock farming which will improve their livelihoods; the government should also compensate the families that have been affected by cattle raids and use all forces to recover the children and women who had been abducted. Further recommends awareness to the local population on the dangers of illegal arms in the area and possession of illegal fire arms. The peaceful disarmament to the local population that will help in restoration and peaceful co-existence of peace in the area is also very important. In conclusion, the preservation of ethnic peace is dependent upon the type and effectiveness of the available conflict management mechanisms and also the respective government's policy choices and decisions. Secondly, the use of constitutional conflict management tools has the potential to create lasting peace. This was more evident in Jonglei, where the government created the foundation for a thriving civil society, accountability and government transparency. The relationship that exist between Ethnic conflict and extents of good governance in Jonglei State is significantly correlated, (sig.>0.05). This means that Ethnic conflicts influences good governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan and the failure to resolve Ethnic conflicts well, the more poor governance, in relations to their posttraumatic condition, and other necessities as well as cease/failure to operate in the foreseeable future. The ethnic conflict theory of Lake and Rothschild, (1996) was proved right. it states that, when ethnic groups come to fear for their future (physical) security, they prepare for conflict, thus initiating a security dilemma. Several things can cause such a fear to develop, such as a decline in cultural security or past experience with conflict. The factor that Lake and Rothchild dwell on the most is rising anarchy, essentially a Hobbesian argument: as the Leviathan (the state) declines (becomes unable to prevent conflict), ethnic groups fear that their physical security may be at risk.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.0 Introduction**

This chapter focused on the background of the study, problem statement, purpose, research objectives, research questions, scope, hypothesis and significance of the study, validity, ethical consideration and limitations of the study.

#### **1.1 Background of the study**

This section includes the historical perspective, the theoretical perspective, the conceptual and contextual perspective of the study background.

##### **1.1.1 Historical Perspective**

Conflict is an attendant feature of human interaction and cannot be eliminated; however, its proper management and transformation are essential for peace and progress in human society. This is why conflict resolution is one of the most important challenges of governance (Abdi, 2013). Legitimacy of conflict management and resolution mechanisms is critical, especially in situations of diversity such as in multi-ethnic societies. When conflict resolution mechanisms fail or are considered untrustworthy, insecurity, including fears of physical insecurity can be heightened and individuals and groups are constrained to rely on their own capabilities. Security initiatives undertaken under conditions of deep suspicion of the motives of others combine with limited information can produce security dilemmas (Posen, 1993). Other forms of insecurity such as food insecurity and famine that may induce desperation and violence are consequences rather than causes of governance failure (Sen, 1989). Poverty does not cause conflict; failure of governance mechanisms can produce distributional and related problems that accentuate cleavage and arouse conflict (Abdi, 2013).

Contemporary conflicts in African societies are frequently categorized as ethnic conflicts even though most of them are caused by governance failure. Such

categorization is due to the fact that ethnic factors are often mobilized as resources of conflict in zero-sum politics associated with highly centralized, autocratic and predatory regimes (Abdi, 2013).. Ethnic loyalties can claim primacy over other forms of group loyalty and protagonists in conflict can more easily take recourse in ethnic solidarity. Conditions of sustained marginalization or fears of assimilation can accentuate ethnic cleavages, and appeals to ethnic sentiments can prove to be a potent tool in conflict. As critical as is ethnicity to conflict, empirical evidence shows that ethnicity, itself, is not a source of violent conflict but can be used as an instrument of conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1998).

After decades of civil war, the Republic of South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011 and was recognized as the newest state by the international community. However, South Sudan has been plagued by the unresolved territorial dispute over the Abyei region with northern Sudan, to which the world has paid much attention. Less attention has been paid to the country's instability and frequent intertribal clashes, especially in Jonglei State, one of ten states in South Sudan. Traditionally, clashes between the two ethnic groups, namely the Lou Nuer and Murle, have been observed in Jonglei (Agbor *et al.*, 2012). The conflicts often occurred when one ethnic group entered territories of other groups, competing over scarce resources such as land and water necessary for cattle grazing. The migratory practices as a result of climate change have been a trigger of those conflicts. Although some human casualties and occasional abduction of children occur, cattle raiding was the main objective of the conflicts because cattle were sources of wealth and sustenance for many pastoralist communities in Jonglei (Agbor *et al.*, 2012).

The type of warfare, however, has significantly changed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, and the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a disarmament campaign solely targeting the Lou Nuer. This uneven disarmament destabilized the country, sharpening the ethnic division and security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and Murle. The security dilemma eventually led to war, which fueled ethnic hatred. The recent clashes are evidently more than just cattle raiding.

Rather, they are characterized by indiscriminate mass killing of civilians, largely motivated by ethnic hatred. Thus, despite longstanding and persistent interethnic clashes between the Lou Nuer and Murle, the emergence of strong ethnic hatred appears to be a recent phenomenon (Agbor *et al.*, 2012). This is not to suggest that there are no purely ethnic-based conflicts. African societies are replete with ethnic conflicts between ethnic and cultural groups, pastoralists and agricultural groups, but these are hardly the arenas of the systemic breakdowns and cataclysmic violence that engulfs entire countries and regions; and even these are exacerbated by failure of governance mechanisms having to do with conflict resolution (Ake, 1996). Studies have shown that a mix of political and military factors having to do with overly-centralized governance structures, the use of military resources in support of arbitrary and autocratic governance and the implementation of policies and practices that sustain rent-seeking and predation are fundamental elements in most situations of institutional failure and violent conflicts (Gurr, 2000; Nwokedi, 1998). While state institutions constitute sites of governance failure, institutional failure at the supranational level often contributes substantially to governance failure resulting in violent conflicts. Institutions of national governance operate in larger regional and international environments to which they must respond. Thus, to investigate the roots of governance failure, we must examine the dynamics of governance at all levels, sub-national, national and supra-national (Ake, 1996).

Governance failure in Africa have their roots in several sources, principal among which are the legacy of colonialism, the nature of the independence struggle, the character of the post-colonial state and their leaders, and the structure and requirements of the global order. Colonial governance institutions were designed to promote domination and extraction, these being colonialism's principle mission. Although these institutions were the target of the anti-colonial struggle, they ultimately became colonialism's legacy to post-colonial governance (Ake, 1996).. Independence struggles around Africa required mobilization and produced movements in which, with few exceptions, decision-making was largely plebiscitary. At independence, African countries maintained over-centralized state institutions that

reposed enormous powers in the hands of their “founding fathers.” Political mobilization and plebiscitary decision-making conveniently dominate post-independence governance strategies, especially since the pursuit of development so as to “catch up” was the national preoccupation. Democracy was not a significant item on Africa’s post-independence governance agenda (Ake, 1996).

South Sudan is a home of about 64 ethnic tribes namely; Acholi, Anuak, Autot, Avukaya, Bai and many others. In Jonglei State is a home land to six communities (tribes) namely: Jie, Kachipo, Murle, Anyuak, Nuer and Dinka of which this study is mainly trying to find out the historical conflict among three neighboring tribes of Murle, Nuer and Dinka (Agence, 2014). The Nuer has three sub-groups which are Lou, Jikany and Gawer. These groups have been involved in intercommunity conflict for some time (Gurr, 2000). However this conflict was small-scale communal conflict which was fought using spears and arrows until the introduction of guns into these groups. Guns were acquired first from Ethiopia during the Italian occupation of 1931 especially by the Murle (Gurr, 2000). Secondly, during the 1972 Anyanya I and Government of Sudan Addis Ababa peace agreement the groups which were not absorbed into the government forces melted into the community with their guns which were also dangerous (Chol A, (2012)).

Thirdly, in 1979 the groups also got guns from Uganda when Idi Amin was overthrown. Also with the formation of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 1983 all the three main groups joined the SPLM/A to fight the government of Sudan. However in 1991 Riak Machar split from SPLM and created the SPLM/A Nassir faction (Agence, 2014). However with this split all the Nuer communities who are the second largest group in South Sudan joined the Riak Machar group and started attacking SPLM/A main stream and other non Nuer communities. These communities which joined Riak Machar were referred to as the White Army. The forces of Riak Machar and white army organized three streams of attack. The first attack was on the Dinka Bor, the second attack occurred simultaneously one was on Murle of Pibor County and other one was Nuer of Unity State on Dinka Bhar el Gazal of Warrap and Lakes State (Chol A. 2012).

In total the inter-communal conflict in Jonglei state can be classified into four types namely:- The Nuer and Dinka conflict the two tribes have been at peace for a longtime since the time immemorial; but in the early 19th century, There had been documented small scale conflict such as Panleep war (Tong e Panleep) in 1914, Panyang war (*KorPanyaang, Tong Panyang*) in 1915, Limtim war (*Tong e Limtim*) Bol e Chuei war around the same period, Paborkoi chaos. (*awoou Paborkoi, Tong e Dual Diu*) in 1928. and the situation became worsened when they acquired firearms first from Ethiopia during the Italian occupation in 1931, secondly from the Anya Nya and thirdly from Uganda when Idi Amin was overthrown in 1979. The possession of firearms made the conflict become more violent (Gurr, 2000). The situation worsened when Riak Machar group split from the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement in 1991. During the split which is called the "Nassir Declaration" of 28th August 1991 Riak Machar promised to attack and wipe out the Dinka Bor. The reason behind this was to hurt John Garang because the Dinka Bor is the homeland of John Garang who was the leader of SPLM/A. (David A, 1996).

The Nuer forces which attacked the Dinka were composed of the Lou and Gawer sub tribes. This conflict has been complicated by the involvement of the Murle who also attack the Dinka, In line with their tradition the Murle use to abduct children and raid cattle from the neighboring tribes (Agence, 2014). The Lou Nuer - Murle conflict the conflict between these two groups is a chronic problem that has been there since time immemorial. During the ancestors time they were using spears and any other traditional war tools (Agence, 2014). However the situation changed when the two groups acquired firearms from Ethiopia, Uganda and the Anyanya I. The main source of conflict is cattle raiding, child abduction (Agence, 2014). The Lou Nuer-Jikany Nuer land dispute, the third line of conflict in Jonglei state involves Lou Nuer-Jikany Nuer land dispute. Despite, the Lou and Jikany being sub-clans of the Nuer tribe they have been in conflict with each other over land. This is because during the dry season Lou Nuer immigrates to Jikany land in search of grazing and water for their animals (Agence, 2014). Conflict arises when Jikany denies entry of Lou into their land. The conflict between Lou and Jikany was worsened with the

increase of firearms especially after the Nasir Declaration when there was no proper systems and rule of law in the area (Agence, 2014). Following this mayhem The Lou Nuer got opportunity to occupy areas along the western bank of the Sobat River, which were traditionally home to the Jikany of Upper Nile state that resulted in a significant Jikany displacement to other parts of Upper Nile state (HSBA, 2013).

### **1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective**

The study was confined to ethnic conflict theory of Lake and Rothschild, (1996) it states that, when ethnic groups come to fear for their future (physical) security, they prepare for conflict, thus initiating a security dilemma. Several things can cause such a fear to develop, such as a decline in cultural security or past experience with conflict. The factor that Lake and Rothchild dwell on the most is rising anarchy, essentially a Hobbesian argument: as the Leviathan (the state) declines (becomes unable to prevent conflict), ethnic groups fear that their physical security may be at risk. Variables: Y: Ethnic conflict X1: Fear of what the future might bring (conditioned strongly by what the past has brought). X2: Three strategic dilemmas: information failure, credible commitment problems, and incentives to use force pre-emptively (the security dilemma). X3: "Nonrational factors" like "emotions, historical memories, and myths" Lake and Rothchild point out that a strong state (or other outside mediator) can frequently help overcome these problems (by collecting information about/from both parties). As states decline, they become less able to do so, making ethnic conflict more likely than an ethnic bargain. The state's inability to mediate this conflict contributes to its further decline. It's important to point out that the collapse of the state does not precede the ethnic conflict typically, but is caused by it.

### **1.1.3 Conceptual Perspective**

An ethnic conflict or ethnic war is an armed conflict between ethnic groups. It contrasts with civil war on one hand (where a single nation or ethnic group is fighting among itself) and regular warfare on the other, where two or more sovereign states (which may or may not be nation states) are in conflict. The term "ethnicity" as used

today arose in the mid-20th century, replacing the terminology of "races" or "nations" used for the concept in the 19th century. Regular warfare was formerly conceived as conflicts between nations, and only with the rise of multi-ethnic societies and the shift to asymmetric warfare did the concept of "ethnic conflict" arise as separate from generic "war". This has been the case especially since the collapse of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union and of the relatively more homogeneous South Sudan in the 1990s, both of which were followed by ethnic conflicts that escalated to violence and civil war (Harbom, 2004).

Good governance is about the processes for making and implementing decisions. It's not about making 'correct' decisions, but about the best possible process for making those decisions (Harbom, 2004). One of these efforts to create an internationally comparable measure of governance and an example of an external assessment is the Worldwide Governance Indicators project, developed by members of the World Bank and the World Bank Institute (Harbom, 2004). The project reports aggregate and individual indicators for more than 200 countries for six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption.

To complement the macro-level cross-country Worldwide Governance Indicators, the World Bank Institute developed the World Bank Governance Surveys, which are country-level governance assessment tools that operate at the micro or sub-national level and use information gathered from a country's own citizens, business people and public sector workers to diagnose governance vulnerabilities and suggest concrete approaches for fighting corruption (Empter, 2009).

#### **1.1.4 Contextual Perspective**

This study was confined to Jonglei State in South Sudan, Jonglei State, home to about 1.3 million people in 11 counties, is the largest and the most populous state in South Sudan, Jonglei is a multiethnic state inhabited by several ethnic groups, such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle (International Crisis Group 28). Most communities depend on the agriculture, including agropastoralism and pastoralism, which provides

more than 80 percent of domestic employment (Food and Agriculture Organization: FAO 3). Jonglei is also known as one of the least developed regions in the world, lacking basic infrastructure due to decades of civil war as well as marginalization by the central authority. Because Jonglei lacks functioning roads, most of the regions become inaccessible during the rainy season, which often hinders timely security response (International Crisis Group 16). The underdevelopment has also made poverty persistent in the region. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, about 48 percent of the population in Jonglei is living below the poverty line (Omondi 2). The level of food insecurity has also been significantly high. According to FAO, since 2008, approximately 39 percent of the population faces food insecurity, and 30 percent faces severe food insecurity (7) (Harbom, 2004)

The situation in Jonglei has changed rapidly over the last three months of SPLA and rebel clashes ever since 2018. Fighting has taken place along multiple fronts, but the Juba-Bor road, linking the national capital with the Nuer-controlled rebel heartland, has seen the brunt of battle. Territorial control has swung back and forth between SPLA and rebel hands, with incremental gains for the SPLA over time, largely thanks to support from the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF). The conflict has been increasingly marked by targeted and indiscriminate ethnic violence, prompting mass civilian displacement and defections. While the rebels have lost some territory in southern Jonglei in the last few weeks, they have managed to secure support from various Nuer communities in Jonglei. The evolution of the conflict from a two-party war to one that has incorporated tribal and ethnic dimensions is similar to dynamics seen in Upper Nile and Unity states.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

After decades of civil war, the Republic of South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011 and was recognized as the newest state by the international community. However, South Sudan has been plagued by the unresolved territorial dispute over the Abyei region with northern Sudan, to which the world has paid much attention. Less attention has been paid to the country's instability and frequent intertribal

clashes, especially in Jonglei State, one of ten states in South Sudan. Traditionally, clashes between the two ethnic groups, namely the Lou Nuer and Murle, have been observed in Jonglei. The conflicts often occurred when one ethnic group entered territories of other groups, competing over scarce resources such as land and water necessary for cattle grazing. The migratory practices as a result of climate change have been a trigger of those conflicts. Although some human casualties and occasional abduction of children occur, cattle's raiding was the main objective of the conflicts because cattle were sources of wealth and sustenance for many pastoralist communities in Jonglei. This conflict further threatens the security of the state because possession of small arms and light weapons has become part of the way of life of the people in Jonglei state. People easily take the law into their own hands either to raid others or to revenge for raids suffered. As a result, The general infrastructure including schools, hospitals, roads, water, telephone systems have been affected and this in turn discourages investors in Jonglei state.

The ethnic conflicts has significantly changed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, and the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a disarmament campaign solely targeting the Lou Nuer. This uneven disarmament destabilized the country, sharpening the ethnic division and security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and Murle. The security dilemma eventually led to war, which fueled ethnic hatred. The recent clashes are evidently more than just cattle raiding. Rather, they are characterized by indiscriminate mass killing of civilians, largely motivated by ethnic hatred. Thus, despite longstanding and persistent interethnic clashes between the Lou Nuer and Murle, the emergence of strong ethnic hatred appears to be a recent phenomenon.

No one's territory is stable, civilians are displaced and starving and a return to fighting is all but guaranteed. The trajectory of the war in Jonglei demonstrates the dangers of limiting IGAD's peace process to only the government and SPLM/A-IO. The uneasy status quo in Jonglei is unlikely to last; the peace deal between the government and SSDA-CF is in danger while the local peace deal between the Murle

and the opposition-affiliated Lou Nuer grows stronger. Jonglei illustrates the nationwide trend of fragmentation of armed groups, alliance formation at the local level and the potential for the war to get much worse during the upcoming fighting season. The people of Jonglei State share a common history together with richly diverse traditions and interests. At the same time, they have suffered the hardships of various cycles of conflict, which have disrupted life in their communities over a long period. The picture which has emerged is that Jonglei State needs greater attention and levels of effort to tackle the various issues which have contributed to outbreaks of violent conflict. It's upon this background that the research took a keen interest to establish the state of Ethnic conflicts and governance in Jonglei State

### **1.3 Purpose of the study**

The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of ethnic conflict and governance in Jonglei State in South Sudan.

### **1.4 Objectives of the study**

#### **1.4.1 General objective**

This study investigated the ethnic conflicts and governance in Jonglei state in South Sudan

#### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives:**

The study was guided by three objectives which included;

- (i) To establish the state of Ethnic conflict in Jonglei state.
- (ii) To examine the extent of governance in Jonglei state, South Sudan
- (iii) To investigate whether there is a relationship between Ethnic Conflict and governance in Jonglei, South Sudan.

### **1.5 Research questions**

- (i) What is the state of Ethnic conflict in Jonglei state?
- (ii) What is the extent of governance in Jonglei state, South Sudan?

(iii) What relationship exists between Ethnic Conflict and governance in Jonglei, South Sudan?

## **1.6 Hypothesis**

There was no relationship between Ethnic conflict and governance in Jonglei, South Sudan

## **1.7 Scope of the study**

### **1.7.1 Geographical scope**

The research was carried out in Jonglei state in, South Sudan. Jonglei state, which covers an area of 122,581 square kilometres (47,329 sq mi), forms the bulk of the eastern part of South Sudan covering most of the eastern centre. Located in the Greater Upper Nile region, it is bordered by Upper Nile State to the north, Unity state to the northwest and west, Lakes State to the southwest, Central Equatoria to the southwest, Eastern Equatoria to the south, and Ethiopia to the east. The principal town, Bor, lies in the southwestern corner of the state. Other towns include Akobo, Ayod, Fangak, Padak, Pibor, Pochalla and Waat. The principal rivers are the White Nile, which flows in the western part of the state, and the Pibor River, which flows in the central-east. The Pibor and its tributaries drain a watershed 10,000 km<sup>2</sup> (3,900 sq mi) in size. The river's mean annual discharge at its mouth is 98 m<sup>3</sup>/s (3,460 ft<sup>3</sup>/s). In the southern part of the state is the Kenamuke Swamp (Kobowen), a wetland which is part of the Boma National. Park In June 2007, Animal Geographic Magazine estimated that over 1.3 million animals lived in Boma National Park. It is "home to one of the largest migrations in the world with an estimated 800,000 white-eared Kob antelope, 250,000 Mongalla gazelle and some 160,000 tiang moving across Jonglei State", according to the wild life Conservation Society. Jonglei is a very poor state. The economy of Jonglei is mostly dependent upon livestock, and most inhabitants are employed in the agricultural sector. UNEP says that the Dinka people of the state are "agro-pastoralists, combining cattle-rearing with wet season agriculture, and migrating seasonally according to the rains and the inundation of the

toic (seasonal floodplains. Jonglei is the largest among the ten states of South Sudan and it is the area of origin of the second Sudanese civil war that began in 1983 in Bor townstarted as a district under the administration of Upper Nile province in old Sudan and it was headed by a Commissioner. The state has two major seasons known as the dry and wet seasons. The dry season has a cooler and a warmer period. The average annual rainfall during the wet season, usually 7-8 months per year, is 400-110mm.This specific place is chosen because a number of ethnic conflicts have majorly been witnessed to begin or escalate to this area.

### **1.7.2 Theoretical scope**

The study was confined to ethnic conflict theory of Lake and Rothschild, (1996) which states that "when ethnic groups come to fear for their future (physical) security, they prepare for conflict, thus initiating a security dilemma". Several things can cause such a fear to develop, such as a decline in cultural security or past experience with conflict. The factor that Lake and Rothchild dwell on the most is rising anarchy, essentially a Hobbesian argument: as the Leviathan (the state) declines (becomes unable to prevent conflict), ethnic groups fear that their physical security may be at risk.

#### **Variables:**

- Y: Ethnic conflicts
- X1: Fear of what the future might bring (conditioned strongly by what the past has brought).
- X2: Three strategic dilemmas: information failure, credible commitment problems, and incentives to use force pre-emptively (the security dilemma).
- X3: "Non-rational factors" like "emotions, historical memories, and myths"

Lake and Rothchild (1996) point out that a strong state (or other outside mediator) can frequently help overcome these problems (by collecting information about/from both parties). As states decline, they become less able to do so, making ethnic conflict more likely than an ethnic bargain. The state's inability to mediate this

conflict contributes to its further decline. It's important to point out that the collapse of the state does not precede the ethnic conflict typically, but is caused by it.

### **1.7.3 Time scope**

The research was carried out in a period of three months, the first month, the researcher wrote the proposal and defended it and in the last two months gathered and compiled the document. This time helped the researcher to gather the relevant information and questionnaires and then be able to code and present the data in the next month.

### **1.7.4 Content scope**

The research investigated the causes, implications and the measures to help in the civil war affecting the young nation of South Sudan. The relevant data from various authors was utilized to assess and achieve gaps that underlie the study.

## **1.8 Significance of the study**

(i) The research is of vital importance to the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in combating the war and achieving ways of eliminating future wars in the country and also to the community of Jonglei State.

(ii) The research was of great importance to the researcher as it aims to help him acquire a Masters Degree in Public Administration of Kampala International University.

(iii) The findings of this study findings will help the Stakeholders to ensure that parties in Ethnic conflict should refrain from destroying food crops, water sources and agriculture infrastructures in order to minimize disruption of food supply and production capacities. Emergency relief should give attention to the rehabilitation of agriculture, livestock and fisheries and to employment or income-generating programmes, to enhance local capacities to improve household security on a self-

reliant and sustainable basis. Health professionals must be advocates of the rights of the child.

(iv) These study findings are helpfulJonglei State authorities to ensure and undertake a more proactive governance role, per the mandate in IGAD Security Resolution, by better defining the circumstances under which it provides protection particularly with regard to inter-tribal violence in high risk areas and making corresponding adjustments to deployment, resources, and operational orders.

(v) The results of this study helps government of South Sudan to ensure greater state security presence at the local level by increasing SPLA deployment to areas of concern to exercise law enforcement functions and make best possible efforts to ensure that the ethnic composition of units does not complicate or jeopardize their engagement.

(vi) The finding of this study provides to the General Public, that, even if they have never seen a gun, millions of children suffer from wars, as resources that could have been invested in development are diverted into armaments.

(vii) To the Conflict factions, these findings will help them to understand the primary health care and the care of children with chronic or acute conditions. Adequate rehabilitative care, such as the provision of artificial limbs for injured or permanently disabled children, should be ensured to facilitate the fullest possible social integration. Child-focused health needs assessments involving local professionals, young people and communities should be speedily carried out by organizations working in conflict situations, and should take into account food, health and care factors and the coping strategies likely to be used by the affected population.

## 1.9 Operational Definitions of key terms

**Ethnic conflict;** it is defined as any episode of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnics, and religious or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status (Bates et. al. 2003).

It is a conflict between two contending ethnic groups. While the source of the conflict may be political, social, or economic, the individuals in conflict must expressly fight for their ethnic group's position within society. This final criterion differentiates ethnic conflict from other forms of struggle

**Ethnic violence;** it refers to violence expressly motivated by ethnic hatred and ethnic conflict. It is commonly related to political violence, and often the terms are interchangeable, or one is used as a pretext for the other when politically expedient.

**Governance;** it refers to "all of processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or territory and whether through the laws, norms, power or language.

Environmental conflict refers to the "struggle for scarce natural resources". Natural resources that are sources of wealth as well as prerequisites for sustenance directly or indirectly contribute to producing food and energy, providing living space, and maintaining one's health. Scarcity of resources can be divided into several different categories: physical scarcity (available amount is finite), geopolitical scarcity (unequal distribution of resources on the earth), socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of wealth gained from natural resources), and scarcity caused by human-led environmental degradation.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the related literature relevant to the study, opinions and information from other researchers that was utilized and reviewed by the researcher.

#### **2.1 Theoretical Review**

The study was confined to ethnic conflict theory of Lake and Rothschild, (1996) it states that, when ethnic groups come to fear for their future (physical) security, they prepare for conflict, thus initiating a security dilemma. Several things can cause such a fear to develop, such as a decline in cultural security or past experience with conflict. The factor that Lake and Rothchild dwell on the most is raising anarchy, essentially a Hobbesian argument: as the Leviathan (the state) declines (becomes unable to prevent conflict), ethnic groups fear that their physical security may be at risk.

##### **Variables:**

- Y: Ethnic conflict
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- X3: "Nonrational factors" like "emotions, historical memories, and myths"

Lake and Rothchild point out that a strong state (or other outside mediator) can frequently help overcome these problems (by collecting information about/from both parties). As states decline, they become less able to do so, making ethnic conflict more likely than an ethnic bargain. The state's inability to mediate this conflict contributes to its further decline. It's important to point out that the collapse of the state does not precede the ethnic conflict typically, but is caused by it.


Although a larger group might make a credible commitment not to abuse a smaller one by power-sharing, guaranteeing a diverse military, or letting the minority hold important economic assets hostage, a shift in one ethnic group's power (especially demographic) makes such commitments break down. Security dilemma: when there are information problems and commitment problems, a security dilemma arises if there are incentives to strike first (offensive advantage).

Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory offers an explanation based on an ethnic groups' access to power and economic resources. This is closely related to Horowitz, (1985) who wrote that group worth is based on the results of economic and political competitions. According to Lake and Rothschild, (1996) ethnic conflict is a sign of a weak state or a state embroiled in ancient loyalties. In this case, states act with bias to favour a particular ethnic group or region, and behaviours such as preferential treatment fuel ethnic conflicts. Therefore, in critical or difficult political situations, the effectiveness of governance is dependent on its ability to address social issues and human needs.



Recently, scholars have come out with different approaches to conceptualizing ethnicity. Faced with the proliferation of separatist conflicts in North America, the inadequacies underlying modernization theory are being exposed. The notion that modernity would result in smooth transition from *Gemeinschaft* (community) to *Gesellschaft* (association), with gradual dissolution of ethnic affiliations, simply did not work. Ethnicity has persisted in North America, Africa and elsewhere. This failure simply means ethnicity will remain, and that the stability of African states is threatened not by ethnicity per se, but the failure of national institutions to recognize and accommodate ethnic differences and interests. According to this argument, the lesson for ethnic conflict management is that governments should not discriminate against groups or they will create conflict.

### 2.1.1 Conceptual Framework

#### Independent Variables



#### Dependent Variables



**Source:** Primary data (2016)

The conceptual framework summarizes the research variables, the independent being ethnic conflict with its causes including religious, political, economical, grab of power, environmental issues among others such as cattle raids and abductions whereas the dependent variable include rule of law, democracy, decentralization, accountability and transparency with others being human security (Auty, 1993).

According to theorists, conflict management means constructive handling of differences (Auty, 1993). It is an art of designing appropriate institutions to guide inevitable conflict into peaceful channels(Mudoch, 2002). The importance of conflict management cannot be overemphasized. It is when leaders and states fail to address important issues and basic needs that violence brews. Nowhere is conflict management and peaceful resolution of conflict more important than in Africa. African leaders should take a second look at their behaviour and policy choices.

Emphasis here should be on discouraging corruption, embracing transparency and good governance (Mudoch, 2002).

## **2.2 Ethnic Conflicts**

### **2.2.1 Cattle raids and Cattle Grazing**

Environmental conflict is an appropriate lens to explain a traditional aspect of interethnic conflicts in Jonglei(Nitzschke, 2003). In South Sudan, cattle are crucial assets for all ethnic groups because cattle are “a primary currency for these groups, representing wealth and social status, and are used for compensation and the payment of wedding dowries” (Rands and LeRiche 7). Approximately, 80 percent of the population depends on cattle grazing to survive, and the livestock industry has been one of the largest sources of employment (Ferrie 5). Because cattle are directly related to the survival of these groups, people often enter territories of other ethnic groups and loot cattle(Mudoch, 2002). Not only are looted cattle used for sustaining people’s lives, they are also sold in exchange for small arms (Rolandsen and Briedlid 54). Although the primary targets in these clashes were cattle, the use of such weapons as protection increased the human lethality of conflicts (Bariyo, 2015)

Although cattle’s grazing requires water and pasture land, not all ethnic groups in Jonglei have access to those resources due to physical as well as geopolitical scarcity(Bariyo, 2015). Hence, during dry seasons or periods of drought, those who inhabit arid land migrate with their cattle to territories of other ethnic groups to compete for resources, often resulting in violent conflicts (Richardson 2011). The lack of clarification on ownership has often deadlocked disputes. Additionally, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan has not yet stipulated the legal framework for pastoralists’ grazing rights (Agbor and Taiwo). Cattle raiding and interethnic clashes have historically been observed in Jonglei, particularly when the Lou Nuer, whose land was often affected by droughts, migrated to territories of other ethnic groups, such as the Dinka and Murle, in search of water and pasture land for cattle grazing (Rands and LeRiche 7). The empirical observations also suggest that the areas where the migrants and hosts confront each other often became conflict

sites (Omondi). Migration of the Lou Nuer has thus been a trigger of interethnic clashes in Jonglei for centuries and gradually sharpened hostilities between the groups.

### **2.2.2 Environmental Conflict**

Libiszewski defines environmental conflict as the “struggle for scarce natural resources”. Natural resources that are sources of wealth as well as prerequisites for sustenance directly or indirectly contribute to producing food and energy, providing living space, and maintaining one’s health (Bob and Bronkhorst). Scarcity of resources can be divided into several different categories: physical scarcity (available amount is finite), geopolitical scarcity (unequal distribution of resources on the earth), socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of wealth gained from natural resources), and scarcity caused by human-led environmental degradation (Bariyo, 2015). Bob and Bronkhorst further argue that perceived or actual scarcity of natural resources, such as water and land, plays an essential role in environmental disputes because resource scarcity would be a direct threat to human security. The worst-case scenario would be an outbreak of interethnic/intergroup conflict over existing resources for survival (Libiszewski, 2016). Several scholars also agree that “the more scarce the resource, the more bitter the fight” (Billon 564).

The impact of global climate change on people’s lifestyles has increasingly been recognized as an accelerator of environmental conflict. Climate change threatens human security by making issues of resource scarcity more “complex and intractable” (Brown, Hammill, and Mcleman 1142). In particular, less precipitation and extended drought, as a result of warmer temperatures, have accelerated degradation of water and land resources (Raleigh and Urdal 677). In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental body that provides scientific assessment of the risks of climate change, identified Africa as the most vulnerable region in the world to climate change because of its rudimentary capability to adapt (Brown, Hammill, and Mcleman 1145). The Christian Aid charity also estimates that the negative effects of climate change would kill more than 184

million people in Africa before the end of the twenty-first century (Nordås and Gleditsch 629).

Facing resource scarcity in their areas, pastoralists are required to decide whether they stay home or leave their arid land in search for better resources (Bariyo, 2015). Reuveny argues that pastoralists in the less developed countries (LDCs) tend to leave the affected areas, believing that net benefit from migrating is greater than not doing so (658). Leff identifies lack of pastoralists' capacities in LDCs to adjust themselves to climate changes as a rationale for migration (189). Such migration is common in Africa, especially during dry seasons or periods of drought (Leff 192).

Climate change-induced migration has potential to erupt into interethnic conflict (Bariyo, 2015). Nordås and Gleditsch argue that the likelihood of conflict increases when the migrants enter the territories of other tribal groups that might also suffer from resource scarcity (633). The increase of competition between the hosts and migrants is often inevitable as the population within the area increases, while available resources decline (Young and Sing'Oei 19). Such a tense situation commonly results in various forms of violence, such as looting and killing (Nordås and Gleditsch 634). In addition, resource competition can develop into ethnic animosity if the hosts and migrants belong to different ethnic groups (Reuveny 659). Several exacerbating factors include longer droughts, which make migrants stay longer in hosts' territories, leading to more frequent clashes (Leff 192). Unclearly defined land boundaries and ownership also prolong conflict by allowing the hosts and migrants to make claims to justify their rights (Bob and Bronkhorst 18). Empirical studies show that conflicts caused by climate change-induced migrations have occurred not only in Africa, but also in Asia, Latin America, and even the United States (Bariyo, 2015)

Broadly, two communities: the Lou and other Nuer groups, fighting under the resurrected banner of the White Army, local defence units initially set up to protect cattle and property, which were militarized during the 1983-2005 civil war; and the Murle, a minority group based mainly in Jonglei's Pibor county. Some members of the

powerful Dinka community have joined the White Army(Osipov, Alexander 2013). Like many proximate livestock-raising communities in marginal lands, rival groups in Jonglei have a long history of raiding each another's cattle, and arming themselves to defend against such raids. The civil war led to a massive increase of small arms as both Khartoum and the then-rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) mobilized various communities, fomenting localized proxy conflicts(Omondi, 2011). Such support is reported to have continued well after the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord(Osipov, Alexander 2013). Recent years have seen an increasing sophistication in the retaliatory cattle raids, with the use of satellite phones, modern weapons and military tactics. Deaths resulting from these raids have risen accordingly and clashes have evolved from targeting only armed youths to attacking - or abducting - any members of a rival community, including women, children and the elderly (Humanitarian Report 2011).

In 2011, inter-communal violence claimed 1,100 lives in Jonglei. Other contributory factors are a scarcity of central government authority, security, development and justice mechanisms, as well as a change in social fabric that has left elders with much less influence over the youth, many of whom are being initiated into combat at a very young age. The latest large-scale Lou Nuer offensive was preceded by an announcement that their intention was to "invade Murleland and wipe out the entire Murle tribe on the face of the earth". Claiming that the Juba government had failed to protect their cattle, children and women, they said they had to take the matter into their own hands "through the barrel of the gun". The Murle contend they are discriminated against, sidelined for development projects and under-represented in the political sphere(Omondi, 2011). At state government level, they say representatives are given little power or money to improve things, and that the authorities often describe the Murle as "pests" or a "nuisance"(Bariyo, 2015) Under development is considered a conflict driver. Pibor County is a vast area with just one aid agency providing medical services to more than 160,000 people, a dearth of schools and no employment opportunities. Mass devastation and some 80,000 heads of cattle taken from Murle areas in January have left tens of thousands

homeless and dependent on overstretched aid agencies for food, after crops were scorched in attacks(BBC and CNN News Reports 2012).

During the civil war the government came up with a system of disarmament in Jonglei state especially in the two community areas, the Murle and the Nuer-lou which is Akobo and Pibor (Bieber, 2001). After the disarmament process, the Murle people claimed that they had been harrassed and tortured and some of them even killed by the government soldiers. Whereas the Murle felt that there was no service from state administration or the government(Bieber, 2001). Like many proximate livestock-raising communities in marginal lands, rival groups in Jonglei have a long history of raiding each another's cattle, and arming themselves to defend against such raids(Bieber, 2001). The civil war led to a massive increase of small arms as both Khartoum and the then-rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) mobilized various communities, fomenting localized proxy conflicts(Richardson, 2011). Such support is reported to have continued well after the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord. (BBC News and Reports on South Sudan 2012).

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### **2.2.3 Ethnic Security Dilemma**

Realism, one of the major theories of international relations (IR), maintains several assumptions regarding international politics(Richardson, 2011). Realists believe in the anarchic nature of international arena, where there is no overarching government that provides security to all (Jackson and Sørensen 59). The anarchic situation inevitably urges states to ensure their security by themselves (Posen 28). To enhance security, states develop their defensive capabilities, which likely threaten the security of others(Richardson, 2011). In response, those who are threatened in turn develop their own defensive capacities, eventually threatening the security of those who first initiated the game(Richardson, 2011). This endless cycle of arms races is referred to as the security dilemma. In other words, although "security for us" can temporarily become "insecurity for them," it will eventually turn into "insecurity for everyone" (Richardson, 2011).

Once trapped into a security dilemma, states have difficulty maneuvering outside of it. "Uncertainty to others' intentions" creates mistrust and fear of being cheated and harmed (Roe 184). Hence, being fearful of others' malign intents,

cooperation on disarmament is unlikely in the anarchic international system (Bob *et al.*, 2004). An increased security dilemma can motivate states to initiate preemptive war because they believe that a first offensive strike would be more effective than defensive operations to survive and achieve greater security (Richardson, 2011). Thus, under the anarchic situation, where no state is guaranteed its security and others are perceived as potential threats, "the occurrence of security dilemmas always remains a possibility" (Bob *et al.*, 2004)

Security dilemmas can also occur in the intrastate context, if, as Posen argues, "conditions are similar to those between states in the international system (Bob *et al.*, 2004). The hard rationalist approach, one of the strands of rational choice approaches, suggests that, under the circumstance where there is no functioning government that can provide security to its citizens, anarchy will likely emerge (Kaufman 2001, 19). Anarchy, together with the tendency of ethnic groups to associate the identity of others with danger (Posen 31), often compels the groups to mobilize their security measures, including preemptive war, which threatens the security of others and, in turn, the security of those who first mobilized. An "ethnic security dilemma" will thus emerge through the similar processes seen in interstate security dilemma (Kaufman 2001, 19).

Ethnic security dilemmas precipitate violent conflict among ethnic groups. Kaufman argues that an ethnic security dilemma often indicates groups' fear of extinction, which justifies "hostile attitudes toward the other group and extreme measures in self-defense" (2001, 31). Young and Sing'Oei elaborate that the hostility toward "them" increases the unity of the group and encourages group members to view every incident through the ethnic lens, which solidifies ethnic hatred (quoted in Kaufman 26). Horowitz stresses that "emotions are what drive ethnic violence" (Brosché, *et al.*, 2012). Diamond also highlights that those who are fearful of extinction and tend to strike first are often marginalized in society (121). Once such a marginalized group initiates an attack on the other, a perceived threat becomes a real threat (Roe 191), which exacerbates an existing ethnic security dilemma. The worst-case scenario would be that ethnic groups are trapped into a spiral of "action-

reaction process”, in which the first ethnic group initiates an attack on the other, which retaliates against the first (196). As Kaufman puts, ethnic animosity and fear of extinction activate the security dilemma, which could erupt into “mass-led violence” (1996, 157).

In the post-conflict context, disarmament campaigns led by a state or external actors can engender or exacerbate ethnic security dilemmas. Armed factions are often unwilling to disarm because the security sector of the fragile state is often incapable of providing common security (Richardson, 2011). In this case, disarmament makes the parties vulnerable to rivals’ potential attacks (Walter 134). Some groups might view others’ disarmament as an opportunity to initiate a war because they perceive their military capabilities as superior to others and believe that relative security will be greatly enhanced by preemptive operations (Brosché, *et al.*, 2012). This consequently exacerbates the existing security dilemma. Moreover, a weak state often uses coercive measures on certain ethnic groups to maintain social cohesion (Roe 197), which also engenders ethnic security dilemmas. Post-conflict disarmament could thus be a source of an ethnic security dilemma (Brosché, *et al.*, 2012).

The most visible consequence of governance failure can be seen the toll violent conflicts have taken on human beings. Most noted is the alarming level of conflict related deaths and displacement. Though estimates vary, it is generally agreed that there has been more than 6 million conflict-related deaths in Africa since 1983 (CSIS Report, 2000). There is an estimated 20 million conflict related displaced persons of whom 14 million are internally displaced (Mamdani, M. 2014). These figures constitute close to three percent of Africa’s total population (World Population Prospects (Richardson, 2011). When disaggregated and their implications fully considered, they reveal a crisis of a profound proportions. In the region of the Central Africa and the Great Lakes, for example, they tell of a disruption of societies consisting of thousands of communities with linkages and spillovers that affect still thousands more (Richardson, 2011). In Uganda, for example, internally displaced people (IDPs) account for close to 3 per cent of that country’s population and with

exponential impact on others. One quarter of Uganda's 45 districts (administrative jurisdictions) is in some form of upheaval. Warring factions operate in northern as well as western districts and sporadic conflicts involving pastoralists are waging in eastern districts (Garfield, 2007). Food shortages and the HIV/AIDS pandemic have added further burdens especially on women and children. Uganda has become a strategic link between systems of conflict extending north in Sudan, west into the Great Lakes region and east into the Horn of Africa (Global IDP, 2001).

The problem of internal displacement has not been given the same level of international attention as the problem of refugees, for instance the externally displaced. In Angola, one out of every four, in Sudan, one out of every 7 and in Eritrea one out of every 10 persons is internally displaced and destitute (Global IDP, 2001). When circumstance and duration of displacement are considered, a bleaker picture emerges (Richardson, 2011). Loss of dignity and diminished hope associated with prolonged displacement can erode self-confidence and optimism red is positions that are vital for self-reliance and self-organization. Moreover, the impact of extensive societal trauma associated with gruesome massacres often witnessed by displaced people (internal and external) can hardly be fully assessed (Richardson, 2011). Resettlement can also be hazardous and rife with insecurity, including insecurity stemming from landmines and other unexploded devices (Carl, O. 2013).

Inspection of indicators related to physical well-being and survival prospects reveal an unpleasant picture for Africa (Collier, 2004) Forty per cent of African countries are yet to achieve 50 percent literacy among males while female literacy remaining discouragingly low (Collier, 2004). The basic challenges of survival confronting individuals and families in Africa are formidable. Statistics cannot tell the full story neither can the story be exaggerated. A good share of these challenges stem from breakdowns in governance, including breakdowns that do not produce violent upheavals (Collier, 2004)

### **2.2.3.1 Disarmament**

The series of recent interethnic clashes beginning in 2009 can also be viewed through the lens of the ethnic security dilemma that preexisted the CPA reached in 2005 and was exacerbated after the civilian disarmament conducted between December 2005 and May 2006 (Garfield, 2007). Based on the authorization of disarmament in the CPA, the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei, targeting the Lou Nuer first (Young and Sing'Oei 21). However, they refused to surrender arms, as they believed the targeted disarmament to be a concerted attempt by the central authorities to weaken their fighting capabilities. This would increase Nuer's relative insecurity to other ethnic groups (Conca, K., 2002).

After negotiations between the GoSS and Nuer failed, the state authority turned to coercive disarmament, in which the White Army, a loosely organized army mostly comprised by Lou Nuer youth, and SPLA soldiers engaged in a series of fights (Rands and LeRiche 11). As a result, while over 3,000 arms were collected, approximately 1,600 soldiers and hundreds of civilians were killed (Garfield 17). The GoSS and SPLA were planning to disarm Murle militias as well, but the plan was not implemented due to concerns of the international community regarding potential casualties following the disarmament (Conca, K., 2002). Subsequently, another round of disarmament led by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) targeting Murle militia resulted in the collection of a small amount of arms, suggesting that people were successfully hiding some of their weapons to prepare for potential conflicts (Leff 197).

The fact that the GoSS and SPLA failed to disarm all ethnic groups in Jonglei simultaneously made the Lou Nuer extremely vulnerable to the Murle, which regarded themselves as Nuer's victims and claimed to have the right to retaliate against the Lou Nuer (Garfield, 2007). Uncertainty between the Lou Nuer and Murle regarding their fighting capabilities exacerbated the ethnic security dilemma. After the completion of the first round of the disarmament campaign in 2006, the Lou Nuer gradually rearmed themselves largely by looting collected arms (UNMISS 6).

However, viewing the situation of the Lou Nuer as being weakened, the Murle attacked them in Akobo County in January 2009, killing about 300 Lou Nuers (Small Arms Survey 3). This was followed by the retaliation of the Lou Nuer in March, which resulted in the deaths of 450 Murle (Conca, K., 2002)

The clashes in 2009 were the most fatal in the post-CPA period (UNMISS 6), and there is no doubt that the two ethnic groups are trapped in the spiral of "action-reaction process." Although another disarmament campaign targeting both the Lou Nuer and Murle was conducted between August 2009 and March 2010, both groups resisted and were apparently successful in hiding some of their weapons (UNMISS 6). The ethnic security dilemma was clearly an essential source of resistance to disarmament (Mamdani, M. 2014). Thus, the 2006 disarmament is the primary reference point of escalation of the ethnic security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and Murle, which erupted into the cycle of brutal attack and revenge (Copnall, J. 2013).

Social factors: Linked to the enormous toll in human life and suffering is the impact of governance failure on basic social institutions, especially those such as the family and other community-level institutions. Governance failure and violent conflicts often lead to the dispersal of people in ways that deeply affect families. Tracing of family members is one of the critical undertakings of international entities such as UNICEF and Red Cross and Red Crescent societies during conflicts. Although exact figures are not available estimates put missing individuals, mainly children, separated from families in the hundreds of thousands in Africa's many conflict zones. Thousands of families are never reunited (The Daily Star 2014). There is the problem of the erosion of values stemming in part from declining capacity of the family to function as an effective socializing agent and the collapse of school systems in many African societies (Leff, 2009). One of the most pronounced signals of the erosion of values can be seen in the growing preference for the use of force and artifice than reliance on achievement through merit and mastery (The Guardian (UK), 2013). Governance arrangements that are highly centralized, repressive or characterized by

excessive rent seeking are more likely to offer rewards on the basis of factors other than achievement through merit (Szeftel, 2000).

In circumstance of armed conflict, power and influence become directly related to capacity to use force and association with those who have acquired and are prepared to utilize those skills(Garfield, 2007). Children choose as models those who carry weapons rather than those who excel in education and demonstrate productive skills. Experience has shown that where militia groups dominate government, youth typically constitute an important element in governance(Copnall, J. 2013). The roles they play in violent conflicts including warring upon their own elders and villages, earn them access to power and resources (Leff, 2009). This generational shift in authority relations exacerbates the decline of the family and further erosion of values and, together with other factors, has become constitutive of the crisis of youth that now poses a fundamental challenge in the task of reconstituting order to ensure lasting peace and proper governance in Africa(Copnall, J. 2013). Thus, the destructive impact of governance failure and associated violent conflict on the family as a social institution is deep and profound and requires measures that go beyond what can be achieved through programs of resettlement and the reconstitution of the central state. It is entirely possible that the central state may itself reinforce these problems (Copnall, J. 2013)

Eroding Sense of Shared Community of Understanding: Another consequence of governance failure can be seen with respect to its impact on communities. Tocqueville (1969, pp. 61) has argued that the township or village is the most basic form of human association. "Local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science," he asserted(Garfield, 2007). What Vincent Ostrom has called "a shared community of understanding" is foundational to situations of collective choice: shared standard of judgment having to do with a common sense of justice (fairness) underpin interactions of mutual trust and accountability among members of a community. If these seem to evolve naturally as Tocqueville suggests, it is because

local communities are typically initially characterized by cultural homogeneity with patterns of interaction girded by common history, norms and values (Garfield, 2007). This is what in the case of Africa, Peter Ekeh's (1975) celebrated article described as the "primordial public." But institutions must be responsive to change and in the matrix of communities that are constitutive of human societies, engaging in patterns of interactions beyond the primordial is unavoidable (De Waal, A. 2014)

Transcending the family and the larger kinship unit to other situations of collective choice require a broadened sense of "shared community of understanding." Henry Sumner Maine (1960) has argued that human institutions evolved progressively from the family to other institutions of collective choice (De Waal, A. 2014). Patterns of human interactions correspondingly evolved from interactions underpinned by status within the institution of the family to interactions governed by rules of contract. This is how patterns of human interaction transcended the primordial and established the autonomy of individual while still preserving social capital offered by family and culture (Leff, Jonah 2009). Tocqueville's conception of the establishment of constitutional orders rooted in the principle of covenanting bears relevance. The point to be made is that Africa's challenge is to transcend the primacy of the "primordial public" and elevate the "civic public" to use Ekeh's second phrase. Governance failure has challenges for the establishment of larger communities of understanding and developing appropriate institutional capacities (De Waal, A. 2014).

Threat to local people's sense of community has increased in many parts of Africa as a result of violent conflicts (Leff, Jonah 2009). Actions of armed groups and warring factions typically originate in rural areas and prey upon villagers long before they reach urban centers (Garfield, 2007). Their hallmark of pillage and plunder is often more starkly visible in rural Africa where villages are frequently razed (De Waal, A. 2014). Youth and others, operating under command, commit enormous atrocities: kill and demean elders, forcibly take teenage girls as "war wives," and desecrate

religious shrines, leaving multiethnic communities shattered into splinters(Leff, Jonah 2009). Any perception of orderly though brutal seizure of power is misleading(Garfield, 2007). And yet there are differences in methods, degree of atrocious behavior and objectives of armed groups that need to be closely studied if appropriate solutions are to be found (Ayittey, 1992; Berkeley, 2001; Schwab, 2001.)

Since independence, South Sudan has been handicapped by the competing interests of powerful political actors and the factions and interests they represent(Garfield, 2007). In early July 2013, along with three other friends of South Sudan, Enough's Founding Director wrote to South Sudan's President Salva Kiir, warning "after almost nine years of self-rule, the government is still failing to meet the basic needs of its people(Leff, Jonah 2009). Despite claims that vast sums have been expended on investment in infrastructure, there is very little to show in the way of roads, medical services, and education for millions of South Sudanese who greeted the prospect of independence with eagerness and hope." Machar and other leading political figures from a variety ethnic group began to openly challenge Kiir's leadership of the ruling party. Pointing to disunity within the ruling SPLM party, Kiir dismissed Vice President Machar and an entire cabinet of ministers in July 2013 (De Waal, A. 2014). As tensions rose within the SPLM, Kiir announced that he had dissolved all internal party structures in November 2013. Originally contained to fighting between Nuer and Dinka elements of the elite Presidential Guard, the violence quickly spread to residential areas of Juba. Multiple sources confirm door-to-door searches for ethnic Nuer. In one dramatic incident documented by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International at least 200-300 Nuer men were shot by security forces at a police station in Juba. Thousands of Nuer civilians sought refuge in peacekeepers' base. Nine months later, many still remain there (Human Rights Report in South Sudan 2011 and 2012).

#### **2.2.4 State's Political Capacity**

The lack of government capabilities to provide security to its citizens that created a state of anarchy within the country also made the ethnic groups resist disarmament and feel responsible for their security (Leff, Jonah 2009). The UNMISS reported that both the national police and security forces lacked capacities to provide security because of inadequate logistical, human, and financial resources and the difficulty of accessing many of the regions which lack functioning roads (26). The absence of a formal justice system has also created a lawlessness situation and resulted in culture of impunity, in which perpetrators of violence are rarely prosecuted (International Crisis Group 15).

There are two major security apparatus in South Sudan: the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and SPLA. The quality of SSPS is "abysmal" (International Crisis Group 19). Because the SSPS was often outnumbered and outgunned by armed pastoralists, it failed to stop interethnic clashes. Lou Nuer youth have expressed their grievances against the SSPS, which always failed to arrest the Murle, who conducted cattle raiding, murder, and abduction (UNMISS 9). Most of the SSPS personnel are former SPLA soldiers, "who were not asked to join the post-CPA army and thus are mostly second-tier quality or worse" (International Crisis Group 19). In addition, many personnel are old and lack proper training and education. The absence of police stations in Jonglei also prevents the SSPS from timely responding to violent incidents (Lange, G. 2002). Moreover, because the police is not seen as an attractive occupation for qualified youth in South Sudan, recruitment of young people to the police will continue to be a great challenge (De Waal, A. 2014).

The credibility of the SPLA has also been questioned (Lange, G. 2002). Although the SPLA as a national army of South Sudan is responsible for dealing with external threats, it is often mobilized to halt domestic incidents due to the SSPS's lack of ability to do so (International Crisis Group 20). However, the SPLA does not intervene in every interethnic clash, which creates "confusion among communities about its role and mandate" (21). Ethnic identities of SPLA soldiers explain the inconsistent responses (Garfield, 2007). A local journalist whom the International Crisis

Group interviewed revealed that soldiers tend to abandon their original mandate and “often stand with their tribe,” when interests of their groups are at stake(Lange, G. 2002). Recently, some SPLA personnel were arrested and punished due to their heavy use of force in the local conflicts in which they intervened, which discouraged the SPLA from further involvement. Corruption within the SPLA has also undermined the legitimacy of the organization (Leff 194).

### **2.2.5 Religious Issues**

The majority of the tribes in South Sudan are of African heritage who practice either Christianity or syncretisms of Christian and Traditional African Religion. There is a significant minority of people, primarily tribes of Arab heritage, who practice Islam(Garfield, 2007). Most tribes of African heritage have at least one clan that has embraced Islam, and some clans of tribes of Arab heritage have embraced Christianity(Kalyvas, 2006). The civil war has seen a set of shifting alliances between and among armed groups including the SPLA, SPLA-IO, SSDA-CF, UPDF, Lou and Gawaar Nuer White Armies, Greater Bor youth and other community-based armed groups. All parties to the war, except the UPDF, have used child soldiers (Douglas, O., 2003).

Neither Kiir nor Machar have full command and control over all of the forces fighting in Jonglei the SSDA-CF operate in nearly a third of the state and the need to build and maintain alliances among the forces amid difficult fighting, heavy casualties and unfavourable political conditions is an ongoing challenge for both sides. Likewise, many of these groups and their interests are not represented in either Kiir’sor Machar’s delegations to the negotiations in Addis Ababa or the more inclusive mechanisms established by IGAD(Douglas., 2003).

Religions followed by the South Sudanese include African Traditional Religion, Christianity and Islam - sources differ regarding proportions(Garfield, 2007). Some scholarly and U.S Department of state sources state that a majority of southern Sudanese maintain African traditional Religion beliefs with those following Christianity

in a minority (albeit an influential one). Likewise, according to the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress: "in the early 1990s possibly no more than 10% of southern Sudan's population was Christian". In the early 1990s, official records of Sudan claimed that from population of what then included South Sudan, 17% of people followed African Traditional Religion and 8% were Christians(Kalyvas, 2006). However, some news reports claim a Christian majority, and the US Episcopal Church claims the existence of large numbers of Anglican adherents from the Episcopal Church of the Sudan: 2 million members in 2005. Likewise, according to the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, the Catholic Church is the largest single Christian body in Sudan since 1995, with 2.7 million Catholics mainly concentrated in South Sudan. The Pew Research centre likewise suggests that around 60% of the South Sudanese population are Christian, with around 33% following 'folk religions'(Kalyvas, 2006). These figures are also disputed as the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life report cites 'The United Nations provided the Pew Forum with special estimates for Sudan and the new nation of South Sudan'. The UN does not have any official figures on ethnicity & religion outside National Census figures (Duffield, M., 2002).

Speaking at Saint Theresa Cathedral in Juba, South Sudanese President Kiir, a Roman Catholic who has a Muslim son, stated that South Sudan would be a nation which respects the freedom of religion Amongst Christians, most are Catholic and Anglican, though other denominations are also active, and African Traditional Religion beliefs are often blended with Christian beliefs (Elbadawi, 2000).

### **2.2.6Abduction**

Gunmen in war-ravaged South Sudan have abducted at least 89 boys, some as young as 13, from their school in oil-rich Upper Nile State, the United Nations said on Saturday (Reuveny, 2007). The boys were taken while doing their exams and the total number of kidnapped children could be "much higher", the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) said. No group has claimed responsibility for the abductions and the gunmen's intentions were not clear, though in the past armed groups have forcibly

recruited children before major offensives (Reuveny, 2007). Conflict has been rife in South Sudan since December 2013 when fighting erupted in capital Juba between soldiers allied to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to his former deputy, Riek Machar. At least 10,000 people have been killed and 1.5 million internally displaced. UNICEF said about 12,000 children have been recruited into armed groups since the outbreak of war. The latest incident took place near Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile State, in a small village that has seen its population swell to about 90,000 due to a flood of internally displaced people (Elbadawi, 2000).

"According to witnesses, armed soldiers surrounded the community and searched house by house. Boys older than 12 years of age were taken away by force," UNICEF said in a statement (Ferrie, Jared 2012). The community where the raid took place is mostly made up from members of the Shilluk tribe, South Sudan's third largest ethnic group after Kiir's Dinkas and Machar's Nueres (Ferrie, Jared 2012). While the war in South Sudan has often pitted Dinkas against Nueres, Shilluks have largely stayed neutral (John, 2012). The use of child soldiers in South Sudan, which only became independent in 2011, has a long history (John, 2012). Many armed groups have recruited children as South Sudan has been struggling to assert law and order across swathes of territory bristling with weapons after the 1983-2005 civil wars with Khartoum. The U.N. last month secured a pledge for the release of about 3,000 child soldiers in South Sudan, in what it called "one of the largest ever demobilizations of children"(Ferrie, Jared 2012)

The findings from interviews were stung they revealed that; Unknown gunmen in military uniform killed a woman and kidnapped her son on Wednesday night in Rajaf Payam near the Juba-Nimule Road, just 23 kilometres away from Juba. Speaking to Radio Tamazuj, Major William GaiBany responsible for Nesitu Police Station confirmed the incident and said it happened after midnight on Wednesday (Flora, 2013).

"They need a child, and when the mother complained they shot her in the abdomen and ran away. They kidnapped a child and killed a woman. I put that woman on the car and tried to take her to hospital but she died before reaching," he said. According to Major Bany, this was not the first time gunmen came to the area. "This is common. All these surrounding areas have the same problem they take children and kill people," he said. Ayor Philip, a neighbor, said the culprits are not known but are suspected to be Murle tribesmen(Flora, 2013). The police commander however said he could not confirm if the gunmen were Murle. "No, I did not see it with my naked eyes. (Garfield, 2007) I did not see it with my eyes so that I can not tell it is a certain tribe." A respondent, one of the soldiers who were on the scene, explains what happened: "Around 11:00 p.m. I heard a sound of a bullet while it was raining and I crossed the tarmac road and I saw red bullets blazing this direction (southern part of Sherika local market)." (Flora, 2013)

"I came in the middle and they began shooting in my direction. I saw a woman shot and I asked her not to move any more but she did and they shot her in her stomach and I saw her intestines come out," he said. Akol said he saw a tall man in a military uniform carrying a child. He said he fought with them until his bullets were finished and said he narrowly survived. More forces have now been deployed, according to Major Williams Gai, and families are being advised not to allow children to move alone at night."People are now alert (John, 2012). I have told this village that if any woman or man is living far from where there are no people they should bring their children to where people are," said Bany. Radio Tamazuj could not reach the family of the deceased because of their remoteness from where incident took place.

Human Rights Watch based its report on more than 200 interviews with victims and eyewitnesses(Garfield, 2007). It stated that during the night of 15 December and the following day, "soldiers and policemen from around the Gudele and other nearby neighborhoods gathered hundreds of Nuer men and detained them in a building used by the police, near the junction that divides Juba's Gudele 1 and Gudele 2 neighborhoods." (Flora, 2013)

According to the interviews conducted among civilians, the findings revealed that, "At around 8 p.m., gunmen alleged to be government forces began systematically shooting into the room through windows on one side of the building, killing almost all of the people in the room, a few survivors said," the report states. HRW quoted one survivor as saying, "The windows were opened and then they shot through them. It was just light from the guns and the sound of the shooting. They shot me in the inner thigh, I fell and then dead people fell on top of me." About an hour later, armed men with torches entered the room and shot again several times at people, apparently anyone who appeared to have survived, leaving the door open after they left, HRW reported. At least two survivors escaped during the night. The following afternoon, members of South Sudan's National Security Service freed 11 others who had been protected when bodies fell on them and who had spent the day with the corpses. Several of the survivors had severe gunshot wounds. "I thought I would go mad for three days I could hear the screaming and the shooting in my head," said one man who had been hiding near the site of the massacre. "I knew my brother was captured in there." Human Rights Watch talked to neighbors of various ethnicities who described with great distress the huge number of bodies they saw at the site on 17 December and their removal in large trucks on 18 December.

Additionally, the findings also revealed that, Crimes by both parties, crimes have been committed also by opposition forces, according to the rights group, including the killing of civilians in Jonglei, where armed youth accompanied by uniformed security forces loyal to ousted vice president Riek Machar on 19 December attacked a UN base in the town of Akobo (Garfield, 2007). Around 30 Dinka including disarmed soldiers and civilians had taken shelter there, witnesses said (Garfield, 2007).

Elsewhere, two Dinka staff at a base owned by the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company oil consortium described to Human Rights Watch how Nuer day laborers turned on Dinka staff and killed at least six men using batons and machetes on the night of 16 December. Both witnesses said Nuer police on the base saw the violence

and did not intervene. Human Rights Watch was not able to conduct an on-site investigation in the town of Bor, the capital of Jonglei that is still under control of general (one of the respondents) who is loyal to Machar (Garfield, 2007).

The civilian death toll is unclear, but many witnesses who had returned to Bor in late December said the streets were littered with dead bodies. Human Rights Watch viewed footage obtained by a local government official showing 28 dead bodies in various locations, including close to the UN base, and many witnesses interviewed in Awerial said relatives or neighbors were among the dead. Gadet's forces, augmented by thousands of armed Nuer, retook Bor on 31 December, 2013. Civilians received warnings of the approaching forces and fled into the bush and marsh areas surrounding the town, in some cases leaving behind elderly or ill relatives who could not run. "Those unable to run (from the rebels) were burned in their houses, including two elderly men, Achieng Mayen and Kuol Garang, and a paralyzed woman, Yanadet Garang," a chief from an area just outside Bor told Human Rights Watch.

### **2.3 Governance in South Sudan**

Over the past decade, significant international attention has been devoted to conducting research into the links between environmental factors and conflict. To some extent, there has been a mismatch between "northern" emphases and "southern" perspectives on the environment and security debate (Jackson, *et al.*, 2010). The objective of participation is stronger state capacity. UNDP stresses how development requires because governments cannot on their own fulfill all tasks required for sustainable human development. This goal requires the active participation and partnership of citizens and their organizations (Smith, 2007).

The achievement of development objectives is likely to be assisted by stronger forms of political accountability. Political accountability is linked to human development because it is a necessary condition for democracy (Jackson, *et al.*, 2010). It is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the

private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Both social and economic development suffers if political accountability is weak (ICG 2009). By making corruption more difficult, political accountability contributes to economic development (Jackson, *et al.*, 2010). If accountability empowers the poor, pro-poor policies may be introduced, with their attendant social and economic benefits. Some important dimensions for political accountability are: Political accountability requires 'free and fair' elections for all rule-making bodies authorized by the constitution. Fairness means the impartial administration of electoral laws. Free means equal opportunities for the exercise of essential freedoms. Freedom of speech is required for free election (ICG 2009). Free elections entail freedom of association to form or join a political party. Another requirement for free elections is freedom to participate to register as a voter or a candidate and to campaign of equally difficult rules and procedures. Elections should be held at regular intervals so that those currently in office cannot postpone them indefinitely. The media should be given the opportunity to advocate, criticize, and not be overwhelmed by government monopolies of election coverage. Elections need to be organized by a professional administration free from partisan manipulation. Fair elections require the prompt declaration of result (Austin, 2008).

The public can accept full accounts and justifications to be given by politicians via the media. A free press is essential for exposing corruption, the purchase of favors, unwarranted secrecy, and abuse of office and violations of human rights. Answerability requires legislative institutions, which can force members of the executive to explain and justify the use made of the powers entrusted to them by statute. The rights of opposition groups within the legislature are fully respected. The important thing for accountability is effective opposition within legislatures. Parliamentary scrutiny of both policy formation and implementation must be effective. This presupposes freedom of information to ensure that the actions and decisions of law-makers (Ignacio, 2010).

Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement (Human Rights Watch, 2014). It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific). Transparency refers to the availability of information to the general public and clarity about government rules, regulations and decisions. Thus, it both complements and reinforces predictability (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The difficulty with ensuring transparency is that only the generator of information may know about it, and may limit access to it (ICG 2009). Hence, it may be useful to strengthen the citizens' right to information with a degree of legal enforceability. For similar reasons, broadly restrictive laws that permit public officials to deny information to citizens need to provide for independent review of claims that such denial is justified in the greater public interest (Menkhaus, 2014).

Access to accurate and timely information about the economy and government policies can be vital for economic decision making by the private sector. On ground of efficiency alone, such data should be freely and readily available to economic agents (Howard, *et al.*, 2012). While this is true across all areas of the economy, it is especially relevant in the case of those sectors that are intrinsically information intensive, such as the financial sector in general and capital markets in particular (Gettleman, 2013).

Transparency in government decision making and public policy implementation reduces uncertainty and can help inhibit corruption among public officials. To this end, rules and procedures that are simple, straightforward, and easy to apply are preferable to those that provide discretionary powers to government officials or that are susceptible to different interpretations. However well-intentioned the latter type of rules might be in theory, its purpose can be vitiated in practice through error or

otherwise(Howard, *et al.*, 2012). In practice, though, it may sometimes be necessary to place limits on the principle of transparency(Howard, *et al.*, 2012).. In doing so, it may be helpful to distinguish information as a commodity from information as a process (Gettleman, 2013).. For example, intellectual property rights may need to be protected in order to encourage innovation and invention; but decision making on the establishment of intellectual property and rights thereto should be transparent (Microfinance Development Centre, 2002)

Good governance requires fair legal frame works that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific). According to Dicey, the rule of law has three meanings: Absence of arbitrary power or supremacy of law: Rule of law means the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power or wide discretionary power. Equality before law: The rule of law needs the equality of law or equality subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law courts. In this sense, no man is above the law (Menkhaus, 2011).

Constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land. In many countries right to personal liberty, freedom from arrest, freedom to hold Public meeting are guaranteed by a written constitution (Gettleman, 2013). Those rights are the result of judicial decisions in concrete cases, which have actually arisen between the parties. The constitution is not the source but the consequence of the rights of the individuals. Thus, dicey emphasized the role of the courts of law as grantors of liberty (Mollah). The rule of law is necessary for political and economic development, including the alleviation of poverty. The rule of law is a foundation of democratic political development. An independent judiciary is the most important institution for resolving disputes between citizens and their governments. The rule of law is relevant to the alleviation of poverty(Gettleman, 2013). The poor are in particular need of the protection of life, personal security and human rights, which the rule of law can

provide. Without the rule of law the poor are also vulnerable to corruption, loss of property to government officials and insecurity. The rule of law is most obviously a foundation of democracy. It is relevant to social development that means alleviation of poverty (Mohamed, 2014).

The division of political and administrative powers territorially between different spatial entities in society is as important a constitutional matter as the allocation of powers between branches of government and the creation of rules within which they operate. According to USAID- "Effective decentralization can be provided exciting opportunities for democratic change at the local level and can help improve national democracy as well". The World Bank argues that- "Successful decentralization improves the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector while accommodating potentially explosive political forces" (Smith, 2007).

Decentralization becomes a source of democratic vitality when it gives people experience of democracy. It can serve democratic consolidation by removing barriers to participation, strengthening the responsiveness and accountability of government. Legitimacy can also be served by democratic decentralization under conditions of ethnic pluralism. Political decentralization can help by giving ethnic groups a degree of autonomy (Smith, 2007). Aid donors are emphasized three major benefits, which is derived from decentralization to local government institutions: Democratic decentralization should be more effective way of meeting local needs than centralized planning. Another major aim of decentralization is to maintain political stability. Decentralization helps the poor by positioning power at the local level where they have a chance of capturing it (Rolandsen *et al.*, 2012). Decentralization is an essential part of good governance and a key aspect of political and administrative reform. Local government institutions can be benefited in three ways by decentralization:- Public policies become more responsive, Democratic stability, Poverty alleviation(Guss *et al.*, 2012). For a sustainable development good

governance is a must and for good governance all of the prerequisites are needed (Mukasa, 2013).

These patterns of conflict and inequitable development are not inevitable, and can be avoided through astute economic management (Giuliano, 2011). Botswana, for example, has adopted socially responsible reinvestment systems, reinvesting most of its mineral revenues in accordance with criteria explicitly aimed at sustainability and the development of physical and human capital, guided by a series of six-year National Development Plans (NDPs) and, more recently the objectives of Vision 2016 (Giuliano, 2011). As a result, the country has accumulated a substantial portfolio of international financial assets, valued at \$6,300 million, or approximately 130 percent of GDP, at the end of 2000 (Giuliano, 2011). This ability to transform one form of wealth non-renewable minerals into other forms of productive wealth is the key to successful economic development of resource-rich economies (Conca K 2002).

### **2.3.1 Public Participation and Democracy**

Multiple people expressed concerns about the lack of public participation at the state level (Guss *et al.*, 2012). Many respondents echoed the sentiment that the public should be consulted in the appointment and selection of their representatives and that they should be informed of new government policies and asked to provide feedback on them (Giuliano, 2011).

A number of Murle respondents said that Murle cannot participate in governance at the state level because of a fear of violence: "The atmosphere in the state capital is not conducive to the participation of Murle community members because they do not feel safe (Rands, *et al.*, 2011).

### **2.3.2 Legislative Branch**

Multiple people expressed particular frustration with the legislative branch at the state level and said that members do not represent the populations' interests (Guss *et*

*al.*,2012). A common complaint was that even if communities have representatives in the SLA, they do not really represent the people, but in-stead represents the interests of the governor and the president (Rolandsen *et al.*, 2012). One respondent stated that the lack of effective representation has contributed considerably to the current crisis (Rands, *et al.*, 2011).

Members often do not come back to the communities that they represent. A number of participants declared that at all levels the system marginalizes youth, women, the disabled, and the war-wounded, but this especially occurs at the state level. There is a lack of accountability in relation to Constituency Development Funds CDF), which are managed by legislators represent which are managed by legislators representing geographical constituencies (Rands, *et al.*, 2011). The fund needs to be audited. Also the competing/conflicting parties do not like to get into power sharing arrangement while they have adequate support for their survival (Rands, *et al.*, 2011).

### **2.3.3 Executive and the Rule of Law**

Many respondents said that the state executive and civil service are not representative. Though officials may be appointed based on which county they come from, they do not represent the interests or will of the people of the state. They as a result of to their relationship with the governor (Rands *et al.*, 2011) Prior to April 2014, some respondents expressed concern that many state officials are Dinka, including most of the previous governors. A number of Murle respondents claimed that there are no Murle at the top levels of state government. "We are outside of decentralization (Reuveny, *et al.*, 2007). If you go to the Jonglei state government you will not find anyone there [from the Murle community]." Others said that Jie and Kachipo are the only tribes not represented in the Jonglei State government (Rands *et al.*, 2011)

Most people interviewed were not aware of any state-level initiatives to improve governance. Those who had heard of initiatives said they only exist on paper and are not being implemented (Reuveny, *et al.*, 2007). Multiple participants said that the

people expect the state to provide services, particularly water, health facilities, and schools, but at the moment there is no service delivery taking place and there is no way for communities to hold officials accountable (Greenberg, 1995)

#### **2.3.4 Traditional and Customary Arrangement**

The culture and accumulation of wealth were the main causes of conflict and human rights violations in Jonglei state. The study also concludes that other people, radios and televisions were the means through which community leader/area administrator received information concerning the conflict status (Greenberg, 1995). In Jonglei for example, (2011 to 2012), it was established that 5-10 cattle camp had been raided in Lou Nuer of (Akobo county), and three counties of Dinka Bor (Duk, Twic East county and Bor counties) between 2011 and 2012, there had been between 100-500 casualties from cattle camps and between 500-1000 herds of cattle had been raided between 2011 and 2012. Further in Juba, 50-500 children and women had been abducted in Jonglei state between the same periods from various counties (Richard, D. 2009).

Multiple respondents cited tension between traditional authorities and state and local governance structures. One participant described the tension as a power struggle where state authorities are trying to take power from the chiefs (Sangmpam, T. 2007).

Competition for scarce resources is another major cause for conflict between groups. Property rights, jobs, educational policy, language rights and other development allocations confer certain benefits on individuals and groups (Zambakari, T. 2004). When these resources are scarce and/or directed favourably towards certain sections of the society, moves toward attaining them begin in organised groups on the lines of religion, caste, class and such other divisions of the society. In societies, where ethnicity is an important basis for identity, group competition is often formed along ethnic lines, though this need not be the case always (Sara Skinner 2012).

In the context of 'modernisation and development', one is caught up with its own dynamics; combating ethnic loyalty on the one hand, and stimulating ethnic consciousness on the other. As a result of this, whatever be the state of development, ethnic conflicts need to be viewed as part of an ongoing process which needs to be accommodated in the society, but which cannot be resolved once and for all, except through either assimilation or elimination of a particular group. Assimilation is seen more as a successful process as compared to the other.

There is yet another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration while analysing the causes of ethnic conflicts. Today, modernization is taking place in every nook and corner of the world. As a result of this modernization, an uneven level of development has spread into cultural differentiation(Young, *et al.*, 2011). The expansion of markets and improved communications increases contacts and generates competition among communal groups. As people aspire to the same social and economic rewards, competition intensifies and communal solidarities become very important or rather the most significant vehicle for mutual support and promotion, especially in urban areas(Young, *et al.*, 2011). The competition, thus created by economic development politicises ethnic pluralism and makes it even more salient than in earlier periods. Thus, as per this idea, modernisation does not eliminate communal solidarities, but modernises them, and sharpens them into much more effective instruments for group projections in a state system. Hence, in relation to development, ethnic competition may be unleashed by regional uneven development, cultural bias in capital accumulation, and the effects of migration flows(Sara Skinner 2012).

Thus, one could say that the colonial legacy, misgovernance with distorted economic policies, violation of human rights, corruption and crime, and the involvement of neighbouring states have caused most of the violent conflicts in the world today, where ideology, religion, or ethnicity have been used as a pretext in the competition for power. Weakness of the state system has always been a crucial factor in changing the nature of conflicts into violent ones (Schomerus, M. 2010).

### **2.3.5 Transparency and Accountability**

The strength of the opposition in the south was made possible by the efforts of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by the charismatic Salva Kiir. Formerly under Garang, the SPLA declared the initial objective of the SPLA (including its civilian-political wing, Sudanese People's Liberation Movement–SPLM) was to restructure the country into a new Sudan free from racial and religious discrimination. Throughout the 1990s the SPLA strengthened its control over the south and by 2001 they were in a position to enter into negotiations to end the war with the Northern government. In 2005 a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed and the SPLA had consolidated its authority as the legitimate representative of the southern territories. The agreement also created the political space for the international community to intervene (Schomerus, M. 2010).

To underline the obvious, however, attempts to ramp up PMSC operations in South Sudan would introduce a host of potential problems. Many examples of notorious incidents have been well-documented and there is no doubt that PMSCs have committed numerous human rights violations. Critics of neoliberalism in the post-Cold War world have rightly expressed concerns that enlarging the roles of private firms in areas of public policy and governance traditionally administered by the state leads to whole societies being transformed in the image of the neoliberal model that has come to define the military-industrial complex in the Western world, a phenomenon often referred to as "the silent takeover." (UNMISS. 2012)

The argument advanced here is that PMSCs can play a significant role in providing security to post-conflict societies when integrated into the SSR process. The international community's approach to SSR in South Sudan, which ignores PMSC activity, as if they are akin to temporary rogue actors, is misguided. As long as the GoSS and the state governments within the country are unable to provide physical security, people will seek out private solutions. Furthermore, the private sector can be a significant source of alternative employment for demobilized soldiers and ex-combatants in a country emerging from decades of civil war. Simply encouraging the proliferation of PMSCs in South Sudan, however, would be equally dangerous. If

PMSCs are going to make a positive impact on the lives of the South Sudanese, their activity has to be limited to tasks that reinforce the capacities of the state. A potential solution then is to revise the South Sudan SSR process with an eye toward creating a hybrid public and private model, with the international community taking the lead in constructing a regulatory framework for PMSC activity in line with international standards. Rather than being a shadow security service that only the wealthy access, PMSCs would be integrated into government services and South Sudan may escape many of the problems caused by the PMSCs that are plaguing other African nations (UNMISS. 2012)

Numerous other sources of insecurity threaten to further destabilize South Sudan. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is ostensibly challenging President Museveni's rule in Uganda, operates throughout the South Sudanese equatorial states. Tribal conflict is also an acute concern. The 2011 December Nuer attack on Murle received considerable international attention as thousands of Lou Nuer carried out attacks in the Pibor country of the Jonglei state. The attacks led to hundreds of deaths and displaced tens of thousands of Murle as they fled the violence. Other types of inter-tribal violence, such as cattle rustling and kidnapping are frequently reported, and violence against women and children (for example being shot while collecting water or fire wood) has increased since 2009. The lack of economic opportunity combined with a twenty five year import of small arms has led to the creation of a large and well-armed criminal class (UNMISS. 2012).

In a country barely recovering from civil war and administered by embryonic institutions, record keeping is a rare luxury and many basic administrative functions exist in what could be best described as a contingency environment. VSS, for example, receives no support from the state or the international community for retraining demobilized veterans as security guards. Moreover, many of its employees are beneficiaries of the country's embedded patronage system. A number of VSS personnel are also currently serving members of the South Sudan military, effectively drawing paychecks from both the government and the PMSC (Varshney, 2002).

## **2.4 Related studies**

Gable's (2000) study of a youth "culture development club" in Guinea Bissau shows how youth can be a source of change by their use of traditional institutions as instruments of change (Varshney, 2002). While there are many examples of youth self-organizing potentials, I follow Gable in the view that in Africa today, the overall trend seems to support the notion of African youth in crisis. The collapse of educational systems, high levels of youth unemployment as evidence by the armies of idle youth to be found in virtually all African cities, the HIV/AIDS pandemic that is taking a higher toll among women, children and youth, the rise in youth criminality and of what Ibrahim Abdullah (1998) has aptly called the political rise of the "lumpen youth," all attest to a crisis whose depth has not been fathomed and whose consequences pose a serious threat to the Africa's capacity to development and sustain a civilization.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the method adopted for data collection that the researcher used to collect information about the problem of the study. It contains information about the research design, population, location, sampling technique and sample size, research procedure, research instruments, data analysis and ethical considerations.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The study adopted a descriptive design since it describes the nature of ethnic Conflicts and governance in Jonglei state as it exists currently. The descriptive correlation design also used to establish the relationship between Ethnic Conflicts and governance in Jonglei state, South Sudan.

#### **3.2 Research Population**

The study population comprised of 220 respondents mostly the civil servants, community members, clan leaders, local council officials, chiefs from Jonglei State, South Sudan.

#### **3.3 Sample Size**

The study population consisted of 220 respondents (Table 3.3.1); from with a sample size of 140 was derived at using Slovene's formula, stated as follows;

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}; \text{ Where } n = \text{the required sample size, } N = \text{target population and}$$

$e$  = Margin of error at 0.05 level of significance

Where:  $n$  = the required sample size

$N$  = Known population size

$e^2$  = Margin of error at 0.05 level of significance.

$$\frac{220}{1+220(0.05*0.05)}$$

$$n = \frac{220}{1+220*0.0025}$$

$$n = \frac{220}{1.57}$$

$$n = \frac{220}{1.57} = \underline{140}$$

**n=140 respondents**

**Table 3.3.1 Sample size distribution**

Category	Target population	Sample size
Civil servants	50	30
Community members	50	40
Clan leaders	40	30
Local leaders	30	20
Chiefs	50	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>140</b>

Source, Field consults (2016)

### **3.4 Sampling Procedures**

Choices of respondents were based on three techniques: stratified sampling, purposive sampling and simple random sampling. Stratified sampling ensured that all categories of Ethnic conflicts are represented; while simple random sampling gave each respondent a chance of representation and purposive sampling to select the respondents of the study.

### **3.5 Research instruments**

The data collection instruments were basically questionnaires, which comprised of open and close-ended questions that require respondents to answer all the questions to the best of their knowledge and options given to avoid deviating from the variables under study supplemented with document Analysis of various organization sections/departments or branches and assess their classroom system (United Nations Country Taskforce Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (UNCTFMR, 2014)

The questions were based on: profile of respondents which composed of, gender, age, tribe, Occupation, Health facilities, number of years in this province and Education. Additionally, regarding ethnic conflicts twenty-five (35) items were set for instance on cattle grazing and raids (5 items), environmental conflict five (5), Ethnic security dilemma five (5), Disarmament and grab of power five (5), state's political capacity five (5) question, religious issues five (5), abduction and (5). Additionally regarding level of governance thirty five (30) items, were set basing on following constructs public participation (5), legislative branch five (5) questions, executive and rule of law five (5), Traditional & customary arrangement five (5), Transparency and accountability five (5) question five on Human security (5), all these were guided by the response mode of; strongly agree (very high), agree (high), disagree (moderate) and strongly disagree (low)

Also the interview guide was used to bridge the gap between the circulated questionnaires among the respondents for instance; Civil servants, Community members/security officials, Clan leaders, local council officials, and chiefs in Jonglei State, South Sudan

### **3.6 Validity and Reliability**

#### **3.6.1 Validity**

To ensure content validity of the instruments, the researcher were requested a panel of six (8) experts: three (4) professors, two (2) political analysts and Two (2) senior

lecturers to validate the instrument. The experts would look at relevance, semantics and clarity of questions in the instrument in view of the problem; objectives research questions, hypotheses and literature. The experts were requested to rate validity/relevancy of each item/question using the following codes; SA = Strongly Agree, A = Agree, D = Disagree, SD = Strongly Disagree. After, the researcher collected the questionnaires and establish a content validity index using excel, to computer the percentage, means and statistical package for social scientist to identify the relationship.

### **3.6.2 Reliability**

The test-retest method was used in order to test the reliability of the questionnaire; here the researcher pre-tested the questionnaire on a few people before administering it to the sample size. The researcher gave the questionnaire to a few respondents (30 people) and they had to answer it, after a period of two weeks, the researcher gave the same questionnaire to the same group (30 people) to answer it again. Responses from the first time (test) were compared to responses of the second test (re-test).

To test for reliability, Cronbach's Alpha was used. The researcher measured internal consistency by using Cronbach's Alpha. The results from the measure of reliability are shown in table 3.4 below.

**Table 3.3.2 Reliability statistics of different constructs of the questionnaire**

<b>Constructs</b>	<b>Number of items</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha</b>	<b>Interpretation</b>
Cattle raids and cattle grazing	4	0.721	unacceptable
Environmental conflicts	6	0.846	Questionable
ethnic security dilemma	7	0.884	Acceptable
Disarmament	4	0.761	Acceptable
State's political capacity	6	0.867	Acceptable
Public participation and democracy	5	0.551	unaccepted
Public participation	8	0.819	Good
Legislative branch	6	0.846	Acceptable
executive and the rule of law	6	0.884	Acceptable
Traditional and customary arrangement	8	0.819	good
Transparency	7	0.884	Acceptable
Accountability	7	0.884	Acceptable
<b>Overall</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>0.813</b>	

**Source:** Primary data (2015)

**Interpretation:** GD, & Mallery, P.2003, SPSS for window: step-by-step: A simple guide & reference 11.0 update, 4<sup>th</sup> edition allyn & Boston, P.231

Overall, the results indicate that the research tool was reliable in measuring the variable since the overall reliability was above 0.6.

### **3.7 Data Gathering Procedures**

#### **3.7.1 Before data gathering**

- (i) An introduction letter was secured from the College of Higher Degrees and Research (CHDR) (Appendix A) to conduct the study after which permission from Jonglei State, South Sudan Authorities.
- (ii) There were actual interviews on appointment and questions collected with or without response. Permission to conduct the research was upon approval of the Thesis proposal.
- (iii) Once approved, the researcher secured a list of the qualified respondents from in Jonglei, Juba, Central Equatorial State, South Sudan". The names were put in a

- rota and selected randomly using the simple random sampling technique. The respondents were briefed about the study and were requested to sign the informed consent form.
- (iv) The researcher oriented and brief his research assistants on the sampling and data gathering procedures.
  - (v) The questionnaires for actual distribution were prepared and coded accordingly.
  - (vi) The non-standardized instruments were tested for validity and reliability.

### **3.7.2 During data gathering**

- (i) The respondents were requested to answer the questions completely and not to leave any part of the questionnaires unanswered.
- (ii) The researcher emphasized that picking of the questionnaires were after five days from the date of distribution.
- (iii) The researcher and assistants emphasized the retrieval of the questionnaires with immediate effect for case five days from the date of distribution can be granted. On retrieval, all returned questionnaires were checked if all are answered.
- (iv) During the picking of the questionnaires, all returned questionnaires were checked to see if all are answered.

### **3.7.3 After data gathering**

The data collected was collated, organized and entered into excel for data processing and analysis generated using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

## **3.8. Data Analysis**

Different statistical techniques were used namely: Simple frequency counts and percentage distributions were used to analyze data on profile of respondents. Means and rank were used to determine the Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan. An item analysis helped the researcher to identify the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities of respondents of Ethnic Conflicts and Governance State, South Sudan of their employees from which conclusions and recommendations

were derived. The following numerical values and response modes were used to interpret the means;

**Table 3.3.3 Interpretation of mean ranges**

<b>Mean Range</b>	<b>Response Mode</b>	<b>Interpretation</b>
3.26-4.00	Strongly agree	Very High
2.51-3.25	Agree	High
1.76-2.50	Disagree	Moderate
1.00-1.75	Strongly Disagree	Low

Source: Standard means (2015)

The Pearson's Linear Correlation Coefficient (PLCC) was used to determine the significant relationship between the Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan, and to test the null hypothesis of the study. Qualitative data would also enhance validity intrinsically.

### **3.9 Ethical Consideration**

To ensure confidentiality of the information provided by the respondents and to ascertain the practice of ethics in this study, the following activities were implemented by the researcher:

- (i) The respondents and states were coded instead of reflecting the names
- (ii) The researcher obtained an introduction letter from the College of Higher Degrees and Research (Appendix A) of Kampala International University that introduced him to the concerned authorities for permission to collect data for this study.
- (iii) Solicited permission through a written request to the concerned officials of the Jonglei State included in the study.
- (iv) Requested the respondents to sign in the Information Consent Form.
- (v) Acknowledged the authors quoted in this study through citations and referencing.

- (vi) Presented the findings in a generalized manner.
- (vii) Voluntarism: the research team had to ensure that respondents are not coerced or manipulated into participating in the study. Respondents were told the purpose of the study and their consent to participate in the study was sought of.
- (viii) Objectivity: The research team was ensured of objectivity when carrying out the research and any attempt to bias results were considered unethical and should therefore be avoided.
- (ix) All questionnaires were coded to provide anonymity of the participants. Request permission through a written communication addressed to the concerned official of the district. References and cite on authors quoted in the study. Generalize presentation of the findings. Respondents were requested to sign the informed consent form. The information got from the participants was kept confidential.

### **3.10 Limitations of the study**

**Extraneous variables;** were beyond the researcher's control such as respondents' honesty, personal biases and uncontrolled setting of the study.

The research environments are classified as ***uncontrolled settings*** where extraneous variables may influence on the data gathered such as comments from other respondents, anxiety, stress and motivation on the part of the respondents while in the process of answering the questionnaires.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter was aligned to the data analyzed and, interpreted the findings of study. It captures the profile information of respondents, the Ethnic Conflict, Governance and the relationship between Ethnic Conflict and Governance in Jonglei State.

#### **4.1 Profile of Respondents**

Respondents were asked to provide information regarding their gender, age, education level, gender, tribe, occupation. Their responses were summarized using frequencies and percentage distributions as indicated in table 4.1;

Regarding the age of the respondent, the findings (table 4.1.1) revealed that, majority of the respondents were between 25 – 35 years of age who composed of 32.1%, followed by those between the age of 18 – 24 who composed of 28.6%, those 36 – 45 years of age comprised of 25% and finally those above 46 of age with 14.3%.

On Age composition of respondents, the finding reveal that (table 4.1.1) majority of the respondents were between the ages of 25 –35 accounting for 32.1%. This implied that they were likely to understand the conflict more thoroughly. The other category of the respondents were in the age range of 18-24 as reported by 28.6% of the study respondents and these respondents' views were very important for the study as most of them are citizens of the community in Juba.

More, 25% of the study respondents were in the category age of 36 – 45. These respondents' views were so great in the process of analyzing the study variable that helped to understand the problem. Finally 14.3% of the respondent indicated to be 46 and above years as these were of the least in number. This could

mean that, Juba is mostly populated by youths of around 25-35 years old followed by those of 18-24 years.

**Table 4.1.1**

Profile of respondents, in terms of age, gender, marital status, Education, occupation, and Education (n=140)

<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent (%)</b>
<b>Age : 18 – 24</b>	40	28.6
25 – 35	45	32.1
36 – 45	35	25
46 and above	20	14.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Gender: Male</b>	50	35.7
Female	90	64.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Marital Status:</b>		
Married	75	53.6
Single	55	39.3
Widowed	8	5.7
Divorced/Separated	2	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Education:</b>		
Secondary	70	50
Primary	35	25
None	10	7.1
Tertiary	25	17.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Occupation:</b>		
Peasants	39	27.9
Students	25	17.9
Others	76	54.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Primary data, (2016)

Regarding Marital status of the respondents, the finding reveal that (table 4.1.1) above, majority of the study respondents constituting 53.6% were married and these were followed by respondents who were single as revealed by 39.3% of the respondents then 1.4% of the respondents who were divorced/separated, whereas 5.7% of the respondents were widowed. The study established that majority of the respondents were married.

Regarding Highest Level of education the findings indicate that,(table 4.1.1) above shows that most of the respondents had attained up to secondary level of education with 50% followed by 25% of the study respondents who had a primary level certificate then those with none or no education at all was reported by 7.1% of the respondents, and finally 17.9% of the respondents who cited that had attained other tertiary levels of education.

The study findings further revealed that respondents with professional courses comprised of those in various fields such as business administration, environmental management, among others, as some of the people in such category reported that were still students in away to attaining such professional courses, in addition to post graduate diplomas in relevant specific fields. The above findings show that secondary level of education take a lead in participating within the research as compared to other levels of education. This is showed that the information was from literate people and who could understand better the research problem.

Additionally, the Occupation of the respondents the results indicate that majority were in the others section consisting of 54.2%, these included politicians, civil servants, clan leaders, business men and women, and religious leaders, whereas the peasants constituted of 27.9% of the total population and followed by students who were 17.9% of the population, it was better realized to seek more other professionals representatives or peasants since they are aware of the current affairs compared to students.

## 4.2 State of Ethnic conflict

Ethnic Conflict is the independent variable in this study, this variable was operationalized using seven constructs which included cattle raids and grazing with five questions, environmental conflict with five questions, Ethnic security dilemma with five questions, disarmament with five questions, religious issues with five questions, abduction with five questions, state's political capacity with five questions in Jonglei State, South Sudan. Each question was likert scaled between 1-4, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree and 4=strongly agree. Respondents were required to show the extent to which they agree or disagree with each item and their responses were analysed using means as summarized in tables 4.1.3

Regarding ethnic conflict, the findings (Table 4.2.1below)Cattle raids and grazing had five items the finding(Table 4.2.1) revealed that, One item was rated very high for instance Cattle raids continue to be a leading source of violent conflict in Jonglei state (mean=3.29), Cattle are an indicator of social standing and wealth, often used for restorative justice and marriage practices was rated high (mean=2.65), Raiding is intimately tied into social norms, masculine ideals and the need to accumulate cattle to marry (mean=2.12), Deaths resulting from these raids have risen accordingly (mean=2.09), cattle raiding between Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan has become an organized criminal activity that feeds into illicit meat markets (mean=2.02) with an average (Average mean=2.43, std.99116)

The findings reveal that people are Facing resource scarcity in their areas, pastoralists have to decide whether they stay home or leave arid land in search for better resources. Reuveny (2007:658) argues that pastoralists in the less developed countries (LDCs) tend to leave the affected areas, believing that the net benefit from migrating is greater than that for not doing so. Leff (2009:189) identifies lack of pastoralists' capacities in LDCs to adjust themselves to climate changes as a rationale for migration. Such migration is common in Africa during dry seasons or periods of drought (Leff 2009:192).

**Table 4.2.1:** State of Ethnic conflicts in terms of cattle grazing and raids. Environmental conflicts, ethnic security dilemma, state political capacity, religious issues and abduction  
(n=140)

Items on armed conflicts	Mean	Std	Interpretation	Rank
<b>Cattle grazing and raids</b>				
Cattle raids continue to be a leading source of violent conflict in Jonglei state	3.29	.878	Very high	1
Cattle are an indicator of social standing and wealth, often used for restorative justice and marriage practices.	2.65	1.064	High	2
Raiding is intimately tied into social norms, masculine ideals and the need to accumulate cattle to marry	2.12	1.128	moderate	3
Deaths resulting from these raids have risen accordingly	2.09	1.076	moderate	4
cattle raiding between Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan has become an organized criminal activity that feeds into illicit meat markets	2.02	1.105	moderate	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.43</b>	<b>.99116</b>		
<b>Environmental conflicts</b>				
Internal displacement is an outcome of the South Sudan Conflict	2.94	1.023	High	1
Geopolitical scarcity (unequal distribution of resources on the earth)	2.91	1.067	High	2
socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of wealth gained from natural resources)	2.42	1.117	moderate	3
scarcity caused by human-led environmental degradation	2.16	1.210	Moderate	4
Diseases and epidemic outbreak has been experienced in the country.	2.09	.957	Moderate	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.50</b>	<b>1.02221</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	
<b>Ethnic security Dilemma</b>				
Loss of agricultural production in the country	2.88	.962	High	1
Low export earnings in the country	2.85	1.028	High	2
Low investment both internally and externally	2.58	1.172	High	3
High expenditure on defense	2.53	1.210	High	4
Infrastructural destruction in the country.	2.38	1.255	moderate	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.64</b>	<b>1.08997</b>		
<b>Disarmament and grab of power</b>				
civilian disarmament are seen as equitable and a serious commitment is made to provide adequate security alternatives	2.89	1.105	High	1
cattle raiding in Jonglei is a polemic example of an issue that affects the entire country and many other African states	2.48	1.077	moderate	2
Until communities are confident that the SPLA and the police will protect them they are unlikely to surrender their guns.	2.35	.885	moderate	3
Reports of rape and torture further enraged Murle youth and drove them deeper into the bush	2.26	1.107	moderate	4

<b>Items on armed conflicts</b>	Mean	Std	Interpretation	Rank
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Deaths resulting from these raids have risen accordingly	2.09	1.076	moderate	4
cattle raiding between Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan has become an organized criminal activity that feeds into illicit meat markets	2.02	1.105	moderate	5
The SPLA battalion responsible for disarmament in Pibor was largely composed of Nuer and Dinka officers, who took the opportunity to take revenge for earlier cattle raids on their communities by members of the Murle community.	2.07	1.048	moderate	<b>5</b>
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.41</b>	<b>.99248</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	
<b>State's political capacity</b>	2.46	1.186	Moderate	1
There is a dialogue within and between Dinka, Nuer and Murle communities to address recent violence and prevent relations from deteriorating further				
communities increasingly felt that dialogue is being used as a substitute for state intervention to protect lives	2.29	1.170	Moderate	2
Jonglei Peace Process succeeded in bringing about a temporary cessation of violence	2.20	.972	Moderate	3
Health, education and water and sanitation services have been disrupted /destroyed, and international organisations are unwilling or unable to increase their presence in insecure areas	2.15	.977	Moderate	4
The state has ability to meet its responsibility to protect its citizens from potentially genocidal violence.	1.79	1.051	Low	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.18</b>	<b>1.03375</b>	moderate	
<b>Religious Issues</b>	2.86	1.066	High	1
Religious factors are the major causes of the current conflict in South Sudan				
The Presbyterian Church is the main religious organisation in Lou Nuer and Murle areas, and Catholics and Anglicans have very little presence.	2.68	.996	High	2
Struggle for power is the major cause of the current conflict in South Sudan	2.12	.935	Moderate	3
Influential issues have contributed to the conflict in South Sudan	2.02	1.011	Moderate	4
Poverty and famine have caused the conflict in South Sudan	1.59	.806	Moderate	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.25</b>	<b>.85146</b>		
<b>Abduction</b>	2.82	.983	High	1
Scarcity of central government authority, security, development and justice mechanisms				
Rival groups in Jonglei have a long history of raiding each another's cattle, and arming themselves to defend against such raids	2.77	1.095	High	2

<b>Items on armed conflicts</b>	Mean	Std	Interpretation	Rank
<b>Cattle grazing and raids</b>				
Cattle raids continue to be a leading source of violent conflict in Jonglei state	3.29	.878	Very high	1
Cattle are an indicator of social standing and wealth, often used for restorative justice and marriage practices.	2.65	1.064	High	2
Raiding is intimately tied into social norms, masculine ideals and the need to accumulate cattle to marry	2.12	1.128	moderate	3
Deaths resulting from these raids have risen accordingly	2.09	1.076	moderate	4
cattle raiding between Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan has become an organized criminal activity that feeds into illicit meat markets	2.02	1.105	moderate	5
The civil war led to a massive increase of small arms as both Khartoum and the then-rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) mobilized various communities, fomenting localized proxy conflicts	2.39	.984	Moderate	3
Jonglei become a breeding ground for armed non-state actors and organized crime, as demonstrated by the recent arrest of criminal groups involved in money counterfeiting in South Sudan	2.33	1.170	Moderate	4
clashes have evolved from targeting only armed youths to attacking - or abducting - any members of a rival community, including women, children and the elderly	2.14	1.033	Moderate	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.49</b>	<b>.63617</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	
<b>Overall mean</b>	<b>2.41</b>	<b>.86233</b>	Moderate	

**Source:** Primary data, (2016)

Climate change-induced migration has the potential to erupt into communal conflicts. Nordås & Gleditsch (2007:633) argue that the likelihood of conflict increases when the migrants enter the territories of other tribal groups that might also suffer from resource scarcity. The increase of competition between the hosts and migrants is inevitable as the population within the area increases, while resources available decline (Young & Sing'Oei 2011:19). Such a tense situation commonly results in various forms of violence, such as looting and killing (Nordås & Gleditsch 2007:634). In addition, resource competition can develop into ethnic animosity if the hosts and migrants belong to different ethnic groups (Reuveny 2007:659). Several exacerbating factors include longer droughts, which make migrants stay longer in hosts' territories, leading to more frequent clashes (Leff 2009:192). Unclearly defined land boundaries and ownership also prolong conflict by allowing the hosts and migrants to make claims to justify their rights (Bob and Bronkhorst 2004:18). Brosché & Elfversson (2012:38) argue that although such

conflicts do not typically produce large-scale human casualty and are often solved by non-violent means, they occasionally turn into violent conflicts.

In South Sudan, cattle are crucial assets for all ethnic groups because cattle are 'a primary currency for these groups, representing wealth and social status, and are used for compensation and the payment of wedding dowries' (Rands & LeRiche 2011:7). Roughly 80 percent of the population depends on cattle grazing to survive, and the livestock industry has been one of the largest sources of employment (Ferrie 2012:5). Because cattle are directly related to the survival of these groups, people often enter territories of other ethnic groups and loot cattle. Not only are looted cattle used for sustaining people's lives, they are also sold in exchange for small arms (Rolandsen & Breidlid 2012:54). Although the primary targets in these clashes were cattle, use of such weapons as protection has increased the human lethality of conflicts.

Regarding ethnic conflict, Environmental conflict had five items the finding (Table 4.2.1) revealed that, Two items were measured and rated high for instance, Internal displacement is an outcome of the South Sudan Conflict (mean=2.94), geopolitical scarcity (unequal distribution of resources on the earth (mean=2.91), socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of wealth gained from natural resources (mean=2.42), scarcity caused by human-led environmental degradation (mean=2.16), Diseases and epidemic outbreak has been experienced in the country (mean=2.09). with an (Average mean=2.50, std 1.02221). These finding are in argument with the ethnic conflict theory of Lake and Rothschild, (1996) was proved right. It states that, when ethnic groups come to fear for their future (physical) security, they prepare for conflict, thus initiating a security dilemma. Several things can cause such a fear to develop, such as a decline in cultural security or past experience with conflict.

According to Libiszewski (1992:3) he defines environmental conflict as the 'struggle for scarce natural resources'. Natural resources that are sources of wealth as well as prerequisites for sustenance directly or indirectly contribute to producing food and energy, providing living space, and maintaining one's health (Bob and

Bronkhorst 2004:12). Scarcity of resources can be divided into several different categories: 1) physical scarcity (the available amount is finite), 2) geopolitical scarcity (unequal distribution of resources on the earth), 3) socio-economic scarcity (unequal distribution of wealth gained from natural resources), and 4) scarcity caused by human-led environmental degradation. Bob and Bronkhorst (2004:15) further argue that perceived or actual scarcity of natural resources, such as water and land, plays an essential role in environmental disputes because resource scarcity would be a direct threat to human security. The worst-case scenario would be an outbreak of interethnic/intergroup conflict over existing resources for survival (Libiszewski, 1992). Several scholars also agree that 'the scarcer the resource, the more bitter the fight' (Le Billon 2001:564).

Additionally, the finding reveal that, the conflicts occurred when one ethnic group entered territories of others to compete over scarce resources, such as land and water necessary for cattle grazing. The migrations due to the influence of climate change were a trigger of those clashes. Although some human casualties were occasionally observed, cattle's raiding was the main objective of the conflicts because cattle were sources of wealth and sustenance for many pastoralist communities in Jonglei.

The impact of global climate change on people's lifestyle has been recognized as an accelerator of environmental conflict. Climate change threatens human security by making issues of resource scarcity more 'complex and intractable' (Brown, Hammill & Mcleman 2007:1142). In particular, less precipitation and extended drought as a result of warmer temperature have accelerated degradation of water and land resources (Raleigh & Urdal 2007). In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an intergovernmental body that provides scientific assessment of risks of climate change, identified Africa as the most vulnerable region in the world to climate change because of its rudimentary capability to adapt (Brown, Hammill & Mcleman 2007:1145).

Regarding ethnic conflict, Ethnic security dilemma had five items the finding (Table 4.2.1) revealed that, four items were rate high for example Loss of

agricultural production in the country (mean=2.88), Low export earnings in the country (mean=2.85), Low investment both internally and externally (mean=2.58), High expenditure on defense (mean=2.53), and the one item was rated moderate this was, Infrastructural destruction in the country (mean=2.38). with an (Average mean=2.64, std. 1.08997). This implies that, when there are information problems and commitment problems, a security dilemma arises if there are incentives to strike first (offensive advantage). Fear can increase this sense of group (ethnic) identity. Sounds like the "rally 'round the flag" effect: "The emotional power of ethnic attachments is typically increased by the unifying effects of what are perceived to be external threats. People who have little in common with others may unite when they feel threatened by external enemies."

The finding also reveals that, the security dilemma eventually led to armed clashes, which fueled ethnic hatred. The recent clashes (2016) are evidently more than just cattle raiding. Rather, they are characterized by indiscriminate killing of civilians with a clear demonstration of mutual hatred. Despite longstanding interethnic clashes between the two tribes, the emergence of ethnic hatred is apparently a recent phenomenon.

On ethnic conflict, Disarmament and grab of power had five items the finding (Table 4.2.1) revealed that, One item was rated high for example civilian disarmament are seen as equitable and a serious commitment is made to provide adequate security alternatives (mean=2.89), others were rated moderate for instance cattle raiding in Jonglei is a polemic example of an issue that affects the entire country and many other African states (mean=2.48), Until communities are confident that the SPLA and the police will protect them they are unlikely to surrender their guns (mean=2.35), Reports of rape and torture further enraged Murle youth and drove them deeper into the bush (mean=2.26), with an (Average mean=2.41 std. .99248). The SPLA battalion responsible for disarmament in Pibor was largely composed of Nuer and Dinka officers, who took the opportunity to take revenge for earlier cattle raids on their communities by members of the Murle

community (mean=2.07), this implies that, although a larger group might make a credible commitment not to abuse a smaller one by power-sharing, guaranteeing a diverse military, or letting the minority hold important economic assets hostage, a shift in one ethnic group's power (especially demographic) makes such commitments break down. Security dilemma: when there are information problems and commitment problems, a security dilemma arises if there are incentives to strike first (offensive advantage). Thus Individual members of an ethnic group may be prompted (by ethnic activists) to act more "ethnic" than they would otherwise in order to not be labeled a traitor.

The type of warfare, however, has significantly changed after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, and the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a disarmament campaign solely targeting the Lou Nuer. This uneven disarmament destabilised the country, sharpening the ethnic cleavage and security dilemma between the Lou Nuer and the Murle.

The findings are in argument with Conca, K., 2002 who argued that the series of recent interethnic clashes beginning in 2009 can also be viewed through the lens of the ethnic security dilemma that preexisted the CPA reached in 2005 and was exacerbated after the civilian disarmament conducted between December 2005 and May 2006. Based on the authorization of disarmament in the CPA, the government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) conducted a civilian disarmament campaign in Jonglei, targeting the Lou Nuer first (Young and Sing'Oei 21). However, they refused to surrender arms, as they believed the targeted disarmament to be a concerted attempt by the central authorities to weaken their fighting capabilities. This would increase Nuer's relative insecurity to other ethnic groups .

On ethnic conflict State's political capacity had five items the finding (Table 4.2.1) revealed that, All items were rated moderate for instance; There is a dialogue within and between Dinka, Nuer and Murle communities to address recent violence and prevent relations from deteriorating further (mean=2.46), communities

increasingly felt that dialogue is being used as a substitute for state intervention to protect lives (mean=2.29), Jonglei Peace Process succeeded in bringing about a temporary cessation of violence (mean=2.20), Health, education and water and sanitation services have been disrupted /destroyed, and international organisations are unwilling or unable to increase their presence in insecure areas (mean=2.15), The state has ability to meet its responsibility to protect its citizens from potentially genocidal violence (mean=1.75) with an (Average mean=2.18 std. 1.03375). This implies that, as states decline, they become less able to do so, making ethnic conflict more likely than an ethnic bargain. The state's inability to mediate this conflict contributes to its further decline. It's important to point out that the collapse of the state does not precede the ethnic conflict typically, but is caused by it.

The lack of government capabilities to provide security to its citizens, which created a state of anarchy within the country, also made the ethnic groups resist disarmament and feel responsible for their own security. The UNMISS (2012:26) reported that both the national police and the security forces lacked capacities to provide security because of inadequate logistical, human and financial resources and the difficulty of accessing many of the regions which lack functioning roads. The absence of a formal justice system has also created a lawlessness situation and resulted in a culture of impunity, in which perpetrators of violence are rarely prosecuted (ICG 2009:15).

There are two major security apparatus in South Sudan: the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) and SPLA. The quality of SSPS is 'abysmal', however (ICG 2009:19). Because the SSPS was often outnumbered and outgunned by armed pastoralists, it failed to stop interethnic clashes. Lou Nuer youth have expressed their grievances against the SSPS, which always failed to arrest the Murle, who conducted cattle raiding, murder, and abduction (UNMISS 2011:9). Most of the SSPS personnel are former SPLA soldiers, 'who were not asked to join the post-CPA army and thus are mostly second-tier quality or worse' (ICG 2009:19). In addition, many personnel are old and lack proper training and education. The absence of police stations in Jonglei also prevents the SSPS from responding timeously to communal violence.

Moreover, because police is not seen as an attractive occupation for qualified youth in South Sudan, recruitment of young people will continue to be a challenge.

The credibility of the SPLA has also been questioned. Although the SPLA as a national army of South Sudan is responsible for dealing with external threats, it is often mobilised to halt domestic incidents due to SSPS's lack of ability to do so (ICG 2009:20). However, the SPLA does not intervene in every interethnic clash, which creates 'confusion among communities about its role and mandate' (2009:21). Ethnic identities of SPLA soldiers explain the inconsistent responses. A local journalist interviewed by the International Crisis Group revealed that soldiers tend to abandon their original mandate and 'often stand with their tribe', when the interests of their groups are at stake. Recently, some SPLA personnel were arrested and punished due to their heavy use of force in the local conflicts in which they intervened, which discouraged the SPLA from further involvement. Corruption within the SPLA has also undermined the legitimacy of the organization (Leff 2009:194).

On ethnic conflict, religious issues had five items the finding (Table 4.2.1) revealed that, Two items were rated high for example Religious factors are the major causes of the current conflict in South Sudan (mean=2.86), The Presbyterian Church is the main religious organization in Lou Nuer and Murle areas, and Catholics and Anglicans have very little presence (mean=2.68) and others rated moderate, Struggle for power is the major cause of the current conflict in South Sudan (mean=2.12), Influential issues have contributed to the conflict in South Sudan (mean=2.02), Poverty and famine have caused the conflict in South Sudan (mean=1.58) with an (Average mean= 2.25 std. .85146). This implies that, Although a larger group might make a credible commitment not to abuse a smaller one by power-sharing, guaranteeing a diverse military, or letting the minority hold important economic assets hostage, a shift in one ethnic group's power (especially demographic) makes such commitments break down.

Regarding ethnic conflict, Abduction had five items the finding (Table 4.2.1) revealed that, Two items were rated high for instance; Scarcity of central government authority, security, development and justice mechanisms (mean=2.82), Rival groups

in Jonglei have a long history of raiding each another's cattle, and arming themselves to defend against such raids (mean=2.77), and other were rated moderate. The civil war led to a massive increase of small arms as both Khartoum and the then-rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) mobilized various communities, fomenting localized proxy conflicts (mean=2.39), Jonglei become a breeding ground for armed non-state actors and organized crime, as demonstrated by the recent arrest of criminal groups involved in money counterfeiting in South Sudan (mean=2.33), clashes have evolved from targeting only armed youths to attacking - abducting - any members of a rival community, including women, children and the elderly (mean=2.11) with an (Average mean=2.49 std .63617) with an overall mean of 2.41)

This implies that, The South Sudan conflict was caused by political interests; conflicts related to the independence curse or to over-politicization involve real political protagonists. These protagonists' specific interests and situations as individuals, groups, classes, or countries and regions leave a special impression on the conflicts. That is why political conflicts generated by the independence curse or by over-politicization manifest themselves differently across countries and regions. Although South Sudan's political conflict may be linked to the independence curse and to over-politicization, its specific political protagonists and situation convey to it its own peculiarity.

Based on the literature, individuals, social classes, and professional groups have been active in the events surrounding the military conflict. President Kiir, his opponent former vice-President Machar, and a cohort of military and bureaucratic officials had personal and professional interests and ambitions that fueled the conflict to a certain extent. Machar, for instance, has been accused by the Kiir government of being impatient. He wants political power so badly that he was willing to bypass the procedural rules of South Sudan's ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), regarding the selection of the party's and country's leadership. This caused his dismissal by Kiir and his attempted coup, and this worsened the situation than solving the problem. Nevertheless, the role of all these individual protagonists in the conflict is overshadowed by their tribal interests. The killings have

opposed the two most important tribes of South Sudan, the Dinka and the Nuer. The two main figures in the conflict, Kiir and Machar, hail from the two tribes respectively. Their fighting forces, especially on the rebel side, are recruited on the basis of tribal allegiance. The conflict then, took a different shape from the independence curse and over-politicization to a tribal conflict in South Sudan.

### **4.3 Extents of Governance**

The dependent variable in this study was the Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan. Governance was broken into five constructs which included;- Public participation with five questions, legislative branch with five questions, Executive and rule of law with five questions, traditional and customary arrangement with five questions, transparency and accountability with five questions. Respondents were required to ascertain the extent to which they agree or disagree with the items or statements by indicating the number which best describes their perceptions. This variable had a response rate ranging between 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=Disagree and 4=strongly disagree. The responses were analyzed and described using means as summarized below in tables 4.3.

**Table 4.3.1:** extent of governance in terms of; Public participation, legislative branch, Executive and rule of law, traditional and customary arrangement, transparency and accountability (**n=140**)

**Table 4.3.1:** Governance in terms of Public participation and democracy, legislative branch, executive branch, executive and rule of law, Traditional & customary arrangement, transparency and accountability, human security(n=140)

<b>Items on Governance</b>	Mean	Std	Interpre tation	Rank
<b>Public participation and Democracy</b>				
Lack of services and political representation	3.18	.946	High	1
concentration of cattle in the hands of the politically connected elite	3.11	.945	High	2
lack of civilian governance structures and suspicion of government	3.03	.935	High	3
Local intercommunal conflict is often part and parcel of national political contestation and supported by politicians	3.00	.997	High	4
There has been even attacks during independence ceremonies	2.99	.993	High	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>.74603</b>	<b>high</b>	
<b>Legislative branch</b>				
Our legislative branch makes and enacts laws that accommodate all tribes in Jonglei	3.07	.880	High	1
Our executive branch carries out laws without discrimination	2.87	1.043	High	2
our judicial branch interpret laws, apply the law as necessary, and rule on the constitutionality of laws accommodating all customs	2.83	.835	High	3
out judicial branch evaluates and interprets laws	2.79	.960	High	4
Our legislative branch introduces and enacting legislation, confirming or rejecting appointments by the president, and declaring war without prejudice.	2.60	1.061	High	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.83</b>	<b>.59523</b>	<b>High</b>	
<b>Executive and rule of Law</b>				
The checks and balances system in place among the branches of the Jonglei	3.13	.987	High	1
the President appoint members of the National Legislative Assembly from all tribes	3.01	1.080	High	2
the President appoint equal members of the Council of States from all religions	2.93	.979	High	3
The vice president, Cabinet and other agencies serve in more supporting and advisory roles putting all aspects of service delivery in the community	2.86	.983	High	4
Our executive brand of a government implement and execute laws passed by the legislative branch of government and interpret ambiguous laws	2.68	1.011	High	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.92</b>	<b>.70057</b>	<b>High</b>	
<b>Traditional &amp; customary arrangement</b>				
traditional leaders should be supported to work with their communities to change attitudes and improve relations with local government actors	3.04	.939	High	1
Political accommodation brings a unique approach to addressing the governance-related drivers of Jonglei's conflicts and building peace	2.78	.922	High	2
Offers a framework and choices for developing governance arrangements which reflect the diversity of Jonglei's communities, without undermining pre-existing informal and nonhierarchical governance arrangements.	2.77	.928	High	3
Links choices on governance arrangements back to people's interests.	2.73	.859	High	4
Provides a voice for groups in remote areas previously in a "governance vacuum" and excluded from socio-economic opportunities	2.60	.994	High	5

<b>Items on Governance</b>	Mean	Std	Interpre tation	Rank
<b>Public participation and Democracy</b>				
Lack of services and political representation	3.18	.946	High	1
concentration of cattle in the hands of the politically connected elite	3.11	.945	High	2
lack of civilian governance structures and suspicion of government	3.03	.935	High	3
Local intercommunal conflict is often part and parcel of national political contestation and supported by politicians	3.00	.997	High	4
There has been even attacks during independence ceremonies	2.99	.993	High	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.78</b>	<b>.68791</b>	High	
<b>Transparency and accountability</b>				
little has been done to implement resolutions related to services, security, protection, justice and accountability	2.90	.867	High	1
The provision of assistance to Murle communities targeted in recent raiding has caused resentment in neighbouring communities, who perceive that they have not received the same level of support	2.85	.926	High	2
Given the high levels of need most organizations have had to focus primarily on crisis response, rather than support for conflict mitigation and prevention	2.80	1.004	High	3
Capacity-building, both in terms of training and logistical support, is sorely needed in security provision, and local civil society	2.78	.969	High	4
thousands of women and children were abducted; yet, despite nine years of UN human rights presence, there has been little international monitoring	2.68	1.008	High	5
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.80</b>	<b>.72664</b>	high	
<b>Human Security</b>				
Unusual weather patterns and flooding affected an additional 201,000 people in Jonglei during the rainy season	3.08	.880	High	<b>1</b>
Food insecurity has increased dramatically across much of the state, with particularly severe effects in Akobo and Pibor	2.86	1.043	High	<b>2</b>
Few agencies are present in the affected area and their capacity to scale up the response is low	2.83	.835	High	<b>3</b>
Prepositioning of stocks is difficult and response times have accordingly been slow.	2.80	.960	High	<b>4</b>
Staff turnover is high and staff presence sporadic, making it difficult to base responses on a good understanding of the context, and without proper Do No Harm analysis what activities are undertaken risk contributing to tensions between communities	2.51	1.060	High	<b>5</b>
<b>Average mean</b>	<b>2.81</b>	<b>.59522</b>	<b>High</b>	
<b>Overall mean</b>	<b>2.87</b>			

**Source:** Primary data, (2016)

Regarding governance, Public participation and Democracy had five items the finding (Table 4.3.1) revealed that, all items were rated high for instance, Lack of services and political representation for instance (mean=3.18), concentration of

cattle in the hands of the politically connected elite (mean=3.11), lack of civilian governance structures and suspicion of government (mean=3.03), Local intercommunal conflict is often part and parcel of national political contestation and supported by politicians (mean=3.00), There has been even attacks during independence ceremonies (mean=2.99). With an (Average mean=3.06, std .74603). this implies that Governance failure in Jonglei have their roots in several sources, principal among which are the legacy of colonialism, the nature of the independence struggle, the character of the post-colonial state and their leaders, and the structure and requirements of the global order. Colonial governance institutions were designed to promote domination and extraction, these being colonialism's principle mission. Although these institutions were the target of the anti-colonial struggle, they ultimately became colonialism's legacy to post-colonial governance. Independence struggles around Africa required mobilization and produced movements in which, with few exceptions, decision-making was largely plebiscitary. At independence, African countries maintained over-centralized state institutions that reposed enormous powers in the hands of their "founding fathers." Political mobilization and plebiscitary decision-making conveniently dominate post- independence governance strategies, especially since the pursuit of development so as to "catch up" was the national preoccupation. Democracy was not a significant item on Africa's post-independence governance agenda (Ake, 1996).

Regarding governance, Legislative branch had five items and the finding (Table 4.3.1) revealed that, all items were rated high for instance, Our legislative branch makes and enacts laws that accommodate all tribes in Jonglei (mean=3.07), Our executive branch carries out laws without discrimination (mean=2.87), our judicial branch interpret laws, apply the law as necessary, and rule on the constitutionality of laws accommodating all customs (mean=2.83), our judicial branch evaluates and interprets laws (mean=2.79), with an (Average mean=2.83, std .59523). Our legislative branch introduces and enacting legislation, confirming or rejecting appointments by the president, and declaring war without prejudice. This implies that, While the role of the executive branch may seem more limited than the

legislative branch, those who work in it often have a wide range of responsibilities. For example, a law requiring the creation of a police force requires the members of the executive branch to decide how to run the force, how to hire officers and how to handle arrested subjects, the way in which the executive branch deals with details has a profound effect on the laws passed by the legislative branch.

Regarding governance, Executive and rule of law, had five items and the finding (Table 4.3.1) revealed that, all items were rated high for instance, the checks and balances system in place among the branches of the Jonglei (mean=3.13), the President appoint members of the National Legislative Assembly from all tribes (mean=3.01), the President appoint equal members of the Council of States from all regions (mean=2.93), The vice president, Cabinet and other agencies serve in more supporting and advisory roles putting all aspects of service delivery in the community (mean=2.86), Our executive branch of a government implement and execute laws passed by the legislative branch of government and interpret ambiguous laws (mean=2.68) with (Average mean=2.92 std. .70057)

Regarding governance, Traditional and customary arrangement had five items and the finding (Table 4.3.1) revealed that, all items were rated high for instance, traditional leaders should be supported to work with their communities to change attitudes and improve relations with local government actors (mean=3.04), Political accommodation brings a unique approach to addressing the governance-related drivers of Jonglei's conflicts and building peace (mean=2.78), Offers a framework and choices for developing governance arrangements which reflect the diversity of Jonglei's communities, without undermining pre-existing informal and nonhierarchical governance arrangements (mean=2.77), Links choices on governance arrangements back to people's interests (mean=2.73), Provides a voice for groups in remote areas previously in a "governance vacuum" and excluded from socio-economic opportunities (mean=2.60) with an (Average mean=2.78 std. .68791)

Regarding Transparency and accountability had five items and the finding (Table 4.3.1) revealed that, all items were rated high for instance, little has been done to implement resolutions related to services, security, protection, justice and accountability (mean=2.90), The provision of assistance to Murle communities targeted in recent raiding has caused resentment in neighbouring communities, who perceive that they have not received the same level of support (mean=2.85), Given the high levels of need most organisations have had to focus primarily on crisis response, rather than support for conflict mitigation and prevention (mean=2.80), Capacity-building, both in terms of training and logistical support, is sorely needed in security provision, and local civil society (mean=2.78), thousands of women and children were abducted; yet, despite nine years of UN human rights presence, there has been little international monitoring (mean=2.68) with (Average mean=2.80 std. .72664).

Regarding Human Security had five items and the finding (Table 4.3.1) revealed that, all items were rated high for instance, Unusual weather patterns and flooding affected an additional 201,000 people in Jonglei during the rainy season 3.08, Food insecurity has increased dramatically across much of the state, with particularly severe effects in Akobo and Pibor (mean=2.86), Few agencies are present in the affected area and their capacity to scale up the response is low (mean=2.83), Prepositioning of stocks is difficult and response times have accordingly been slow (mean=2.80), Staff turnover is high and staff presence sporadic, making it difficult to base responses on a good understanding of the context, and without proper Do No Harm analysis what activities are undertaken risk contributing to tensions between communities (mean=2.51) with (Average mean= 2.81 std. .59522). This implies that, the conflict since its beginning and escalation has claimed a number of lives and none of the two fighting parties wants to be accountable for this devastation. Loss of lives, IDPs, refugees and hunger are among the other consequences of the conflict, there hasn't been any further development, the economy has declined, starvation and hunger, refugees and insecurity in the country have all been experienced. Currently the country still is under the conflict

and these devastations have been seen, what is most likely to happen if the conflict continues only God knows.

As stated in the literature by CCTV, 2014, “the ultimate consequence of the migrations and profusion of tribes in SSA is tribal horizontality”. Tribal horizontal relations are exclusive to SSA. They do not exist in other developing regions, including North Africa. They differ from vertical “ethnic” relations, observed in all the other developing regions. Vertical ethnic relations in North Africa, Asia, and South America are pyramidal, unequal, and dominated by one “ethnic” group politically, economically, and socially for example Arabs in Sudan before partition and in North Sudan today, Arabs in North Africa and the Middle East, Europeans or Mestizos in South America, Han Chinese in China, Kinh in Vietnam, Indo-Aryans in India). By contrast, tribal horizontality in SSA rests on assumed and built-in equality among tribal groups. No tribal group dominates the others.

This assumed equality brings demands by each tribal group however small to be given equal chance to control political power. This may take the form of violent overthrow or fair or rigged election, even though the outcome does not necessarily reflect this equality. The Dinka-Nuer military conflict reflects, thus, the tribal horizontal equality-triggered demand by the Nuer tribal group for control of political power, which has been up till now exercised by the Dinka.

#### **4.4 Relationship between Ethnic conflict and Governance**

The last objective in this study was to establish whether there is a significant relationship between Ethnic conflict and extents of good governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan, the researcher stated a null hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between Ethnic conflict and extents of good governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan, In order to achieve this objective and to test this null hypothesis, the researcher correlated the overall mean on Ethnic conflict and extents of good governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan using the Pearson's Linear Correlation Coefficient, as indicated in table 4.4;

**Table 4.1.7:** Significant relationship between level of Ethnic conflict and extents of good governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan  
(Level of Significance = 0.05)

Pearson correlation between the level of armed conflicts and children protection

Variables Correlated	r-value	Sig	Interpretation	Decision on Ho
Ethnic conflicts Vs good governance	.392	.004	Significant correlation	Rejected

**Source:** Primary data, (2015)

The results of the relationship between armed conflicts and children protection are shown in Table 4.1.7

Results show that good governance was significantly correlated with Ethnic conflicts( $r=0.542$ , at  $Sig=.000$ ).

The results in table 4.1.7 indicate that the relationship that exist between Ethnic conflict and extents of good governance in Jonglei State is significantly correlated, ( $sig.>0.05$ ). This means that Ethnic conflicts influences good governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan and the failure to resolve Ethnic conflicts well, the more poor governance, in relations to their posttraumatic condition, and other necessities as well as cease/failure to operate in the foreseeable future.

Based on the results, the stated null hypothesis was accepted and a conclusion is made that Armed Conflicts affects Children Protection.

**Table 4.1.8**  
**Regression between Ethnic conflicts and Governance**

<b>Variables regressed</b>	<b>Adjusted r<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>F- value</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Interpretation</b>	<b>Decision on H<sub>0</sub></b>
Governance Vs Ethnic conflicts	.542	54.176	.000	Significant effect	Rejected
<b>Coefficients</b>	<b>Beta</b>	<b>t-value</b>	<b>Sig.</b>		
(Constant)		21.870	.000	Significant effect	Rejected
Cattle raids	.448	1.541	.124	No significant effect	Accepted
Environmental conflict	-.178	-.563	.574	No significant effect	Accepted
Ethnic security dilemma	-1.385	-5.991	.000	Significant effect	Rejected
disarmament	.620	1.676	.095	No significant effect	Accepted
State Capacity	2.033	7.815	.000	Significant effect	Rejected
Public participation	-2.318	-12.146	.000	Significant effect	Rejected
Legislative branch	.707	2.799	.005	Significant effect	Rejected
Executive and the rule of law	.416	10.754	.000	Significant effect	Rejected

**Source:** Primary data, (2015)

The results of the regression analysis between armed conflicts and children protection are shown in Table 4.1.8

Results show that 54.2% ( $r^2=0.542$ ) of the dependent variable (governance) is explained by the independent variable (Ethnic conflicts). This implies that it's only Ethnic conflicts majorly that affect governance in war tone areas like Jonglei State since most atrocities are committed during wars like public participation, democracy, traditional and customary arrangement, executive and rule of law, transparency and accountability.

A tide of political democratization and economic liberalization based on competitive principles has been sweeping the world and stimulating, in its wake, the drive toward a new role for government. A shift is also occurring in development strategies, away from a single focus on economic development and toward greater emphasis on sustainable development.

Many countries, moreover, are becoming aware (albeit to varying degrees) of the need to provide opportunities for broader participation as a complement to government-led development approaches. Yet in consideration of the present widening disparities in developing countries such as those between the rich and the poor groups of society, it is necessary to review past methods of promoting economic and social development in developing nations.

#### **4.5 Findings from the Interviews Guide**

The situation in Jonglei has changed rapidly over the last three months of SPLA and rebel clashes. Fighting has taken place along multiple fronts, but the Juba-Bor road, linking the national capital with the Nuer-controlled rebel heartland, has seen the brunt of battle. Territorial control has swung back and forth between SPLA and rebel hands, with incremental gains for the SPLA over time, largely thanks to support from the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF). The conflict has been increasingly marked by targeted and indiscriminate ethnic violence, prompting mass civilian displacement and defections. While the rebels have lost some territory in southern Jonglei in the last few weeks, they have managed to secure support from various Nuer communities in Jonglei. The evolution of the conflict from a two-party war to one that has incorporated tribal and ethnic dimensions is similar to dynamics seen in Upper Nile and Unity states.

##### **What are the effects of the violence Like Cattle Raids?**

Mass devastation and some 80,000 heads of cattle taken from Murle areas in January have left tens of thousands homeless and dependent on overstretched aid agencies for food, after crops were scorched in attacks.

The top government official in Pibor reported 3,000 deaths, a figure that is impossible to confirm given the large area involved and access difficulties. Survivors have spoken of seeing hundreds of bodies near villages after attacks.

The UN has registered more than 140,000 people in Jonglei needing assistance, many of them displaced.

Cattle have been stolen and people made homeless in their tens of thousands. Large areas under cultivation have been scorched.

Without cows and the women they saved years to raise enough cattle to marry, many men are destitute, with little or no ability to rebuild a modicum of economic security. Such disaffection is likely to fuel the cycle of violence.

Recent attacks have led to the deliberate, widespread destruction of essential basic services, such as water points, health posts and schools, as well as crucial humanitarian centres, where supplies were looted. Such destruction greatly complicates the return of the displaced populations.

### **Why civilians were not better protected?What is the state's political capacity**

The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was able to track an 8,000-strong column of armed men marching towards Pibor village before some of the worst violence. But with only 400 peacekeepers and 800 government troops in place, they were vastly outnumbered, and urged residents to flee the column and take refuge behind their defensive lines in Pibor. UNMISS also said the diffuse and unpredictable nature of the attacks on remote villages compromised its ability to protect civilians.

UNMISS has since increased its Jonglei presence to around 1,100 peacekeepers in new permanent bases, roughly half the mission's in-country combat-ready troops, and has called on Juba to deploy a "a significant number" of troops to fill substantial gaps in a planned buffer zone.

The UN force's capacity will be affected by the April departure of its contingent from Russia, which provides many of UNMISS's pilots and aircraft. In late 2011, Russian pilots went on strike over alleged harassment by SPLA forces in Jonglei.

The army said it would bring up to 6,000 soldiers to Jonglei - where, local officials say, 3,000 SPLA troops are currently deployed, 1,000 of them in Pibor town. Locals say the presence of the troops will not necessarily deliver protection, especially if the

individual soldiers are drawn from the same community as some of the combatants, which would limit their willingness to engage militarily.

### **What is being done to prevent Ethnic Conflict?**

The government has said the army will forcibly disarm all communities in Jonglei state in the near future. Security experts have deemed this premature and an extremely dangerous move that could spark mass violence unless carried out in conjunction with comprehensive peace talks and by soldiers belonging to none of the ethnic groups involved in the violence.

They say lessons must be learnt from previous operations - notably the 2006 forced disarmament of the White Army in Jonglei, during which several hundred Nuer youths were killed - which tended to expose disarmed communities to attack, leading them to quickly obtain new weapons.

There has been little in the way of dialogue between rival groups, despite repeated appeals by religious leaders, community elders and aid agencies.

Instead, the rhetoric is increasingly combative. The "Nuer and Dinka White Army" recently released a statement saying some 30,000 "well-armed youth" comprising Dinka and Nuer in Jonglei and 10,000 Ethiopian Nuer, would from early March embark on "Operation Savanna Storm" with the aim of preventing future raids by Murle youth. "The operation will be permanent until Murle do not pose security threats to their neighbours," the statement said.

A group of respondents stated that the constitution gives too much power to the president, alleging that if he can remove governors and dissolve parliaments, they cannot do their jobs effectively. Power needs to be more evenly distributed among the other pillars of government.

Others asserted that the executive does not represent the interests of the people, and is not transparent at all. Some respondents stated that the President had lost legitimacy due to events in the current conflict.

Respondents expressed equally diverse opinions on whether a national dialogue process could address problems in Jonglei. A few voiced the opinion that national dialogue could not bring peace to Jonglei because it would not be conducted with Jonglei's needs and interests in mind. However, many thought that a national process has potential to bring some peace to Jonglei, but that the process itself would not be enough. Multiple respondents suggested using traditional problem-solving methods to complement, or at times replace, a national peace process in order to truly reconcile longstanding issues. Many also expressed the concern that while in theory a national peace process could help Jonglei, it would not be implemented properly or include proposals truly beneficial to Jonglei.

Structure and functions of local government: Almost all respondents emphasized the need for local government to maintain a clear focus on service delivery as well as on ways to be responsive to local populations in times of crisis. The issue as to whether Jonglei is viable as a state in its current form, and options for its possible restructuring, emerged as a repeated theme. A consensus view was that dividing Jonglei into smaller constituent units would bring public decision making and resources closer to communities, and therefore deliver greater stability.

Executive and legislative representation: Many respondents felt unrepresented, underrepresented, or ineffectively represented in state and national government, despite some instances of members of their communities holding seats in the legislature and the executive. Respondents generally attributed this grievance to two reasons. First, some people did not know who their representatives were, due to a lack of information and some national and state legislative members' absence from their constituencies. Second, some people considered that seats in the state and national legislatures and executive did not translate to meaningful representation of their interests, whether due to poorly executed elections or a perception that representatives lacked capacity to advocate for their constituencies' interests.

Public participation in local government: The importance of public participation emerged as a repeated theme in focus groups. In the current system, the national and state levels assert considerable influence over the local level. More opportunities for local participation in decision making may more effectively capture population's needs and support efficient and equitable distribution of services.

Traditional and customary arrangements: Consultations revealed the importance of the relationship between county commissioners and traditional authorities. Some focus group participants expressed that traditional authorities should have greater decision making power compared to the commissioner, and that local governance had declined as powers were wrested from traditional authorities and granted to formal government institutions.

Effective implementation of agreements: Many respondents expressed skepticism about the implementation of peace agreements, a doubt that they attributed to their experience of previous agreements falling into disuse. Specifically there was concern as to whether the agreement signed between the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) Cobra Faction and Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) in May 2014 would translate from paper to practice. In discussing this agreement and a potential peace agreement at the national level, respondents voiced the need for processes to go beyond elites and involve broad public participation, inclusive of women and Jonglei's diverse political and socio-cultural groupings. They also stressed the importance of bringing dialogue to the community level.

The conflict began on 18 December when rebel forces under the direction of Peter Gadet, a Nuer commander in charge of the SPLA 8th Division and with a history of switching allegiances, launched a surprise attack using tanks, rockets, mortars and artillery on Panpandiar and Malual-Chaat military camps outside Bor town, forcing hundreds of SPLA loyalists to flee south. Gadet is originally from Unity state and is considered the founder of the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SSLM/A). Following his amnesty deal in 2012, the SPLA put him in charge of the

disarmament of civilians in Pibor County, Jonglei. He was also in charge of the SPLA's counter-insurgency against David Yau Yau's Cobra Faction.

Immediately after the December attack, Gadet joined the opposition, leaving for Kolnyang to reorganize his forces. Almost simultaneously, Nuer youths in Akobo county, allegedly infuriated by reports suggesting that Dinka soldiers had killed Nuer civilians in Juba, attacked a UN base and killed two Indian peacekeepers and injured a third. An additional 30 Dinka civilians housed in the UN camp in Akobo were also killed. Within days, 20,000 internally displaced people from Jonglei fled to neighboring Lakes state, and another 14,000 sought shelter within the UN compound in Bor. By 1 January, President Salva Kiir had declared a state of emergency in Jonglei.

By 2 January 2014, control over Bor had shifted rapidly back and forth between pro-government and rebel forces. They also exchanged fire around a string of villages that straddle the Bor-Juba highway near the Jonglei-Central Equatoria border. In particular, the Pariak and Panpandiar areas marked the battle frontlines where forward operating soldiers traded artillery fire with their rebel counterparts. Fighting continued the next several days with pro-government forces receiving additional reinforcements from Yambio and advancing from Yebisak on 3 January to Malek, 15km south of Bor, by 5 January.

Gadet's forces retreated from Panpandiar to near Bor. According to one estimate, two rebel battalions returned to positions in and around Bor by the end of the first week of January, while one battalion remained south of Bor possibly to delay advancements made by pro-government forces. Despite Gadet's assurances that rebel forces controlled territory up to Malek as of 7 January, artillery fire coming from SPLA controlled parts could be heard in Bor.

The rebels used their intimate knowledge of the SPLA former colleagues or brothers-in-arms to their advantage. They have used Bor as a staging area, from which they launched offensive operations south of Bor. In response, pro-government forces, led by the UPDF, unleashed an aerial bombing campaign. Fixed-wing MiG-29 aircraft and helicopter gunships were frequently sighted near Malek, Pariak and

further south in Mangalla in Central Equatoria. By 17 January, overwhelmed by the air attacks, rebel forces fell back to north of Bor. The next day, Ugandan and SPLA brigades arrived in Bor to secure the town and reopen the airport. By 1 February, the SPLA and UPDF forces reported no sightings of rebel forces east of Bor along the Bor-Pibor road.

Rebels in the north of Jonglei close to Upper Nile have also operated somewhat independently from those further souths, capitalizing on local grievances to recruit new members. Riek Machar allegedly moved around northern Jonglei continuously in order to encourage Nuer communities to support rebel forces, as well. This partly explains why the government's recapture of Bor did not lead to the destruction of the entire rebel system. Opposition forces remain in parts of Akobo, Urur, Nyirol, Fangak, Canal, and Ayod counties all Nuer-areas.

The SPLA-rebel fighting in Jonglei has drawn other armed elements. Lou Nuer cattle youths ('white army') reportedly engaged in skirmishes with the SPLA in Bor South county and Anyidi to the east of Bor town towards the end of January. On 5 February, a group of armed Murle men, allegedly loyal to Machar, also attacked Kolnyang to the south of Bor, killing dozens, stealing livestock, and abducting children. It also appears that the SPLA in Jonglei has organized around different power centers. For example, in Pochala, there are several different self-identified SPLA groups: a Boma town cadre, a rapid action group, those SPLA that have been permanently stationed in Pochala, and new arrivals. The lines of command and control between these groups are unclear.

While defections have occurred on both sides, SPLA defections to the rebel side have been better documented. On 18 January, 80 SPLA soldiers defected to the opposition in Pibor, apparently because of the lack of food. One SPLA commander in Pibor also commented on the likelihood of another thousand defections because soldiers had not been paid in months. Yet, towards the end of March, several men under the leadership of Peter Ruach, a defected SPLA commander operating between Pibor and Akobo counties, abdicated to the SPLA. On 26 January, the South Sudan Police Service also reported that several of its members defected to the opposition.

Furthermore, on 22 March, Nuer and Dinka SPLA soldiers in a military camp in Pochalla fought each other. Dozens of Nuer soldiers left the camp for Akobo.

In mid-February, a former State Law Enforcement Minister, Gabriel Duop Lam, also declared that he was joining rebel forces, the latest in a string of ministerial defections. Some other high profile defections include former Deputy Governor, Hussein Maar Nyuot, the Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Manawe Peter, and Minister of Education, Stephen Par Kuolsome of whom have publicly voiced their criticism of the current government in the past. County commissioners for Akobo, Fangak, Uror, Nyirol and Ayod are also considered rebel sympathizers. Notably, these areas are largely Nuer-dominated, and as such have had strong historical ties with Riek Machar.

The position of David Yau Yau, who prior to December was the last and strongest of the militia leaders, remains ambiguous. Peter Ruach sought Yau Yau's help in late January, and managed to bring over his second in command, Arzen Kong Kong, and a group of fighters though Kong Kong's ultimate allegiance is unknown. Rebels participating in peace talks in Addis Ababa have also been in touch with Yau Yau, attempting to bring him into alliance. But on 30 January, Yau Yau's South Sudan Democratic Movement/Defense Army (SSDM/A)-Cobra, signed a cessation of hostilities agreement with the government. Yet Yau Yau's loyalty to the government is tenuous. On 23 March, his group reiterated previously-voiced secessionist demands for a Murle home in Jonglei.

The humanitarian and governance effects of the conflict in Jonglei are significant. Bor town was almost entirely destroyed in the first round of fighting. According to one report, at least 2,500 people were killed in Bor in the first three weeks of the crisis, and numerous accounts indicate revenge killings along ethnic lines. Ugandan nationals working in Jonglei have been targeted, as have Eritreans. Most state government officials departed soon after the conflict began, and only now have begun to trickle back in. On 28 January, the Jonglei Director for Relief and Rehabilitation stated that local authorities had collected some 500 bodies. On 4 February, the Mayor of Bor announced that government authorities had buried more

than one hundred bodies in a mass grave, and that more such burials were likely to follow. UN investigations also revealed similar graves or openly exposed bodies around Bor town, which remained deserted. On 26 February, the paramount chief of Duk County was abducted by rebel forces supposedly for criticizing their actions in the county. According to media reports, dozens of people were killed or injured in Duk County, and thousands displaced from Duk to Twic East County towards the end of March.

Despite a military surge by the regime and the opposition's counteroffensives, neither side has been able to project force decisively. If anything, the ongoing conflict in Jonglei represents a microcosmic reflection of the overall crisis across South Sudan. As in Upper Nile and Unity, neither the government nor the rebels in Jonglei have reached a decisive tipping point. Both parties to the conflict have resorted to the burning of tukuls, forced displacement, food blockades, sexual violence, and the deliberate killing of civilians. Furthermore, the SPLA has used banned munitions like cluster bombs. Food shortages have also prompted armed men to loot from local populations, and UN safe zones for civilians have been regularly targeted. As of the end of March, military operations within Jonglei continue.

Widespread perceptions that governance structures are biased in favor of certain groups.

Diminished impact of accountability and reconciliation efforts between communities, as a result of the effects of decades of violence, Militarization of communities and societies.

Communities' expressed need for self-defense structures in the absence of sufficient state capacity to provide security, Common lack of faith in the ability of the government to provide security, in some instances driving youth to assume the role of community protectors.

Wide availability of small arms and light weapons as well as Competition among communities and their leaders over natural resources and political power

Perceptions of ethnic marginalization that extend beyond security service provision and relate to political inclusion and representation.

Mistrust of the political class, especially in the state capital. This has led some communities to withdraw or turn inward when attacked or subjected to what they view as political manipulation.

A particular sense of marginalization among youth, as well as a sense among women at the grassroots level that they do not have a voice in public decision making and politics

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY, DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter presents the findings, conclusions, recommendations and suggested areas that need further research following the study objectives and study hypothesis.

#### **5.1 Discussion of Findings**

This study was set to establish the relationship between Ethnic conflict and Governance in Jonglei State, and South Sudan. It was guided by the following specific objectives, that included determining the (i) characteristics of respondents based on the dimensions of; age, tribe, Gender, occupation, Education. (ii) To examine the nature and historical roots of the intercommunity armed conflict in Jonglei state.(iii) To assess the factors contributing to the ethnic conflict in South Sudan. (iv)To establish how governance can overcome the ethnic conflict in South Sudan.

While there has been no agreement on the border's location, the border region was the site of a series of clashes in the first half of 2012, before the rainy season. In March and April, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) took Hejlij from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), to widespread international condemnation. The SPLA said the assault was prompted by a series of SAF attacks on South Sudanese positions along the border, notably at Kiir Adem between Northern Bahr el Ghazal and East Darfur, and in Unity state. Fighting continued throughout 2012, with SAF repeatedly bombing SPLA positions along the frontier, especially in the Northern Bahr el Ghazal–East Darfur region. While the clashes indicate a deteriorating relationship between the two countries, the conflict is also a continuation of strategies seen at the negotiating table: both sides attempt to press home a military advantage that can then be used as a basis for subsequent negotiations.

### **5.1.1 Profile of the respondents**

The findings indicated that majority of respondents were

- (i) Majority of the respondents were between 25-35 year of age who composed of 32.1%.
- (ii) Female respondents dominated the study with 64.3% out of the total sample size compared to their female counterpart
- (iii) Married respondents dominated the study with 53.6% sample size compared to other marital status category
- (iv) Secondary Certificate holders dominated the sample size with 50%
- (v) Regarding occupation others dominated the entire sample size with 54.2%

### **5.1.2 Objective 1: The state of Ethnic Conflict**

The level of Ethnic Conflict as witnessed in Jonglei State, and South Sudan, ranged from very high to low. Evidently, there were some areas of Ethnic Conflict in which the respondents were not fully satisfied such as; The findings on Ethnic conflict revealed that eight items were measured and rated as follows; cattle grazing and raids (Average mean=2.43, std. 0.99116) Environmental conflicts (Average mean=2.50, std. 1.02221), ethnic security dilemma (Average mean=2.64, std. 1.08997) Disarmament and grab of power (Average mean=2.41 std. 0.99248), state political capacity (Average mean=2.18 std. 1.03375) religious issues (Average mean= 2.25 std. 0.85146) and abduction (Average mean=2.49 std. 0.63617) with an overall mean of 2.41)

With a surface area of 123,000 Sq Km, the largest and also the most densely populated of the 10 states in South Sudan, It suffers from a dearth of basic infrastructure such as roads, as well as chronic insecurity rooted in resource conflicts, and frequent floods. Crop production is the primary economic activity, although cattle and fishing play an important role in livelihoods. Sudan's second civil war began in Jonglei in 1983. The region is home to six Nilotic ethnic groups: the Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak, Murle, Kachipo and Jieh. Its lack of infrastructure has greatly limited the

interest of external investors; French oil giant Total has been unable to explore its concessions there. Stability is a prerequisite for fulfilling the tourism potential offered by some of Africa's largest migrations of wildlife.

The conflict has so far in Jonglei state between 2011 and 2012 claimed over 100-500 casualties in armed places. Hence the literature also supported that there are majorly two main causes of the conflict which were struggle for power and ethnic differences.

Hence, the establishment of patterns of regional governance is critical to the provision of an array of public goods such as peace and security, justice and rule of law, and natural resource and physical infrastructure development. Processes and strategies of constitutional choice in Liberia, for example, must conceive of regional scale of governance right from the start rather than perceiving such scale as relating to externalities that can be addressed later. What this means is that the role of regional institutions such as the East African Community on Economic Development must be seen as critical actors in processes of constitutional choice undertaken to establish self-governing orders in the East African sub-region

The study found out that decline in standards of living, children having to flee their villages in fear of being abducted, shortage of money due to displacement by civil wars, poverty since cows were the only source of livelihood among the pastoral communities such as Dinka and scaring away investors thus affecting the economy of the country were some of the economic impacts that children and women abduction had on the economy of the country. Other impacts such as deaths, human rights violations, infrastructural degradation and others have also been experienced. Further, lack of investment activities in the area due to insecurity, lack of schools, roads and hospitals and people not cultivating their land due to insecurity were the development impacts on the economy of the country while loss of hope of better things in the future due to these situations, mistrust on the government by the citizens, parents of the abducted child being frustrated because there was no hope of seeing their child again and people who had lost their loved ones and their wealth

were psychologically affected and this had psychological impact on the people of Jonglei state.

The study found out that the problem of the conflict escalation and child abduction had been resolved in some regions of Juba and the government had tried peace talks with the rebels whereas the government had disarmed some communities leaving other communities with guns hence causing panic and fear among the communities whose guns had been taken away, the government had failed to use local leaders of the notorious communities and the government failed to initiate development programs to engage the communities by transforming their ways of life. Further, due to the fact that the government had disarmed some communities leaving other communities with guns hence causing panic and fear among the communities whose guns had been taken away, the government had failed to use local leaders of the notorious communities and the government failed to initiate development programs to engage the communities by transforming their ways of life due to lack of providing food to the communities, being biased in terms of reports and they do nothing in regards to arms and they only side with the minority tribes. The study also found out that the implementation of laws and order by the Jonglei state authorities was poor and that most of the respondents reacted by taking revenge and condemning the raids when their community members had been raided or abducted by other communities.

### **5.1.3 Objective 2: Extents of Governance**

The extent of Governance was generally rated high. The findings on Governance revealed that eight items were measured and rated as follows; Public participation and Democracy (Average mean=3.06, std .74603) Legislative branch (Average mean=2.83, std .59523), Executive and rule of Law (Average mean=2.92 std. .70057) Traditional & customary arrangement (Average mean=2.78 std. .68791), Transparency and accountability (Average mean=2.80 std. .72664) Human Security (Average mean= 2.81 std. .59522) with an overall mean of 2.87)

Governance reforms that depart from autocracy and monocentric governance must be based on a theory of governance that vests limited authority in several centers rather than centralizing power in a single center. Thus, polycentric governance of local to regional scale is appropriate. In constituting such order in the Jonglei area, it is important that institutional reforms be made consistent with the nature of the governance challenges that confront the societies of the area. Certain reforms will have to be made on a regional scale and others at local, provincial or national scales. The nature of public goods and services to be delivered must determine the type and scale of institutional arrangements to be crafted. Institutional reform must provide both general purpose and task-specific governance institutions and such institutions must coexist, interact and overlap as necessary to ensure the efficient and equitable provision of such public goods and services (Frey and Eichenberger (1999).

#### **5.1.4 Objective 3: Ethnic Conflict and Governance**

There was a significant relationship between the state of Ethnic conflict and Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan hence the null hypothesis was rejected. The relationship that exist between Ethnic conflict and extents of good governance in Jonglei State is significantly correlated, (sig.>0.05). This means that Ethnic conflicts influences good governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan and the failure to resolve Ethnic conflicts well, the more poor governance, in relations to their posttraumatic condition, and other necessities as well as cease/failure to operate in the foreseeable future. Although a larger group might make a credible commitment not to abuse a smaller one by power-sharing, guaranteeing a diverse military, or letting the minority hold important economic assets hostage, a shift in one ethnic group's power (especially demographic) makes such commitments break down.

Environmental conflict provides an appropriate lens to explain the traditional aspect of interethnic conflicts in Jonglei. In South Sudan, cattle are crucial assets for all ethnic groups because cattle are 'a primary currency for these groups, representing wealth and social status, and are used for compensation and the

payment of wedding dowries' (Rands and LeRiche 2011:7). Roughly 80 percent of the population depends on cattle grazing to survive, and the livestock industry has been one of the largest sources of employment (Ferrie 2012:5). Because cattle are directly related to the survival of these groups, people often enter territories of other ethnic groups and loot cattle. Not only are looted cattle used for sustaining people's lives, they are also sold in exchange for small arms (Rolandsen and Breidlid 2012:54). Although the primary targets in these clashes were cattle, use of such weapons as protection has increased the human lethality of conflicts.

Although cattle grazing require water and pasture land, not all ethnic groups in Jonglei have access to those resources due to physical as well as geopolitical scarcity. Hence, during dry seasons or periods of drought, those who inhabit arid land migrate with their cattle to territories of other ethnic groups to compete for resources, often resulting in violent conflicts (Richardson 2011). The lack of clarification on ownership has often deadlocked disputes. Additionally, the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan has not yet stipulated the legal framework for pastoralists' grazing rights (Agbor and Taiwo 2012:14). Cattle raiding and interethnic clashes have historically been observed in Jonglei, particularly when the Lou Nuer whose land was often affected by droughts migrated to territories of other ethnic groups, such as the Dinka and the Murle, in search of water and pasture for cattle grazing (Rands & LeRiche 2011:7). The empirical observations also suggest that the areas where the migrants and the hosts confront each other often became conflict sites (Omondi 2011:6). Migration of the Lou Nuer has thus been a trigger of interethnic clashes in Jonglei for centuries.

#### **5.1.5 Ethnic Conflict theory of Lake and Rothschild (1996)**

The ethnic conflict theory of Lake and Rothschild, (1996) was proved right. it states that, when ethnic groups come to fear for their future (physical) security, they prepare for conflict, thus initiating a security dilemma. Several things can cause such a fear to develop, such as a decline in cultural security or past experience with

conflict. The factor that Lake and Rothchild dwell on the most is rising anarchy, essentially a Hobbesian argument: as the Leviathan (the state) declines (becomes unable to prevent conflict), ethnic groups fear that their physical security may be at risk. Thus presence on ethnic conflicts influences governance in Jonglei state, South Sudan

## **5.2 Conclusion**

The main objectives of the study were, Jonglei is a site of a violent system of conflict that has produced profound human tragedies.

### **5.2.1 State of Ethnic conflict in Jonglei state.**

While the conflict that rages there bears similarities to conflicts elsewhere in Africa, each conflict warrants careful studies that uncover its special features and reveal clues as to how its challenges can be addressed. Understanding the context, actors and incentives that drive each conflict is of critical importance in the search for solutions. A complex system of conflict such as that which has unfolded in the region cannot be addressed in whole through atomistic state-centered prescriptions. Neither can such conflict system be resolved through a quick-fix solution. As a regional conflict system with global aspects, much more than a local solution is needed. Conflict resolution and the establishment of order in the area require nothing short of the reconstitution of complex configurations of self-governing orders from the level of villages to regional levels. This is a momentous task that cannot be accomplished without a properly coordinated and sustained international effort.

The study concludes that the problem of the conflict is also attributed to cattle raiding and child abduction and has been tried several times in Jonglei state and the government had done enough to stop the conflict of cattle raiding and child abduction due to the fact that the government had disarmed some communities leaving other communities with guns hence causing panic and fear among the communities whose guns had been taken away, the government had failed to use local leaders of the notorious communities and the government failed to initiate

development programs to engage the communities by transforming their ways of living.

### **5.2.2 Extent of governance in Jonglei state, South Sudan**

The humanitarian and governance effects of the conflict in Jonglei are significant. Bor town was almost entirely destroyed in the first round of fighting. According to one report, at least 2,500 people were killed in Bor in the first three weeks of the crisis, and numerous accounts indicate revenge killings along ethnic lines.

Most state government officials departed soon after the conflict began, and only now have begun to trickle back in. On 28 January, the Jonglei Director for Relief and Rehabilitation stated that local authorities had collected some 500 bodies. On 4 February, the Mayor of Bor announced that government authorities had buried more than one hundred bodies in a mass grave, and that more such burials were likely to follow. UN investigations also revealed similar graves or openly exposed bodies around Bor town, which remained deserted. On 26 February, the paramount chief of Duk County was abducted by rebel forces supposedly for criticizing their actions in the county. According to media reports, dozens of people were killed or injured in Duk county, and thousands displaced from Duk to Twic East county towards the end of March.

### **5.2.3 Ethnic Conflict and governance in Jonglei, South Sudan.**

The study concludes that decline in standards of living, children having to flee their villages in fear of being abducted and recruited by the rebels, shortage of money due to displacement by civil wars, poverty since cows were the only source of livelihood among the communities such as Dinka and scaring away investors thus affecting the economy of the country were the economic impacts that children and women had on the economy of the county, state and country.

Further, lack of investment activities in the area due to insecurity, lack of schools, roads and hospitals and people not cultivate their land due to insecurity

were the development impacts on the economy of the country while loss of hope of better things in the future due to these situations, mistrust on the government by the citizens, parents of the abducted child being frustrated because there was no hope of seeing their child again and people who had lost their loved ones and their wealth being psychologically affected were the psychological impacts of the people of Jonglei state.

In conclusion, the preservation of ethnic peace (or its breakdown) is dependent upon the type and effectiveness of the available conflict management mechanisms and also the respective government's policy choices and decisions. Secondly, the use of constitutional conflict management tools has the potential to create lasting peace. This was more evident in Jonglei, where the government created the foundation for a thriving civil society, accountability and government transparency. In Jonglei state however, the undemocratic 2014/2015 federal constitution lacks the support of the citizens. The constitution was drafted by military dictators and handed over to the people. It has not gone far enough to resolve the problems of ethnicity that have dogged the country since independence. Civil liberty groups are currently campaigning for a new constitution. Ethnic conflicts arose as a result of the denial of the basic human needs of access, Identity autonomy, security and equality, compounded by the autocratic roles played by the government and the military. Furthermore, the violent conflicts in Jonglei resulted in a more distorted pattern of governance, which led to further denial of basic needs to the masses. Conflict management is more effective if a government is devoid of corruption. In tune with John Burton's theory, this is the only way to satisfy people's basic needs.

Ethno-religious conflicts in Jonglei have continued because South Sudan elites are corrupt and split along lines of religion and ethnicity. This has resulted in ethnic rivalry, suspicion and hostility among leaders. Without a bold and articulate leadership, conflict management or prevention will always be a mirage. The unequal power structure that exists in a state system could kick-off ethnic conflicts. In the event of the state structure being in the hands of a particular ethnic group, the dominant-subordinate group fights for power-sharing for societal rewards and goods

manifest themselves in ethnic terms. However, inequality in power-sharing need not always lead to ethnic conflicts. Few preconditions exist for such conflicts; a socially mobilised population; the existence of a pool of symbols connoting its distinctiveness; the selection, standardization and transmission of such symbol pools to the community by the leadership; and a reference group in relation to whom a sense of relative deprivation (real or imaginary) is aggregated.<sup>1</sup> Also, the spatial and numerical components of an ethnic group condition towards ethnic conflict. The larger the number of people of a particular groups in an area, the greater the potential for demand articulation and aggregation. Ethnic conflicts also make their emergence because of accumulated fears about the future and after long experience in the past of various types.

## **5.3 Recommendations**

### **5.3.1 Objective 1: Ethnic Conflict**

Regarding ethnic conflict, it was recommended that; Equitable sharing of resources, Strengthening local administration, Empowerment of traditional leadership, Government to treat all communities equally, Governor should visit all communities regularly, Creation of new counties and states as discussed, Location of state capital to central areas should be discussed, Provision of judges and public prosecutors; construction of courts in the counties, Upgrading of unqualified civil servants through capacity-building, compensation of salaries to chiefs. While issues of inclusive governance and equity are important drivers of conflict, these statements highlight complex and in some cases long-standing governance-related issues which largely went beyond the mandate of the peace conference. Political accommodation provides people with an approach to tackle these governance issues directly.

The government needs to sit with the rebel leaders and finalize a strong documentation of the peace talks which can be evidenced by an external country or peace keeping body and enforced through a strong legal framework on the rights of the people that will stop further attacks by either the government or the rebels.

Government of the Republic of South Sudan and state government should encourage its citizens to diversify in other economic activities like farming and mining apart from cattle keeping which is the only source of livelihood among the pastoral communities such as the Dinka, Lou Nuer and Murle of Jonglei state. This will reduce or eliminate cattle raiding and child abduction and prevent further killings and loss of innocent lives. Further the governments should enhance security to enable more investment activities in the area, like the building of schools, roads and hospitals to provide social amenities to the citizens of Jonglei state.

The government undertakes further possible solutions. Such as the former peace initiative that was underway since 2011 and 2012 which was to be taken as a basis of future peace initiatives. The Vice-President Riek Machar Teny and advisor to the president on peace issues Mr. Ismail Kony were the first delegates to reach Likuangule and stop the youth of Lou Nuer from moving towards the destruction of the Murle villages.

Government should disarm all communities since leaving other communities with guns, while others do not have, would cause panic and fear among the communities whose guns had been taken away. The government should also use local leaders of the notorious communities to preach peace and the government should initiate development programs to engage the communities by transforming their ways of life to enable them produce food by providing to the communities.

Authorities in Jonglei state should implement law and order instead of condemning the raids when the community members had been raided or abducted. The state has now become lawlessness therefore the study recommends to provide more and tough security measures by strengthening the police with the mobility, communication equipments, marking of animals to prevent them from being stolen, chiefs and local administrators should be empowered so that they can take the necessary measures against such crimes, they should build roads to link the counties for more interaction.

Government digging of more boreholes and water resources to shorten the distance of nomads to water their animals instead of travelling long distances to look for pasture

### **5.3.2 Objective 2: Governance**

Political accommodation brings a unique approach to addressing the governance-related drivers of Jonglei's conflicts and building peace because it: Offers a framework and choices for developing governance arrangements which reflect the diversity of Jonglei's communities, without undermining pre-existing informal and nonhierarchical governance arrangements. Links choices on governance arrangements back to people's interests. Creates incentives for potential belligerents to engage in political dialogue, Provides a voice for groups in remote areas previously in a "governance vacuum" and excluded from socio-economic opportunities. Establishes a "safety net" at the local level such that minority parties engage foremost in political interactions to pursue their needs

To think about the power sharing aspect in a realistic way, who will be sharing the power? To look at the case of Jonglei state, there are about 20 languages spoken and several different religions practised, not to mention the various distinct tribal groups. Here, if power sharing is to be done to the satisfaction of all different ethnic, religious, caste, tribal and linguistic identities, millions of people would have to be accommodated in various state structures. Hence, power sharing does not seem to offer any viable solution at all.

Inculcate regional autonomy and federation into the state system which would enable local and regional authorities with a degree of autonomous power and authority.

Decentralization, states, regional autonomy and federalism have been tried as part of conflict negotiations in Sudan, Angola and South Africa, with quite a success.

Another way to bring out some amicable solution to these conflicts is through external intervention. The response of states involved in conflicts to external intervention varies from state to state. South Sudan states have not been so

appreciative of the whole idea of state intervention. Juba and Jonglei have not allowed foreign organizations or countries to find a solution to their internal conflicts like those of the Nuer tribal's, and Dinka. Among the South Sudan states, only Jonglei has been open to a partial mediation by international community in its IGAD problem.

With the number of ethnic conflicts increasing in the present times, opportunities for international organizations and other states to intervene in the internal problems of a state have gone high. External interventions have two primary effects. First, intervention can alter the internal balance of ethnic power and lead groups to moderate their demands. The second primary effect of intervention is to provide guarantees for new ethnic contracts between the warring parties, at least during an interim period.

The demobilized persons should be equipped with skills agriculture, carpentry, blacksmith and modern ways of livestock farming which will improve their livelihoods. The government should also compensate the families that have been affected by cattle raids and use all forces to recover the children and women who had been abducted.

It was further recommends awareness to the local population on the dangers of illegal arms in the area and possession of illegal fire arms. The peaceful disarmament to the local population that will help in restoration and peaceful co-existence of peace in the area is also very important.

### **5.3.3 Objective 3: Ethnic Conflict Vs. Governance**

There is need to emphasized the importance of public participation in governance processes of their states (Jonglei).

Women and youth face particular challenges to public participation. Several participants stressed the importance of youth participation in safeguarding long term governance arrangements.

Let chiefs play a meaningful role if they have judicial powers, and the judiciary should be decentralized and full powers returned to the chiefs.

There is need to put across concern that county councilors would further reduce the powers of the traditional authorities. Some feared that local government law might not be relevant to the local context.

Participants emphasized that transfers of resources needed to be more equitable. They expressed preference for a formula for fiscal transfers that took account of population size and geographical area. Some saw the lack of adequate resources to Jonglei as a direct cause of security challenges.

Many feel that decentralization has not been effectively implemented, and the implementation of the Local Government Act has been slow and partial.

Regarding executive, The Jonglei State Council of Ministers needs to be representative of the diversity of the State. Some felt that the immunities for state ministers undermine legal processes.

Interventionist should raise concerns about the independence of the state legislative assembly, and that it appears to play too passive a role alongside the executive.

The state authority when it comes to commissioners should be directly elected, in accordance with the Local Government Act.

#### **5.4 Areas for further research**

The research suggests that another study in other states in for instance Greater Upper Nile, Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Western and Eastern Equatorial be conducted to comprehensively document the affected children indimensions of; age, tribe, gender, tribe, occupation, education, forced marriage, health facilities, number of years in the province, and status of the parents. This will expound, draw comprehensive recommendation and enrich the findings in South Sudan.

Also study is conducted to identify the influence of International Communities and political stability in South Sudan.

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**APPENDICES**  
**APPENDIX 1A: TRANSMITTAL LETTER FROM COLLEGE OF HIGHER DEGREES AND RESEARCH**



**KAMPALA  
INTERNATIONAL  
UNIVERSITY**

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P.O. Box 20000, Kampala, Uganda.  
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Website: [www.kiu.ac.ug](http://www.kiu.ac.ug)

**College Of Education, Open and Distance e-Learning**  
*Office of the Principal*

18<sup>th</sup> September, 2016

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

Dear Sir/Madam,

**SUBJECT: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH STUDY IN YOUR ORGANIZATION**

With reference to the above subject, this is to certify that **Mr. JOSEPH GIBILL ISAAC LOMERI** Reg. No. **MPA/42428/141/DF** is a bonafide student of Kampala International University pursuing a Masters Degree in Public Administration. He is currently conducting a field research entitled, **"Ethic Conflicts and Governance in South Sudan: Case Study of Jonglei State, South Sudan."**

This area has been identified as a valuable source of information pertaining to his research project. The purpose of this letter therefore is to request you to avail him with the pertinent information as regards to his study.

Any data shared with him will be used for academic purposes only and shall be kept with utmost confidentiality.

Any assistance rendered to him will be highly appreciated.

Yours truly,

**SSEMUGENYI FRED (PhD)**

**Principal -College of Education Open and Distance e-Learning**

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Email: [ssemugenyifred@yahoo.com](mailto:ssemugenyifred@yahoo.com)

*"Exploring Heights"*

## APPENDIX 1B: ACCEPTANCE LETTER FROM THE RESPONDENT


REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
MINISTRY OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
JONGLEI STATE - BOR


**DATE: 25<sup>th</sup>/09/2015**

**TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN**

**Subject: - Acceptance Letter**

Reference to the above cited subject, the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure has accepted **Mr./ Joseph Gibril Isaac Lomeri** to conduct his research on **Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in South Sudan A Case Study of Jonglei State**, so we wish him good luck everywhere within the state territory in doing that important research studies.

Regards,  
  
Andrew D. Malek Lomeri  
For/ 1st Director General  
State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure  
Jonglei State / Bor



**APPENDIX III: INSTRUMENTATIONS**  
**KAMPALA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, COLLEGE OF HIGHER DEGREES AND RESEARCH**

---

Dear Sir/Madam,  
Greetings!

I Joseph Gibril Isaac Lomeri a candidate for a Masters' Degree in Public Administration at the College of Higher Degrees and Research of Kampala International University with a Thesis proposal on, "***Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan***"

As I pursue this academic prerequisite, may I request your assistance by being part of this study?

Kindly provide the most suitable information as indicated in the questionnaires and please do not leave any item unanswered. Any data from you shall be for academic purposes only and will be kept with utmost confidentiality.

May I retrieve the questionnaires two days after you receive them?

Thank you very much in advance,

Yours faithfully,

Joseph Gibril Isaac Lomeri  
(RESEARCHER)

---

**INFORMED CONSENT**

I am giving my consent to be part of the research study carried out by Joseph Gibril Isaac that will focus on "***Ethnic Conflicts and Governance in Jonglei State, South Sudan***" I shall be assured of privacy, anonymity and confidentiality and that I will be given the option to refuse participation and right to withdraw my participation any time. I have been informed that the research is voluntary and that the results will be given to me if I request for them.

**Initials**.....

**Date**.....

## APPENDIX IA: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

### Direction:

Please provide information about yourself. Kindly **tick or fill out** in the blank spaces of each option:

Code No \_\_\_\_\_ Date Received by  
Respondent \_\_\_\_\_

### Gender (please Tick):

(1). Male ☐

(2). Female ☐

1. Age of the respondent. 18-25 ☐ 26-35 ☐ 36-45 ☐ 46 ☐ above
2. Marital status of the respondent Single ☐ b. Married ☐ c. Widowed  
d. Divorce/Separated
3. Level of education attained by respondent None b. Primary c. Secondary  
d. Tertiary
4. Religion Catholic Protestant ☐ c. Moslem ☐ d. Born Again ☐
5. Occupation Peasant student Others (specify)
6. Residence Urban ☐ Rural ☐

## APPENDIX IIIB: QUESTIONNAIRE FORETHNIC CONFLICTS

**Instruction:** Please kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements by circling that best reflects. Kindly use the rating guide below:

Tick the right number corresponding with each item.

Respond Mode	Rating	Description	Legend
Strongly Agree	1	Very Good	SA
Agree	2	Good	A
Disagree	3	Moderate	D
Strongly Disagree	4	Fair	SD

NO	The following statements are related to Level of Ethnic Conflict				
	<b>A. Cattle grazing and raids</b>	<b>Rating</b>			
1	Cattle raids continue to be a leading source of violent conflict in Jonglei state	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
2	Cattle are an indicator of social standing and wealth, often used for restorative justice and marriage practices.	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
3	Raiding is intimately tied into social norms, masculine ideals and the need to accumulate cattle to marry	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
4	Deaths resulting from these raids have risen accordingly	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
5	cattle raiding between Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan has become an organized criminal activity that feeds into illicit meat markets	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
	<b>B. Environmental conflicts</b>				
6	Internal displacement is an outcome of the South Sudan Conflict	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
7	Loss of life/Death is another consequence of South Sudan Conflict	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
8	Conflict has resorted civilians into migration	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
9	Hunger has also been experienced in the country.	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
10	Diseases and epidemic outbreak has been experienced in the country.	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
	<b>c. Ethnic security Dilemma</b>				
11	Loss of agricultural production in the country	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
12	Low export earnings in the country	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
13	Low investment both internally and externally	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
14	High expenditure on defense	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
15	Infrastructural destruction in the country.	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
	<b>D. Disarmament and grab of power</b>				
16	civilian disarmament are seen as equitable and a serious commitment is made to provide adequate security alternatives	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
17	cattle raiding in Jonglei is a polemic example of an issue that affects the entire country and many other African states	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
18	Until communities are confident that the SPLA and the police will protect them they are unlikely to surrender their guns.	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>

19	Reports of rape and torture further enraged Murle youth and drove them deeper into the bush	1	2	3	4
20	The SPLA battalion responsible for disarmament in Pibor was largely composed of Nuer and Dinka officers, who took the opportunity to take revenge for earlier cattle raids on their communities by members of the Murle community.	1	2	3	4
	<b>E. State's political capacity</b>				
21	There is a dialogue within and between Dinka, Nuer and Murle communities to address recent violence and prevent relations from deteriorating further	1	2	3	4
22	communities increasingly felt that dialogue is being used as a substitute for state intervention to protect lives	1	2	3	4
23	Jonglei Peace Process succeeded in bringing about a temporary cessation of violence	1	2	3	4
24	Health, education and water and sanitation services have been disrupted /destroyed, and international organizations are unwilling or unable to increase their presence in insecure areas	1	2	3	4
25	The state has ability to meet its responsibility to protect its citizens from potentially genocidal violence.	1	2	3	4
	<b>F. Religious Issues</b>				
26	Religious factors are the major causes of the current conflict in South Sudan	1	2	3	4
27	The Presbyterian Church is the main religious organization in Lou Nuer and Murle areas, and Catholics and Anglicans have very little presence.	1	2	3	4
28	Struggle for power is the major cause of the current conflict in South Sudan	1	2	3	4
29	Influential issues have contributed to the conflict in South Sudan	1	2	3	4
30	Poverty and famine have caused the conflict in South Sudan	1	2	3	4
	<b>G. Abduction</b>				
31	Scarcity of central government authority, security, development and justice mechanisms	1	2	3	4
32	Rival groups in Jonglei have a long history of raiding each another's cattle, and arming themselves to defend against such raids	1	2	3	4
33	The civil war led to a massive increase of small arms as both Khartoum and the then-rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) mobilized various communities, fomenting localized proxy conflicts	1	2	3	4
34	Jonglei become a breeding ground for armed non-state actors and organized crime, as demonstrated by the recent arrest of criminal groups involved in money counterfeiting in South Sudan	1	2	3	4
35	clashes have evolved from targeting only armed youths to attacking - or abducting - any members of a rival community, including women, children and the elderly	1	2	3	4

***Thank you for your valuable time and cooperation***

## APPENDIX IIIC: QUESTIONNAIRE TO DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF GOVERNANCE

**Direction:** Please write your preferred option on the space provided before each item. Kindly use the rating guide below:

Tick the right number corresponding with each item.

Respond Mode	Rating	Description	Legend
Strongly Agree	1	Very Good	SA
Agree	2	Good	A
Disagree	3	Moderate	D
Strongly Disagree	4	Fair	SD

	Level of governance	Rating			
	<b>A. Public participation and Democracy</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
1	Lack of services and political representation	1	2	3	4
2	concentration of cattle in the hands of the politically connected elite	1	2	3	4
3	lack of civilian governance structures and suspicion of government	1	2	3	4
4	Local intercommunal conflict is often part and parcel of national political contestation and supported by politicians	1	2	3	4
5	There has been even attacks during independence ceremonies	1	2	3	4
	<b>B. Legislative branch</b>				
6	Our legislative branch makes and enacts laws that accommodate all tribes in Jonglei	1	2	3	4
7	Our executive branch carries out laws without discrimination	1	2	3	4
8	our judicial branch interpret laws, apply the law as necessary, and rule on the constitutionality of laws accommodating all customs	1	2	3	4
9	our judicial branch evaluates and interprets laws	1	2	3	4
10	Our legislative branch introduces and enacting legislation, confirming or rejecting appointments by the president and declaring war without prejudice.	1	2	3	4
	<b>C. Executive and rule of Law</b>				
11	The checks and balances system in place among the branches of the Jonglei	1	2	3	4
12	the President appoint members of the National Legislative Assembly from all tribes	1	2	3	4
13	the President appoint equal members of the Council of States from all regions	1	2	3	4
14	The vice president, Cabinet and other agencies serve in more supporting and advisory roles putting all aspects of service delivery in the community	1	2	3	4
15	Our executive branch of a government implement and execute laws passed by the legislative branch of government and interpret ambiguous laws	1	2	3	4

	<b>D. Traditional &amp; customary arrangement</b>				
16	traditional leaders should be supported to work with their communities to change attitudes and improve relations with local government actors	1	2	3	4
17	Political accommodation brings a unique approach to addressing the governance-related drivers of Jonglei's conflicts and building peace	1	2	3	4
18	Offers a framework and choices for developing governance arrangements which reflect the diversity of Jonglei's communities, without undermining pre-existing informal and nonhierarchical governance arrangements.	1	2	3	4
19	Links choices on governance arrangements back to people's interests.	1	2	3	4
20	Provides a voice for groups in remote areas previously in a "governance vacuum" and excluded from socio-economic opportunities	1	2	3	4
	<b>E. Transparency and accountability</b>				
21	little has been done to implement resolutions related to services, security, protection, justice and accountability	1	2	3	4
22	The provision of assistance to Murle communities targeted in recent raiding has caused resentment in neighbouring communities, who perceive that they have not received the same level of support	1	2	3	4
23	Given the high levels of need most organisations have had to focus primarily on crisis response, rather than support for conflict mitigation and prevention	1	2	3	4
24	Capacity-building, both in terms of training and logistical support, is sorely needed in security provision, and local civil society	1	2	3	4
25	thousands of women and children were abducted; yet, despite nine years of UN human rights presence, there has been little international monitoring	1	2	3	4
	<b>F. Human Security</b>				
26	Unusual weather patterns and flooding affected an additional 201,000 people in Jonglei during the rainy season	1	2	3	4
27	Food insecurity has increased dramatically across much of the state, with particularly severe effects in Akobo and Pibor	1	2	3	4
28	Few agencies are present in the affected area and their capacity to scale up the response is low	1	2	3	4
29	Prepositioning of stocks is difficult and response times have accordingly been slow.	1	2	3	4
30	Staff turnover is high and staff presence sporadic, making it difficult to base responses on a good understanding of the context, and without proper Do No Harm analysis what activities are undertaken risk contributing to tensions between communities	1	2	3	4

***Thank you for your valuable time and cooperation***

## **APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDE**

1. What do you know about the conflict in South Sudan?

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2. What are the effects of the violence like cattle raids?

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3. Why were civilians not better protected? what is the State's political capacity

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4. What is being done to prevent Ethnic Conflict?

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5. What is your take on the causes of the conflict?

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6. What do you think are the impacts of the conflict?

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7. What are the effects of the conflict?

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8. What are the consequences of the conflict to the country's economy?

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9. What are the effects of the conflict to the neighboring countries?

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10.What are the effects of the conflict to the civilians of the country?

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11.What are the measures to be taken to prevent the conflict?

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12.What are the indicators of the calamities caused by the conflict?

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13.How can the country abstain from future conflicts?

.....  
.....  
.....

***Thank you for your valuable time and cooperation***

# APPENDIXV: THE ADOPTED TIME FRAME OF THE STUDY

TASK	Weeks											
	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>	6 <sup>th</sup>	7 <sup>th</sup>	8 <sup>th</sup>	9 <sup>th</sup>	10 <sup>th</sup>	11 <sup>th</sup>	12 <sup>th</sup>
Read literature												
Finalize objectives												
Draft literature review												
Devise research approach												
Review secondary data												
Organize survey												
Develop survey questions												
Conduct survey												
Analyze secondary and primary data												
Evaluate data												
Draft findings chapter												
Complete remaining chapters												
Submit to tutor and await feedback												
Revise draft and format for submission												
Print, bind												
Submit												


**Source:** Private Arrangement with the supervisor(2016)

**APPENDIX VI: THE ADOPTED BUDGET FOR THE STUDY.**

<b>NO.</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>QUANTITY</b>	<b>UNIT COST</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>Stationery</b>			
	A) 3 Ream of Photocopying Paper	3	8,500	25500
	B) 1 Ream Ruled Paper	1	7,000	7,000
	C) 5 Floppy Diskettes	5	1,000	5,000
	D) 6 Bic Pens	6	200	1,200
	E) 1 Flash Disk of 2.0 GB	1	28000	35,000
	F) 6 Pencils	6	100	600
	<b>Sub Total</b>			<b>224,300</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>Secretarial Services</b>			
	A) Typesetting		35,000	35,000
	B) Photocopying		15,000	15,000
	C) Binding	3 copies	15,000	45,000
	D) Printing	100 per page	1500	150,000
<b>3.</b>	<b>Travel Costs</b>			
	(a) Distribution of questionnaire			<b>150,000</b>
	(b) Collection of questionnaire			<b>150,000</b>
	<b>Sub Total</b>			<b>295000</b>
<b>4.</b>	<b>Data Treatment and Analysis</b>			
	a) Literature Collection			40,000
	b) coding			90,000
	c) interpreting and analysis			300,000
	d)Appointment schedules			40,000
	<b>Subtotal</b>			<b>290000</b>
	<b>Grand total</b>			<b>1,002,300</b>

**Source:** Private Savings (2016)

# APPENDIX VIIA: MAP OF SUDAN SHOWING THE STUDY AREAS (JONGLEI) CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE



## APPENDIX VIIB: MAP OF JONGLEI SHOWING THE MAJOR CLASHES AND AREAS OF CONTROL UPPER NILE STATE

